WI: Polish-Saxon Crisis Escalates

The first treaty of Paris had already been quite generous with France (borders of 1792) and I doubt that France might seriously ask for Antwerp and the former Austrian Netherlands. The resources of Flanders are not yet so obvious as they would become after 1830, but I cannot see any British government accepting a French control of Antwerp. Not only this would negate the strategy of French containment but it would also mean that the Netherlands would get no compensation for the loss of the Cape and Ceylon. Even when the danger of a Napoleonic resurgence was out of the picture (Belgian insurrection of 1830) there was never a chance that France would be allowed to take Flanders, notwithstanding all the attempts made by Talleyrand.
The strategy of French containment was also the reason for which Prussia (which had already a number of exclaves in the area) was awarded the balance of the Rheinland (again 1st treaty of Paris). Prussia was not exactly elated since there was no territorial contiguity between Brandenburg and the Rheinland, and they would have by far preferred Saxony. The compromise reached by the powers in February 1815 was to grant Prussia 40% more or less of Saxony, but to keep Saxony independent (Russia and Prussia had different ideas: Prussia was supposed to gain all of Saxony, while Russia would be compensated with Prussian territories in Poland, and would have been allowed to include all the Polish lands in the "kingdom of Poland".

As far as the Austrians were concerned, they did not want Saxony to disappear, since it would have resulted in an excessive strengthening of Prussia, and did not want a large kingdom of Poland either, which might have ambitions on Kracow and Galicia. The Austrians did also want Murat ousted from Naples, and they got this too.

The British had no interest at all in enlarging their continental possessions: Hanover was already seen as a problem child, since it would have been very hard to defend. Adding Westphalia or whatever else in western Germany would have not made things better, rather the contrary. The British were quite happy in gorging up in the colonies, and keeping choice bits like Malta, the Ionian islands and Heligoland.
Changing the succession law in Hanover was theoretically possible (it had been done 70 years earlier in Austria with Marie Therese), but it was never considered seriously and I doubt very much it would have been acceptable to the British parliament.

The compromise reached in Vienna in February 1815 was quite a reasonable one: everyone got something, even if not all they would have wanted. IMHO this is the strongest reason for which a war pitting Russia and Prussia against UK, Austria and France. The second strongest reason was that all the powers wanted an end to major wars, after almost 20 years of uninterrupted warfare.

I tend to agree with the Belgium issue.

Do you think the British Parliament would have a say in the matter of adding Westphalia to Hanover?

Remember, the British Parliament had no say over the governance of Hanover. It was not a colony of Britain but held by George III (and administered by this point by his sons) and was as separate nation. If the monarchy was fine to take it, I can't seem Parliament doing anything about it. They wouldn't launch a coup d'état against the King or invade. They would just openly state that no British government would do anything to help Hanover should it get itself into trouble.

I know Britain often thought that they were obligated to help defend the King's "Other Realm" in the past (7 Years War) but they can't refuse to allow the King to take this additional land to Hanover if he wanted to.

The biggest issue is if Britain was unhappy with other facets of the Treaty (the elimination of Saxony) while the King was happy with it. It would be embarrassing if the King signed it on behalf of Hanover while Britain refused.
 
I tend to agree with the Belgium issue.

Remember when I said that the Netherlands would probably keep out, because they have nothing to gain? Well if France wants the southern Netherlands, suddenly the Netherlands will get involved. Creating another enemyout of nowhere generaly isn't a good idea in any war.
 
I tend to agree with the Belgium issue.

Do you think the British Parliament would have a say in the matter of adding Westphalia to Hanover?

Remember, the British Parliament had no say over the governance of Hanover. It was not a colony of Britain but held by George III (and administered by this point by his sons) and was as separate nation. If the monarchy was fine to take it, I can't seem Parliament doing anything about it. They wouldn't launch a coup d'état against the King or invade. They would just openly state that no British government would do anything to help Hanover should it get itself into trouble.

I know Britain often thought that they were obligated to help defend the King's "Other Realm" in the past (7 Years War) but they can't refuse to allow the King to take this additional land to Hanover if he wanted to.

The biggest issue is if Britain was unhappy with other facets of the Treaty (the elimination of Saxony) while the King was happy with it. It would be embarrassing if the King signed it on behalf of Hanover while Britain refused.

You may have a point, at least a point of law.
In practical terms, I would say that if the prince regent refused to sign the treaty in his persona as prince regent of the Electorate of Hanover (rather than the other way around: I doubt that Castlereagh would have supported a treaty which could be potentially unpalatable to the British parliament) it would have been quite messy and most likely ended up in a constitutional crisis. As it was, Hanover was quite well treated at Vienna: it was upgraded to kingdom, and its territory was substantially enlarged. This said, I'm strongly of the opinion that when the personal union was dissolved in 1837 the British parliament was certainly relieved.
 
You may have a point, at least a point of law.
In practical terms, I would say that if the prince regent refused to sign the treaty in his persona as prince regent of the Electorate of Hanover (rather than the other way around: I doubt that Castlereagh would have supported a treaty which could be potentially unpalatable to the British parliament) it would have been quite messy and most likely ended up in a constitutional crisis. As it was, Hanover was quite well treated at Vienna: it was upgraded to kingdom, and its territory was substantially enlarged. This said, I'm strongly of the opinion that when the personal union was dissolved in 1837 the British parliament was certainly relieved.

Agree that most Britons, rightly or wrongly, had nothing but relief.

In the past, though, one may argue that access to Hanoverian soldiers were vital to the survival of the British Empire and Hanover was stuck fighting British Wars more often than Britain was fighting Hanover's wars.
 
Agree that most Britons, rightly or wrongly, had nothing but relief.

In the past, though, one may argue that access to Hanoverian soldiers were vital to the survival of the British Empire and Hanover was stuck fighting British Wars more often than Britain was fighting Hanover's wars.

Maybe you can help me to clarify one thing: when the Prince of Wales was appointed Regent in 1810, was he regent for both Great Britain and Hanover or just for the former? I understand that from 1816 his youngest brother was Viceroy of Hanover, but it is not clear to me what was the situation between 1810 and 1816.
 
In the past, though, one may argue that access to Hanoverian soldiers were vital to the survival of the British Empire and Hanover was stuck fighting British Wars more often than Britain was fighting Hanover's wars.

Uh...no, AFAIR there was a very strict law passed back when the PU began that prohibited from any Hannoverian soldiers being called up to defend the elector's British interests. This is the reason George III made use of the Hessians in the ARW rather than Hannoverians.
 
Maybe you can help me to clarify one thing: when the Prince of Wales was appointed Regent in 1810, was he regent for both Great Britain and Hanover or just for the former? I understand that from 1816 his youngest brother was Viceroy of Hanover, but it is not clear to me what was the situation between 1810 and 1816.

AFAIK, George IV's regent powers were confined to UK and it's Empire, plus his regency was by force of parliament - which as pointed out - would've had no say in Germany. Most likely Georgie Porgie was de facto ruler of Hannover, signing decrees etc, but IDT he was ever named as such. I mean, George III never set foot in Hannover, and the country had been governed by a viceroy/privy council since George II's death, so whether the elector was mad or sane in Britain, the Hannoverians simply deferred all decisions to London, and whomever was in charge in there ran the show I should imagine
 
AFAIK, George IV's regent powers were confined to UK and it's Empire, plus his regency was by force of parliament - which as pointed out - would've had no say in Germany. Most likely Georgie Porgie was de facto ruler of Hannover, signing decrees etc, but IDT he was ever named as such. I mean, George III never set foot in Hannover, and the country had been governed by a viceroy/privy council since George II's death, so whether the elector was mad or sane in Britain, the Hannoverians simply deferred all decisions to London, and whomever was in charge in there ran the show I should imagine

It makes sense, considering that after 1806 Hanover territories were anyway under French control. There was a German Chancery in London, and Hanoverian exiles fought in the King's German Legion. I'd assume that Castlereagh managed all negotiations at Paris and Vienna on behalf of Hanover too, although there certainly was someone from the German Chancery in his entourage. From 1816 the situation was regularised with the appointment of a Viceroy.
 
Uh...no, AFAIR there was a very strict law passed back when the PU began that prohibited from any Hannoverian soldiers being called up to defend the elector's British interests. This is the reason George III made use of the Hessians in the ARW rather than Hannoverians.

I believe that many Hanoverian soldiers were used as garrison troops in India, the West Indies, The Channel Islands, Gibraltar, etc that freed up British troops. I'd never heard of any prohibition about serving to protect British interests. Maybe it was just actual warzones?

Certainly in earlier years, this was common. Often Hanoverians were used to garrison Britain when war was threatened.

Can you cite this?

Really, without the Germans both "Hessians" and Hanoverians, the massive reinforcement of 1776 would have been about 5000 men. The Battles of Long Island and Manhattan would have gone a bit differently.
 
Maybe you can help me to clarify one thing: when the Prince of Wales was appointed Regent in 1810, was he regent for both Great Britain and Hanover or just for the former? I understand that from 1816 his youngest brother was Viceroy of Hanover, but it is not clear to me what was the situation between 1810 and 1816.

I believe that future George IV would officially in charge of both but he delegated his brother to run Hanover on a day to day basis during the Regency years. He probably could have reappointed Viceroys of Hanover at will.

I could be wrong.
 
I believe that many Hanoverian soldiers were used as garrison troops in India, the West Indies, The Channel Islands, Gibraltar, etc that freed up British troops. I'd never heard of any prohibition about serving to protect British interests. Maybe it was just actual warzones?

Certainly in earlier years, this was common. Often Hanoverians were used to garrison Britain when war was threatened.

Can you cite this?

Really, without the Germans both "Hessians" and Hanoverians, the massive reinforcement of 1776 would have been about 5000 men. The Battles of Long Island and Manhattan would have gone a bit differently.

Ask and ye shall receive, knock and the door shall be opened:
http://www.vondonop.org/hessianfaq.html
http://www.vondonop.org/hessianfaq.html

Found this when wondering why German George didn't use Hannoverian soldiers against the colonists.
 
Ask and ye shall receive, knock and the door shall be opened:
http://www.vondonop.org/hessianfaq.html

Found this when wondering why German George didn't use Hannoverian soldiers against the colonists.

Thanks!

Here is an excerpt:

King George was also the elector of Hanover! So why didn't he just use his Hanoverian troops instead of hiring Hessians?

Because the estates of Hanover had made it law that the Elector could not use Hanoverian troops outside of Europe. George III did actually 'loan' himself six regiments from Hanover which were used to garrison Gibraltar in Spain. The fear in Hanover was that George would use the Hanoverian troops to fight the 'dirty' wars in the Indies (the Caribbean Islands), where troops would succumb to diseases and exposure long before they actually had a chance to see combat. In fact, when the Revolutionary War became a "world war" by the entry of the French and Spanish and Dutch into the conflict, the British did want to use Hessians in the Indies. However, Landgraf Friedrich forbade the use of his troops in such a way. Others were not so lucky. The Waldeck Regiment was sent to the Gulf coast of Florida in 1778, where it was captured at Pensacola in May of 1781. The English government did not even bother to tell the Prince of Waldeck that his regiment had been sent south, and when the Prince inquired of Lord Germain about the whereabouts of his troops in March of 1779, The Prince did not get a reply until May of 1780!



Note that I don't believe this prohibition as in place during the French Revolutionary Wars.

In that instance, Hanover itself was at war.
 
I recently found this thread on another site, basically asking this similar question, but proposing that Saxony would receive Westphalia in exchange for Prussia receiving Saxony. Is this a possible exchange or no?
 
I recently found this thread on another site, basically asking this similar question, but proposing that Saxony would receive Westphalia in exchange for Prussia receiving Saxony. Is this a possible exchange or no?

The idea was the Saxon king would get a Rhenish kingdom in exchange for giving up Saxony
 
The idea was the Saxon king would get a Rhenish kingdom in exchange for giving up Saxony

Yeah, but, I kinda thought it was an interesting idea, it's not like Jérôme's gonna get Westphalia back at Vienna, and once they've restored Hannover/whatever else made up Westphalia, wouldn't it have served as a decent sized kingdom? Maybe once united with the Napoléonic grand duchy of Berg?
 
Would this change anything? The Wettins were against leaving their ancestral lands in Saxony, and half of Westphalia would have been not really attractive. From the POV of the winning powers, and assuming that Frederick Augustus was guilty of supporting Napoleon to the end, setting a Wettin near the French border would have risked opening a potential invasion route for French armies. Austria preferred to keep an independent Saxony. So we are always back to square one: Russia wanted Posen, in addition to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and Prussia was more keen to annex Saxony rather than getting lands in the west without territorial contiguity; anyway they wanted to acquire the same population at least that they would relinquish in Poland. Since Austria opposed this, Great Britain supported them (and France too, since Talleyrand was close to Metternich and saw a path to a better outcome for France).

Obviously the preferences of the Wettins (or of the Saxon population) did not count at all; even Prussia, who ended up as a large beneficiary in terms of land annexations, was the sidekick of Russia rather than a major player on its own. Notwithstanding the historical revisionist attempt to paint the Congress of Vienna as a complete success which ensured peace in Europe for a century and forged the basis for international cooperation, IMHO the Powers were quite shortsighted and more keen in setting up a land-grabbing exercise rather than recognizing that the changes of the past 25 years could not be cancelled or swept under the carpet. As an exercise of shortsightedness, the Congress of Vienna is only matched by the treaty of Versailles in 1919: the problems started almost immediately (Spain and Naples); by 1830 there was another revolution in France, and in Belgium too. Italy and Poland could be kept under hold only by censorship, police and military interventions. The repression of the Spring of the Peoples in 1848-49 was the last song of the Congress: 10 years later Italy was unified, 20 years later Germany too.
 
Is there any way that Prussia can qualify for less, perhaps? I get that having Russia on your side would be a big thing, but say Russia's not willing to back Prussia as much as they say they are, or Britain/Austria/France are not so keen on Prussia being so powerful?
 
Prussia was by far the weakest member of the Coalition Powers, and the idea that Prussia would become powerful enough to threaten the balance of power in Europe would have been considered ludicrous.
Prussia's weakness continued until the 1850s (when Prussia tried to form the Union of Erfurt in competition with the existing German Confederation under Austria's presidency in 1851, Austria mobilised and the Prussians caved in immediately - see the Punctuation of Olmutz).
During the Napoleonic wars Prussia had gone from defeat to defeat, usually with a very poor showing on the battlefield, and ended up with French garrisons in the major cities and a limitation to the size of its army (40,000 men).
At the end some reforms were put in place, and the Prussians contributed in a significant way to Coalition victories at Leipzig and Waterloo, but no one was truly worried about Prussia (which is another reason for their conspicuous gains at Vienna).
Later on, the Prussian army went to rot, mostly for the scarcity of money, and "modern"reforms started again after 1856. In 1866 the consensus was that Austria and her German allies would have easily defeated Prussia, and in 1870 Louis Napoleon was still convinced that a war against Prussia would have been a "short and victorious" one.
 
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