WI: Prussia doesn’t mobilize for war in 1859?

Prussia mobilized 132,000 men of its military in 1859 to prepare for war with France and Piedmont-Sardinia who were in the process of defeating the Austrians in Italy at the time.

During this mobilization, the Prussian military command realized how woefully ill-equipped and inefficient their mobilization process and army training was, which directly led to their military reforms in the following years that built the Prussian armies that crushed Austria and France in in the 1860s and 1870s.

What if Prussia did not decide to mobilize troops in preparation for war in 1859? Would this lead to no military reforms? How would Prussian politics/diplomacy play out in its quest to unify Germany? Does France end the 1900s as the premier continental European power and do the Bonaparte’s live on?
 
Prussia mobilized 132,000 men of its military in 1859 to prepare for war with France and Piedmont-Sardinia who were in the process of defeating the Austrians in Italy at the time.

During this mobilization, the Prussian military command realized how woefully ill-equipped and inefficient their mobilization process and army training was, which directly led to their military reforms in the following years that built the Prussian armies that crushed Austria and France in in the 1860s and 1870s.

What if Prussia did not decide to mobilize troops in preparation for war in 1859? Would this lead to no military reforms? How would Prussian politics/diplomacy play out in its quest to unify Germany? Does France end the 1900s as the premier continental European power and do the Bonaparte’s live on?
Sooner or later the Prussian army must accept the need for a reorganization. Maybe the opportunity could be a second defeat in the dispute over Schleswig-Holstein in the early 1860s.
OTOH the reform of the army started in 1853-54, as a reaction to the humiliation of Olmutz, although it was mostly concentrated on procuring more advanced rifles and placid some limited orders for Krupp guns.
The chaotic and very slow mobilization of 1859 convinced von Roon of the necessity of getting read of the worst dead wood in the officer corps, although not everyone who should be retired was, and finally the need for a centralized army staff advocated by von Moltke was accepted. Then von Moltke planned how to best use the railways to support his operational plans. It was touch-and-go for a few years, due to the ingrained resistance to change and the usual problems with allocating proper funds for the modernization. Only after the 2nd Danish war proved that von Moltke was right, the reform went at full steam. However in the war of 1866 the general in charge for the western front was pretty resistant to follow to the letter the instruction he received from Berlin, and even in 1870 the commanders of the different army corps were not always obedient enough.
 
Sooner or later the Prussian army must accept the need for a reorganization. Maybe the opportunity could be a second defeat in the dispute over Schleswig-Holstein in the early 1860s.
OTOH the reform of the army started in 1853-54, as a reaction to the humiliation of Olmutz, although it was mostly concentrated on procuring more advanced rifles and placid some limited orders for Krupp guns.
The chaotic and very slow mobilization of 1859 convinced von Roon of the necessity of getting read of the worst dead wood in the officer corps, although not everyone who should be retired was, and finally the need for a centralized army staff advocated by von Moltke was accepted. Then von Moltke planned how to best use the railways to support his operational plans. It was touch-and-go for a few years, due to the ingrained resistance to change and the usual problems with allocating proper funds for the modernization. Only after the 2nd Danish war proved that von Moltke was right, the reform went at full steam. However in the war of 1866 the general in charge for the western front was pretty resistant to follow to the letter the instruction he received from Berlin, and even in 1870 the commanders of the different army corps were not always obedient enough.

Interesting, but a second loss to Denmark might spur some Germanic states to switch allegiance to austria, as Prussia’s loss in the early 60s may lead to them not being as aggressive in diplomacy as in our timeline.
 
Interesting, but a second loss to Denmark might spur some Germanic states to switch allegiance to austria, as Prussia’s loss in the early 60s may lead to them not being as aggressive in diplomacy as in our timeline.
In principle, all the minor German states owe allegiance to Austria, as president of the German Confederation. In 1866, all states contributed troops to the Austrian side, some of them with eagerness (Saxony) and others with much more deliberation. However, if Prussia needed an army reform in order to play on a level field with Austria, the other states needed an army reform to have a minimum of credibility: none of these armies was much better than a glorified honor guard, they had no homogeneity in armament and the field maneuvers that they participated in were more similar to country picnics than training exercises. Which was perfectly fine for Austria (the Austrians did not want anyone to get ideas) and for Prussia too.
The real danger in a second defeat is that it could be ruinous for the careers of three key men: Bismarck, von Roon and von Moltke. Therefore I may have to rephrase my concept a bit: the 2nd Danish war is still won by the German Confederation, but with much higher losses and a significant amount of chaos ;)
 
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