WI : Post Mohammed Pro-Roman Rebellions

GdwnsnHo

Banned
As title really, I was wondering what impacts that there would be if successful pro-Roman rebellions in Egypt and the Levant.

So two seperate large rebellions in Syria and Egypt, whilst not endorsed by the Romans, or funded, but the rebellions seek to restore Roman Rule.

Besides being curious as to the size of the rebellions required, what would the long term impacts be? Would the Romans be able to institute full administration, or would there be two huge devolved administrations? What impact would this have on the Caliphate?
 
As title really, I was wondering what impacts that there would be if successful pro-Roman rebellions in Egypt and the Levant.

So two seperate large rebellions in Syria and Egypt, whilst not endorsed by the Romans, or funded, but the rebellions seek to restore Roman Rule.

Besides being curious as to the size of the rebellions required, what would the long term impacts be? Would the Romans be able to institute full administration, or would there be two huge devolved administrations? What impact would this have on the Caliphate?
IIRC,this isn't possible because the long Persian occupation broke the region's loyalty to Rome.Not to mention,much of Egypt and Syria was dominated non-Chalcedonian Christian groups who were persecuted by Chalcedonian church.Roman rule was so bad for them that they saw Muslim rule and jizya tax as a better alternative.
 
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GdwnsnHo

Banned
What about them just being Christian uprisings then? I don't know what the Caliphate may need to do, but what if the rebellions are only Pro-Roman because they can provide additional protection.

So they'd maintain religious autonomy, Levant under Antioch/Jerusalem and Egypt under Alexandria - and largely administrative, but paid taxes/tribute to the Romans as vassals/protectorates. Is that reasonably plausible?

I can see the benefit to Rome - new forces, money and manpower would certainly be useful - and in exchange they just need to be hands off about administration and religion. At worst they might request an Exarchate/Despotate system to formalise the relationships.
 
As title really, I was wondering what impacts that there would be if successful pro-Roman rebellions in Egypt and the Levant.
It's really contingential : while the caricature of proto-nationalism in these region is unfounded*, most of the tentatives of negociation or temporisation were quite brutally denounced by Constantinople (see Patrirach Kyrrhos) and once the empire ceased to react (roughly at the end of 640's) and had a more passive approach, you simply didn't have a real political motivator.

Giving that Islam, as a religion, wasn't yet really stabilized (Christian chroniclers would begin to see it as distinct from judaism or christianism only a century later, and would still consider it as a christian heresy for some times), it allowed conquered provinces to not see the conquests as an existential threat : remember that Persian conquests that happened earlier were relatively more harsh, and Persians had a huge tolerent approach nevertheless.

That said, it means that an imperial reaction before the mid-VIIIth century could have lead to pro-Roman revolts, not only from melkites (as one should remember that monophysists and jacobits weren't the only Christian presence there, far from it : urban centers tended to be more on line with the imperial beliefs, hence the name of melkites, "imperials") but also from non-chalcedonians. Would the anti-christian reaction of Umayyads happening earlier or touching more importantly non-chalcedonians, it would have encountered some resistences (admittedly, probably more in Syria than Egypt)

There's nothing really preventing, at least if we look only at Near East context, a reedition of the expedition in Alexandria in 644/645.

*Note that religious differences, by paralleling linguistical and cultural difference, created a real potential used by Arabs conquests.
 
AFAIK, Egypt had some huge revolts, although in a later timeframe (eight/ninth century).
Syria never had such in a significant, structured manner, at least to my limited knowledge. What opposition there was there to the Caliphate was hardly pro-Roman.
A harsher Caliphal approach might be the trigger, but it's hard to see why the government would opt for that. The Arab rule was seriously uninterested in active proselytism in the first phases, under a "your taxes are more valuable than your soul" sort of approach. The tax burden was also apparently fairly bearable at first (AFAIR, generally lower than what the Roman rule exacted). This changed over time, of course.
 

PhilippeO

Banned
well, qing dynasty botched it conquest badly on hairstyle policy, other than this, qing generally maintain very successful policy to make their rule acceptable.

same thing could happen here, Caliphs in Medina might make some policy that caused rebellion.

as a bonus, a bad policy could very well anger soldier in frontline, make them join rebellion, Muslim army at that time still contain lots of non Muslim.

enforce zakat collection from Muslim soldier and non Muslim ?
executing Muawiyah, Amr bin An'as , and Khalid bin Walid due to politic ?
enforce celibacy in the army ?
slaughtering pig herd from farmer ?
killing priest andmonk ?
 
AFAIK, Egypt had some huge revolts, although in a later timeframe (eight/ninth century).
Syria never had such in a significant, structured manner, at least to my limited knowledge. What opposition there was there to the Caliphate was hardly pro-Roman.
A harsher Caliphal approach might be the trigger, but it's hard to see why the government would opt for that. The Arab rule was seriously uninterested in active proselytism in the first phases, under a "your taxes are more valuable than your soul" sort of approach. The tax burden was also apparently fairly bearable at first (AFAIR, generally lower than what the Roman rule exacted). This changed over time, of course.


Syrian revolts in later periods where typically pro Umayyad esque, anti Abbasid in nature and in general were fairly rare. Syria during the majority of Islamic history (early periods) was an extremely lax region with lax people in comparison to the radical lands of Iraq, Iran, Kurdistan, Najd, East Arabia, Afghanistan, Sistan, etc... I would argue strongly that this has to do with the fact of disarmament and relative weakness in terms of martial quality and spirit found amongst the Christian populace of the Levant and Egypt. I have argued this many times, and to the poster, so I doubt this will be accepted as it is so enjoyable to discuss Roman revival coming from seriously passive entities somehow being radicalized and turned into a fighting force capable of defeating far larger and fiercer opponents.

On Egyptian revolts, these were far too small to gain traction. These revolts were typically out of the way and considered an afterthought. The fact that one of the largest revolts among the Dhimmi, the Bashmurian was put down extremely easily by Ma'mun and then Copts due to their disobedience were attacked in their villages and subject to the wrath of the Mihna (inquisition). Copts after this knew the reason why revolt was foolhardy, especially when they themselves knew not how to make war.

Part of the argument you make is true, but it is also clear that taxation is a method of conversion in Islam, especially the Umayyad and Abbasid period. By taxing and shaming, a populace finds the incentive in becoming a Muslim and thus the conversion process began in swing. This was found throughout the history books in both Ulema and historians alike.
 
Syrian revolts in later periods where typically pro Umayyad esque, anti Abbasid in nature and in general were fairly rare. Syria during the majority of Islamic history (early periods) was an extremely lax region with lax people in comparison to the radical lands of Iraq, Iran, Kurdistan, Najd, East Arabia, Afghanistan, Sistan, etc... I would argue strongly that this has to do with the fact of disarmament and relative weakness in terms of martial quality and spirit found amongst the Christian populace of the Levant and Egypt. I have argued this many times, and to the poster, so I doubt this will be accepted as it is so enjoyable to discuss Roman revival coming from seriously passive entities somehow being radicalized and turned into a fighting force capable of defeating far larger and fiercer opponents.

On Egyptian revolts, these were far too small to gain traction. These revolts were typically out of the way and considered an afterthought. The fact that one of the largest revolts among the Dhimmi, the Bashmurian was put down extremely easily by Ma'mun and then Copts due to their disobedience were attacked in their villages and subject to the wrath of the Mihna (inquisition). Copts after this knew the reason why revolt was foolhardy, especially when they themselves knew not how to make war.

Part of the argument you make is true, but it is also clear that taxation is a method of conversion in Islam, especially the Umayyad and Abbasid period. By taxing and shaming, a populace finds the incentive in becoming a Muslim and thus the conversion process began in swing. This was found throughout the history books in both Ulema and historians alike.

That taxation encouraged conversion is notoriously correct, of course, but this seems not to have been the case in the first decades of the Caliphate.
Traditional Muslim historiography tends to credit either Umar II or the Abbasids for the abolition of jizya due by converted Muslims. Before that, people who converted to Islam were generally mawali with a legal and fiscal status closer to non-Muslims. There was no fiscal incentive to convert at first, it appears (although there were other incentives anyway) and the ruling groups certainly did not in general actively seek to convert the conquered in the seventh century AD. I agree with the rest of your post. It is also quite likely that Syria was extremely sick of war when the Arabs conquered it, which helps explaining the relatively low degree of resistance. Many cities simply let the conquerors in and submitted peacefully (although not enthusiastically, one would guess).
 
I'd point that jiziya fiscal pressure wasn't removed trough its redefinition (rather than abolition) : kharaj maintained it quite largely and you had to wait a relatively long time before it became really applied to Arabs and not just muladi in facts (to not mentions regions when the latter had to pay both for some time still, in spite of Caliphal reforms)

Of course, the whole fiscal point is a bit moot for the first decades of the Caliphate, being understood that conquerors merely took over the current fiscal organisation and kept on from there : having fiscal pressure going harsher as IOTL but more quickly (earlier Fitna? unability to continue campaigns as easily?...) could help.
 
I'd point that jiziya fiscal pressure wasn't removed trough its redefinition (rather than abolition) : kharaj maintained it quite largely and you had to wait a relatively long time before it became really applied to Arabs and not just muladi in facts (to not mentions regions when the latter had to pay both for some time still, in spite of Caliphal reforms)

This is correct; I am under the impression that regional variation was really considerable. But in Abbasid times and afterwards, fiscal incentives to conversion clearly were there.
 
That taxation encouraged conversion is notoriously correct, of course, but this seems not to have been the case in the first decades of the Caliphate.
Traditional Muslim historiography tends to credit either Umar II or the Abbasids for the abolition of jizya due by converted Muslims. Before that, people who converted to Islam were generally mawali with a legal and fiscal status closer to non-Muslims. There was no fiscal incentive to convert at first, it appears (although there were other incentives anyway) and the ruling groups certainly did not in general actively seek to convert the conquered in the seventh century AD. I agree with the rest of your post. It is also quite likely that Syria was extremely sick of war when the Arabs conquered it, which helps explaining the relatively low degree of resistance. Many cities simply let the conquerors in and submitted peacefully (although not enthusiastically, one would guess).

In all honesty, what the Umayyad or Abbasid did in the 7th and 8th century are somewhat inconsequential. The Umayyad was clearly more interested in expansion outwards into Dar al-Harb/Dar al-Kufr rather than active conversion. This is typical activity of expanding Islamic polities, in contrast to Christianity, which was more interested in conversion of the masses and internal domination, Islam was more towards the concept of expansion and the goal is not just to have everyone become Muslim through Dawah but making the work consent to Tawheed ar-Raboobiyyah. The Umayyad period showed this, it taxed Dhimmi with special taxes and uplifted the Muslim (rather than active Dawah) and then expand outward.

The Abbasid is different, they were dependent upon Dhimmi and other minorities whether Muslim or not. This they obviously not too interested in converting them. The Abbasid however is the first major example of systematic religious persecution of a physical harm aspect, opposed to fiscal oppression. This was however forwarded to Muslim and Arabs, so to keep any qualms against their regime quiet and force a Mu'Tazila worldview on the Ummah.

Countless states would come and go, all with differing levels of positions towards Dhimmi. The most radical I can think of would be as such:

Safavid
Almohad
Ayyuib
Saljuk
Ghaznavid
Durrani
etc...

Vs more tolerant

Fatimid
Ottoman
Saffarid
Qurtubah
etc...

I don't understand the argument on the Mawli... Mawli is a term for a helper or advocate, it can mean many different things. The fact of taxation upon them was likely more akin to lack of information on the part of tax collectors and state institutions. As in there was no legislation in favor of taxing Mawli, it was just an unfortunate happening.
 
This thread is going to divulge into taxation and fiscal policy of the Caliphates... None of us three seem to disagree on the intended topic of the thread lol.
 

Spengler

Banned
As title really, I was wondering what impacts that there would be if successful pro-Roman rebellions in Egypt and the Levant.

So two seperate large rebellions in Syria and Egypt, whilst not endorsed by the Romans, or funded, but the rebellions seek to restore Roman Rule.

Besides being curious as to the size of the rebellions required, what would the long term impacts be? Would the Romans be able to institute full administration, or would there be two huge devolved administrations? What impact would this have on the Caliphate?
The Problems are that at the time Rome through being very anti Monophysist. You need them to suddenly reverse course on that Policy. The later Iconoclasm also makes the likelihood of such revolts harder as to the Christians of Syria and Egypt that made Rome worse then the Muslims.
 
I don't understand the argument on the Mawli... Mawli is a term for a helper or advocate, it can mean many different things. The fact of taxation upon them was likely more akin to lack of information on the part of tax collectors and state institutions. As in there was no legislation in favor of taxing Mawli, it was just an unfortunate happening.

All I read on the subject (which I read some time ago, so maybe I am a bit rusty) suggests that, in roughly the first century of the hijra (but not after that) the Mawali were purposefully taxed. In this context the term means the "helped", not the "helper"; that is, people who 'affiliate' to a (usually) Arab patron (and the patron's tribe) through conversion. Under the Rashidun and the early Umayyads, Arab identity trumped Muslim identity (although both were apparently somewhat loose) and non-Arab Muslim converts had a lower social status than Arabs, and generally kept paying the same taxes they paid as dhimmis. They essentially paid for the protection guaranteed by the Arab military forces (mainly) regardless of their personal faith, thourgh Jizya and Kharaj. Later, Muslims were exempted from Jizya upon conversion and Kharaj was generalized for Muslim (more precisely, Kharaj was defined as taxation tied to the land itself, regardless of the religion of the farmers or owners).
It is correct that there was not a legislation specifically saying that however; in general, fiscal policies were managed by the court administration without general statements of law on the topic (these came later, in early Abbasid times when Abu Hanifa and other codified taxation according to Shari'a law - which was not, however, universally applied: my sources are very clear about people, Dhimmi and Muslim alike, complaining about illegal exactions).

Anyway, you are right this is drifting off-topic.
 
All I read on the subject (which I read some time ago, so maybe I am a bit rusty) suggests that, in roughly the first century of the hijra (but not after that) the Mawali were purposefully taxed. In this context the term means the "helped", not the "helper"; that is, people who 'affiliate' to a (usually) Arab patron (and the patron's tribe) through conversion. Under the Rashidun and the early Umayyads, Arab identity trumped Muslim identity (although both were apparently somewhat loose) and non-Arab Muslim converts had a lower social status than Arabs, and generally kept paying the same taxes they paid as dhimmis. They essentially paid for the protection guaranteed by the Arab military forces (mainly) regardless of their personal faith, thourgh Jizya and Kharaj. Later, Muslims were exempted from Jizya upon conversion and Kharaj was generalized for Muslim (more precisely, Kharaj was defined as taxation tied to the land itself, regardless of the religion of the farmers or owners).
It is correct that there was not a legislation specifically saying that however; in general, fiscal policies were managed by the court administration without general statements of law on the topic (these came later, in early Abbasid times when Abu Hanifa and other codified taxation according to Shari'a law - which was not, however, universally applied: my sources are very clear about people, Dhimmi and Muslim alike, complaining about illegal exactions).

Anyway, you are right this is drifting off-topic.

No you are correct in general. I was just commenting on how my interpretation was that it was not purposeful on the part of the state entities in question.
 
The Problems are that at the time Rome through being very anti Monophysist.

It's more complex than that : they tried to abide to nestorians and the various monophysisms while keeping an orthodox/imperial authority, and failed to do so entierly.
On the first hand, they manage to rally "Theodosians" monphysists in Alexandria in 633 and the armenian catholicos enact monoenergist thesis, and the Patriarchate of Antioch seems to go the same way.

On the other hand, Edessa refuses communion to Heraclius, Sophrone becomes Patriarch of Jerusalem and creates havoc with the arcbishop of Cyprus, and the ecthesis (which tried to rectify the vagueness of monoenergism) backfired, etc.

Saying Rome was very anti-Monohpysist isn't just only dismissing the reeally complex reality of the time, but is a misinterpretation of imperial politics : they had to resolve the fracture between chalcedonians and non-chalcedonians, plus the fractures between non-chalcedonians, plus the fractures between chalcedonians about the politics to resolve fractures.

In the end, they focused only on chalcedonians, giving that non-chalcadonians provinces were definitely lost. If there were possibility to at least partially recover them, religious policies after the end of VIIth century would certainly have gone differently.
 
It's more complex than that : they tried to abide to nestorians and the various monophysisms while keeping an orthodox/imperial authority, and failed to do so entierly.
On the first hand, they manage to rally "Theodosians" monphysists in Alexandria in 633 and the armenian catholicos enact monoenergist thesis, and the Patriarchate of Antioch seems to go the same way.

On the other hand, Edessa refuses communion to Heraclius, Sophrone becomes Patriarch of Jerusalem and creates havoc with the arcbishop of Cyprus, and the ecthesis (which tried to rectify the vagueness of monoenergism) backfired, etc.

Saying Rome was very anti-Monohpysist isn't just only dismissing the reeally complex reality of the time, but is a misinterpretation of imperial politics : they had to resolve the fracture between chalcedonians and non-chalcedonians, plus the fractures between non-chalcedonians, plus the fractures between chalcedonians about the politics to resolve fractures.

In the end, they focused only on chalcedonians, giving that non-chalcadonians provinces were definitely lost. If there were possibility to at least partially recover them, religious policies after the end of VIIth century would certainly have gone differently.

Very interesting.
 
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