No one wanted a Rhine state because they were afraid it would become a French pupet.
Only option was giving it to a great power, the UK and Austria had other areas of interest and the Russians were too far from the Rhine, so the Prussians got the land and became the ones protecting thd door to central Germany.
They were happy for Savoy and Holland to be independent without becoming French puppets.
Austria controled northern Italy só they could block their advance into Italy and Holland got Belgium so that they could serve as the other gatekeeper and to keep France from the Rhine. No one wanted a possibility of having France on the Rhine and Russia had promissed Prussia land in the west in exchange for the majority of their polish lands.
One, the British didn't want an actual great power owning the excellent Dutch ports (which the Netherlands-with-Rhineland might well be); two, the Dutch were at least somewhat suspect allies after the whole Batavian Republic gig; three, integrating Belgium would be trouble enough (and as history proved, too much) for the Netherlands.Then why not give the Rhineland territories to Netherlands instead?
Britain didn't want continental commitments and the hanoverians tended to get rolled over in conflict with serious continental opponents.How about integrating the Rhineland with the British-owned (sort of) Hanoverian territories? Britain could potentially make some concessions elsewhere in exchange for this - preferential trade agreements, or giving up colonies or ports.
Of course, this would create massive complications in 1837, with Queen Victoria's accession - the differing succession laws in Hanover meant that it was split from the British Crown, and if this happened to the Rhineland holdings as well, then that would potentially be a very powerful German state on par with Prussia.
and four, if Prussia doesn't get the Rhineland they would have to get all of Saxony (which would anyway be their first choice).One, the British didn't want an actual great power owning the excellent Dutch ports (which the Netherlands-with-Rhineland might well be); two, the Dutch were at least somewhat suspect allies after the whole Batavian Republic gig; three, integrating Belgium would be trouble enough (and as history proved, too much) for the Netherlands.
Britain didn't want continental commitments and the hanoverians tended to get rolled over in conflict with serious continental opponents.
While the prussians still had a reputation for punching above their weight even if that reputation had taken a hit in the Napoleonic wars.
I said their reputation had taken a hit, not that it had evaporated, most didn't expect them to get whipped by Napoleon they way did .Actualy it was the post-1813 reputation that gave them those lands. The numbers that they gathered in 13-14 and their tenacity at Leipzig, 13-14 and the 100 days was what convinced most that they would be the best to guard the Rhine.
Britain didn't want continental commitments and the hanoverians tended to get rolled over in conflict with serious continental opponents.
While the prussians still had a reputation for punching above their weight even if that reputation had taken a hit in the Napoleonic wars.
You would have to change Prussias contribution, flip flopping worked out fine for Bavaria.The other possibility is that Britain agrees to give up Hanover in order to unite it with the Rhineland, under a sympathetic monarch (another member of the dynasty, perhaps). This could be likely if Prussia was seen as a much less reliable ally due to the part they played in the wars - they left Austria out for the French in 1805, and switched sides due to an army mutiny in 1813 to join the Sixth Coalition. This sort of thing could leave them looking as perfidious as Britain, and not good ally material; Britain and potentially Austria might think a less powerful Rhenish-Hanoverian state a preferable option here. In some ways, Hanover's militarily unthreatening nature might be an asset - Austria's dominance over the German Confederation is confirmed, benefitting them; Britain gets a more reliable ally on the Continent (to do any fighting or German politics for them) and there's a small but significant counterweight against a resurgent France, that can hold them off for long enough for the Quadruple Alliance to form the Eighth Coalition and all pile in against France.
You would have to change Prussias contribution, flip flopping worked out fine for Bavaria.
Well yeah the easiest way to have the Prussians not on the Rhine is to have the Russians get their way and have the Prussians get all of Saxony and lose poznan, if this does ultimately lead to Hanover gaining the Rhineland and they manage to keep and develop it then you get a third significant power in Germany.That is a good point - making Prussia contribute less to the 1813 war would be one way of going about it. There are alternatives, though - one way would be for Prussia to claim all of Saxony at the Congress and for nobody to care too much about the Saxons (maybe if they continued their support for Napoleon for longer, or if more emphasis was placed on it),meaning that everyone feels that Prussia has quite enough land from this.
An interesting alternative would be for the actions of General Yorck - the Prussian general who joined the Russians in 1812, and persuaded the government to follow suit - to be reviled, as an example of treachery driven by nationalism. Metternich could certainly make something of that.
That is a good point - making Prussia contribute less to the 1813 war would be one way of going about it. There are alternatives, though - one way would be for Prussia to claim all of Saxony at the Congress and for nobody to care too much about the Saxons (maybe if they continued their support for Napoleon for longer, or if more emphasis was placed on it),meaning that everyone feels that Prussia has quite enough land from this.
An interesting alternative would be for the actions of General Yorck - the Prussian general who joined the Russians in 1812, and persuaded the government to follow suit - to be reviled, as an example of treachery driven by nationalism. Metternich could certainly make something of that.
I don't see how you could get Yorck reviled, especially considering that his actions were ultimately beneficial.