WI: Ottoman conquest of East Africa

In 1589, the Ottomans attacked Mombasa. The Ottomans were actually at a fairly advantageous position initially, but this was ruined by a wild card arrival of supposedly 20,000 warriors from inland Africa. The battle ended in a total defeat for the Turks, with their admiral, Mir Ali, apparently still in a Portuguese dungeon by 1608. Muslims would not regain Mombasa until in 1698.

What if the Ottomans won at Mombasa? I'll just quote The Ottoman Age of Exploration, which does a better job of summing up the circumstances:
With all of these advantages in his favor, what might have happened had Mir Ali and his allies managed to prevail at Mombasa in 1589? Supposing the Ottoman plan had worked, and Tomé de Sousa Coutinho and the Portuguese fleet had actually been defeated, it seems at least conceivable that Mir Ali would have eventually forced the capitulation of Malindi, Portugal’s last local ally, and from there taken possession of the entire Swahili Coast. Th is, in turn, could have allowed Hasan Pasha to present Sultan Murad III with irrefutable evidence of the merits of continued expansion in the Indian Ocean, silencing naysayers and finally ensuring a steady stream of material support for continued campaigning in the south. In time, the Ottomans might very well have extended their rule as far as the Zambezi River (or “the mines of Cuamá” in the language of the Portuguese sources), seizing control of the lucrative trade in gold, ivory, and slaves from the African interior and depriving the Portuguese of this crucial source of revenue. Thus weakened, it is an open question whether the Portuguese could have maintained control of Mozambique, and it is even more uncertain how they could have faced the coming challenge from the Dutch in the following century. In short, under only slightly different circumstances, Mir Ali’s expedition to the Swahili Coast could quite possibly have spelled the premature demise of Portuguese Asia and ushered in an entirely new era of Ottoman dominion in East Africa.

Of course, the Ottomans still faced major structural issues by this point, not only with their maritime presence in the Indian Ocean but with the empire in general. But with all this in mind, what would have happened had Mir Ali routed the Portuguese fleet in Mombasa?
 

Don Quijote

Banned
How is that relevant? Lepanto is in an entirely different body of water with an entirely different fleet built for an entirely different circumstance.

And the Ottomans rebuilt much of their fleet pretty quickly, with some galleasses based on those which had defeated them at Lepanto. I can't say if these would help in the Red Sea though.
 
In 1589, the Ottomans attacked Mombasa. The Ottomans were actually at a fairly advantageous position initially, but this was ruined by a wild card arrival of supposedly 20,000 warriors from inland Africa. The battle ended in a total defeat for the Turks, with their admiral, Mir Ali, apparently still in a Portuguese dungeon by 1608. Muslims would not regain Mombasa until in 1698.

What if the Ottomans won at Mombasa? I'll just quote The Ottoman Age of Exploration, which does a better job of summing up the circumstances:


Of course, the Ottomans still faced major structural issues by this point, not only with their maritime presence in the Indian Ocean but with the empire in general. But with all this in mind, what would have happened had Mir Ali routed the Portuguese fleet in Mombasa?

Biggest problem for the Ottomans in conquering east Africa is the Portuguese and Ethiopian empires. The Portuguese wanted the Swahili coast due to its strategic importance in trade. And the Christian Ethiopians were natural allies to the Europeans. If they can placate both empires, then it could be possible for the Ottomans to push as far south as Mozambique.
 
And the Ottomans rebuilt much of their fleet pretty quickly, with some galleasses based on those which had defeated them at Lepanto. I can't say if these would help in the Red Sea though.

The important part of the fleet wasn't the actual ships, it was the people who manned them. Provided the personnel were saved, fleets could be, and were, rebuilt very quickly with no detrimental affect on the quality. Indeed, large portions of the fleet were often constructed specifically for each campaign as the cost of constructing a new galley was frequently less than the cost of maintaining one over the down season. The Venetians were the most extreme example of that, but it affected all of the Mediterranean states. That was what was gutted at Lepanto and what the Ottomans were never really able to rebuild. For example, the archers used by the Ottomans were largely hereditary, as the skill necessary to use, construct, and maintain their bows took a very long time to learn and develop. That knowledge was generally passed down by the soliders themselves when they weren't on campaign so losing that corps of active soldiers meant the loss of much of the skill set necessary to maintain and rebuild it in the future. Much the same applies to the naval infantry as well. These factors that apply to the soldiers of the Ottoman fleet also affected the other personnel such as the navigators, gunners, and, to a lesser degree, oarsmen. Additionally, my understanding is that most of the naval troops the Ottomans used were timar holders and so could not be replaced as easily as salaried soldiers might have.

Of course, the Ottomans were able to rebuild an effective fleet quite rapidly after Lepanto, as evidenced by the recapture of Tunis only three years later, in 1574. But they were never able to reach the point the fleet was before it had it's human resources gutted at Lepanto. Now, whether that would have affected their fleet in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, I can't say. It would depend on the size of the fleet they were using and from where they were drawing the men for it. If they were only using local sources then Lepanto won't have had much of an affect. If they were drawing support form the Ottoman Mediterranean forces than it does become a factor.

Moving on to the actual question, I'm hesitant to say that an Ottoman victory would have totally expelled the Portuguese from East Africa. As noted in the OP, Portugal still has Mozambique as well as territories in India as bases to strike back against the Ottomans. Plus forces can always be sent from Portugal itself. So while an Ottoman victory at Mombasa would have been amajor blow against Portugal it wouldn't have gurranteed their expulsion from East Africa.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
How strong was Oman at this point? I know it went on to have an empire along the East African coast in the 1700s, but I'm not sure about the situation in the 16th century, apart from its war with Portugal.
 
How strong was Oman at this point? I know it went on to have an empire along the East African coast in the 1700s, but I'm not sure about the situation in the 16th century, apart from its war with Portugal.

If I remember correctly, the Ottomans made incursions into Oman and captured Muscat. The Portuguese held Muscat for an extended period as well and built a fortress. Oman didn't spread down the Swahili Coast until the late 17th century.
 
Portuguese Empire.

The first thing to note is that since 1580 the Portuguese empire was ruled by Philip II of Spain, which although were given to the Portuguese access to the Spanish military assets, also made it to his empire the target of attacks from the English and Dutch.

The second is not to underestimate the extent and strength of thalassocratic Portuguese empire which only lost part of their possessions to Western rivals, powerful native states or an alliance of both. Nor forget what were the strategic priorities Ottomans: the Balkans, the Mediterranean (East and Central) and Mesopotamia.

The other theaters of conflict were fought by the Ottomans through local proxies with different participation of Ottoman forces ... the examples are the naval battle of Diu and failed sieges of 1538 and 1546.
Another example is the Ethiopian-Portuguese decisive victory in 1543 against the forces of the Sultan of Adal and his allied Ottomans (arquebusiers mercenaries).

In relation to the Pod, the naval battle, although won by the Ottomans, just give them an enclave far from its main bases. This location should be defended, garrisoned and fortifying so it could be an acceptable naval base; a great investment for a minimized potential gain.
It should be noted that the Portuguese control and access to East Africa and the Arabian Sea, were not threatened by a possible defeat this Battle or for an hypothetical ottoman presence.

The Portuguese in East Africa, besides having several factories fortified, constructed Fort Sao Sebastiao, in the Ilha of Moçambique, from which controlled the trade.
Which it was also the main and most powerful fortress in East Africa. This fortress victoriously resist successive attacks from the Dutch in 1604, 1607 and 1608.

Another strategic enclave in the chain of fortified trading posts in strategic places, was from 1515 the Fort of Nossa Senhora da Conceição of Hormuz, whose strategic importance is evident.

Finally, we have to the India itself; where were the best protected and the most richest Portuguese possessions

The Portuguese India were protected primarily from their base in Baçaim or Bassein Fort (now Vasai) it was of great strategic value for the Portuguese Empire and its dominance of the Arabian Sea and thus had an enormous strategic value.

Also had the largest and economically most valuable possessions Portuguese city-fortresses of Diu, Goa and especially its commercial and naval base of Mumbai with its strategic natural harbor and its natural isolation of ground attacks.


This city was also protected by the fortifications of Bombay Castle, Bandra Fort (Castella de Aguada) and the Madh Fort.


Also existed in southern Fort St. Angelo, which was built in 1505 and in the Bay of Bengal was another trading post and fortified enclave of Porto Grande Bengal (Chittagong Mylapore).

Not to mention the Ceilão Português (Sri_Lanka) 1517-1658 or Malacca 1511-1641...
 
Biggest problem for the Ottomans in conquering east Africa is the Portuguese and Ethiopian empires. The Portuguese wanted the Swahili coast due to its strategic importance in trade. And the Christian Ethiopians were natural allies to the Europeans. If they can placate both empires, then it could be possible for the Ottomans to push as far south as Mozambique.

Ethiopian empire is a late 19th century thing.
in the 1500's abbysinia was isolated kingdom in the highlands.
all the coasts around it were held by muslim states or christian states allied with muslims and enemies of the abbysinians.
 
The second is not to underestimate the extent and strength of thalassocratic Portuguese empire which only lost part of their possessions to Western rivals, powerful native states or an alliance of both. Nor forget what were the strategic priorities Ottomans: the Balkans, the Mediterranean (East and Central) and Mesopotamia.
There was actually an Indian Ocean faction in Constantinople for most of the 17th century, which stressed increased Ottoman involvement in the IO. A decisive victory in the Swahili Coast and the removal of Malindi would encourage continued Ottoman involvement in the east.

With an outpost on the Swahili Coast, the Ottomans could menace the seas around Mozambique (as Sefer Reis wanted to do in 1565), which could be very damaging to the Portuguese enterprise further east.
 
The balance of power in East Africa and the Arabian Sea

There was actually an Indian Ocean faction in Constantinople for most of the 17th century, which stressed increased Ottoman involvement in the IO. A decisive victory in the Swahili Coast and the removal of Malindi would encourage continued Ottoman involvement in the east.

With an outpost on the Swahili Coast, the Ottomans could menace the seas around Mozambique (as Sefer Reis wanted to do in 1565), which could be very damaging to the Portuguese enterprise further east.

The existence of a faction which advocated greater attention and devote more resources to East Africa... by itself, does not prove anything but the fact that they have not been successful in their lobbying in OTL, shows where were the strategic priorities of the Ottomans.

As for how a different outcome of the naval battle may have affected the balance of power in East Africa and the Arabian Sea ... I reaffirm my previous conclusions.

The Portuguese was even more than the British a thalassocratic Empire... based on their fleets and primarily in its various strategic and fortified enclaves, which must be besieged and conquered for first threaten and then try to wrest control of trade in East Africa and its control of the Arabian sea.

At least for the Ottomans was more important city of Diu and Portuguese India and its attempts to take it failed like Dutch successive attempts in East Africa, when they failed in their attempts to take Fort São Sebastião; which it was the key to Portugal position in Africa.

Consider that if a few years later, the Dutch could not take it in a weaker Portugal and with greater resources than any resources that the Ottomans might have intended credibly, to try to conquer it.

Therefore the scenario of the possible consequences of an Ottoman victory itself are incorrect.

It would need a total change in the Ottomans strategic priorities and considerable and extended effort over time... only to perform attempted to threaten the Portuguese position in the region.
 
I really like the book, The Ottoman age of Exploration. It shows in the end that the Ottomans did not only threaten, but undermined considerably the Portuguese position in the region, when you consider that they broke the Portuguese Monopoly on trade between India and Arabia. :)
 
The existence of a faction which advocated greater attention and devote more resources to East Africa... by itself, does not prove anything but the fact that they have not been successful in their lobbying in OTL, shows where were the strategic priorities of the Ottomans.
I'll freely admit that the Ottomans were not an Indian Ocean empire and never would be, but priorities aren't static. And besides, have you read The Ottoman Age

At least for the Ottomans was more important city of Diu and Portuguese India and its attempts to take it failed like Dutch successive attempts in East Africa, when they failed in their attempts to take Fort São Sebastião; which it was the key to Portugal position in Africa.
There were no major Portuguese forts whatsoever north of Mozambique in the 1580s (this is before Fort Jesus), and the Portuguese position there was reliant on allies (particularly Malindi). To be sure, India and Mozambique are different, but the loss of much of the Swahili Coast would have repercussions throughout the Indian Ocean.

Therefore the scenario of the possible consequences of an Ottoman victory itself are incorrect.
Obviously Casale is exaggerating to show the contrast between the possibilities and what actually happened, but he's an academic historian on the early modern Ottoman empire (who has actually extensively researched Portuguese and Ottoman archives) so I'd say you're too quick to discredit what he says.
 
It'd be rather hard to hold -- Ethiopia was nigh unconquerable at the time, and Portugal was only weak so long as vampiric Spain kept them subordinate.

I think that the Ottomans could, with quality naval victories, throw the Portuguese out of East Africa, after which native control might return or other Europeans or even Oman might get involved.

The distance from the imperial core, the distractions of other frontiers -- and the problems of Ethiopia and Europeans in general -- would make East Africa a temporary Ottoman zone, probably in the way that Algiers or Morocco were under Ottoman suzerainty.

TLDR: Biggest impact is screwing the Portuguese even earlier, which may allow for not only the Dutch and English but the French to get involved in the asia trade earlier.
 
The distance from the imperial core, the distractions of other frontiers -- and the problems of Ethiopia and Europeans in general -- would make East Africa a temporary Ottoman zone, probably in the way that Algiers or Morocco were under Ottoman suzerainty.

TLDR: Biggest impact is screwing the Portuguese even earlier, which may allow for not only the Dutch and English but the French to get involved in the asia trade earlier.
This is what I thought too. However, on a more local level Ottoman rule might change the nature of Swahili states and make them more centralized as the Ottomans accord more power to sultans and consequently weaken the autonomy of the sultan's vassal allies. We don't really know what would happen, admittedly, because the Portuguese rule of the Swahili Coast was very different from a hypothetical Ottoman one, and because the Omanis ran the area like a colonial enterprise.
I would also think that there would be a Swahili cultural renaissance, as there was during the early periods of Portuguese expulsion and Omani rule.
 
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