WI Patrice Lumumba was not overthrown?

What if Lumumba stayed in power instead of being overthrown and killed by Mobutu? Either the CIA and Belgians don't support Mobutu's coup or perhaps the coup fails due to greater Soviet support. This would avoid Mobutu's disasterous rule and butterfly away the Second Congo War, and perhaps the Rwandan Genocide.

What course would Lumumba's Pan-Africanism take?
 
What if Lumumba stayed in power instead of being overthrown and killed by Mobutu? Either the CIA and Belgians don't support Mobutu's coup or perhaps the coup fails due to greater Soviet support. This would avoid Mobutu's disasterous rule and butterfly away the Second Congo War, and perhaps the Rwandan Genocide.
In the simplest of terms, the Second Congo War is a blowover from the Rwandan and Burundian Genocides. I don't see how a different Congolese leader butterflies it.

Also, you're going to need an earlier POD to keep Lumumba in power. Surviving the coup is a whole different ball game to retaining a position of authority.
What course would Lumumba's Pan-Africanism take?
It'd probably be no more effective than the Pan-Africanism of Mugabe and Gaddafi. Such ideologies tend to have find little practical appeal outside fashionable urban circles, and oft degenerate into ideological covers for despotic regimes. Congo's plight isn't something a 'good' leader can butterfly away.
 
In the simplest of terms, the Second Congo War is a blowover from the Rwandan and Burundian Genocides. I don't see how a different Congolese leader butterflies it.

Arguably the one man most responsible for prolonging the Second Congo War was Laurent Kabila, a follower of Lumumba and radicalized in this youth when he fought against the Mobutu regime. All sides agreed to peace negotiations immediately after his assassination.
 
It'd probably be no more effective than the Pan-Africanism of Mugabe and Gaddafi. Such ideologies tend to have find little practical appeal outside fashionable urban circles, and oft degenerate into ideological covers for despotic regimes. Congo's plight isn't something a 'good' leader can butterfly away.

Neither of them fit into the 1950s/1960s Pan-African movement, Gaddafi was a Pan-African only when he realised being a rabid anti-West Nasserite attracted too much attention. Some people in the Tory Party tinkered with the idea of re-branding themselves the Worker's Party, doesn't mean David Cameron is now a Marxist.

If Lumumba could get anything like a stable country together it would more likely follow the example of Ghana and Tanzania, 'African Socialism' trying to combine self-sufficiency, the (supposed) inherent equality of the pre-colonial systems and Western democratic socialism.

Like them you'd see corruption, shortages due to autarky, nationalisations and the general teething problems of decolonisation. Add the Soviet connection and you might end up with a Contra style situation even if Lumumba can avoid full blown civil war.

Big difference between a country like Ghana and Congo however is that Ghana was quite developed by colonial standards, Congolese infrastructure was entirely based on Belgian resource collection which meant it started at the back of the race when it came to nation building.

If I was a newly secure President Lumumba who has defeated a military coup and a CIA-orchestrated plot to split off the wealthiest province in my country I'd take every ruble I could get. Would get messy.

If you search there is a Congo-wank floating around on here which is short and very good without jumping into ASB territory. Though its slightly depressing that a 'wank' about the Congo with a POD in the 1930s only has the country edging into the BRICS group in the present day.
 

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You'd get a less kleptocratic Congo. That said, the place was very underdeveloped, uneducated and corrupt (holdovers from the Colonial Period). As well, Belgium tried to sabotage the place as much as it could.

It'd still be per capita poor and a mess, but probably more like Nigeria than Sudan or Haiti.
 
Lumumba wasn't a very good statesman. He was very charismatic, but he lacked any real administrative talents and was hopelessly inept in international politics. It is hard to see how he could govern the Congo for any length of time. Most likely he'd be removed in a coup anyway, or see the Congo break up. Just the particulars would change.

If he stayed in power because of massive Soviet support, a Congolese civil war would likely see a separate state established at some point (some form of Katanga). The actual details would be complicated because there'd be so many factors to consider - pretexts, clandestine support, public diplomacy, UN votes, etc.
 
Lumumba wasn't a very good statesman. He was very charismatic, but he lacked any real administrative talents and was hopelessly inept in international politics.
I think that's unfair and heaps a plethora of problems on one man's shoulders. Lumumba's government was largely splintered from the word go and he inherited a crooked colonial system in which the only people who knew how to run it were jumping ship. Lumumba, like so many other post-colonial leaders, didn't grasp just how far the colonial powers would go to maintain their grip (even before independence the various colonial powers were scrambling to maintain their hold over their assets) but that's not to say he couldn't have developed if he hadn't been ousted; he wasn't even in power long enough, really.
 
KATANGA

I was going to start another thread for this, but this seems as good a place as any.

I think a more interesting question would be the repercussions of Tshombe's Katanga being allowed to exist, especially south of the border. While Lumumba was a weak ideologue, Tshombe was all about practicality. He would also have been a black African leader in charge of a country with a fairly significant white population, which could work wonders to allay the fears of the Southern Rhodesians, who were not the rabid racists they were and still are often made out to be. Thoughts, comments, counters?
 
I was going to start another thread for this, but this seems as good a place as any.

I think a more interesting question would be the repercussions of Tshombe's Katanga being allowed to exist, especially south of the border. While Lumumba was a weak ideologue, Tshombe was all about practicality. He would also have been a black African leader in charge of a country with a fairly significant white population, which could work wonders to allay the fears of the Southern Rhodesians, who were not the rabid racists they were and still are often made out to be. Thoughts, comments, counters?
Tshombe was pretty much the stooge of Belgian imperialism which, I suppose, is 'practical' if you want to sell out the populace you represent for your own personal gain. In general I feel that the local support for independence in Katanga, and Kasai, are largely exaggerated and for the most part it was the realpolitik machinations of various imperialist powers trying to weaken the left wing anti-colonials within the country as opposed to any bottom-up drive for independent Katanga. In other words, the only way Tshombe is going to cling onto power is by suppressing all the spontaneous strikes, protests, unrest etc that were occurring, and the only force to do that were white mercenaries and Belgian paratroopers.
 
Tshombe was pretty much the stooge of Belgian imperialism which, I suppose, is 'practical' if you want to sell out the populace you represent for your own personal gain. In general I feel that the local support for independence in Katanga, and Kasai, are largely exaggerated and for the most part it was the realpolitik machinations of various imperialist powers trying to weaken the left wing anti-colonials within the country as opposed to any bottom-up drive for independent Katanga. In other words, the only way Tshombe is going to cling onto power is by suppressing all the spontaneous strikes, protests, unrest etc that were occurring, and the only force to do that were white mercenaries and Belgian paratroopers.

While Tshombe may have been a stooge, there was a great deal of resentment building in Southern Katanga against the Kasaian immigrants in the province by the 1950s. In addition many Katangese felt that more of the revenue from the mines should remain in the province. One has to remember that the copper and cobalt from Katanga provided the single largest source of income for the Congo (around 50% of the revenues in 1960). However, the Katanga only had 1.7 million people in 1960 (13% of the Congo's total), many in the Katanga felt that the majority of their mineral wealth should remain in the province, and they preferred federalism or independence. Granted much of this ethnic nationalism was created by the divide and rule of the Belgian Colonial Authorities.

The Belgian mining conglomerate in Katanga (Union Minière du Haut Katanga) of course backed the Katangese aspirations for self rule, once it became clear that Belgium would quit the Congo. They backed separatist parties and began fanning the flames of ethnic hatred against the Kasaian immigrants. The European minority was the largest in terms of % of the population here, and they too backed Katangese separatist parties.

If the Katanga had been separated from the Congo in 1959 as was discussed at the time, there were talks of having it become its own autonomous state associated with Belgium leading to eventual independence. I dare say it would have been among the wealthiest African countries at least until 1975 when copper prices came tumbling down. At that point it would have probably faced some of the many problems that plagued copper-dependent Zambia. On the other hand, being pro-Western it probably would have maintained a free-market economy (unlike Zambia) and been the darling of western regimes receiving generous aid from Europe and the United States until the thawing of the cold war.

I assume that an independent Katanga would have resembled the Ivory Coast or Gabon with their pro-western governments. A policy that would encourage foreign investment and a growing number of expats. Katanga had 40,000 Europeans in 1960, and this number probably would have grown due to a reliance on Belgian and French expats (Ivory Coast and Gabon's European populations grew from under 15,000 to around 50,000 each by the 1970s). In addition the regime would have probably remained friendly with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.

The real test would come after the cold war when such a regime no longer mattered. The ending of the Cold War would have probably dried up much of the Western military and economic aid. Coupled with low copper prices until 2003, any regime here would have had a tough time during the 1991-2003 period.

Even as late as 1993, violent attacks on Kasaians in Katanga occurred. Some 100,000 Kasaians were forced out of the province by the ethnic violence there, and this was during the Mobutu period. So the ethnic rivalry continues to this day. The copper from Katanga remains overwhelmingly important to the Congo, however the Katanga's share of the Congo's population has decreased to around 7% of the total, with fewer than 6 million people living in the mineral rich province.
 
Viriato, what do you think about the possible affects on race relations in southern Africa? As far as I understand, what bothered the Rhodesians and made them wary of majority rule was the violent reprisals on Europeans in the Congo. If a Congolese leader, even a break-away one, could assure them that black leaders could rule a multi-ethnic country responsibly, do you think they'd be less likely to go the path they did. I'm hoping it would lead to a long-term Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but that may be wishful thinking.
 
Viriato, what do you think about the possible affects on race relations in southern Africa? As far as I understand, what bothered the Rhodesians and made them wary of majority rule was the violent reprisals on Europeans in the Congo. If a Congolese leader, even a break-away one, could assure them that black leaders could rule a multi-ethnic country responsibly, do you think they'd be less likely to go the path they did. I'm hoping it would lead to a long-term Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but that may be wishful thinking.

Many Europeans fled the Congo as refugees via Rhodesia. This frightened many whites in not only Rhodesia, but in the Portuguese colonies along with South Africa into believing that majority rule was untenable. In Rhodesia there had been at least in the 1950s a portion of the white population that felt that majority rule could be achieved peacefully. The horror stories brought by the refugees, hardened the attitude of many whites into not accepting majority rule. In Angola before 1961 there had been a group of whites that were in favour of independence, but there too many settlers began to believe it would be unworkable.

Leading up to 1965, further reprisals by newly independent African governments against European minorities hardened settler attitudes. For instance in 1962 when the independent government of Algeria reneged on the Évian accords, that had would have allowed Europeans to remain in the country, respecting their property. Then came indiscriminate killing of European settlers in northern Angola by Congolese-backed rebels of UPA in 1961.

A peaceful pro-Western state may have alleviated many of the white Rhodesian's fears, however Southern Rhodesia and Katanga were two very different territories. Katanga resembled Northern Rhodesia in that both had large European settler populations, however few of these were large landowners. Most lived in cities and towns working in mining, railways, etc. In Southern Rhodesia, over half of the land was in the hands of Europeans commercial farmers.

Kenya had some resemblance to Southern Rhodesia, but there the whites were only 1% of the population in 1960, whereas in Southern Rhodesia they were 7% of the total (dropping to 5% by 1970). In Kenya land reform was largely funded with the assistance of the British Government. Even in Kenya, by the late 1960s the European and larger Asian (Indians were around 3% of the poulation) minorities were threatened with expulsion if they did not acquire Kenyan citizenship and give up their British passports.

Finally, the expulsion of the 80,000 or so Asians from Uganda in 1972 by Idi Amin further hardened the attitudes against majority-rule in Southern Africa. The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique where the large white settler communities departed in a matter of months further added to this sentiment (some 20,000 whites from Mozambique settled in Rhodesia in 1975-1976).

Perhaps had the cold war not existed a peaceful solution could have been achieved. Namibia and South Africa both achieved majority rule after the end of the cold war and in both countries the minority interests have been largely secured. For better or worse, European and Asian minorities in most of the African countries composed the majority of skilled individuals and business owners, and expelling them would have led to economic suicide had Soviet advisers and aid not filled the gap. By the same token, western aid propped up many corrupt regimes that also would have not lasted as long as they did.
 
A peaceful pro-Western state may have alleviated many of the white Rhodesian's fears, however Southern Rhodesia and Katanga were two very different territories. Katanga resembled Northern Rhodesia in that both had large European settler populations, however few of these were large landowners. Most lived in cities and towns working in mining, railways, etc. In Southern Rhodesia, over half of the land was in the hands of Europeans commercial farmers.

If Northern Rhodesia's transition to independence didn't reassure the Southern Rhodesians, I doubt that Katanga would. Zambia was about 2.5 percent white at independence, and the white people who stayed did fine. There's less racial tension in Zambia than in nearly any other former settler state I can think of, and today it has a white vice-president. But Southern Rhodesia still went UDI.

In any event, a stable Katanga would come too late. Even if the anti-communist bloc supports Tshombe against a surviving Lumumba, here would be a period of instability first, and by that time, the Rhodesian Front would already be in power. The white Rhodesians were already moving to the right during the 1950s - most of them weren't motivated as much by fear of reprisal as by impending loss of privilege - and IMO a more favorable outcome for the Europeans in Katanga would be too little and too late to change that.
 
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