WI: Polish-Saxon Crisis Escalates

[LordKalvan]

If the crisis goes hot, and the Russo-Prussians start hammering Austria, Murat's move against Milan might not be as stupid as you make it.
The war should be a short one, and while he is not likely to be allowed to keep Milan Murat might well keep Naples and some parts of the Papal States. Not that I do believe in a real possibility of war in 1815.

I did some further research (unfortunately I don't have Rites of Peace with me) and apparently there was a secret treaty signed on 1815, with the ostensible aim of guaranteeing the provisions of the treaty of Paris signed in 1814: this would make much more sense, since it was a generous treaty for defeated France. This secret treaty might include a clause guaranteeing also Austrian Poland. It does not guarantee however Saxony, which is where the Russo-Prussians are most likely to intervene to force the issue. I still don't see how the Franco-British might really help Austria if the s*** hits the fan: French troops crossing the Rhine would be a scandal, and sending them to Italy might not be helpful either. British troops in the Austrian Netherlands would be less controversial but what are they going to achieve? March on Berlin?

I've not read Jarrett's book, but from some reviews it looks like he's on a revisionist position, arguing that the Congress guaranteed 100 years of peace in Europe and opened the door for improved relationships between countries and for the upholding of an international rule of law.
A position originally argued by Kissinger IIRC and supported by neocon tanks, but mostly isolated among historians. I cannot say I was impressed, but it does not mean that I'm impugning his scolarship: just his conclusions.

 

[Autocrat]

On the note of musical chairs the idea was to establish a Rhenish kingdom from the Prussian Phenish provinces and give it to Frederick Augustus.

 

[LordKalvan]

On the note of musical chairs the idea was to establish a Rhenish kingdom from the Prussian Phenish provinces and give it to Frederick Augustus.

It was certainly one of the options, but the aim of French containment required establishing strong (or at least strongish) states on French borders. Which is why the Rhenish Palatinate ended up in Prussian hands, even if its inhabitants were totally against it. FA was not considered reliable enough, in particular since he would have been ousted out of his ancestral lands by the Coalition Powers.

 

[Kowita]

So here are the sides so for...

Russian side: Russia, Prussia, & Naples

Austrian side: Austria, Britain, France, Saxony, Hanover, & Bavaria

Neutral: Netherlands

Any other thoughts?

 

[Yanez de Gomera]

I've not read Jarrett's book, but from some reviews it looks like he's on a revisionist position, arguing that the Congress guaranteed 100 years of peace in Europe and opened the door for improved relationships between countries and for the upholding of an international rule of law.

I haven't read it all either, I linked it because the parts about the secret treaty were available online. About the Congress of Vienna having a positive effect on international relations... well, there was the clause about ending the slave trade... Beyond that the "concert of nations" only worked when there was the will to oppression power and nationalities, and it broke down pretty soon when divergence of interests between great powers became apparent. 100 years of peace included Crimea, three Italian wars, Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish conflicts, a well as many other minor conflicts. The last thirty years of peace constant colonial conflicts amd crises, building up pressure for the disaster that was the Great War. It doesn't read as a history of success to me...

So here are the sides so for...

Russian side: Russia, Prussia, & Naples

Austrian side: Austria, Britain, France, Saxony, Hanover, & Bavaria

Neutral: Netherlands

Any other thoughts?

Sardinia-Piedmont could side with the Anglo-Austrians, but they have just been restored, don't know in what shape their army was, but I would suppose very poor and only good for defensive ops.

Talleyrand would want French participation at all costs, but as others have said it is difficult to see a French army roaming Germany so soon without enormous backlash. If the army is away it will also become difficult to control Paris...

 

[LordKalvan]

I haven't read it all either, I linked it because the parts about the secret treaty were available online. About the Congress of Vienna having a positive effect on international relations... well, there was the clause about ending the slave trade... Beyond that the "concert of nations" only worked when there was the will to oppression power and nationalities, and it broke down pretty soon when divergence of interests between great powers became apparent. 100 years of peace included Crimea, three Italian wars, Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish conflicts, a well as many other minor conflicts. The last thirty years of peace constant colonial conflicts amd crises, building up pressure for the disaster that was the Great War. It doesn't read as a history of success to me...



Sardinia-Piedmont could side with the Anglo-Austrians, but they have just been restored, don't know in what shape their army was, but I would suppose very poor and only good for defensive ops.

Talleyrand would want French participation at all costs, but as others have said it is difficult to see a French army roaming Germany so soon without enormous backlash. If the army is away it will also become difficult to control Paris...

It looks like we're on the same page re. the outcome of the Congress and its effects on Europe during the 19th century (and beyond). I think the worst outcome however was wasting a couple of generations of European progress, since it took at least up to the war of Crimea for the reactionary alliance to falter. It would be too optimistic to believe that the winning Powers might take a more statesmanlike approach to solving European issues and would willingly refrain from the naked land grab that happened, but this does not mean that the outcome of the Congress must be considered unavoidable. The failure of the unrealistic attempt to turn back the clock to the 18th century couldn't but fail, and it's hard to believe that the cream of European diplomacy could believe otherwise.
The genie was out of the bottle, and all the efforts of repression, censorship and policing could not put it back into it.

The army of Sardinia could not have been in any good shape, nor be considered completely reliable from a political point of view: the trained officers and soldiers were coming out of the Napoleonic army, while the troops that had spent the previous twenty years holed up in Sardinia were certainly not up to scratch to fight in Europe. Additionally, the first treaty of Paris had left Chambery and most of Savoy to France: another reason for the Sardinians to stay out of any possible war.

As far as France is concerned, the Napoleonic army had been dissolved after the occupation of Paris, and it's doubtful that Napoleon's veterans would flock to the Royal banners with a will. There is also the sticking point that there is still an occupation army in France, the bulk being Russians and Prussians. In the unlikely event of war the first battles might be fought in France (which is another reason for Louis xviii to be very careful in making this kind of decisions.

I do wonder where Sweden would stand (they sent some twenty thousand men to fight at Leipzig): the Swedes do not like the Russians for sure, but they are also quite surrounded by Russia and Prussia. Most likely they would stay out too (which is the most likely choice for all the minor powers, unless they are forced at gun point).

 

[JonasResende]

I seem to recall reading that there were several Napoleonic marshals (Ney amongst them), "who believed that by serving the Bourbons they were serving France". And the France implied was Imperial France rather than the ancien regime.

Plus, when Louis made a dash for the Assembly when Napoléon landed, the Chambers pledged undying loyalty. And as Louis' carriage drove through the rain the soldiers dutifully shouted "Vive le Roi" but added "du Rome" in a whisper, while they hid their Bourbon cockades by putting Macintosh covers over their bearskins.

Makes one wonder if Napoleon is dead or otherwise permanently out of commission, the French troops would rally to throw out the occupying armies?

 

[Rdffigueira]

Ok, this thread is less than a month old... I hope it's not considered necroing, but I really didn't see it around at the time, and I think it's better than starting a new one.

First of all, I agree with LordKalvan when he says that the outbreak of a war is not that likely.

I just wanted to ask, is there any way Prussia is attracted to the alliance with the UK and Austria, thus isolating Russia? I mean, even if we adopt that the very premise of this PoD is that Prussia and Russia are allied together, can we imagine that perhaps the Great Powers would find it to be a "lesser evil" simply "sacrificing" Saxony to Prussia (which in turn means that Rhineland is not given to Prussia), but trying to keep Russia out of Poland? Or perhaps... giving more of Poland to Prussia instead of to Russia. This would break the deadlock of January 1815 against the Russian interest, and not even Tsar Alexander might think Poland is worth another European war.

Of course, this goes into the same problem of upsetting the balance of power, and I doubt that Austria would like this sort of arrangement that simply makes Prussia even bigger, but we could suppose that once Austria sees itself facing almost alone (if the UK and France fail to commit their forces to battle in Eastern Europe) against Russia, it might consider Prussia to be convenient supporter.

Or, analyzing the question from another point of view... would Prussia itself exchange the alliance with Russia to one with Austria if this meant receiving the whole of Saxony and perhaps a larger share of Poland (and receiving no Rhineland, btw)?

 

[Westphalian]

Or, analyzing the question from another point of view... would Prussia itself exchange the alliance with Russia to one with Austria if this meant receiving the whole of Saxony and perhaps a larger share of Poland (and receiving no Rhineland, btw)?

I am reasonably sure that this would actually lead to a DoW by Alexander on Prussia, and that is a war they cannot win. Not even together with Austria. And inviting in French armies to help stop the Russians directly after the wars of liberation is politically impossible.

 

[Emperor Constantine]

A Saxon-Polish crisis escalating into a war would be very interesting. Something to remembe: there was NO occupation force in France before the hundred days. The first treaty of Paris was very clear on that point. No indemnities were forced on the French nor were any caps/limits on their armed forces. Second, none of the great powers had really demobilized their armies at this point either. If it came down to an Anglo-Austro-French (and German most German states were terrified and infuriated at the idea of Saxony being handed over to Prussia) alliance vs Russia and Prussia, well my money would be on the former.


The French army still had its Napoleonic leadership and I'll bet they'd love a chance at revenge on at least some of the former allies. Britain would be able to outspend (and out-fund) of the other great powers, as the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars proved, could blockade the Russians if it came down to it. Not to mention that the Russians would be on the defensive in a way not like Napoleon's invasion: if Alexander wants to hold Poland his army can't retreat deep into Russia and wait for winter. I'd also bet that Sweden would get involved, if only to try for Finland. If backed by Britain, they would surely take the chance to reclaim their lost provinces. As for the Netherlands, they were closely aligned with London, so the Orange-Nassaus would likely support the British-Austrians as well.

If it comes down to a shooting war, Prussia could and would likely get steamrolled by the armies of France, Austria, the Netherlands, Britain and the various German states. Russia would probably be able to hold its own but would be in a tough spot economically. The real question becomes what the Final act of Vienna looks like. Would Prussia lose Silesia? Would Austria be willing or even able to allow the restoration of a smaller Poland (ceding Galicia in exchange for Prussian lands)? Would France be able to strong-arm some of their former conquests as payment for their aid in the war? Would we see the German Confederation emerge as a stronger entity if without a Austro-Prussian rivalry? Finally, there's the fate of the Rhineland; if it doesn't go to Prussia, what happens to it? Divided into several new/revived states? Divided among the various German powers? Or a third fate? Really the only thing assured would be a much more fun 19th century.

 

[JonasResende]

Is it opssible that a war resulting from the esclaation of the Polish-Saxon crisis is more like the War of the Bavarian Succession (where both armies were more concerned with trying to cut each other's supply lines etcs) i.e. 'n Kartoffelnkrieg (Potato War) than an out-and-out war with battles?

 

[JonasResende]

bumping this

 

[Rdffigueira]

Is it opssible that a war resulting from the esclaation of the Polish-Saxon crisis is more like the War of the Bavarian Succession (where both armies were more concerned with trying to cut each other's supply lines etcs) i.e. 'n Kartoffelnkrieg (Potato War) than an out-and-out war with battles?

Indeed, that might be a plausible scenario. Austria will try to delay whatever advances it can from Prussia and Russia... while the Russians mobilize their forces to maintain the Polish occupation. Prussia might spread its forces by deploying divisions inside Saxony itself and in the long border with the minor German states (if they remain on Austrian side). I can see the Austrians remaining in defensive for the larger part of the war - unless an eventual Neapolitan invasion of Northern Italy forces them to diverge forces to the Po Valley - until the French troops arrive in central Europe to combat Prussia.

I imagine the UK will remain peripheral in the conflict, operating in the Baltic to attack Prussian and Russian navies (if by this time, they still had any...) and blockade their ports. If Sweden jumps the fray to reconquer Finland, the British troops could be sent to the "Ingrian theatre of war" to force the Russians to reallocate their forces back home.

That said, unless France and the wrecked German minors committs a significant number of troops, I think the Austrians will lose the war, even more if Prussia and Russia play a joint strategy to take her out of the war soon enough. An eventual appearance of Sweden to reconquer Finland might yield some gains for them, but I think Russia might expel them. They did it with Napoleon, after all...

 

[Emperor Constantine]

Is it possible that a war resulting from the esclaation of the Polish-Saxon crisis is more like the War of the Bavarian Succession (where both armies were more concerned with trying to cut each other's supply lines etcs) i.e. 'n Kartoffelnkrieg (Potato War) than an out-and-out war with battles?

No. The era of Cabinet wars (as a lot of the 18th century conflicts were called) was dead and gone. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars made it quite impossible for those types of wars to return at that point in history. Russia would still be in a position to enforce its goals if they aren't heavily beaten. Same for Prussia. The key here is Britain. Russia and Prussia on their own couldn't finance major wars at this point and needed British loans to do so. Without such loans both nations would be in a tougher position, especially if the war drags out.

Even if Britain offers financial assistance and minimum troops to her allies its still puts them in a much better position. Plus the German states feared Prussia much more than they did Austria. Austria was the traditional defender of their rights; Prussia's trying to out and out annex one of the oldest states in Germany. Not many are going to side with the Prussians on that. Also remember that Prussia would have to remain on the defensive as their operating a highly unpopular occupation in Saxony, where even OTL there was riots against them. I can easily see the Austrians and British funding a campaign by the Saxon army (or whats left of it) to disrupt the Prussians.

I do wonder that if the allies could knock Prussia out quickly enough, would Russia withdraw her demands? I mean depending on when the war starts (late 1814 or early 1815) the Russians had withdrawn from Saxony and been replaced with Prussian troops. It would be quite difficult to dislodge the Russians from Poland, especially sense the Poles had rather naively bought into Alexander's promises of restoring the Commonwealth, but at this point the Austrians had a larger army than the Prussians and could potentially be able to restore the Saxons. Then it comes down to would both sides be willing to arrange for peace after that or would they fight to the death, so to speak?

Something else to consider is the position of France. They'd just have to give up twenty years of conquests; would a longer war mean that the French would demand some of their former borders back in exchange for helping against the Prussians and Russians? It never came up OTL because no war broke out and because Talleyrand wanted make France look as least threatening as possible. But if the French, with their Napoleonic officers and veterans, becomes a tie-breaker then the Bourbons could decide to try for more, like maybe Belgium and/or left bank of the Rhine (which is what the Allies offered Napoleon at the aborted Congress of Prague in 1813).

Then the final wildcard is Napoleon himself. Would he try to return to France if Europe is already at war again and would he have the same popularity to regain his throne if it looks like the Bourbons were again supporting the army?

 

[JonasResende]

What if parliaments disavows whatever treaty Castlereagh signed, and decides to stay out of this war (even financially), or is this unlikely? I mean, while I could see Britain being all for the balance of power, but wouldn't they prefer a Protestant alliance with Prussia than a Catholic alliance with their former enemy, France, and that Viennese pastry (as the one author diescribes it) known as the Austrian Empire?

Would the Bourbons have settled for the left bank of the Rhine (I mean, after all, they're not Napoleon, so I can't think they would have wanted European domination instead)? And would France holding a share in Germany have been viewed as revanchist as Germany holding a French province? And how could Austria force the Prussians to the table for peace after driving them out of Saxony, if Russia is supporting them?

 

[JonasResende]

On the subject of the Congress of Prague:

The Coalition still offered France the "natural frontiers" on the Alps, Rhine, and Pyrenees after Leipzig. The Austrians in particular were quite keen for France to have Antwerp and thus present a credible threat to Britain on the seas. We heard none of that OTL, but ITTL there hasn't been a Leipzig and Metternich is in control.

That's a ginormous butterfly, of course: Belgium industrialised second after Britain and in the mid-19th C still had a full third of French outputs in iron and so on despite being so small. A France with Belgium and the Rhineland is going to be way more powerful in the 19th C.

Now, if Britain is feeling threatened by France, could she decide to throw her lot with Prussia instead? And why did Austria worry about France being a credible threat to Britain, anyway? It's not as though Austria had colonies that the British were threatening.

BRegarding Denmark, I did not understand who would compensate it for Bernadotte gulping down Norway.
IIRC denmark is a french ally at his point (mainly because the coalition asked its king to wave norway goodbye and keep smiling).

Which makes one wonder how Scandinavia is going to be reacting. Bernadotte invaded Norway instead of Finland, plus he had the backing of the the Russian emperor to do it. Denmark, on the other hand, lost Norway because he was allied to Napoleon. Now the Bourbons might not feel as guilty about it, but if they're standing up for the king of Saxony losing territory, might they equally stand up for the king of Denmark to be recompensated if this quasi-war goes ahead and the Franco-Austrian side wins or at least forces Russia-Prussia to a stalemate?

 

[JonasResende]

You'll notice, though, that he turned down the terms he was offered in 1813. Iirc, didn't he suggest that if the GD of Warsaw were dissolved, then Prussia should compensate the King of Saxony with a chunk of Prussian territory including Berlin??

Now while I don't see Louis XVIII or Talleyrand (who Nappy himself referred to as 'shit...shit in a silk stocking...but shit nonetheless') desiring so much territory for Saxony, I think it might be interesting to see how the German unification process would play out with Saxony not being so shrunk in size

 

[Alt History Buff]

Note that the Elector of Saxony was one of Napoleon's most loyal allies to the end. It would not be that difficult for the crown heads of Europe to de-throne him and offer Westphalia to his younger brother (whom succeeded him anyway in a reduced Saxony after the war).

I'd never heard of this until this was brought up. I may bring this up in future TL's of mine.

 

[Alt History Buff]

Question, was there ever a potential for compromise in this alleged "secret treaty" where Britain may be bought off to sign off on this?

Maybe Prussia gets Saxony, Russia gets most or all of the Duchy of Warsaw and the British King (I.E. George III) would get Westphalia and merged into Hanover, forming a powerful northwest German state. Maybe Austria gets a sliver of Saxony or, more controversially, Bavaria east and south of the Inn River (about 40% of the land) and France keeps Antwerp/Belgium in order for everyone to claim they got something.

The OTL enlargement of Prussia did not seem pre-ordained.

I've had this idea for a while of the Duke of Kent surviving his pneumonia in 1820 and inheriting the Kingdom for a few years until Victoria is a bit more seasoned. The TL would be Victoria-centric where she would grow up with a doting father and how that would affect her character. Maybe King Edward (70 when he takes the throne from his brother William) would live a few years and change the inheritance law of western Germany to match Britain's (i.e. woman can inherit).

Is this doable?

Thanks.

 

[LordKalvan]

Question, was there ever a potential for compromise in this alleged "secret treaty" where Britain may be bought off to sign off on this?

Maybe Prussia gets Saxony, Russia gets most or all of the Duchy of Warsaw and the British King (I.E. George III) would get Westphalia and merged into Hanover, forming a powerful northwest German state. Maybe Austria gets a sliver of Saxony or, more controversially, Bavaria east and south of the Inn River (about 40% of the land) and France keeps Antwerp/Belgium in order for everyone to claim they got something.

The OTL enlargement of Prussia did not seem pre-ordained.

I've had this idea for a while of the Duke of Kent surviving his pneumonia in 1820 and inheriting the Kingdom for a few years until Victoria is a bit more seasoned. The TL would be Victoria-centric where she would grow up with a doting father and how that would affect her character. Maybe King Edward (70 when he takes the throne from his brother William) would live a few years and change the inheritance law of western Germany to match Britain's (i.e. woman can inherit).

Is this doable?

Thanks.

The first treaty of Paris had already been quite generous with France (borders of 1792) and I doubt that France might seriously ask for Antwerp and the former Austrian Netherlands. The resources of Flanders are not yet so obvious as they would become after 1830, but I cannot see any British government accepting a French control of Antwerp. Not only this would negate the strategy of French containment but it would also mean that the Netherlands would get no compensation for the loss of the Cape and Ceylon. Even when the danger of a Napoleonic resurgence was out of the picture (Belgian insurrection of 1830) there was never a chance that France would be allowed to take Flanders, notwithstanding all the attempts made by Talleyrand.
The strategy of French containment was also the reason for which Prussia (which had already a number of exclaves in the area) was awarded the balance of the Rheinland (again 1st treaty of Paris). Prussia was not exactly elated since there was no territorial contiguity between Brandenburg and the Rheinland, and they would have by far preferred Saxony. The compromise reached by the powers in February 1815 was to grant Prussia 40% more or less of Saxony, but to keep Saxony independent (Russia and Prussia had different ideas: Prussia was supposed to gain all of Saxony, while Russia would be compensated with Prussian territories in Poland, and would have been allowed to include all the Polish lands in the "kingdom of Poland".

As far as the Austrians were concerned, they did not want Saxony to disappear, since it would have resulted in an excessive strengthening of Prussia, and did not want a large kingdom of Poland either, which might have ambitions on Kracow and Galicia. The Austrians did also want Murat ousted from Naples, and they got this too.

The British had no interest at all in enlarging their continental possessions: Hanover was already seen as a problem child, since it would have been very hard to defend. Adding Westphalia or whatever else in western Germany would have not made things better, rather the contrary. The British were quite happy in gorging up in the colonies, and keeping choice bits like Malta, the Ionian islands and Heligoland.
Changing the succession law in Hanover was theoretically possible (it had been done 70 years earlier in Austria with Marie Therese), but it was never considered seriously and I doubt very much it would have been acceptable to the British parliament.

The compromise reached in Vienna in February 1815 was quite a reasonable one: everyone got something, even if not all they would have wanted. IMHO this is the strongest reason for which a war pitting Russia and Prussia against UK, Austria and France. The second strongest reason was that all the powers wanted an end to major wars, after almost 20 years of uninterrupted warfare.