WI: Pearl Harbor Was Foiled

Actually, all It might take is someone listening to the radar post that picked up the Japanese strike force at least an hour outside of Oahu. They were told 'oh, it must be the B-17 Flight arriving early' (because direction finding in those early radars was pretty limited) and so it never got any higher than the Lt. in charge of the radar. If acted upon instead, there is enough time for ships to make steam, AA guns to be manned and fighters to get aloft

They would have had an hour tops. That's an hour to figure out what is going on, get the word out to everybody, and then get everyone moving. I doubt many ships will be underway. Things will be better prepared but I'm not sure it is the game changer people act like it is sometimes.
 
I sometimes think the best thing to do with 20/20 hindsight is lull the Japanese into thinking they have achieved surprise. Keep all of the ships in port but have them fully manned and at battle stations with all guns manned and buttoned up and ready to take damage. Airborne fighters are keep just south of Oahu where they can pounce once the Japanese are committed to their attack runs while all air units are fully alerted with planes dispersed or ready to take off.
 
Our timeline the radar stations went back into action after the attack started.
This is the part that gets me, why on earth were there 'off' periods when the radar wasn't operating considering the warnings? Okay I know they weren't at war and you need down time for things like maintenance but the sources I've read, granted not massive amounts, generally seem to indicate that it was a regular thing. Was it lack of operators, did they only operate it at night and expect to use visual means during the day, was there other sets that they handed over to but who weren't able to spot the raid?


They would have had an hour tops. That's an hour to figure out what is going on, get the word out to everybody, and then get everyone moving. I doubt many ships will be underway. Things will be better prepared but I'm not sure it is the game changer people act like it is sometimes.
They won't have been able to raise steam yet but having the crews at battle stations, watertight doors locked, salvage crews at the ready, and anti-aircraft weapons manned are going to be a major bonuses.
 
They would have had an hour tops.
40 minutes actually.

That's an hour to figure out what is going on, get the word out to everybody, and then get everyone moving. I doubt many ships will be underway. Things will be better prepared but I'm not sure it is the game changer people act like it is sometimes.
Not a game-changer, but a real kick. What will happen is getting a load more guns manned and armed, ships with waterproof doors closed, aircraft spread across the field, and even a few aircraft up, plus the ones already up are on alert. How much difference would it make? well nothing to the ships probably, but fewer aircraft would be destroyed, and Japanese losses would be a lot higher, twice or more what they were.

Hells, if you're lucky you might even be able to get a working Zero out of it, like the one that landed on Niihau OTL. That would be a game-changer.
 
This is the part that gets me, why on earth were there 'off' periods when the radar wasn't operating considering the warnings? Okay I know they weren't at war and you need down time for things like maintenance but the sources I've read, granted not massive amounts, generally seem to indicate that it was a regular thing. Was it lack of operators, did they only operate it at night and expect to use visual means during the day, was there other sets that they handed over to but who weren't able to spot the raid?

The week previous they, when the war warning messages came, they tried running the radar full time. Spare parts were rapidly running out, so the equipment was limited to a operating rate that would not exhaust the replacement parts before more arrived. If the parts arrived when promised. Keep in mind this was equipment that was still half prototype, the designs did not exist a year previous. Even the electrical engineers that designed it really did not know a lot about keeping it running. The techs were lucky if their experience with similar equipment went back a full year. Most were fresh out of the first classes in the military schools. Earlier they were being trained at the factories or OJT by the people who built the first models. The British had four years to figure out their air defense radars. The US was less than two years into the task.
 
The week previous they, when the war warning messages came, they tried running the radar full time. Spare parts were rapidly running out, so the equipment was limited to a operating rate that would not exhaust the replacement parts before more arrived. If the parts arrived when promised.
Ah I see, this is much more logical. Thanks.
 
G3Ms T/O at 8:20, G4Ms at 9:30 it's about 3.5 hour trip for b17 clark to takao, so the (only)16 b17s would have to be fueled, bombed up, ammo loaded, crews briefed (all done after 5:00) in the air and on the way by 6:00 to even have a chance of finding anything on the ground, ---(for MattIII)not taking account of bombing from 20-30 thousand feet(u.s. bomber doctrine). either way, bomber command is going to lose half their strength. tell vt-8 how much safer it is in the air.

When pearl harbor was attack, this is what happen in the philippines.

From wikipedia: At 03:30 local time on 8 December 1941 (about 09:00 on 7 December in Hawaii),[126] Sutherland learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor and informed MacArthur. At 05:30, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, ordered MacArthur to execute the existing war plan, Rainbow Five. MacArthur did nothing. On three occasions, the commander of the Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, requested permission to attack Japanese bases in Formosa, in accordance with prewar intentions, but was denied by Sutherland. Not until 11:00 did Brereton speak with MacArthur about it, and obtained permission.[127]MacArthur later denied having the conversation.[128] At 12:30, nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, aircraft of Japan's 11th Air Fleet achieved complete tactical surprise when they attacked Clark Field and the nearby fighter base at Iba Field, and destroyed or disabled 18 of Far East Air Force's 35 B-17s, 53 of its 107P-40s, three P-35s, and more than 25 other aircraft. Most were destroyed on the ground. Substantial damage was done to the bases, and casualties totaled 80 killed and 150 wounded.[129] What was left of the Far East Air Force was all but destroyed over the next few days.[130]

Also Admiral Harts went to meet MacArthur and found him in a strange behavior like surprise to see that Japan had attack pearl harbor. It is still a mystery why MacArthur didn't react in time to strike taiwan.
 
When pearl harbor was attack, this is what happen in the philippines.

From wikipedia: At 03:30 local time on 8 December 1941 (about 09:00 on 7 December in Hawaii),[126] Sutherland learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor and informed MacArthur. At 05:30, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, ordered MacArthur to execute the existing war plan, Rainbow Five. MacArthur did nothing. On three occasions, the commander of the Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, requested permission to attack Japanese bases in Formosa, in accordance with prewar intentions, but was denied by Sutherland. Not until 11:00 did Brereton speak with MacArthur about it, and obtained permission.[127]MacArthur later denied having the conversation.[128] At 12:30, nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, aircraft of Japan's 11th Air Fleet achieved complete tactical surprise when they attacked Clark Field and the nearby fighter base at Iba Field, and destroyed or disabled 18 of Far East Air Force's 35 B-17s, 53 of its 107P-40s, three P-35s, and more than 25 other aircraft. Most were destroyed on the ground. Substantial damage was done to the bases, and casualties totaled 80 killed and 150 wounded.[129] What was left of the Far East Air Force was all but destroyed over the next few days.[130]

Also Admiral Harts went to meet MacArthur and found him in a strange behavior like surprise to see that Japan had attack pearl harbor. It is still a mystery why MacArthur didn't react in time to strike taiwan.

MacArthur's overall Dec 1941 performance should go down as one of the most incompetent months of Generalship since McClellan in 1862.

He ignored the existing plans, let his planes get caught on teh ground, and instead of retreating to Bataan immediately, He tried to meet the Japanese as they landed on Northern Luzon, got outmaneuvered, flanked and forced to retreat, allowing the Japanese to capture 2/3 of his food, ammunition and fuel supplies.

Had he retreated to Bataan to begin with (which *was* the plan), with 3 times the supplies he had in OTL, they could probably have held out for more like a year, instead of 4 months. If Macarthur died in that campaign, he'd be considered one of the worst generals in US history
 
From wikipedia: At 03:30 local time on 8 December 1941 (about 09:00 on 7 December in Hawaii),[126] Sutherland learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor and informed MacArthur. At 05:30, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, ordered MacArthur to execute the existing war plan, Rainbow Five. MacArthur did nothing. On three occasions, the commander of the Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, requested permission to attack Japanese bases in Formosa, in accordance with prewar intentions, but was denied by Sutherland. Not until 11:00 did Brereton speak with MacArthur about it, and obtained permission.[127]MacArthur later denied having the conversation.[128] At 12:30, nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, aircraft of Japan's 11th Air Fleet achieved complete tactical surprise when they attacked Clark Field and the nearby fighter base at Iba Field, and destroyed or disabled 18 of Far East Air Force's 35 B-17s, 53 of its 107P-40s, three P-35s, and more than 25 other aircraft. Most were destroyed on the ground. Substantial damage was done to the bases, and casualties totaled 80 killed and 150 wounded.[129] What was left of the Far East Air Force was all but destroyed over the next few days.[130]

Thats a start. From John Costello 'The Pacific War': On receiving notice of the PH attack Bereteon ordered a full alert for his command and all personel to their posts.

Ordered the bombers flown off to a orbit station south closer to Mindano.

Ordered a CAP started at dawn.

Both orders were accomplished. When no Japanese bombers showed by 08:00 part of the pursuit planes were brought down to refuel.

At around 09:30 radar spotted a small number of bombers approach the north end of Luzon. The pursuit planes on the ground were relaunched. The nine Japanese bombers attacked some auxilliary airfields well to the north & returned to Formosa.

At approx 10:30 a thunderstorm cell was mistaken for aircraft by the radar operators. The CAP was alerted for a third time.

With no enemy bombers in sight @ approx 11:00 two orders were given; The CAP was to refuel, and the bombers were to return to Clark Field to arm & refuel.

The bombers had to return to Clark Field as no other munitions storage had been built. it was the only location for the bombs.

As i see it discipline broke down at this point. The pursuit squadrons had been awake since 03:00 or earlier, had mostly missed breakfast, and had been through three false alarms. The Air Corps commanders across the board seem to have lost control. All the pursuit planes landed, instead of rotating in relays to refuel and eat. The air defense CP seems to have been abandoned by the commanders. Weather they were at lunch, a meeting, inspecting the flightline or whatever there does not seem to have been any leaders of any experience or authority at the CP.

When the radar stations picked up the actual Japanese attack at around 11:45 they attempted to warn, but could not raise anyone but a few Sgts or jr Lt on the telephones. Messengers were sent from the CP or HQ to find the wing or squadron commanders, or anyone, but was too late.

Bereton of course bears ultimate responsibility for all the aircraft to return to the Manilia airfields in one cluster....k. His subordinate commanders and staff were guilty as hell in this too. But ultimately MacAurthur has responsibility for not giving a clear order at any time during the morning.

Also Admiral Harts went to meet MacArthur and found him in a strange behavior like surprise to see that Japan had attack pearl harbor. It is still a mystery why MacArthur didn't react in time to strike taiwan.

My best guess in Mac had some sort of breakdown. His entire strategy for defending Luzon depended on the Japanese not attacking until April. His ego interfered with him dealing with the fact the war had started four months before his perfect plans were in place.
 
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What about the sub the ward attacked.
Another warning ignored.

Again, another example of the difficulty in transitioning from the previous year of mobilization to war conditions. Technically they should have all been thinking on a war basis since the warnings of the 24th or 27th November. Unfortunatly when a order came to rest the men on Sunday the officers thought that applied to them as well. While it was not necessary to fully staff the CP offices there should have been officers senior enough to make critical decisions. Lt Cmdrs, majors, Colonels & Captains needed to be in the critical CP. Lts to take messages was not war prepardness. As at Clark Field later that day the leadership failure went below Stark & Kimmel. Their Admirals and captains failed here as well. They had seen the War Warning messages, just because they were tired after a week of extra work was no excuse. Yet across the board they all failed.
 
Thats a start. From John Costello 'The Pacific War': On receiving notice of the PH attack Bereteon ordered a fill alert for his command andd all personel to their posts.

Ordered the bombers flown off to a orbit station south closer to Mindano.

Ordered a CAP started at dawn.

Both orders were accomplished. When no Japanese bombers showed by 08:00 par of the pursuit planes were brought down to refuel.

At around 09:30 radar spotted a small number of bombers approach the north end of Luzon. The pursuit planes on the ground were relaunched. the nine Japanese bombers attacked some auxilliary airfields well to the north & returned to Formosa.

At approx 10:30 a thunderstorm cell was mistaken for aircraft by the radar operators. the CAP was alerted for a third time.

With no enemy bombers in sight @ approx 11:00 two orders were given; The CAP was to refuel, and the bombers were to return to Clark Field to arm & refuel.

The bombers had to return to Clark Field as no other munitions storage had been built. it was the only location for the bombs.

As i see it dicipline broke down at this point. The pursuit squadrons had bee awake since 03:00 or earlier, had mostly missed breakfast, and had been through three false alarms. The Air Corps commanders across the board seem to have lost control. All the pursuit planes landed, instead of rotating in relays to refuel and eat. The air defense CP seems to have been abandoned by the commanders. Weather they were at lunch, a meeting, inspecting the flightline or whatever there does not seem to have been any leaders of any experience or authority at the CP.

When the radar stations picked up the actual Japanese attack at around 11:45 their attempted to warn, but could not raise anyone but a few Sgts or jr Lt on the telephones. Messengers were sent from the CP or HQ to find the wing or squadron commanders, or anyone, but was too late.

Bereton of course bears ultimate responsibility for all the aircraft to return to the manilia airfields in one cluster....k. His subordinate commanders and staff were guilty as hell in this too. But ultimately MacAurthur has responsibility for not giving a clear order at any time during the morning.



My best guess in Mac had some sort of breakdown. His entire strategy for defending Luzon depended on the Japanese not attacking until April. His ego interfered with him dealing with the fact the war had started four months before his perfect plans were in place.

Not really with what you said about General Bereton he was given orders by General MacArthur and if he sent those bombers south to Mindano it was order by MacArthur. Bereton wanted to take Taiwan in the early morning of December 8, 1941 but MacArthur did not approved of this. Also Bereton wanted to send his bombers much further south near Davao but MacArthur only told hime to send the bombers and fly around Mindano. Now that is a big mistake which Bereton knew but could not do anything. When the bomber return to Clark Field around 11 AM, Bereton knew that it was a big mistake. Also MacArthur wanted a bomb strike on Taiwan around 2:30 pm but were caught on the ground. Remember Bereton was following orders and he could not take his own orders but to follow MacArthur. After the war Bereton gave an interview saying that he would have done diferent things but he was not in charge and had to follow orders.
 
When pearl harbor was attack, this is what happen in the philippines.

From wikipedia: At 03:30 local time on 8 December 1941 (about 09:00 on 7 December in Hawaii),[126] Sutherland learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor and informed MacArthur. At 05:30, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, ordered MacArthur to execute the existing war plan, Rainbow Five. MacArthur did nothing. On three occasions, the commander of the Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, requested permission to attack Japanese bases in Formosa, in accordance with prewar intentions, but was denied by Sutherland. Not until 11:00 did Brereton speak with MacArthur about it, and obtained permission.[127]MacArthur later denied having the conversation.[128] At 12:30, nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, aircraft of Japan's 11th Air Fleet achieved complete tactical surprise when they attacked Clark Field and the nearby fighter base at Iba Field, and destroyed or disabled 18 of Far East Air Force's 35 B-17s, 53 of its 107P-40s, three P-35s, and more than 25 other aircraft. Most were destroyed on the ground. Substantial damage was done to the bases, and casualties totaled 80 killed and 150 wounded.[129] What was left of the Far East Air Force was all but destroyed over the next few days.[130]

Also Admiral Harts went to meet MacArthur and found him in a strange behavior like surprise to see that Japan had attack pearl harbor. It is still a mystery why MacArthur didn't react in time to strike taiwan.

As the Japanese planes approached northern Luzon, the airborne American aircraft received the all-clear signal and were instructed to land. By 1130 nearly all the planes were back at their bases. The two squadrons of B-17s were on Clark Field, loading with gas and bombs for the raid against Formosa. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was also at Clark after its vain attempt to intercept the last Japanese flight. At Nichols, the 17th Pursuit Squadron, which had been covering Clark, was landing to refuel. The 3d and 34th pursuit Squadrons were standing by at Iba and Del Carmen.[32]

Shortly before 1130, reports of an approaching enemy formation began coming in to the plotting board at Nielson.

--84-- In addition to radar reports, almost every postmaster along the northwest coast of Luzon reported the high-flying enemy bombers to the air warning center by telephone or telegraph.[33] Colonel George, chief of staff of the Interceptor Command, was in the plotting room when the reports were coming in, and predicted "that the objective of this formidable formation was Clark Field."[34]
At about 1145, according to Col. Alexander H. Campbell, the aircraft warning officer, a warning message went out to Clark Field by teletype. If the message did not get through, as is frequently asserted, this fact was not know to the officers in the plotting room at Nielson. It is asserted also that an attempt to warn the field by radio over the Far East Air Force net was made, but with no success. The reason for this failure can only be guessed. Col. James V. Colier, a G-3 officer in USAFFE headquarters, later stated, "The radio operator had left his station to go to lunch," and another source states, "Radio reception was drowned by static which the Japanese probably caused by systematic jamming of the frequencies."[35] Apparently other available means of communication, such as the long distance telephone lines, telegraph, and the command radio net to Fort Stotsenburg, were not used or thought of. Colonel Campbell did get a telephone message through to Clark Field and talked with an unknown junior officer there. This officer intended, said Campbell, to give the base commander or the operations officer the message at the earliest opportunity.[36]

Meanwhile, Colonel George at Nielson had dispersed his fighters to meet the attack. The 34th Squadron was ordered to cover Clark Field; the 17th, the Bataan peninsula; and the 21st, the Manila area. The 3d Squadron at Iba was dispatched to intercept a reported enemy formation over the South China Sea.[37] At Clark Field, two squadrons of B-17s and the 20th Pursuit Squadron were still on the ground. Sometime shortly before 1145 the fighters were ordered aloft as soon as refueling was completed to cover their own base.[38]

The 3d Pursuit Squadron took off from Iba to intercept the enemy flight over the South China Sea. A thick haze of dust prevented the 34th at Del Carmen from taking off, and at 1215 the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark, whose planes had just completed refueling, made ready to take off.[39]
 
MacArthur's overall Dec 1941 performance should go down as one of the most incompetent months of Generalship since McClellan in 1862.

He ignored the existing plans, let his planes get caught on teh ground, and instead of retreating to Bataan immediately, He tried to meet the Japanese as they landed on Northern Luzon, got outmaneuvered, flanked and forced to retreat, allowing the Japanese to capture 2/3 of his food, ammunition and fuel supplies.

Had he retreated to Bataan to begin with (which *was* the plan), with 3 times the supplies he had in OTL, they could probably have held out for more like a year, instead of 4 months. If Macarthur died in that campaign, he'd be considered one of the worst generals in US history

mac didn't know the date of the attack? what happened to his crystal ball? did IGHQ stop conferring with him? withdrawing immediately to bataan was never, at any time, the plan. it was always the last chance all else fails option. he tried to carry out the existing plan(recently approved and why so much equipment/reinforcements were being sent).
 
Not really with what you said about General Bereton he was given orders by General MacArthur and if he sent those bombers south to Mindano it was order by MacArthur. Bereton wanted to take Taiwan in the early morning of December 8, 1941 but MacArthur did not approved of this. Also Bereton wanted to send his bombers much further south near Davao but MacArthur only told hime to send the bombers and fly around Mindano. Now that is a big mistake which Bereton knew but could not do anything. When the bomber return to Clark Field around 11 AM, Bereton knew that it was a big mistake. Also MacArthur wanted a bomb strike on Taiwan around 2:30 pm but were caught on the ground. Remember Bereton was following orders and he could not take his own orders but to follow MacArthur. After the war Bereton gave an interview saying that he would have done diferent things but he was not in charge and had to follow orders.

Bereton claimed he received no orders at all from MacArthur. Nothing until very late in the morning.
 
mac didn't know the date of the attack? what happened to his crystal ball? did IGHQ stop conferring with him? withdrawing immediately to bataan was never, at any time, the plan. it was always the last chance all else fails option. he tried to carry out the existing plan(recently approved and why so much equipment/reinforcements were being sent).


Mac has 8-12 hours warning, and still got caught with his planes on the ground. As for retreating to Bataan right away, that was ALWAYS the plan, because the War Department knew there were Japanese bases between The Phillipines and the US, so it would take some time to relieve them, better to be in what was effectively a redoubt
 
Actually, they were expecting an attack of some sort IIRC or at least some sort of trouble. But an air attack caught them completely out-of-sorts.

If memory serves, we basically expected them to hit the Philippines, at which point U.S.-Filipino forces were to make a fighting retreat down to the Bataan Peninsula, as they did IOTL, and hold out as long as possible while U.S.N. Pacific Fleet assets rallied at Hawaii and set out escorting a relief convoy.

Imperial Japanese forces would have sought to interdict them, and likely done so somewhere along the way, resulting in a huge naval battle in which, U.S.N. planners hoped, the American forces would win. They would then keep going to the Philippines, unload their precious cargoes of troops and supplies, and set about winning.
 
If memory serves, we basically expected them to hit the Philippines, at which point U.S.-Filipino forces were to make a fighting retreat down to the Bataan Peninsula, as they did IOTL, and hold out as long as possible while U.S.N. Pacific Fleet assets rallied at Hawaii and set out escorting a relief convoy.

Imperial Japanese forces would have sought to interdict them, and likely done so somewhere along the way, resulting in a huge naval battle in which, U.S.N. planners hoped, the American forces would win. They would then keep going to the Philippines, unload their precious cargoes of troops and supplies, and set about winning.

That plan was found to be unworkable as early as 1910 & abandoned by 1922. The USN had been doing staff studies, map exercises, and fleet exercises on the problem of supporting the Phillipines since at least 1907 - there was a war scare that year. While the Battan redoubt was the only option for the few thousand in the Phillipines defense force in the 1920s the part about the USN rushing off the save them was dropped. In the wargames and fleet exercises it never ended well for the USN. It was recognized two things would be needed to support the PI: 1. A intermeadiate base. Micronesia was the ideal location, tho other place might do. 2. A significantly larger battle fleet than the Japanese. Trying to defeat the Japanese navy at long range with only parity in the battle fleet resulted in stalemate at best and often the conclusion was defeat. There were a lot of reasons for this. One of the largest is the battle fleet could not carry enough fuel for combat operations between the Hawiian islands and PI. A straight through cruise was not problem, but combat ops sucked the fuel tanks dry.

This problem was gamed, tested at sea, and endlessly studied by naval staffs from around 1907 through 1941. The strategy recommended by the USN & embodied in War Plan Orange was for the Navy to spend from 12 to 24 months raiding Japanese bases and making opportunistic attacks. During that time a construction program would expand the fleet, both the battle fleet and more importantly the support fleet. Securing a intermeadiate base anywhere and landing a fresh army in the PI was going to require a large cargo fleet, and a well organized one. Hastily contracting a mass of commercial carriers was not going to get it. The Russian example from 1905 showed how wrong this could go. The British experience in moving expeditionary forces around the globe for a couple centuries, and recently in the Great war showed how it had to be done. Going off in a rush was guranteed to end badly.

War Plan Orange was rolled into the Rainbow plans a the end of 1940. But, the basic naval strategy remained in those. First a year or more of naval construction and preparation, then a methodical advance across the Central pacific where US advanced bases would be secured and the Japanese naval bases nuetralized. The last peacetime example of this would be Admiral Kimmels WPPac-46, published in March 1941 shortly after he took command of the Pacific Fleet. I dont have a copy in document form that can be attached here, but the original is on the net and a little work should turn it up if my link does not work.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410725apac.html

Of course it was extremely unlikely the Phillipines defense force of the 1920s or 1930s could hold out a year or more. However the US Congress repeatedly refused to vote funds for a proper defense. While there was a small minority who favored such a thing the majority repeatedly wrote off defending PI with each budget bill.
 
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I read a magazine called sea classic almost 18 years ago where someone wrote about this and that on the morning December 7, 1941 the radar on Opara point picked up the first incoming airstrike. The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard, reported a target. But Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees difference) to the bombers, and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size. Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of the six B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known). If the operators would have told the size to Tyler, then things would have been diferrent. Tyler would have informed to his superiors about this and maybe the fighters would have been scramble. Also seeing this the fleet would be on red alert. Then maybe things would have gone diferrently.

I have always wondered what Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler's response would have been if that flight of B-17's was not scheduled to arrive until Monday morning, 8 December 1942. Who would he have called? I know when I was a battalion/DivArty SDO the SOP was to call the XO if anything serious came up. I wonder what the SOP would be followed by Lt. Tyler (or even if there was and SOP)? I am sure a lieutenant (first or second) could not on his own alert army force to stand to. And then there was the navy. Since we all know the army never talks to the navy, when would the navy gotten notified? The question then becomes how long would it take to contact superiors and get a answer as to what to do and how long was it between Privates Elliot and Lockard reporting the target and the first bombs falling?

The other question is why did that flight of B-17 leave California Saturday evening? Why did they not wait until Monday morning to begin the flight?
 
If you want to know how and why the disaster in the Philippines happened read William Bartsch, December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor. It does an excellent job of explaining what transpired. From what I remember (I don't have the book handy), there were two or three pursuit squadrons in the air but they were out of position, diverted to the wrong location, etc. by poor air defense coordination. Even if they had been in position, it would not have been pretty. Their training levels were low, guns had not been bore-sighted, there was a insufficient Prestone anti-freeze for the Allison engines, overall lack of spare parts. You name it, it was FUBARed.
 
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