And the USN knew this would be the basic IJN strategy and thus didn't plan to do so until at least 2 years into any war by which point it would have built up enough forces to crush the IJN and it would have the fleet train to support them and even then much like how the Pacific Campaign shaked out in otl it planned to go from Island to Island.I read from another thread that the IJN planned to lure the USN towards the Philippines and attack them in the deep waters of the Pacific, thus making the warships unsalvageable.
sinking battleships at anchor with all spaces opened for inspection is easy compared to Standards at sea and maneuvering, and firing AAAgo fight the Japanese in deep waters will mean the utter loss of the fleet;
The problem is, while both high commands (USN and IJN) were very much of the mindset of the Big Guns (i.e. using Battleships as the main firing line of a fleet and the rest as support or escorts), some Japanese admirals had an understanding of the use of air power, something Yamamoto used to his advantage to great effect at Pearl. The USN ships were poorly prepared for the air war that defined the Pacific, lacking AAA, modern radio and radar, and generally would have been little more than moving targets.sinking battleships at anchor with all spaces opened for inspection is easy compared to Standards at sea and maneuvering, and firing AAA
Might want to look at the low number of Torpedo strikes that hit, compared to number of drops
Here's an example
Six torpedo bombers misidentified the demilitarized battleship Utah as a frontline battleship and attacked, scoring only two hits. One torpedo missed Utah so badly it hit the light cruiser Raleigh in an adjacent berth. Considering that this first wave was unopposed by enemy fighters and flew the easiest approach—similar to rehearsals, when 83 percent of the torpedo bombers hit their targets—it was a miserable performance.
The remaining 10 bombers in the carrier attack group swung south of Ford Island looking for battleships; none of the aviators wanted to come home from the most important battle in Japanese history to say they had attacked a secondary target. Five misidentified the backlit silhouette of the old minelayer Oglala, moored outboard of the light cruiser Helena, as a battleship; only one torpedo hit. In all, 11 of the 16 torpedoes from the group assigned to attack carriers—more than a quarter of the 40 torpedoes in the entire attack—were launched at misidentified targets.
of the 40 torpedo planes there were 17 hits altogether.
80 Vals had 500 pound bomb, that was unable to penetrate the Standards Deck Armor. The Kates in Level bomber mode will not be able to drop their converted battleship shell.
All those planes against moving targets will have far worse luck.
84 G3M Nell and G4M Betty dropping Bombs and TorpedoesBritain had already tried its luck fighting aircraft with ships, resulting in several embarrassing losses; the HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales were lost to air power. Yes, they were solo ships braving a massive, hostile enemy front, but they were not the only losses and only highlighted the woeful inadequacy of Allied AAA and preparations in the pacific.
A failure of the attack on Pearl Harbor doesn't change the fact that the Empire of Japan still launched an unprovoked attack against the USA without a prior DoW. This IMO is the fallacy of the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory. And even if the attack on Pearl Harbor would have failed to the extent of not having been carried out at all, the concurrent Japanese attack on the Philippines would still have constituted a sufficient casus belli, but that's neither here nor there since, due to bureaucratic inertia, the Japanese ambassador in Washington DC would have handed in the Japanese DoW against the USA.But if Pearl Harbor failed, does the US still go to war?
Which wasn't really a straight DoW, eitherbut that's neither here nor there since, due to bureaucratic inertia, the Japanese ambassador in Washington DC would have handed in the Japanese DoW against the USA.