WI Poles and/or Czechs invaded eastern Germany in solidarity with Franco-Belgian Ruhr occupation?

raharris1973

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PoD # 1

What if the Czechs and Poles occupied all of Silesia, East Prussia and maybe Pomerania during the Ruhr occupation. They justify this publicly by citing their alliances with France.

Their objectives - At a minimum, revision of the postwar treaties so that Germany is committed to demilitarization east of the Oder-Neisse on the model of the Rhineland and inclusion of great power guarantees of their existing borders with Germany.

Militarily, I don't know how they would do, but they have the advantage of the French sitting on the Ruhr on top of the Germans.

I imagine the reactions in the U.S., Britain and Soviet Union will be sharply negative, but positive in France, with those eastern countries forming tighter bonds with France. Disinterested countries will have a a little bit of "WTF?" with the Poles and Czechs, but the French will be glad to have allies.

Can the Poles and Czechs physically do this occupation of far eastern Germany?

Can or will the Germans oppose Polish and Czech actions with any more resistance than they gave to France in the Ruhr (non-violent with some strikes and crowd actions but nothing military)?

If the Germans do as OTL in the west but fight hard in the east, how do the French react?

What is this going to do to German internal politics for the rest of the 1920s and with international diplomacy of the decade like the Locarno Pact, Dawes Plan and Kellog-Briand Pact?

The Soviet Union will be pissed and may have a temptation to retaliate against Poland to secure lands east of the Curzon line, but I tend to think they would be too tired and focused on reconstruction and too fearful of provoking French hostility.

As for Italy, I don't know what Mussolini would do. Was Italy a recipient of any reparations payments from Germany at this time? Were the Germans paying up? I imagine that Italy would seek to manipulate the situation to its advantage and try to gain concessions from one or both sides.

Britain would be angry at all parties, but would they be so mad that they'd be explicit about having no continental commitments for the next two decades? On the other hand, do the British, wanting the conflict to go away, judge they need to appease the Poles and Czechs in some way?

I think that within Germany this dual occupation would boost extremist politics and be bad for the economy. At the same time, the Reichswehr and most German rightists might commit even more deeply to cultivation of the USSR as a German ally.

Could the Germans somehow pull off a surprise, dignity-reviving short-term "win" from such a Ruhr crisis gone pan-European?

PoD #2

If we need to schedule this for a point where the Poles and Czechs would have more motivation, perhaps they could launch their attack during the Locarno Pact negotiations in 1925 as it becomes clear the pact is leaving the permanence of Germany's eastern borders unaddressed, even while guaranteeing the western status quo.

This is militarily riskier, but the eastern powers have more motive to show they cannot be discounted at this point. The biggest change is that France rather than sitting on the Ruhr is pulling back a bit on the Rhineland. The Soviets might feel a little bit more recovered and tempted to intervene, but I doubt it.

I imagine the British here will be pissed at the pissant eastern powers, but might judge there needs to be diplomatic concessions to the Poles and Czechs to quiet things down. The French probably will not be angry at the Poles and Czechs and will become more interested in these countries as allies unless their performance is militarily incompetent.
 
The problem is that Polish-Czechoslovakian relationes were rather poor. And eveni f by some luck there were better (let's say the question of Tesin/Cieszyn is peacefully resolved before 1920) they would still hestitate to act on their own. If France decides to intervene in 1936 and ask for support - yes, Poles might go for it, although it would break Polish-German non-aggression treaty z 1934. Alone? I do not think so.
Would they be able to do it? Possibly: Germany was still being remilitarized. Germany had at the time over 1000 tanks, but almost all of them were Panzer I. Armoured units were still being organized and were far from being operational - even in 1938 German Panzerwaffe still was not ready, whih was shown dureing the Anschluss (German invasion was so poorly prepared about 30% of German tanks didn't reach Vieanna because of lack of fuel). OTOH German still had 36 infantry divisions against twice as many of Polish and Czechoslovakian units - that is not so bad when you are in defensive; also Germany had strong industry and large human reserves. But if a core of German army is trying to deal with the French... But AFAIK German generals later claimed that Hitler had ordered to withdraw in case o French intervention. That is not enough time or Poles and Czechoslovakians to mobilize and attack.
 
PoD # 1

What if the Czechs and Poles occupied all of Silesia, East Prussia and maybe Pomerania during the Ruhr occupation. They justify this publicly by citing their alliances with France.

Actually, Czechoslovakia didn't like the occupation at all:

"In fact, these military conventions received a rude shock as early as 1923, when the French Army occupied the Ruhr. The occupation came as a surprise to Prague. The implications of the military clause became obvious and frightened the Czechs. In this case, French national interests were evidently not identical with those of the Czech, for the Czechs feared that Germany, if pushed too far by France, could turn Bolshevik, thus isolating Czechoslovakia off from the West. Dr. Benes bravely supported the French. Nonetheless, he felt very uneasy. On November 17, 1923, he firmly instructed his Ambassador in Paris, S. Osusky, to urge the French to stop their sanctions against and their occupation of Germany. Benes was convinced that any further French pressure would inevitably lead to the Bolshevization of Germany. Any such change in Germany would vitally affect Czechoslovakia..." Miloslav Rechcigl, *Czechoslovakia Past and Present, Vol. 1*, p. 805. https://tinyurl.com/ybbt9uju
https://tinyurl.com/y7mls3z8

Also, it would just not be politically possible for Czechoslovakia to use force. Czechoslovak democracy was by no means as stable in the 1920's as is sometimes thought. The Communists had broken off from the Social Democrats and would get 12.86 percent of the vote in the 1925 election. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovak_parliamentary_election,_1925 They would obviously violently oppose Czechoslovak participation in the "Entente imperialist aggression" against Germany. So of course would all the Sudeten Germans, even including moderate parties like the German Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia (which the governments in Prague tried to woo and which finally joined the Czechoslovak government in 1929). Sending Czechoslovak troops to be foreign occupiers (and probably to suffer casualties from terrorists) might also make the Slovaks consider separation.

This is just not going to happen, so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned. I'll have to do some research on Poland but I don't think that's plausible either.
 

raharris1973

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Actually, Czechoslovakia didn't like the occupation at all:

"In fact, these military conventions received a rude shock as early as 1923, when the French Army occupied the Ruhr. The occupation came as a surprise to Prague. The implications of the military clause became obvious and frightened the Czechs. In this case, French national interests were evidently not identical with those of the Czech, for the Czechs feared that Germany, if pushed too far by France, could turn Bolshevik, thus isolating Czechoslovakia off from the West. Dr. Benes bravely supported the French. Nonetheless, he felt very uneasy. On November 17, 1923, he firmly instructed his Ambassador in Paris, S. Osusky, to urge the French to stop their sanctions against and their occupation of Germany. Benes was convinced that any further French pressure would inevitably lead to the Bolshevization of Germany. Any such change in Germany would vitally affect Czechoslovakia..." Miloslav Rechcigl, *Czechoslovakia Past and Present, Vol. 1*, p. 805. https://tinyurl.com/ybbt9uju
https://tinyurl.com/y7mls3z8

Also, it would just not be politically possible for Czechoslovakia to use force. Czechoslovak democracy was by no means as stable in the 1920's as is sometimes thought. The Communists had broken off from the Social Democrats and would get 12.86 percent of the vote in the 1925 election. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovak_parliamentary_election,_1925 They would obviously violently oppose Czechoslovak participation in the "Entente imperialist aggression" against Germany. So of course would all the Sudeten Germans, even including moderate parties like the German Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia (which the governments in Prague tried to woo and which finally joined the Czechoslovak government in 1929). Sending Czechoslovak troops to be foreign occupiers (and probably to suffer casualties from terrorists) might also make the Slovaks consider separation.

This is just not going to happen, so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned. I'll have to do some research on Poland but I don't think that's plausible either.


Thanks for the fact Czech- interesting, and informative, as always.
 
You know, instead of asking what if the Poles and Czechs had occupied Germany militarily, it might be a bit more realistic to ask: What if they didn't actually help Germany survive by selling it more coal and pig-iron! For that is what they did in OTL:

"... From the beginning Germany was at a disadvantage. As a highly industrialized country, it was dependent upon the export of manufactured goods and the import of raw materials and food stuffs. Eighty-five percent of German coal production came from the occupied area. When occupation started, the railways, for example, had coal reserves for seven weeks. Unoccupied Germany had coal reserves for four weeks, while coke would last for three weeks.. Cuno's problem was to keep industry going and prevent unemployment, since unhampered production was the basis of resistance. During the first weeks production in the Ruhr went on, and, because of the inefficiency of French controls, the railways were able to transport coal from the Ruhr until the end of January, when France cut connections between occupied and unoccupied Germany. But even with these additional reserves and the increase of production in the unoccupied part of the country Germany would not have lasted long if Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Great Britain had not increased their coal exports to Germany. While Poland had only delivered 2.9 million tons in 1922, exports to Germany reached 8.7 million tons in 1923. In 1924, after normal conditions had been partially restored, Poland still exported 6.5 million tons to Germany. Coal imports from Czechoslovakia also increased from 160,000 tons in 1922 to 802,000 tons in 1923. British coal exports to Germany doubled and rose from 7.7 million tons in 1922 to 15.4 million tons in 1923.84 During 1923 Germany ordered about half of her coal from abroad, receiving credit from Britain for the purchase of British coal.

"In other fields developments were similar. The import of pig-iron from France and Belgium decreased, while imports from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Britain increased. Czech industry put more blast furnaces into operation to supply the German market with iron products. In the first three months of 1923, only five percent of German iron imports came from Czechoslovakia, while by June 1923 fifteen percent of Germany's total imports originated there. In the textile market British goods replaced French and Belgian exports.

"The attitude of Poland and Czechoslovakia was a severe handicap to France. Poincare had simply not foreseen that these members of the French alliance in Eastern Europe hesitated to cooperate, and he urged these countries to curtail their exports to Germany. Both countries promised to do so, but hardly anything happened, and despite repeated intervention, deliveries continued as the above figures show. Some upper Silesian milling companies also informed the Ministry of Transport in Berlin that they did not intend to break off trade relations, even if demanded to do so by the Polish government. French control of the Ruhr was also hindered when Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and other neutral countries complained about interference of trade with the occupied zone. Poincare was especially sensitive to these protests and when London demanded that France stop meddling with British coal transports into the Ruhr, he ordered their immediate release. Great Britain and other European countries with their depressed mining industries were only too willing to provide Germany with coal after France had halted the transport of Ruhr coal into unoccupied Germany. This economic "aid" greatly contributed to the strengthening of the German position and also led to a prolongation of the Franco-German struggle. Without sufficient coal supplies, Germany could never have been able to organize resistance. .."

https://books.google.com/books?id=g0lFBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA113
https://books.google.com/books?id=g0lFBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114

In other words, everyone hates France! (OK, maybe "hates" is too strong a word, but at least they are not going to let France's desire to squeeze Germany interfere with their own profits.)

One footnote: The Soviets were somewhat concerned over a possible Polish invasion of East Prussia or German Silesia, and warned that the USSR would not stand by idly if that were to happen. However,

"There is no evidence that Poland seriously planned any aggressive action against Germany during the Ruhr crisis. On the contrary, on January 18 the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in the Sejm's Foreign Affairs Committee that no one had asked Poland to participate in sanctions against Germany; a few days later, on January 22, he assured the German Minister to Warsaw, Ulrich Rauscher, "that Poland [was] resolved to remain passive." He was, however, "worried about the Russian attitude." Simultaneously, the Polish Minister to Berlin declared to the German Foreign Minister "on behalf of his government that Poland will under all circumstances maintain peace and did not intend in any way to step out of her present position." He admitted, however, that "alleged Russian military preparations made the Poles very nervous" and that Rantzau's presence in Berlin was indicative of a common Soviet-German plan concerning Poland.

"Poland, indeed, was in no position to strike. Marshal Pilsudski had retired in protest against constant conflicts among political parties and the country was on the verge of economic collapse..." https://books.google.com/books?id=TiPWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA131

There was a lot of anti-Polish propaganda by the USSR during the Ruhr crisis, but it was based on the assumption that Germany was on the verge of a Communist revolution, and that Poland might join France in an attempt to strangle that revolution. Both the assumptions that Germany was on the verge of revolution (Zinoviev held on to this notion long after its falsity should have been obvious) and that Poland was a mere tool of France were wrong, so I would say there was very little risk of the Ruhr crisis developing into a new war. The most one could say is that if Poland had been tempted to use force in Germany, the Soviet warnings might have given her pause; but in fact, there never seems to have been any such temptation.
 
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raharris1973

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More good stuff- So that's a good what-if on the economic track.

"The attitude of Poland and Czechoslovakia was a severe handicap to France. Poincare had simply not foreseen that these members of the French alliance in Eastern Europe hesitated to cooperate, and he urged these countries to curtail their exports to Germany. Both countries promised to do so, but hardly anything happened, and despite repeated intervention, deliveries continued as the above figures show.

Obviously whatever the potential strategic benefit of working with France, the Poles and Czechs would have paid significant opportunity costs by cooperating with French sanctions.

What if the Poles and Czechs had agreed to comply with an export cut-off if France paid them to do so. Perhaps to populate a "strategic coal and iron reserve" for France and its colonies?
 
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