WI: Ottomans march on Moscow?

Why would the Ottomans be invading in winter? Doesn't sound like a very good idea to me. :p
It wasn't winter when Napoleon and Hitler invaded. Russia is big and takes time to invade. You can't conquer it in one campaign season.
The Turks would be minding their own business doing the raping pillaging and burning of Russian towns then they get stuck in the mud and then it starts to snow.
 
Why would the Ottomans be invading in winter? Doesn't sound like a very good idea to me. :p

Well, actually this was a very good idea as had been proven during the Mongolian conquest. You don't have problems with the lousy roads and countless rivers and swamps and the food and forage are collected and stored by the peasants. :)

Of course, this leaves an obvious question: would the Ottomans be prepared to the winter war? The most probable answer is "no".
 
Somehow, I believe that the Mongols were far better prepared for winter than any coalition that the Ottomans would put together. As well as something else that was touched on earlier, mobility. It plays out a lot better for the steppe ponies than it does for the infantryman and artillery train.
 
Somehow, I believe that the Mongols were far better prepared for winter than any coalition that the Ottomans would put together. As well as something else that was touched on earlier, mobility. It plays out a lot better for the steppe ponies than it does for the infantryman and artillery train.

Your belief is a correct one: the Mongols had harsh winters in their native area and were quite prepared to the snows and cold. The same goes for their horses: they live outdoors all year, dealing with temperatures from 30 °C (86 °F) in summer down to −40 °C (−40 °F) in winter. OTOH, the Turkish horses had been beautiful but much more sensitive and (according some XVIII century writers) did not have too much of a stamina (not my opinion - I have none). AFAIK, they had been imported by the Poles for their hussar regiments but hussars did not travel on their battle horses: for that they were using less exotic beasts.

As far as the artillery train is involved, at least during their Winter campaign in Russia the Mongols had been widely using various siege engines so it is probably reasonable to assume that those had been transported disassembled rather than built from the scratch on every occasion (and Battle of Mohi seemingly confirms that option). So they had some bulky stuff to carry with them (perhaps using the camels?) but still were much more mobile than infantrymen with an artillery and supply train.
 
That's still a 200,000 man army of high quality, i.e. more than enough to assure the security of the empire against any offensive aspirations of his Continental enemies. If he'd had that when Prussia rose against him, it'd be more than enough to wipe them from the map and discourage Austria from joining the war. The wars of liberation were only conceivable because of how total the destruction in Russia was. If the Russians had been utterly shattered at Borodino, Napoleon would have been able to go into winter quarters and preserve the strength of his army; if the retreat had been better managed, even with 100,000 men returning to Germany, this would suffice to not just defeat but destroy the Spring coalition when joined by new drafts. With regard to an Ottoman march on Moscow, if they were to set out with 100,000 men from Kiev and arrive with only half, that's still a very substantial army; under a great general, that could be enough to win a battle of annihilation over the Russians. From there, they could go into winter quarters and avoid the catastrophe that befell Napoleon.

Losing half a million men is enough to qualify as "running into trouble" in my book, even if it wouldn't be enough trouble to unseat Napoleon. (Though I do suspect you're being too sanguine here about his ability to bounce back from such losses.) And whilst it's theoretically possible for an Ottoman force to capture Moscow, it would require so many things to go right (getting there in the first place, in spite of supply difficulties; winning a battle of annihilation against the Russians, as opposed to just a regular victory; keeping their army sufficiently intact to take Moscow itself; the Russians not being able to mobilise any new forces to cut the Ottomans off from their home base; etc.) that a successful outcome would be highly unlikely.
 
Losing half a million men is enough to qualify as "running into trouble" in my book, even if it wouldn't be enough trouble to unseat Napoleon. (Though I do suspect you're being too sanguine here about his ability to bounce back from such losses.) And whilst it's theoretically possible for an Ottoman force to capture Moscow, it would require so many things to go right (getting there in the first place, in spite of supply difficulties; winning a battle of annihilation against the Russians, as opposed to just a regular victory; keeping their army sufficiently intact to take Moscow itself; the Russians not being able to mobilise any new forces to cut the Ottomans off from their home base; etc.) that a successful outcome would be highly unlikely.

There's no doubt it's very unlikely, but stranger things have happened. The situation here is a bit different, since OP is asking about the conquest of Moscow, whereas Napoleon was pursuing the destruction of the Russian army to make the Tsar fall in line with the Continental System, but my point is that the spectacular misfortune of Napoleon's campaign wouldn't necessarily mean this one would be doomed to the same fate. It arose from specific conditions we can't take for granted. By far the greatest difficulty would be destroying the Russian army; if taking and holding Moscow is impossible, it'd be because the Ottomans couldn't bring the Russians to battle, and achieving that would essentially mean going double or nothing with the army. If it can't go into winter quarters, it's dead; if it can't destroy the Russians before it's time to go into winter quarters, it's dead. The Russians have to be willing to fight a battle for Moscow for the invasion to have a chance of working.
 
From the river Neman (Napoleon's starting point) to Moscow is 606 miles. From Kiev to Moscow is 523 miles.

The Ottoman route is also more southerly than the one taken by Napoleon, so if they did have to return home it might not be quite so cold.
 
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