Assume that FDR receives information that the Japanese intend to attack Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. How does the United States respond to this threat?
What's the source? Is it a personal telegram from the Japanese Emperor - 'Help! My crazy military chiefs are planning to attack your nation at Pearl Harbour and in the Philippines on <insert dates and times here>' or is it a vague rumour picked up from a friend of a friend of a low-ranking US embassy intelligence man in Tokyo?Assume that FDR receives information that the Japanese intend to attack Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. How does the United States respond to this threat?
Actually, they were expecting an attack of some sort IIRC or at least some sort of trouble. But an air attack caught them completely out-of-sorts.
Depends on how much notice the USN gets. The attack commenced after 7am. If the USN gets notice of the attack the night before, at 20 knots, the slowest battleships could be anywhere within 150 miles.An actual sortie of the fleet leaving Pearl Harbor would result in a worse result as it would mean more loss of life and less likely to refloat the ships.
Move the ships out of port the day before. Have CAP up to stop the IJN aircraft. And........ have a significant submarine force off Japanese ports to kill the returning carriers.Assume that FDR receives information that the Japanese intend to attack Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. How does the United States respond to this threat?
The problem was, all indications of 'enemy action' were that it would be sabotage of some kind, not an air-raid.I think it is fairly easy. The existing notices to Kimmel and Short IOTL should have prompted them to take action. Throughout late November and early December messages from Admiral Stark (the Chief of Naval Operations) and General Marshall (US Army Chief of Staff) told them to expect enemy action at any moment and to take such preparations as needed. For some reason though, Kimmel did nothing. He blamed the contradictory commands in the messages. However, where he saw contradictory messages, I only see the routine bureaucratic language organizations routinely use. The intent was always clear - expect enemy action at any moment, and take all measures necessary for defense.
I think it is fairly easy. The existing notices to Kimmel and Short IOTL should have prompted them to take action. Throughout late November and early December messages from Admiral Stark (the Chief of Naval Operations) and General Marshall (US Army Chief of Staff) told them to expect enemy action at any moment and to take such preparations as needed. For some reason though, Kimmel did nothing. He blamed the contradictory commands in the messages. However, where he saw contradictory messages, I only see the routine bureaucratic language organizations routinely use. The intent was always clear - expect enemy action at any moment, and take all measures necessary for defense.
Kimmel and Short were not derelict of their duty, but they did massively screw up.
....
The problem was, all indications of 'enemy action' were that it would be sabotage of some kind, not an air-raid.
Depends on how much notice the USN gets. The attack commenced after 7am. If the USN gets notice of the attack the night before, at 20 knots, the slowest battleships could be anywhere within 150 miles.
Maybe, but the Japanese hadn't even declared their intention to cease negotiations before they attacked, never mind declaring war, so whether or not it had been wargamed, it wasn't expected.That has a bit of myth as well. The USN and Hawaian Defense command had done staff studies, table exercises, and fleet exercises that showed it was practical to attack the island with carriers. Fleet plans and exercise had been run to attack such a raid. There was a concern about Japanese sabatoge, but it was not the only or even primary concern.
Maybe, but the Japanese hadn't even declared their intention to cease negotiations before they attacked, never mind declaring war,
so whether or not it had been wargamed, it wasn't expected.
All WI and AH changes, but it would have been ideal if the US carriers had been in a position to launch strikes after Japan launched theirs. Then have the planes on Oahu loaded and airborne. With all AAA manned and ready the US might have been able to take out Japanese planes and carriers.
I admit very big changes from OTL, but I can think it and dream.![]()
No, the war warning made it sound like the negotiations were in trouble, not that they'd actually failed.Yet the War Warning made it clear that negotiations had ceased, and that hostile action should be expected.
which is quite different from knowing there's an enemy fleet just days away from your main naval base.It also made it clear any Japanese military aircraft or ships sighted were to be considered hostile and could be attacked.
The war warning was vague and a little contradictory, and placed greater emphasis on sabotage and other subversive operations than an outright attack. This is why they were exonerated in 1999.Not expecting a attack Oahu had become the most densely defended bit of territory of the US. Hmm... When the war warning came the fleet went to sea, submarine picket line was deployed, the Army manned the combat posts, and the air groups run ragged on reconissance missions.
Move the ships out of port the day before. Have CAP up to stop the IJN aircraft. And........ have a significant submarine force off Japanese ports to kill the returning carriers.
The problem was, all indications of 'enemy action' were that it would be sabotage of some kind, not an air-raid.
Well as far as I'm aware, there was nothing in the warnings that got sent about a military attack on Pearl Harbour, but some warnings about potential sabotage attacks, thus Kimmel and Short were raked over the coals for stuff that wasn't really their fault. Also, it should be noticeable that Macarthur somehow survived with his career intact, despite screwing up far worse than Kimmel and Short (the message to him was explicit about potential attacks, he had better codebreaking capabilities at his command, and PH occurred nine hours before any attack on PI).Really, my understanding was that the 'War warning' was interpreted by Short - because sabotage was the only possible danger to the base, air attack and/or invasion were just too ridicules to consider from his point of view - though they may follow-on. They perceived the more overt action to take place to the west, Philippines, Wake, Guam, whereas the danger to PH was more subversive in character. While Washington, may not have had PH as being on the danger list - their war warning was to all bases to take all means to guard against an attack.