WI/PC: Early Iran-Iraq War and Consequences

The political parts, yes. The military parts, no.

Make the Iranian intervention exceedingly halfhearted, and still have them win on the battlefield. If it grows in scope, the Arabs can't win.

Thanks for your help. As you can probably, tell, I don't know all that much about the Iran-Iraq War, specifically their militaries' strengths and weaknesses. I've been trying to do research, but there is a limited amount of time that I have, and not all that much access to highly detailed sources.

So, a half-hearted Iranian intervention... Could that come as they invade in order to pull an Iranian-backed Kurdish rebel militia's chestnuts out of the fire after Iraq's military, however poorly trained and led it is, wipes the floor with Kurdish tribesmen armed with Enfield rifles. Iraqi troops get close to the border, and cross several times to engage Kurdish rebels supported by the Iranians. The Shah, to quiet down his population through nationalist pandering, attacks Iraqi troops and invades Kurdistan mostly, but attacks all along the border to draw Iraqi forces off.

The war, which lasts only a month or so, ends with an independent Kurdistan and a victorious Iran. However, it also ends with an Iraq "brought in from the cold" in the Arab world, and much greater distrust among the Arab states of alliance with the United States. Sadat in Egypt, under pressure from Nasserists domestically, swings back towards the Non-Aligned Movement and the USSR. The Gulf states remain American allies, but support the Arab League becoming a greater force in the region.

On another note, would the death of Saddam Hussein, and therefore no purging of the Iraqi officer corps, affect the operational ability of the Iraqi army? I was under the impression that Saddam's Stalin-esque purges in 1979 had made a reasonably effective military (especially the armoured corps) completely and totally useless in the field.
 
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Cook

Banned
Also people grossly overstate just how effective Iran's army under the Shah would be. Yeah, it looked strong on paper (as did the Iraqi army) but the Shah's goverment was corrupt, ineffective and unpopular.
Given that the Iranian Regular Army divisions proved themselves quite effective during the Eight Year War even after the purge of officers loyal to the Shah, the fact that army training had virtually ceased between the fall of the Shah and the commencement of the war, the shortages of spare parts that saw them cannibalising armoured vehicles to keep others running, and the inability to replace American ammunition, it isn’t unreasonable to expect a significantly better performance in a war five years earlier.
 
Thanks for your help. As you can probably, tell, I don't know all that much about the Iran-Iraq War, specifically their militaries' strengths and weaknesses. I've been trying to do research, but there is a limited amount of time that I have, and not all that much access to highly detailed sources.

Yes. Iraqi procedure at the time of the story was to advance extremely cautiously, with much firepower.

So, a half-hearted Iranian intervention... Could that come as they invade in order to pull an Iranian-backed Kurdish rebel militia's chestnuts out of the fire after Iraq's military, however poorly trained and led it is, wipes the floor with Kurdish tribesmen armed with Enfield rifles. Iraqi troops get close to the border, and cross several times to engage Kurdish rebels supported by the Iranians. The Shah, to quiet down his population through nationalist pandering, attacks Iraqi troops and invades Kurdistan mostly, but attacks all along the border to draw Iraqi forces off.

Sounds all right. Historically, Iran even sent disguised troops and funneled more modern weapons to the Kurds to bail out their rebellion when they stupidly tried to fight a conventional war with Iraq.


The war, which lasts only a month or so, ends with an independent Kurdistan and a victorious Iran. However, it also ends with an Iraq "brought in from the cold" in the Arab world, and much greater distrust among the Arab states of alliance with the United States. Sadat in Egypt, under pressure from Nasserists domestically, swings back towards the Non-Aligned Movement and the USSR. The Gulf states remain American allies, but support the Arab League becoming a greater force in the region.

Sounds acceptable.

On another note, would the death of Saddam Hussein, and therefore no purging of the Iraqi officer corps, affect the operational ability of the Iraqi army? I was under the impression that Saddam's Stalin-esque purges in 1979 had made a reasonably effective military (especially the armoured corps) completely and totally useless in the field.

On the strategic level, they'll be slightly better. On the tactical level, they'll be as poor as they always were. Iraq's armor was never very good. In the Yom Kippur War, it was aggressive but poorly skilled even by the standards of Arab armies. Units almost never maneuvered or even conducted basic patrols, making them easy to encircle.

They resorted to giant fortifications to hold off Iran's mostly infantry army on the defense, and scripted attacks on the offense. In a war against the shah's full army, they don't stand a chance.
 
Another question. Turkey's role: How does Turkey react to a war like this? On one hand, Turkey, an American ally, has been aligned with Iran for a long time. On the other hand, the Iranian intervention is supporting a Kurdish revolution, which would create a possibly irredentist Kurdish state. That would be extremely dangerous to Turkey's territorial integrity, and would be a major fear of Turkey's military establishment. Is it possible that they secretly allow Soviet fighters across their airspace in tacit support of Iraq, but publicly stay neutral. Would they pull out of NATO's command structure (a la France), or out of NATO altogether, in the event of major American support for the Kurds?
 
The Shah doesn't want an independent Kurdish state. He backed those rebels because they weakened Iraq, having them successfully break away would sabotage relations with Turkey and present a threat to Iran's own territorial integrity. The Shah ought to remember that Barzani was once involved with the Republic of Mahabad.

Sadat's not going to change alignment over this. His main goal was recovering the Sinai and he's not going to throw away an opportunity for Iraq's sake. And the Corrective Revolution assured that nobody could tell him differently.

I disagree rising power of iran whether shah or ayatollah was a bigger threat to them

It makes a big difference whether it was the Shah or the Ayatollah. It was the latter that was trying to bring the Shiites of the Persian Gulf under an Iranian sphere of influence, not the former. Imperial Iran would not be seen as a threat unless it exhibits expansionist aims. That means initiating the war or defeating an initial Iraqi onslaught and then marching on Baghdad.

Only problem is that saddam is hardly a puppet of soviets infact their relationship was very troublesome.
No, he's not a Soviet puppet, he's a Soviet ally. He's a threat to US allies in a vital region of the world, a wealthy and reliable buyer of Soviet arms and a member of the hardline group in OPEC.

They wouldnt start WW III to save saddam.
They'd attack Iran and hope to Karl Marx that it doesn't lead to WWIII. Same way they were willing to send forces to Syria during the Yom Kippur War if left with no other option to prevent the Israelis from taking Damascus. Same way they were willing to retaliate to a US invasion of Cuba during the Missile Crisis.

They would likely use their influence to have him accept a face saving peace ASAP and use diplomatic efforts to persuade western powers to stop the Shah.
I'm talking about a scenario where it's the Shah that won't accept peace. The Soviets don't have to convince anyone to do anything, the Americans would already be pushing the Shah in order to prevent a Soviet response, since they actually would take the risk of a superpower clash seriously.
 
The Shah doesn't want an independent Kurdish state. He backed those rebels because they weakened Iraq, having them successfully break away would sabotage relations with Turkey and present a threat to Iran's own territorial integrity. The Shah ought to remember that Barzani was once involved with the Republic of Mahabad.

Wouldn't they want to weaken the Iraqi regime more than they would want to avoid alienating the Turks? Especially if they had a large Kurdish refugee problem (similar to the Palestinians), wouldn't they care more about appeasing their domestic Kurdish population and creating instability in Iraq then their relationship with Turkey? Another point is that by becoming the Kurds' patron, the Iranians gain a level of power of the Turks, as they can back Kurdish uprisings or block them through their control over the Kurdish nationalists' arms supply.

Sadat's not going to change alignment over this. His main goal was recovering the Sinai and he's not going to throw away an opportunity for Iraq's sake. And the Corrective Revolution assured that nobody could tell him differently.

While they want the Sinai back, Sadat may feel that the best way to do that is through hostile action once again as opposed to negotiation. The USA, if it continues to support Iran through the whole debacle of a war, will have showed Egypt that it isn't serious about supporting it. That might have pushed Sadat back towards his routes in Nasserism. It might even cause a uprising or coup if he didn't push back.

It makes a big difference whether it was the Shah or the Ayatollah. It was the latter that was trying to bring the Shiites of the Persian Gulf under an Iranian sphere of influence, not the former. Imperial Iran would not be seen as a threat unless it exhibits expansionist aims. That means initiating the war or defeating an initial Iraqi onslaught and then marching on Baghdad.

Wouldn't Arab states still fear a non-Arab, Shi'a interloper in their territory, especially one that would create the precedent that an oppressed minority can free itself with foreign help? Why couldn't the Palestinians in Jordan do it? Or the Christians in Syria? Or the Shiites in the Gulf? Or the Copts in Egypt?

No, he's not a Soviet puppet, he's a Soviet ally. He's a threat to US allies in a vital region of the world, a wealthy and reliable buyer of Soviet arms and a member of the hardline group in OPEC. They'd attack Iran and hope to Karl Marx that it doesn't lead to WWIII. Same way they were willing to send forces to Syria during the Yom Kippur War if left with no other option to prevent the Israelis from taking Damascus. Same way they were willing to retaliate to a US invasion of Cuba during the Missile Crisis.

You think they would attack Iran? Would they actually send tanks over the border? Wouldn't they hold off on such a drastic step because it would risk bringing the Americans into the war directly? I feel like they might do what the Americans did in the Yom Kippur War, and fly repainted Soviet planes into Iraq pretending they are Iraqi and Syrian planes that were "training" in the USSR. The ruse might work, and even if it didn't, it would create plausible deniability for the American, allowing them to stay out of a potential nuclear conflict. Both Carter and Ford, whoever is President at this point, won't be willing to support Iran militarily unless Soviet tanks cross the border.

I'm talking about a scenario where it's the Shah that won't accept peace. The Soviets don't have to convince anyone to do anything, the Americans would already be pushing the Shah in order to prevent a Soviet response, since they actually would take the risk of a superpower clash seriously.

Agreed. Likely, the war would be short. bloody, and would end with a different Iraqi government (likely still Ba'athist, maybe with more Communist influence) and an independent Kurdistan.
 
Wouldn't they want to weaken the Iraqi regime more than they would want to avoid alienating the Turks? Especially if they had a large Kurdish refugee problem (similar to the Palestinians), wouldn't they care more about appeasing their domestic Kurdish population and creating instability in Iraq then their relationship with Turkey? Another point is that by becoming the Kurds' patron, the Iranians gain a level of power of the Turks, as they can back Kurdish uprisings or block them through their control over the Kurdish nationalists' arms supply.

The Kurds are not someone you just control. The Kurds have oil to sell on the world market, they have the Soviets to get/buy weapons from and they have Syria to act as their window to the outside world. Hell, Southern Kurdistan will probably be even more pro-Soviet than Baathist Iraq. They're not in Iran's pocket and they'd be unreliable even if they were. The aspirations of Iranian Kurds are more likely to be fueled than appeased - after all, an independent Iraqi Kurdistan doesn't offer them anything besides an example.

Weakening Iraq was achieved by either keeping the regime and the Kurds at war with each other (and backing the weaker side) or being able to threaten it with a Kurdish uprising if it didn't behave. The Kurds were not Iran's friends, just a lesser enemy turned ally of convenience; you don't want to do them any great favors and you don't want them and the greater enemy to reach any final peace settlement and then potentially turn against you, both of them.

And the alliance with Turkey was a big fucking deal.

While they want the Sinai back, Sadat may feel that the best way to do that is through hostile action once again as opposed to negotiation. The USA, if it continues to support Iran through the whole debacle of a war, will have showed Egypt that it isn't serious about supporting it. That might have pushed Sadat back towards his routes in Nasserism. It might even cause a uprising or coup if he didn't push back.
US support for Iran would mean nothing to Sadat. Saddam was not his friend, the Shah was not his enemy and his OTL actions show that he did not believe in some international Arab cause that had anything to do with getting the Sinai back. The US actions that interested him first and foremost concerned Israel and the occupied territory. I don't think even Nasser would have thrown away that opportunity for Iraq's sake, all rhetoric to the contrary. If anything, the US bailing out on a major ally would create doubts as to the worth of improving relations with Washington.

Wouldn't Arab states still fear a non-Arab, Shi'a interloper in their territory, especially one that would create the precedent that an oppressed minority can free itself with foreign help? Why couldn't the Palestinians in Jordan do it? Or the Christians in Syria? Or the Shiites in the Gulf? Or the Copts in Egypt?
They wouldn't see it in terms of Arab vs non-Arab. The conservative regimes never believed in Arab solidarity, only referred to it on occasion and for ulterior motives. The radical regimes believed in it to some degree, but that didn't prevent Syria and Libya from backing Iran in the OTL war. As for the Shah, foreign Shiites were not his main concern; he certainly didn't let them prevent cordial relations between his monarchy and those of Saudi Arabia and (pre-1958) Iraq. If he initiated the war, or if he intends to end it with his troops in Baghdad, he did it only to eliminate a powerful rival. As I said in my first post in this thread, Syria and the Gulf monarchies would be on the fence in such a scenario, not because they saw the region through this lens you're pushing on them but because Iran would then transform from an ally threatened by a rival into an ambitious power seeking to eliminate that rival. Under the alternate scenario, their support for Iran would be unquestioned.

You think they would attack Iran? Would they actually send tanks over the border? Wouldn't they hold off on such a drastic step because it would risk bringing the Americans into the war directly? I feel like they might do what the Americans did in the Yom Kippur War, and fly repainted Soviet planes into Iraq pretending they are Iraqi and Syrian planes that were "training" in the USSR. The ruse might work, and even if it didn't, it would create plausible deniability for the American, allowing them to stay out of a potential nuclear conflict. Both Carter and Ford, whoever is President at this point, won't be willing to support Iran militarily unless Soviet tanks cross the border.
None of the superpowers wanted WWIII, but both were willing to risk it to protect major allies. I think I expressed myself wrongly - war with Iran would not be the Soviet's first option for saving the Baathist regime, but it would be an option. If massive deliveries of weaponry and munitions and the secret dispatch of Soviet forces doesn't do the trick, an ultimatum will be delivered to Iran, and it won't be a bluff. Backing down risks compromising Soviet credibility in the 3rd World just as they were making their greatest advances there.

Agreed. Likely, the war would be short. bloody, and would end with a different Iraqi government (likely still Ba'athist, maybe with more Communist influence) and an independent Kurdistan.
I already explained why I don't agree with that.
 
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