WI: Peace on the Eastern Front in December 1917

In december 1917, an armistice was concluded between the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks. The TL;DR version of this is that the CPs initially only demanded for Poland, Lithuania and Courland which roughly corresponded to the frontline. The Bolshevik negotiations stuck with their policy of "no annexations, no indemnities", after which the CP slapped the Bolshevik negotiator with the right to self-determination the Bolsheviks themselves espoused.

Wikipedia said:
The Russians only hopes were that given time their allies would agree to join the negotiations or that the western European proletariat would revolt, so their best strategy was to prolong the negotiations. As Foreign Minister Leon Trotsky wrote "To delay negotiations, there must be someone to do the delaying".[17] Therefore Trotsky replaced Joffe as the leader.

That of course just made things worse for them and resulted in OTL's Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with OTL's terms. So what if the Bolsheviks made immediate peace in December 1917 by signing away Poland, Lithuania and Courland to consolidate their revolution instead of March 1918? What are the consequences, if any, on the how the Great War plays out?
 
The sooner the Germans can move forces west the better for them. Michael may go off sooner, which means even fewer Americans in France, let alone ready to go in to the line. The question is, can the offensive do well enough to break French morale? What will it take to do that - lose Paris, totally split the British and French forces, any ideas? If all they do is gain more territory in the west, some of which they will end up giving up to establish a good defensive line, they may prolong the war but they don't win it. US industry is ramping up to actually produce what the US Army needs, and the US was on track to have 2 million men in the AEF in France by early spring 1919. Of course, there is lots more manpower on tap for the USA.
 
Two to three more Corps available for operatiion Michael in the west right from the beginning ?

The sooner the Germans can move forces west the better for them. Michael may go off sooner, which means even fewer Americans in France, let alone ready to go in to the line. The question is, can the offensive do well enough to break French morale? What will it take to do that - lose Paris, totally split the British and French forces, any ideas? If all they do is gain more territory in the west, some of which they will end up giving up to establish a good defensive line, they may prolong the war but they don't win it. US industry is ramping up to actually produce what the US Army needs, and the US was on track to have 2 million men in the AEF in France by early spring 1919. Of course, there is lots more manpower on tap for the USA.

My gues that with 2-3 extra corps from the get-go, the German Spring Offensive could at the very least take Amiens and Hazebrouck, which both appear to have been key supply hubs to the Entente. From there, they can try to cut off the BEF by racing toward the coast. Actually, come to think of it, there could be more than 2-3 additional corps as they could also use troops that IOTL were used to occupy Ukraine. If they split the Entente powers and drive the BEF into the sea, I'm guessing the Germans win by spring or summer 1918.
 
Does anyone have any thoughts on what the peace would look like if the CPs win in early to mid 1918? Do Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans have any chances of survival at this point in time?
 
Assuming the CPs have managed to avoid the US entry to war, using the draw down of liquidity by 1916 and more doubts about what the Anglo-French will actually do, I am trying to talk the PG into accepting peace feelers rather than simply stay the course and get us past February. I am hoping the British are poor enough that their promised loans look too wishful.

And if I give Germany better gains in an East First scenario, likely already closer to OTL B-L line of advance, I think the PG can give away Poland, Courland and negotiate for Western Ukraine and assorted as the Entente now faces the big shift West in the air. Will Germany yield something to shift West? Will the British decide its time to talk? Will France?
 

raharris1973

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What happens within Russia while the rest of the war plays out. How large does the civil war flare up? Do the Bolsheviks get more trouble from the Left SR's?

From December 1917 to December 1918, is a Russian civil war putting all the Russian peripheries into anti-Bolshevik hands temporarily, or is the Bolshevik regime maintaining secure control over European Russia, to include Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Ukraine, Bessarabia, Georgia and Kars-Ardahan?

Can the two-three extra corps be fed and supplied reliably during their east to west transit, and then at the front line, up to the launch of Michael?
 

raharris1973

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Does anyone have any thoughts on what the peace would look like if the CPs win in early to mid 1918? Do Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans have any chances of survival at this point in time?

Yes, the AH-ers and Ottomans can survive, although Ottoman territory will be reduced.

Do the Germans/CPs launch an intervention into Russia right away after winning in the west? If not, and the Bolsheviks consolidate control earlier (the Allies being too desperate on the west front to do much for the Whites) will the Bolsheviks adopt the NEP economic policy for reconstruction, or will they try to build socialism continuously, perhaps trying to collectivize in the early 1920s?
 
Yes, the AH-ers and Ottomans can survive, although Ottoman territory will be reduced.

Do the Germans/CPs launch an intervention into Russia right away after winning in the west? If not, and the Bolsheviks consolidate control earlier (the Allies being too desperate on the west front to do much for the Whites) will the Bolsheviks adopt the NEP economic policy for reconstruction, or will they try to build socialism continuously, perhaps trying to collectivize in the early 1920s?

Depending on the timing, you might have the Arab Revolt fizzle, if Germany looks like it might win and thus the Ottomans will not be defeated, there was sentiment in the Arab leadership to cease the revolt, I think they felt used and worried the British would leave, and they knew the Ottomans if returning would be far more fearsome. So even reduced territory may or may not be as serious as some propose, taking the Hejaz is really dumb, giving anything to France will lose Arab support, etc. Britain grabbing land ill only alienate the Arabs, even if under supposed independent "Kingdoms". As per OTL, the reign is about as stable or long lived.
 
Even if the Germans are winning in the west in 1918, Take the rail centers and French coal mines within reach. I can't see a peace.

Britain can't agree to give back Germany's colonies and have them setup submarine bases all over the world for the next war.
France isn't going to want to give up another strip of territory to Germany.

So what probably happens is the German gains make any counter attack in 1918 impossible. In 1919 the Allies attack on all front and crush the Central Powers. A smart Germany agrees to a real compromise peace before that happens. Actual Germany won't and just loses.

A compromise peace:

1914 boundaries in the west. German gains in the east recognized, German colonies lost (the gains in the east worth far more that any African colonies anyway).

Serbia reduced to status of an Austrian client state.

Turkey picks up Kars and Batum, otherwise back to 1914 boundaries.

Italy at 1914 boundaries.
 
A compromise peace:

1914 boundaries in the west. German gains in the east recognized, German colonies lost (the gains in the east worth far more that any African colonies anyway).

Serbia reduced to status of an Austrian client state.

Turkey picks up Kars and Batum, otherwise back to 1914 boundaries.

Italy at 1914 boundaries

Agreed on all accounts sans the last. Britain and France may not be willing to give up anything themselves, but I'm not confident they're going to be sticking out their neck for Italy's sake. At the very least, I think Austria will insist Italy renounces all claims on Austrian territory and influence over Albania as well as demilitarization of Veneto/the Italian side of the Adriatic, similar to the minor border changes that were imposed on Romania, as well as a return of the Dodecanese to the Ottomans.
 
Yes, the AH-ers and Ottomans can survive, although Ottoman territory will be reduced.

Do the Germans/CPs launch an intervention into Russia right away after winning in the west? If not, and the Bolsheviks consolidate control earlier (the Allies being too desperate on the west front to do much for the Whites) will the Bolsheviks adopt the NEP economic policy for reconstruction, or will they try to build socialism continuously, perhaps trying to collectivize in the early 1920s?

A surviving Imperial Germany would have no love for Bolshevism and I believe they'd at least attempt an intervention to kill the fledgling Soviet state in the cradle. Germany will be in bad shape after a victory in 1918, just like Britain and France were IOTL and their OTL intervention was no success, but the Germans do have geographic proximity working for them. From Courland they can start up their intervention by advancing on Petrograd and then giving it to whatever White General they like the most and see where things roll from there. If the Bolsheviks lose Moscow too, they lose the Russian Civil War and after that we're likely looking at warlord cliques of former Tsarist generals, possibly with a figurehead Tsar.
 
Depending on the timing, you might have the Arab Revolt fizzle, if Germany looks like it might win and thus the Ottomans will not be defeated, there was sentiment in the Arab leadership to cease the revolt, I think they felt used and worried the British would leave, and they knew the Ottomans if returning would be far more fearsome. So even reduced territory may or may not be as serious as some propose, taking the Hejaz is really dumb, giving anything to France will lose Arab support, etc. Britain grabbing land ill only alienate the Arabs, even if under supposed independent "Kingdoms". As per OTL, the reign is about as stable or long lived.

Not to mention, France and GB will now be in a geopolitical conflict for global interest with Germany in which the Ottomans are a particularly valuable prize (And there are certainly pro-Entente elements within the Turkish government and society). Finding a way to pry the Caliphate out of the German orbit is certainly a strategy I imagine they could try pursuing, since Arab Nationalism as a cause is probably going to be thoroughly discredited in traditionally Islamic elements of society, and the Turkish nationalism of the CUP leadership is likely to open up potential for political support from those elements for a more liberal leaning Pan-Islamist/Ottomanist movement
 
Not to mention, France and GB will now be in a geopolitical conflict for global interest with Germany in which the Ottomans are a particularly valuable prize (And there are certainly pro-Entente elements within the Turkish government and society). Finding a way to pry the Caliphate out of the German orbit is certainly a strategy I imagine they could try pursuing, since Arab Nationalism as a cause is probably going to be thoroughly discredited in traditionally Islamic elements of society, and the Turkish nationalism of the CUP leadership is likely to open up potential for political support from those elements for a more liberal leaning Pan-Islamist/Ottomanist movement

A surviving OE is quite interesting itself, the ideological as well as geo-political struggle between surviving peer and near-peer powers is fascinating fodder for all sorts of odd paths. I think we assume the OE and Germany remain friends, the linkage between Germany and Turkey still exists, but the OE had its own agenda and simply being exploited by Germany rather than the British or French is not going to go smoothly. An odd side note is the mixed reaction to the Armenian Genocide, not a few Germans were horrified, so a surviving Empire might have the topic return to impact relations. And certainly both the British and French have levers to pull, any change in allies usually leaves someone alienated, the OE should be a friction zone, just as it was, and as the oil wealth ramps in, the competition gets more serious than access to the Straights. But it also might be interesting to ponder how being allied to a major European (Western/Christian) state alters the path in both Middle Eastern as well as Islamic engagement with that world beyond merely having the money or a legacy of imperialism. We might see more Islamic culture injected into Germany and some German culture mixed into Ottoman life.
 
A surviving OE is quite interesting itself, the ideological as well as geo-political struggle between surviving peer and near-peer powers is fascinating fodder for all sorts of odd paths. I think we assume the OE and Germany remain friends, the linkage between Germany and Turkey still exists, but the OE had its own agenda and simply being exploited by Germany rather than the British or French is not going to go smoothly. An odd side note is the mixed reaction to the Armenian Genocide, not a few Germans were horrified, so a surviving Empire might have the topic return to impact relations. And certainly both the British and French have levers to pull, any change in allies usually leaves someone alienated, the OE should be a friction zone, just as it was, and as the oil wealth ramps in, the competition gets more serious than access to the Straights. But it also might be interesting to ponder how being allied to a major European (Western/Christian) state alters the path in both Middle Eastern as well as Islamic engagement with that world beyond merely having the money or a legacy of imperialism. We might see more Islamic culture injected into Germany and some German culture mixed into Ottoman life.

One key question here is just how these crucial extra months feed into the Russian Civil War and, by extention, the independence wars on her fringe territories. If we have an OE getting involved in Transcaucasia to any serious degree (Which, given Enver's Turnist ideals and general desire, if not to crush the Soviets exactly, by all the major powers to contain Russia/Communism, seems likely) and supporting the Azeri and maintaining the goodwill of the Kurds, they may very well be presenting the world with a fiat accompli with they and their ethnic allies regretably overseeing a severe dip in the local Armenian population to the point that constructing a surviving political entity/pressure group just isen't feesable. Perhaps in the long view of history it'd get a sharper critique, but in the short to medium terms political considerations likely result in Western Europe holding their noses and treating the situation like they would the horrible actions of "SOB's, but OUR SOB's" by the Superpowers during the Cold War. They certainly occupy a strategic position (And, if the Azeri and Chechen are effectively tied into their sphere, THEN a notable share of the petroleum production... otherwise we're projecting out a couple of decades before sources like Galicia, Romania, and California/Texas get overshadows, particularly if we include access to refining facilities) which would encourage this kind of looking the other way.

There's also the question of just how much the CUP can make its ideological goals 'stick' without alienating the Arab provinces overmuch. A compromise away from the ultra-centeralization, modern ethno-nationalism by blending in elements of Islamism/traditional governance would certainly do much to win back the loyalty of the south... though I wonder just how forgiving they'd be to those elites who betrayed them to side with the British. Purging them for treason would certainly provide a capital oppritunity to "drain the swamp", as it were, and replace them with more plient locals in positions of power.
 
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