WI Red Army retreats to the Stalin Line

Why wouldn't it be easier for the Soviets to build defenses in time of peace, when they can do what they want and use what forces they desire than prior to Operation Citadel, when they are already at war and therefore most of the Red Army must stay on alert in that area on on the other fronts with Nazi Germany?
I think it is time to quote all-knowing Wikipedia (one source I'm extremely suspicious of, but if it sings praise to Russian or Soviet deeds, it is always telling the truth, that with legions of Russophobe, Antisoviet and Anticommunist editors working with smooth unison to deny USSR any questionnable claims achievements and only keeping those impossible to question):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Citadel#Soviet_plans
The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to prepare, and with every passing day, they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended areas on Earth. Two Fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines, and the Steppe Front was available as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million land mines and dug about 5000 km (3000 mi) of trenches, to a depth of 175 km (95 mi). In addition, they massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft. This amounted to 26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft and 46% of its tanks
This all had been built to defend "200 km (120mi) wide and 150 km (90mi) deep Soviet-held salient". Now, you can use a calculator to estimate number of troops and equipment needed to build and man something comparable from Klaipeda (Murmansk, really) to Odessa... And I hope I don't divulge Great Military Secret, but Wehrmacht did broke through Soviet defence in Kursk. But it was a Pyrrhic victory, followed by an immediate Soviet counter-blow.

Nobody is saying fortifications are useless. But anyone declaring them useful for anything more than to delay infantry for a week is daydreaming. Purpose-built fortresses defending small extremely important pieces of real estate (Navy bases) are exceptions, but even Superpower America never possessed nearly enough resources to built something comparable to Sevastopol along Soviet border.
 
I think it is time to quote all-knowing Wikipedia (one source I'm extremely suspicious of, but if it sings praise to Russian or Soviet deeds, it is always telling the truth, that with legions of Russophobe, Antisoviet and Anticommunist editors working with smooth unison to deny USSR any questionnable claims achievements and only keeping those impossible to question):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Citadel#Soviet_plans
This all had been built to defend "200 km (120mi) wide and 150 km (90mi) deep Soviet-held salient". Now, you can use a calculator to estimate number of troops and equipment needed to build and man something comparable from Klaipeda (Murmansk, really) to Odessa... And I hope I don't divulge Great Military Secret, but Wehrmacht did broke through Soviet defence in Kursk. But it was a Pyrrhic victory, followed by an immediate Soviet counter-blow.

Nobody is saying fortifications are useless. But anyone declaring them useful for anything more than to delay infantry for a week is daydreaming. Purpose-built fortresses defending small extremely important pieces of real estate (Navy bases) are exceptions, but even Superpower America never possessed nearly enough resources to built something comparable to Sevastopol along Soviet border.

tell that to the corps that patton assigned to take metz. fortifications or fortified lines are effective if they are well manned and sited for all round defense. the mannerhiem line in finland seems to demonstrate this. It had 109 reinforced concrete structures along its front and well equipped competent infantry manning it.

If the Stalin line was well sited and manned with strong reserves behind it, it would be hard to crack. The Germans in particular lacked the necessary mobile heavy artillery to crush a fortified place or city. It was a time consuming process for them to bring up their line infantry divisions and their heavy guns and time was their biggest enemy in 1941
 
A more interesting scenario would be the lack of commercial agreements between SU and Germany.
But anyhow-the discussion focused on ability of Stalin Line to be succesfull defence.
However....what effect would be moving Soviet units from eastern Poland on their encirclement, capture of supplies, ammo ?
 
tell that to the corps that patton assigned to take metz.
Are you talking about the Metz, which had been fortified since at least 1850 non-stop? Brest was resisting for a month, but did it affect German advance? Not really.

the mannerhiem line in finland seems to demonstrate this.
I guess you have to educate yourself on a difference between Ukrainian plains and Karelian swamps. And Mannerheim Line had been breached twice, in 1939 and 1944 (second time it took Red Army something like 10 days).

If the Stalin line was well sited and manned with strong reserves behind it, it would be hard to crack. The Germans in particular lacked the necessary mobile heavy artillery to crush a fortified place or city.
I beg you to read my response to Chife. I posted some data there what this much ballyhooed Stalin Line really was, and you might conclude for yourself how serious barrier it was. You have to also keep in mind that 1941 was an abnormal year as far as weather is concerned. Summer was much drier than anything within previous century, turning normally impenetrable swamps into tank highways. Wehrmacht usd it to it's full advantage. Then autumn came in with incredible amount of rain and early frosts, turning roads into mud pools. It was Red Army's turn to use a natural advantage...
 
I guess you have to educate yourself on a difference between Ukrainian plains and Karelian swamps.

You got a point there, over 70% of all terrain near the Mannerheim Line defences was forest or swamp. Of course, the line was specifically designed to utilize the natural obstacles found on the Isthmus - for a big part because most of it was not very strongly fortified to begin with. In fact, most of the lenght of this much-vaunted line was simple trenches with logs for protection and barbed wire to slow down the enemy. Most sectors had mostly just some bunkers with machine gun positions for infantry support: artillery was sparse, though at the both ends the 132 km line was anchored on coastal forts that could use their large-caliber guns to support the nearest sector on land too.

The Finns had benefits during the Winter War that the Soviets would not have. The defence could be very static, and plans were made allowing possible withdrawal to new defensive positions on a similar South-West/North-East axis along the Isthmus. Because the war would be decided here, they could concentrate the big majority of their best troops on a small area (a Division per 25 km or so). For the attacker the Isthmus acts as a natural funnel making a war of manouver with large formations very hard, in addition to the terrain limiting mobility. Thus the meat grinder effect witnessed by the advancing Red Army troops of 1939 vintage, accentuated by their poor co-ordination between infantry, armor and artillery.

Such possibility would not present itself in the wide open spaces of the Ukraine, for example.

And Mannerheim Line had been breached twice, in 1939 and 1944 (second time it took Red Army something like 10 days).

During the Winter War it took the Red Army 2 months to breach the line, inept leadership being the biggest reason the defense could hold on even this long. In 1944, there was no "Mannerheim line" as such, because a big part of it had been dismantled by Soviet military engineers in 1940-41 and only some surviving fortifications were used for the last, temporary defensive lines. You are thinking of the "Main Line" more south along the Isthmus. Now, of course, the Red Army was a whole different beast and on the Isthmus the Finns had less than half the number of men in comparison to 1939 (initially, 75 000 Finns against 450 000 Soviets).
 
Citadel is unique as both sides knew from at least spring 1943 that it would be the next big thing and Soviets spent months preparing. Besides, you just can't build and man Citadel-like defence from Klaipeda to Odessa without having a billon soldiers at your disposal. And, last but not least, 1943 Red Army was NOT 1941 Red Army. This is huge, I can't stress it enough.
The Germans can't go through the Pripet Marshes so the Red Army only has to worry about the north and south flanks of the marshes. That wont take *a billion soldiers*. The Red Army of 1941 had a lot of experienced long service soldiers who gone into the bag during the big encirclements. They could've been better used if Stalin simply put them in a better position to fight from.
 
Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of mankind
-Napoleon
picard-facepalm.jpg
 
During the Winter War it took the Red Army 2 months to breach the line, inept leadership being the biggest reason the defense could hold on even this long
I would say that 2 months passed between 1st (unsuccessful) attack and the attack which did breach the line. It wasn't like 2 months of non-stop high-intensity action.

In 1944, of course, the Red Army was a whole different beast and on the Isthmus the Finns had less than half the number of men in comparison to 1939 (initially, 75 000 Finns against 450 000 Soviets).
That's the other difference I'm talking about. I don't know how much better Red Army of 1944 was than Wehrmacht of 1941 (or was it better at all), but we can safely say that those were in the same league and Red Army in 1941 was in a league beyond that. So, if it took Red Army that short to breach Finnish defenses in defender's paradise of Isthmus, Stalin line would not be that impenetrable for Wehrmacht in 1941.

The Germans can't go through the Pripet Marshes so the Red Army only has to worry about the north and south flanks of the marshes.
As I said, 1941 was abnormally dry and a lot of much-feared marches turned into dry meadows. Wehrmacht's Vyazma success, for example, owns this dryness a lot, they just went around Red Army flanks through marches that were impassable before and after that (it dried up only once since 1941, in 1972).

The Red Army of 1941 had a lot of experienced long service soldiers who gone into the bag during the big encirclements.
Good well-motivated soldiers don't sit in cauldrons for too long. They break through or slip through (German units did it repeatedly in 1941-1942).

They could've been better used if Stalin simply put them in a better position to fight from.
Used somewhat more effectively? Yes. Change the course of war? More likely not, although I wish they could.
 
I would say that 2 months passed between 1st (unsuccessful) attack and the attack which did breach the line. It wasn't like 2 months of non-stop high-intensity action.

You can say that. But the lull after the first attack was used for a near-complete overhaul, reorganization and strengthening of the Soviet armies on the Isthmus front, involving large troop transfers not only from the rear to the front but also along it. This, obviously, could not be achieved simultaneously with a ongoing, "high-intensity" attack against the Finnish defense.

Given that this reorganization was needed for achieving success later, it is very much appropriate to say that the fixed defensive line, however imperfect, did hold the Red Army back for two months. If the fresh Finnish troops had to greet the Soviets, superior in numbers and firepower, without any prepared fortifications or trenches, the organization and composition of the attacking troops would have not needed reconsideration or far-reaching changes during the operation and the length of the hostilities could have been measured in weeks rather than months.

That's the other difference I'm talking about. I don't know how much better Red Army of 1944 was than Wehrmacht of 1941 (or was it better at all), but we can safely say that those were in the same league and Red Army in 1941 was in a league beyond that. So, if it took Red Army that short to breach Finnish defenses in defender's paradise of Isthmus, Stalin line would not be that impenetrable for Wehrmacht in 1941.

I agree with you on the general gist of the argument, but I think it is important to remember that the fact that Finnish troops were driven quickly back from the initial defensive positions on the southern Isthmus in 1944 was not only a testament to the penetrability of fixed fortifications by a determined attacker, but was also caused by the Finnish strategic blunder of keeping the majority of troops tied up in Eastern Karelia north of the Ladoga after Spring, even if anyone should have seen that the Isthmus was again going to take the brunt of a possible (and very likely), strong Red Army attack against Finland.
 
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Bearcat

Banned
Soviet soldiers did that plenty of times. The ones who did not manage too slip through usually joined the partisans.

Too often in '41 Stalin ordered tham to 'hold at all costs', leaving them trapped until it was too late.

Allowing his generals the flexibility to trade space for time would be the best change you could make to Stalin's 1941 leadership record.
 
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