WI: Pacific Fleet in San Diego?

Fascinating - I'd had no idea that the USN had already been "getting comfortable" with the newer, non-surface combatant technologies in the run up to the war. I'd always somewhat assumed it had been a "battleships or nothing!" followed by "well, as we really don't want nothing, carriers!"

There's a new book out on the USS Lexington that goes into the pre-war exercises in detail. At some point in the early 1930's the carriers were in the exercises and neither team was paying them much attention. Then, in one of the games, one of the admirals put one of the Lexington Class into the scouting forces while the other kept his with his battle line. The unit in the scouting forces rapidly became the dominating focus of the exercise, with the one roped to the battle line being quite ineffective in comparison. I think that was the origin of the shift in the US navy from battleships to carriers.
 
To understand the full development of USN carriers and doctrine read up on Admiral Bull Reeves.

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998-09/admiral-wings

There is a more complete article which I can find this afternoon, with a lot more detail on his decisions that underlay the development of USN carrier doctrine. Among the trivia is he took command of the Langley & took his flight training at age fifty three in 1925. He refused to shave his beard & wore through his entire career. On a more important level he added things the crash barrier to the flight deck & ordered the Langleys air complement be increased from the experimental number of eight to a 'strike' capable group of twenty+. His career & influence continued after his official retirement @ age 65 & he was still active on Navy aviation advisory boards during WWII
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
More information ther than everything else on my shelf. had I time I could collate all those snippts into some sort of crude summary. Hopefully others can find more on this subject.

Thanks for the links

No problem, I learnt stuff looking. Hey, we built 50 tugboats for the US forces!
 
Glenn239 said:
I think it's probably worse for the US navy than losing the battleships, but again, not crippling. Instead of being forced to concentrate on carrier task forces because the battleships were sunk, now Kimmel/Nimitz would have to do so because the logistics at Oahu are not capable of supporting both carrier and battleship fleets.
Agreed. Which ultimately is worse for Japan.:eek: It means Pearl is mainly suitable for ops by the Sub Force, & it means the need to build up facilities for subs at Midway sooner than OTL... The theory being, the subs are Richardson's main striking force off the coast of Japan. (TTL, he's still CinCPac 7/12.)

It may also encourage Richardson &/or King (offhand, IDK whose call it was) to pull the Asiatic Fleet subs back to Hawaii (& Midway, TTL)--& that's also bad for Japan.:eek:

That does raise a question: is Withers still ComSubPac? Does he get replaced after 7/12? By English as OTL? Or by somebody else? Nimitz, frex...?:cool: If English gets killed in that 21 Jan 1943 a/c wreck (if he's even flying that day TTL...:rolleyes:), does that give Nimitz the job?
Glenn239 said:
They were on the target list - no.6. Combined Fleet decided that battle forces were more important, then between the fleet train and the shore facilities, that the fleet train was more important. But if all that were elsewhere, or already hit, then, hello no.6...
Fair enough. Still far enough down the list IMO not to be enough to attract a major attack. A one-CV raid? 2?

What happens with the other 4 or 5 CVs? Are they deployed into DEI? Or off P.I.? Off Wake? Do USN S-boats or fleet boats get any shots at them? (I'd guess that's unlikely, but just possible off P.I.; most probable is an S-boat scores a hit. Jim Coe? Moon Chapple?)

And what's Kimmel up to? Sent to England? Com 7th in SWPA? Or is he ComBatFor? (IIRC, he would've been.)
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Ooo! another item :) Got source? We should start a thread compiling all these bits & sources on New Zealand as a USN logistics hub.

That's a couple of paragraphs down from the second 'Home Front" NZOH link. Various stats in the next couple of pages.
BTW, the James Fletcher mentioned was a major figure.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Fletcher_(industrialist)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fletcher_Building

And I've just noticed the 'War Economy' Volume!
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Econ.html
Shipbuilding and Repair:
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Econ-c7-39.html
 
It may also encourage Richardson &/or King (offhand, IDK whose call it was) to pull the Asiatic Fleet subs back to Hawaii (& Midway, TTL)--& that's also bad for Japan.:eek:

There can be a tendency to assume that changes from historical will be worse for Japan. The implication to that is Nimitz kept picking the worst option available for the USN.

That does raise a question: is Withers still ComSubPac? Does he get replaced after 7/12? By English as OTL? Or by somebody else? Nimitz, frex...?:cool: If English gets killed in that 21 Jan 1943 a/c wreck (if he's even flying that day TTL...:rolleyes:), does that give Nimitz the job?
No idea.

Fair enough. Still far enough down the list IMO not to be enough to attract a major attack. A one-CV raid? 2?
Naval installations would form no part of an attack on Oahu. But if Nagumo had ordered a third wave, they come straight to the top as the primary target - with all the smoke and anti-aircraft, Fuchida's high-level bombers wouldn't be able to attack ships. About the only thing big enough to hit through the smoke from the altitude necessary to lessen the effects of AA would be the base infrastructure.

What happens with the other 4 or 5 CVs? Are they deployed into DEI? Or off P.I.? Off Wake?
Probably attack Luzon would be my guess for their first mission.

And what's Kimmel up to?
No attack on Pearl Harbor? I'd guess Kimmel is in command of the Pacific Fleet for the foreseeable future.
 
Glenn239 said:
There can be a tendency to assume that changes from historical will be worse for Japan. The implication to that is Nimitz kept picking the worst option available for the USN.
True. Then again, while IMO Nimitz didn't make many bad ones, the decisions to base boats in Oz, to focus on close surveillance with subs rather than placing them in Home Waters & off Luzon, & to not use minelaying (rather than close surveillance) were bad calls. If the Oz decision wasn't his, I'll grant him a pass; the others were. And if they get made differently, it will be worse for Japan.
Glenn239 said:
Naval installations would form no part of an attack on Oahu. But if Nagumo had ordered a third wave, they come straight to the top as the primary target
Given 3d wave with the Fleet at home, agreed. I'm less sure, if the Fleet's in San Diego...

Given the attack goes off, tho, there were some pretty precious targets, not least the old Admin Building (with Hypo in the basement:eek:), the power station (which kept the base running), & the Navy Yard. The torpedo store, had it been destroyed (& thereby forced BuOrd or NTS to change to a private contractor), could actually have made things worse for Japan.:p
Glenn239 said:
Probably attack Luzon would be my guess for their first mission.
I'd guess one or two CVs detailed, with the other four supporting DEI ops (based on what happened OTL). Maybe one at Wake & one at Luzon, instead (ditto).
Glenn239 said:
No attack on Pearl Harbor? I'd guess Kimmel is in command of the Pacific Fleet for the foreseeable future.
That was my thinking, too.
 
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