WI: Ottomans annihilate the Russians at Pruz

From Caroline Finkel's Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire, usually considered the best narrative history of the Ottoman state (just read the bold part if you're short on time):

Reports from the Ottoman Empire’s northern frontier only served to confirm the threat posed by Peter [the Great of Russia], and in November 1710 the Ottomans declared war on Russia. After a winter spent in making preparations, on 19 July 1711 the advance guards of the two armies, Russia’s led by Tsar Peter himself, confronted one another across the Prut, a tributary of the Danube. That night, Tatar forces swam the river to engage the Russians while Ottoman engineers secured the bridges across the river, allowing the rest of the vastly superior Ottoman army to cross. Peter’s troops retreated a distance from the fighting on the river, but although he found himself surrounded and short of supplies, his men at first resisted the Ottoman onslaught on their positions. On 22 July, after an attack on the Russians by forces led by the grand vezir and commander-in-chief, Baltacı Mehmed Pasha, Peter proposed terms to which Baltacı Mehmed readily agreed. Between Russian prevarication and Ottoman indecision as to whether to continue the war, however, the Treaty of Adrianople, as it is known in the West, was not ratified until 1713; under its terms, Russia lost all it had gained in 1700.

The reason for Baltacı Mehmed’s failure to pursue his undoubted advantage has remained a matter for conjecture, as has the question of whether a more resolute Ottoman stance would have changed the course of history. The argument that the Ottomans lacked either the resources or the will to involve themselves in another and perhaps prolonged war cannot have persuaded the Sultan, who dismissed and imprisoned Baltacı Mehmed. Many years later, in 1763, Frederick the Great asked the consummate Ottoman politician and envoy to Berlin, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, about this battle on the Prut: he was told that the Ottomans’ withdrawal from the fray had been dictated by the Sultan’s magnanimity.
Wikipedia link on the Pruth River Campaign:

Alexander Mikaberidze argues that Baltacı Mehmet Pasha made an important strategic mistake by signing the treaty with relatively easy terms for the Russians. Since Peter himself was commanding the Russian army, and had Baltacı Mehmet Pasha not accepted Peter's peace proposal and pursued to capture him as a prisoner instead, the course of history could have changed. Without Peter, Russia would have hardly become an imperial power, and the future arch-enemy of the Ottoman State in the Balkans, the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus.

Although the news of the victory was first received well in Constantinople, the dissatisfied pro-war party turned general opinion against Baltacı Mehmet Pasha, who was accused of accepting a bribe from Peter the Great. Baltacı Mehmet Pasha was then relieved from his office
So what if Baltacı Mehmed or some other general presses his advantage and captures Peter the Great... in the middle of the Great Northern War?
 
From Caroline Finkel's Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire, usually considered the best narrative history of the Ottoman state (just read the bold part if you're short on time):

Reports from the Ottoman Empire’s northern frontier only served to confirm the threat posed by Peter [the Great of Russia], and in November 1710 the Ottomans declared war on Russia. After a winter spent in making preparations, on 19 July 1711 the advance guards of the two armies, Russia’s led by Tsar Peter himself, confronted one another across the Prut, a tributary of the Danube. That night, Tatar forces swam the river to engage the Russians while Ottoman engineers secured the bridges across the river, allowing the rest of the vastly superior Ottoman army to cross. Peter’s troops retreated a distance from the fighting on the river, but although he found himself surrounded and short of supplies, his men at first resisted the Ottoman onslaught on their positions. On 22 July, after an attack on the Russians by forces led by the grand vezir and commander-in-chief, Baltacı Mehmed Pasha, Peter proposed terms to which Baltacı Mehmed readily agreed. Between Russian prevarication and Ottoman indecision as to whether to continue the war, however, the Treaty of Adrianople, as it is known in the West, was not ratified until 1713; under its terms, Russia lost all it had gained in 1700.

The reason for Baltacı Mehmed’s failure to pursue his undoubted advantage has remained a matter for conjecture, as has the question of whether a more resolute Ottoman stance would have changed the course of history. The argument that the Ottomans lacked either the resources or the will to involve themselves in another and perhaps prolonged war cannot have persuaded the Sultan, who dismissed and imprisoned Baltacı Mehmed. Many years later, in 1763, Frederick the Great asked the consummate Ottoman politician and envoy to Berlin, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, about this battle on the Prut: he was told that the Ottomans’ withdrawal from the fray had been dictated by the Sultan’s magnanimity.
Wikipedia link on the Pruth River Campaign:

Alexander Mikaberidze argues that Baltacı Mehmet Pasha made an important strategic mistake by signing the treaty with relatively easy terms for the Russians. Since Peter himself was commanding the Russian army, and had Baltacı Mehmet Pasha not accepted Peter's peace proposal and pursued to capture him as a prisoner instead, the course of history could have changed. Without Peter, Russia would have hardly become an imperial power, and the future arch-enemy of the Ottoman State in the Balkans, the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus.

Although the news of the victory was first received well in Constantinople, the dissatisfied pro-war party turned general opinion against Baltacı Mehmet Pasha, who was accused of accepting a bribe from Peter the Great. Baltacı Mehmet Pasha was then relieved from his office
So what if Baltacı Mehmed or some other general presses his advantage and captures Peter the Great... in the middle of the Great Northern War?

Russia's much needed reforms will be delayed. Sweden, Poland-Lithuania and Ottoman Empire are relieved until the next half of the 18th century. So a Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739 will be butterflied. As well as any war afterwards. Replaced with different wars.

All it takes is a second tsar to continue Peters path. Then the fun starts again.

Baltaci won't be dismissed as in OTL.
 
Help the ignorant - how much are Russia's reforms likely to be delayed, really? So far we're discussing Peter's capture, not death; presumably his capture would be leveraged for concessions, at which point he'd be returning to Russian soil. Not sure what concessions those might be.... They lost Azov historically, and Ottoman-Tatar gains into the Ukraine would be difficult to maintain if they involved more than handing over some border forts. Perhaps Russia could be coerced to abandon its subordinates in the upper Caucasus; Cossacks and Kalmyks IIRC. Free Astrakhan is a bridge too far, I suppose?

Might this allow Poland-Lithuania to benefit in the Ukraine, if only peripherally? I suspect they're better positioned to hold territory there than the Turks.

If Sweden's already hamstrung and the Ottomans can make good on their victory, presumably Russia could end up with more of a northern-directed economic focus than historical. Military focus might point the opposite direction though.

The Ottomans were increasingly dealing with centrifugal tendencies and overstretch in the century. I'm not sure how much this helps them in the long-run. The OTL c1800 crisis will succumb to butterflies, but does that mean simply a replacement crisis? The timing of the French wars distracted Europe enough to make the Ottoman turn of the century nadir much less bad. Different timing could make things go worse for an Ottoman Empire that began a crisis better off.
 
After skimming some sources, my impression is that Peter's commitment and personal presence against the Ottomans (i.e. the reason it as a missed opportunity) might not be a given absent the prior and decisive defeat of the Swedes. Even the opening of hostility was about Charles. So contrary to my first impulse, this outcome might be outright impossible to combine with ATL Swedish success.

I also discovered that the Hetmanate was a Swedish ally. The Russians defeated them shortly before Poltava, and the latter was the end of independent aspirations, but it is suggestive. Might be the sultan could demand Peter renounce sovereignty over the Cossacks. Might just mean retaking them a bit later, maybe they end up looking to the Poles as a less intrusive relationship, or maybe they maintain a precarious independence for a while.
 
Help the ignorant - how much are Russia's reforms likely to be delayed, really? So far we're discussing Peter's capture, not death; presumably his capture would be leveraged for concessions, at which point he'd be returning to Russian soil. Not sure what concessions those might be.... They lost Azov historically, and Ottoman-Tatar gains into the Ukraine would be difficult to maintain if they involved more than handing over some border forts. Perhaps Russia could be coerced to abandon its subordinates in the upper Caucasus; Cossacks and Kalmyks IIRC. Free Astrakhan is a bridge too far, I suppose?

Might this allow Poland-Lithuania to benefit in the Ukraine, if only peripherally? I suspect they're better positioned to hold territory there than the Turks.

If Sweden's already hamstrung and the Ottomans can make good on their victory, presumably Russia could end up with more of a northern-directed economic focus than historical. Military focus might point the opposite direction though.

The Ottomans were increasingly dealing with centrifugal tendencies and overstretch in the century. I'm not sure how much this helps them in the long-run. The OTL c1800 crisis will succumb to butterflies, but does that mean simply a replacement crisis? The timing of the French wars distracted Europe enough to make the Ottoman turn of the century nadir much less bad. Different timing could make things go worse for an Ottoman Empire that began a crisis better off.

The best Ahmed III can get is a vassal/ally Hetmanate in Northern and Central Ukraine if Peter is captured, freeing the Don Cossacks and the fortress of Azov... Maybe some land gain for the Crimeans. It keeps the Russians away from the Crimean peninsula which relieves the Ottomans from a burden. In such case the Crimeans can assist the Ottomans in future wars with Austria. Astrakhan can be considered implausible for the 18th century. Russia has already populated the area where a canal suppose to be to reach Astrakhan. Without a canal the Ottomans can still move to Astrakhan but as result the Ottoman Army gets wrecked. Logistically reaching Astrakhan is not possible for the Ottomans without a canal between the Don and Volga.

Sweden can benefit the first years. Russia will be unsure if Peter ever returns (alive). In such case Sweden can make peace with minor losses. That is what I would do. The next years Sweden can regain strenght in case Russia decides to attack.

Poland Lithuania has a less modernised and non-reformed giant on their Eastern border. No interference from Russia will help PLC but that still is no guarantee for future survival.

Back to the Ottomans. The reason the Ottomans were militarily horrible in the the secons half of the 18th century is the lack of war fought between 1739 (1746: with Persia) and 1768. That is 29 years of experience and veterans wasted. If you don't fight wars you don't know what military tactics are used and developed and you can't replace your troops with veterans. So. Unless the Otto's continue the same peace path the latter half of the 18th century won't change much as in OTL. Except this time, there is no strong Russia to fight so less desire to reform.
 
After skimming some sources, my impression is that Peter's commitment and personal presence against the Ottomans (i.e. the reason it as a missed opportunity) might not be a given absent the prior and decisive defeat of the Swedes. Even the opening of hostility was about Charles. So contrary to my first impulse, this outcome might be outright impossible to combine with ATL Swedish success.

I also discovered that the Hetmanate was a Swedish ally. The Russians defeated them shortly before Poltava, and the latter was the end of independent aspirations, but it is suggestive. Might be the sultan could demand Peter renounce sovereignty over the Cossacks. Might just mean retaking them a bit later, maybe they end up looking to the Poles as a less intrusive relationship, or maybe they maintain a precarious independence for a while.

If Ahmed III instructed Baltaci Mehmed what to do then he could go for it. Securing Ukraine is hitting two birds with one stone. You secure the Crimeans from Russian threats and the Crimeans can aid you without having to worrt about the Russians***.
 
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