WI: Ottomans Win The Battle of Lepanto

So the battle of Lepanto was a very close run affair, and very easily could have gone the other way and lead to an Ottoman victory. Although the Ottomans were able to rebuild their fleet, they never really managed to recover to their former sea strength, partly due to the loss of so many experienced sailors and officers, which were irreplaceable.

So what if the Ottomans had won at Lepanto? The Ottomans would have bested the Christians 3 times out of as many sea battles, and it would have resulted in a massive loss of experienced officers and sailors on the Christian side, much as what happened to the Ottomans-what effect would this have on the future of Ottoman sea power and power projection in Europe? Is another go at Malta likely?
 
The battle of Lepanto was a much less "close run affair" than you think.
The role of the Venetian galeasses placed as artillery platforms between the two opposed fleets was crucial, and the only doubtful moment was when Ulic Ali managed to move between the Christian center and the right wing to threaten and envelopment of the center. The reserve galleys and the return of the right wing under Doria forced Ulic Ali to flee (and he was the only commander who managed to do so). Admiral Doria was widely criticised for his apparent unwillingness to close immediately the gap (and there were hints even at the time at the battle that he was unwilling to risk his own galleys).

If you want a real POD, there must be no battle (as per the orders from the Grand Vizir who had instructed Muezzinzadeh Ali Pasha to refuse battle). The Fleets of the Holy Alliance had been very slow in concentrating (and once again Doria was the slowest), the campaign season was over and the Ottoman fleet had no interest in accepting a battle (and could not be forced being secure under the fortifications of Lepanto. If the Ottomans refuse battle, their fleet is intact and well positioned for the campaign of the next year. The Holy Alliance is much more fragile and it is unlikely it will be possible to assemble again so many ships and fighting men for the new season.
 
And, I must add, this is in the long run less influential than you think. The Ottomans WON the war that Lepanto was a part of, after all. This spares them a lot of ships and a lot of expense in the short run--but it also keeps them locked into naval practices that were getting increasingly outdated and dangerous for them in combat. A Lepanto in a war fought to the Turks' advantage, at the height of their powers, is likely better for them than a similar battle happening in, say, a rough equivalent to the Cretan War.
 
And, I must add, this is in the long run less influential than you think. The Ottomans WON the war that Lepanto was a part of, after all. This spares them a lot of ships and a lot of expense in the short run--but it also keeps them locked into naval practices that were getting increasingly outdated and dangerous for them in combat. A Lepanto in a war fought to the Turks' advantage, at the height of their powers, is likely better for them than a similar battle happening in, say, a rough equivalent to the Cretan War.

Did they really win the war? It seems to me that after Suleiman the Magnificent's death, they were generally a lot less successful in their war with the Hapsburgs.
 
Did they really win the war? It seems to me that after Suleiman the Magnificent's death, they were generally a lot less successful in their war with the Hapsburgs.

Yes. They did. Cyprus was captured and annexed to the empire. Venice caved and signed a peace treaty where they paid the Ottomans for the trouble of fighting the Turk when they invaded. The idea that the war was some sort of victory for the West comes about because of Lepanto, which was a great moral victory that Spain and Venice would up trumpeting and celebrating for centuries afterwards, but ultimately wound up being little else thanks to the Holy League's inherent tensions causing it to collapse.

As for the Turks being less successful--that was starting towards the end of Suleyman's life. Even then, they were still gaining territory for quite some time. It was just less dramatic, and increasingly came with reverses. Simply put, the Empire had reached close to the limits of what it could conquer.
 
Yes. They did. Cyprus was captured and annexed to the empire. Venice caved and signed a peace treaty where they paid the Ottomans for the trouble of fighting the Turk when they invaded. The idea that the war was some sort of victory for the West comes about because of Lepanto, which was a great moral victory that Spain and Venice would up trumpeting and celebrating for centuries afterwards, but ultimately wound up being little else thanks to the Holy League's inherent tensions causing it to collapse.
Considering that the Ottomans landed in Cyprus in July 1570 and it took more than one year to assemble the fleets of the Holy League (and by that time the last Venetian stronghold - Famagusta - had fallen, it is difficult to argue that Lepanto changed anything in the course of the war. However looking at Lepanto from a different point of view it was a momentous victory: let the Ottomans refuse battle (a battle that they cannot win) and the Christian fleets will have to leave the gulf of Lepanto and return to their basis. The Ottoman fleet can winter in Lepanto and be ready in a very advantageous position in the spring 1572 (but it is very doubtful that the league will be able to field the same fleets). Philip II has a lot of pots on the fire and eastern Mediterranean is very low on his list of priorities; Venice probably accept the fait accompli and negotiate the best possible peace with the Ottomans (they had to sue for peace in 1573 anyway). Then the Ottomans can threaten Dalmatia or Southern Italy (or even Sicily); alternatively they might go again for Malta. Luckily the Ottomans too were less united than it can appear at first glance: in particular the Gran Vizir faction and the "sea party" were at dagger heads and Muezzinzadeh resented that Kara Mustafa Pasha had gained all the honors for the conquest of Cyprus. So maybe the battle was unavoidable: both supreme commanders were young and both were glory hounds.
As it played out IOTL the Ottomans push for the control of Central Mediterranean ended with Lepanto: it means it was a very significant victory

As for the Turks being less successful--that was starting towards the end of Suleyman's life. Even then, they were still gaining territory for quite some time. It was just less dramatic, and increasingly came with reverses. Simply put, the Empire had reached close to the limits of what it could conquer.

The Ottomans were far from being a push-over for almost another 3 centuries: they lost and regained Belgrade (the key to the Balkans) 4 or 5 times, but in 1867 there was still an Ottoman garrison in the fortress. In 1683 they sieged Vienna for the second time and if Ian Sobielski had not arrived in the nick of time they city might very well fall and be sacked (the Ottomans could not hold it, Vienna was too far away: however the repercussions of the sack would have been significant). In 1620 they invaded Poland: it ended up badly (once again a failed siege spelt the doom of the invaders) but it was not what one would expect from a spent force. The peace of Passarowitz in 1718 was a harsh one, but by 1739 they had recouped most of the territories lost (including Belgrade). I would say that up to the end of the 1860s the "sick man of Europe" was still quite strong.
 
Considering that the Ottomans landed in Cyprus in July 1570 and it took more than one year to assemble the fleets of the Holy League (and by that time the last Venetian stronghold - Famagusta - had fallen, it is difficult to argue that Lepanto changed anything in the course of the war. However looking at Lepanto from a different point of view it was a momentous victory: let the Ottomans refuse battle (a battle that they cannot win) and the Christian fleets will have to leave the gulf of Lepanto and return to their basis. The Ottoman fleet can winter in Lepanto and be ready in a very advantageous position in the spring 1572 (but it is very doubtful that the league will be able to field the same fleets). Philip II has a lot of pots on the fire and eastern Mediterranean is very low on his list of priorities; Venice probably accept the fait accompli and negotiate the best possible peace with the Ottomans (they had to sue for peace in 1573 anyway). Then the Ottomans can threaten Dalmatia or Southern Italy (or even Sicily); alternatively they might go again for Malta.

But that is the thing, LK--it was this very threat that had resulted in the Holy League assembling in the first place. A victory in this war will likely see the usual Italian clusterfudge of backbiting and backstabbing in the immediate future--but they're still likely to try it again in the near future if the Turks are a near threat, and once again, without a strong defeat, the Turks will stick with what they imagine works. A "Lepanto" may not be inevitable, but it's pretty damn likely.


Luckily the Ottomans too were less united than it can appear at first glance: in particular the Gran Vizir faction and the "sea party" were at dagger heads and Muezzinzadeh resented that Kara Mustafa Pasha had gained all the honors for the conquest of Cyprus. So maybe the battle was unavoidable: both supreme commanders were young and both were glory hounds.
As it played out IOTL the Ottomans push for the control of Central Mediterranean ended with Lepanto: it means it was a very significant victory

I'd argue that ultimately it's not the naval defeat that leads to an Ottoman naval decline--or rather, it's not the primary cause--it's the lengthy war with Persia diverting funds and attention. That, and the utter disaster that was Murad III's government. Philip II's Spain faced similar problems on NUMEROUS occasions, and yet despite what people frequently think, Spanish naval power bounced back.


The Ottomans were far from being a push-over for almost another 3 centuries: they lost and regained Belgrade (the key to the Balkans) 4 or 5 times, but in 1867 there was still an Ottoman garrison in the fortress. In 1683 they sieged Vienna for the second time and if Ian Sobielski had not arrived in the nick of time they city might very well fall and be sacked (the Ottomans could not hold it, Vienna was too far away: however the repercussions of the sack would have been significant). In 1620 they invaded Poland: it ended up badly (once again a failed siege spelt the doom of the invaders) but it was not what one would expect from a spent force. The peace of Passarowitz in 1718 was a harsh one, but by 1739 they had recouped most of the territories lost (including Belgrade). I would say that up to the end of the 1860s the "sick man of Europe" was still quite strong.

No argument here--I'm as opposed to seeing the post-Suleyman Ottomans as a spent force as you are. While I'd argue they were facing difficulties, they were hardly insurmountable (or for that matter that many of them weren't ultimately surmounted)--hell, the reason I mention them facing these problems under Suleyman is to fight the equally false myth of "Suleyman I, the Perfect Sultan."
 
But that is the thing, LK--it was this very threat that had resulted in the Holy League assembling in the first place. A victory in this war will likely see the usual Italian clusterfudge of backbiting and backstabbing in the immediate future--but they're still likely to try it again in the near future if the Turks are a near threat, and once again, without a strong defeat, the Turks will stick with what they imagine works. A "Lepanto" may not be inevitable, but it's pretty damn likely.
I'm afraid we have to disagree completely. The battle of Preveza of 1538 (the only time that Spain sent naval forces to the Greek coast prior to Lepanto) had already cast a pall on the relations between Spain and Venice. Once again the Holy League had been organized - with a lot of efforts - by a pope (Paul III), the largest contingents were from Spain and Venice and a Doria (Andrea, the uncle of the Gianandrea who fought at Lepanto) was in overall command. The numerical advantage of the Holy League fleet was denied by lack of wind and the more aggressive tactics of Hayreddin Barbarossa brought an Ottoman advantage by the close of the first day of fight. The second day (although the wind had come back) Andrea Doria refused to press the action and retreated. In 1539 Barbarossa could devastate with impunity the Italian and Dalmatian coast: the fleets of the League did not materialize. In 1540 Venice sued for peace. Do you think that the Serenissima had forgotten Preveza?? The sluggish mustering of the Spanish contingent, the delaying tactics of another Doria and the futility of prosecuting a war which appeared already lost (Famagusta had already fallen by the time of the mustering of the fleet at Corfu) brought the League ships in front of Lepanto at the very close of the campaigning season in the Mediterranean (and if Don John of Austria had not been in overall command they would never have gotten there). If there is no battle in October 1571, that's the end of the League: Philip II will hoard his ships and his soldiers and Venice will again sue for peace.



I'd argue that ultimately it's not the naval defeat that leads to an Ottoman naval decline--or rather, it's not the primary cause--it's the lengthy war with Persia diverting funds and attention. That, and the utter disaster that was Murad III's government. Philip II's Spain faced similar problems on NUMEROUS occasions, and yet despite what people frequently think, Spanish naval power bounced back.
That's true, but it does not tell all the story. The follow up of Preveza (and the influence of Barbarossa) had brought the central and western Mediterranean under the gaze of Suleiman in his perpetual fight against Charles V. Tripoli was taken from the Knights of Malta, the fleet of the Holy League mark II was defeated at Djerba in 1560 and finally there was the great siege of Malta in 1565: this time the attack failed even if Spain was not in the position to send a relieving fleet so soon after Djerba. The death of Suleian and the ascension of Murad III changed the strategic focus, reducing the weight of the sea party (Cyprus was not really a naval operation, and the command was given to Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha rather than to the Kapudan-i-Darieh). With the war against Persia again coming to the front Muezzinzadeh Pasha needs a victory to keep the fleet in the focus of the new Sultan's attention.



No argument here--I'm as opposed to seeing the post-Suleyman Ottomans as a spent force as you are. While I'd argue they were facing difficulties, they were hardly insurmountable (or for that matter that many of them weren't ultimately surmounted)--hell, the reason I mention them facing these problems under Suleyman is to fight the equally false myth of "Suleyman I, the Perfect Sultan."
The reasons for the slow decline and the ultimate downfall of the OE have been discussed for centuries in Europe (and obviously in Constantinople too, but with a lot of caution :D). There have been no real consensus, and there have been no consensus also on the ways and means to stop the decline and regenerate the empire. My 2 cents are that from Mehmet the Conqueror to the death of Suleiman the Ottomans were quite open to innovations (within limits), in particular to progress in war techniques and tactics. With the death of Suleiman this (relative) openness to innovation stops, or at least slows down to a glacial pace. The power centralization also increases and there are a lot of established players in the game who tend to work more to maintain the status quo rather than open the door to changes which may well diminish their influence.
 
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