WI: President Roosevelt wants (to liberate) the Channel Islands in 1942?

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What if, in 1942, President Roosevelt becomes convinced that the Western Allies should liberate the Channel Islands in 1942 (no Operation Torch is to take place) as a trial of American troops, to test equipment and tactics, and ultimately to provide forward bases and as a major step towards a landing in and the liberation of France?
President Roosevelt is assumed to have made his mind up on this in June 1942, when the Germans and Italians recapture Tobruk. He tells Churchill that Congress will obstruct him as much as possible on any American actions in North Africa in the light of current British failures there and that he has no desire to spend political capital in the face of such opposition.
How soon would the British and Americans be able to attempt an invasion/liberation of the Channel Islands and with what chances of success? (If possible, Churchill will try to ensure nothing is to be taken from the 8th Army in North Africa which would have been historically there until March 1943, due to ongoing fighting with Rommel.)
 
Talk about your limited objectives, hardly seems worth while. Only be testing amphibious tactics and techniques, not really any of the more pedestrian elements of modern warfare. Pretty sure Winnie would Pooh-Pooh the idea...
 
Talk about your limited objectives, hardly seems worth while. Only be testing amphibious tactics and techniques, not really any of the more pedestrian elements of modern warfare. Pretty sure Winnie would Pooh-Pooh the idea...
Winston is assumed to have been told that unless he wants to land in France itself, it is the only military adventure in or adjacent to Europe that the US will consider.
Winston is assumed to be sufficiently allergic, following the failures at Dieppe* in this war (which has probably gone ahead as in the original timeline, even though it is after Tobruk) and Gallipoli in the previous one, to prefer a Channel Islands operation to a direct confrontation with the Germans in France.

* Unless a revised and expanded 'Dieppe' could be perhaps put back a month or two and redirected to one of the Channel Islands.
 

Deleted member 9338

To take them only and try to hold them will tick off Stalin, and the American public when the casualties mont over this small piece of the British Empire.
 
To take them only and try to hold them will tick off Stalin, and the American public when the casualties mont over this small piece of the British Empire.
Except it is (in Roosevelt's mind) part of the move towards France:
Step 1: remove Germans from Channel Islands
Step 2: build the Channel Islands up as a major logistics base and cover them with airfields, to ensure domination of nearby parts of France; meanwhile ship more troops over the Atlantic and engage in more training
Step 3: land in and liberate northwest France
 
Roosevelt Knew he was not a military expert and listened to his advisers. Churchill had his enthusiasms but he listened to the professionals too and he knew enough to realise the channel islands were indefensible and a strategic dead end. The biggest island is only 46 square miles (malta is 122 square miles) and is positioned west of the Normandy peninsular in difficult waters and less than 20miles from France while being 90 miles from England. Could it be captured? Yes but what would the allies gain?
 
Frisian islands? Not this absurd stuff again. . . Unless that was a joke.

I am sure it was.

The size of the Channel islands & their garrison in 1942 was so small they would be trivial as a 'experience' event for the US Army. A single division putting ashore a couple regimental landing teams with plenty of combat engineer support could manage it.

Except it is (in Roosevelt's mind) part of the move towards France:
Step 1: remove Germans from Channel Islands
Step 2: build the Channel Islands up as a major logistics base and cover them with airfields, to ensure domination of nearby parts of France; meanwhile ship more troops over

The port facilities on the islands are to small. Britain was nearly as close, had large deepwater ports, billions of square meters or dry storage warehouses, a huge skilled labor force. The channel islands had some tourist hotels, and fishing boats. The islands were fully exposed to Atlantic storm weather. Limiting littoral operations to a few unpredictable days each month.

In early 1942 this might have been a training exercise for the US Navy. When the US Marine Brigade was withdrawn from Iceland then Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet could have made up a operation to pick off the Channel islands, weather permitting. In the end this resembles another Iceland garrison, where the US 5th Infantry Division sat on Iceland from the spring of 1942 through to summer of 1944 when it departed for France.

In the Allies favor the Germans may react to this as a real threat & it would divert some combat and support forces to NE France during 1943. maybe.
 
The Channel Islanders appreciate the boost created to their economy by the wreck diving industry due to the large number of merchant ships sunk in their waters as the Allies desperately try and keep island supplied post invasion.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
The whole operation makes no sense at all. Where is the strategic gain from the Channel Islands? There was a strategic goal with Torch of opening up the Med. to shipping and clearing North Africa, but in the Channel Islands there is nothing at all.
Approval of the concept would mean the agreement to such a foolhardy plan by many clever and experienced people. FDR wasn't a dictator and neither was Churchill. Their secretaries of state's, military chiefs, fellow politicians would all have an opinion on this and most would say this was madness.
 
Regardless of why Roosevelt would want to liberate them, they were some of the mostly heavily defended parts of the Atlantic wall and were well garrisoned. Any invasion attempt would have likely been met with failure because of the strength of the German defences. And the Americans would have to ask the British for permission, and I think Churchill and the British government would refuse for the forementioned reasons and the fact that they don't really want the Channel Islands levelled to the grounds during a unsuccessful invasion, or even a Dieppe type raid, especially as many of the Islanders would be killed in the process.
 
Capture of the Channel Islands would have been a major gain for the Allies. It would expose the northern coast of Brittany and the western coast of Normandy to invasion, forcing the Germans to deploy substantial forces to defend those area. It would allow the Allies to establish air bases much closer to that whole area of France. (The distance may not seem that much shorter, but crossing the Channel took up a significant fraction of fighter plane range and loiter time. This was especially important with short ranged aircraft such as the P-40 and Hurricane.) It would anchor Allied forces on both sides of the Channel, blockading it to any German coastal traffic. (There was a fair amount.)

So... The Germans heavily fortified the Channel Islands. Lots of massive concrete bunkers. The Germans made this costly effort because they could see the problems they would have if the Allies had the Channel Islands.

So... The Allies respected the German defenses, and made no attempt to invade the Channel Islands.

IMO, Stalin would at least notice a Channel Islands invasion, and would note the corresponding diversion of German forces from the Eastern Front.

I doubt if the US could have invaded the Channel Islands successfully in 1942.
 
Capture of the Channel Islands would have been a major gain for the Allies. It would expose the northern coast of Brittany and the western coast of Normandy to invasion, forcing the Germans to deploy substantial forces to defend those area. It would allow the Allies to establish air bases much closer to that whole area of France. (The distance may not seem that much shorter, but crossing the Channel took up a significant fraction of fighter plane range and loiter time. This was especially important with short ranged aircraft such as the P-40 and Hurricane.) It would anchor Allied forces on both sides of the Channel, blockading it to any German coastal traffic. (There was a fair amount.)

So... The Germans heavily fortified the Channel Islands. Lots of massive concrete bunkers. The Germans made this costly effort because they could see the problems they would have if the Allies had the Channel Islands.

So... The Allies respected the German defenses, and made no attempt to invade the Channel Islands.

IMO, Stalin would at least notice a Channel Islands invasion, and would note the corresponding diversion of German forces from the Eastern Front.

I doubt if the US could have invaded the Channel Islands successfully in 1942.
At the moment I've only been able to identify one German infantry division - 319th (static) - which would have been in the Channel Islands in 1942 (and that seems to have been spread out around the islands). Do you know if there was anything else there in terms of troops?
 
At the moment I've only been able to identify one German infantry division - 319th (static) - which would have been in the Channel Islands in 1942 (and that seems to have been spread out around the islands). Do you know if there was anything else there in terms of troops?

AFAIK, that was it. One division may not seem like much, but the aggregate exposed front is only about 25 km. By comparison, the three divisions which opposed the D-Day landings each covered about 30 km of front.
 
Would've been a terrible idea.

I honestly doubt the WAllies could pull it off at that stage. This isn't even the force that totally botched Torch, it's the one that couldn't take Senegal in Operation Menace and got thrashed in Dieppe against a force that it outnumbered like 6:1.

Amphibious ops are extremely tricky and take extensive training and support. Without it...I don't see this being a victory.
 
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