WI: Otto the Great doesn't intervene in Italy?

So as some of you might not know Otto the Great was the founder of the Holy Roman Empire as we know it. This foundation came from his intervention into the disintegrating Kingdom of Italy, his assumption of the protection of the papacy and subsequent Papal coronation as Emperor of the Romans. However, before he crossed the Alps he was a highly successful King in Germany, inheriting a powerful realm from his father Henry the Fowler and further centralizing royal authority over the dukes and the Church. In some ways the intervention into Italy was a long-term disaster; it split the German Kings attention between Germany and Italy and insured that future sovereigns would always have to focus on multiple realms, eventually destroying central authority in Germany for centuries to come.

So my question is this: what if Otto the Great never intervened in Italy for whatever reason? Maybe Adelaide of Italy is forced to marry Adalbert of Ivrea before she can escape, never offering her hand to the German King. Or someone else intervenes first, like France or the Byzantines. Or hell maybe the rulers in Italy manage to get their acts together and save kingdom from outsiders. The point is Otto never has the opportunity/reason to intervene in Italy and stays focused on Germany.

The most obvious change is the Holy Roman empire as we know it is never formed. But what else changes? Would Germany remain a centralized Kingdom under the Ottonians? Would Italy eventually develop its own polity and fully independent government? Would someone else develop a Holy Roman Empire analog? Basically whats the long-term repercussions to Italy and Germany remaining separate?
 
Sorry for the overlong post (I really wish we could have
stuff to make it easier to read). Butterflies, and more or less short-term ones, being huge, it's more about possible tendencies than really safe bets.

It was discussed a bit there (allow me to copy some of the post there) : wiking proposed something interesting, having Liudolf's mother surviving and Otto dying before intervening in Italy; making Liutdolf focused on solidifying his control of Germany rather than going South.

Italy

Hugues d'Arles managed IOTL to fought off the worst of the italian feudal anarchy that plagued the peninsula, but it took his power himself from an invasion not too dissimilar to Otto's.
Admittedly, if Lothar of Arles survives and that Ottonians support Bosonids, you may end with a Bosonid Italy which may be slightly stabler but Ottonians would have few reasons to support Bosonids all the time from this point.

In fact, Ottonids could see fit to favour one or the other pretender or regional powers (Bosonids, Old Welfs, Ivreans), in order to prevent a relativly powerful rival on their southern borders to appear (admittedly, we could see a stronger Carolingian or Robertian Francia meddling itself in Provence as they tried to do IOTL): don't forget that Italian kingship is particularly tied to the imperial title. A strong Italian king would certainly be declared such and that would be a threat for Germany, not even considering most of important roads passed trough northern Italy.

While Ottonians could be spared to intervene as deeply they did IOTL (by lack of clear claims) they would still be likely to undergo campaigns more or less regularly. They would indeed be the main dynasty of the Xth and maybe XIth centuries, and would have to intervene there would it be only for their own sake.

This unstability may even be an Ottonian objective : giving that main trade and strategic roads were passing trough Italy, they won't let them to someone else. Having at least North-East Italian nobility under their lead seems likely.
On the other than, Carolingians in Western Francia may have interest to keep links with Burgundy, would it be only to prevent a too great Ottonian influence on France (even if it wouldn't likely counter-balance the PoD's effects).

An Ottonian focus on Italy and Carolingian focus on Burgundy may sounds interesting, but I'm afraid it'd would be too simplistic. Mostly because they are going to deal with more close issues : Carolingians/Robertians with their immediate neighbours; Ottonians with their nobles and clergy.

Eventually, depending on the strength of Carolingian/Robertian France, I could indeed see Ottonians putting a relative or a client in charge of Burgundy or Italy, at least temporarily.
We could see some nobles switching alliegance, and in Burgundy's case being more close to France or Germany depending on the situation. Eventually it's going to be clarified, but I can't really say how in the forseeable future (again, it depends a lot of what happen in France and Italy).


his assumption of the protection of the papacy and subsequent Papal coronation as Emperor of the Romans.
I'm not sure it was as clear as it became in the later Ottonian reigns : IIRC, they took the same titles than Carolingian Emperors "August Emperor", but it should be checked out.

Germany
Italy was really important for several German matters : not only it was where most of roads and trade ways passed trough before entering Germany, but it represented a huge legitimacy necessity for Ottonians :

- Pontifical support, that helped undergo ecclesiastical reforms to have a German church directly tied to Ottonians, rather than great nobles.

(Without this, I don't think nominating Bruno as Duke of Lotharingia would have been entierly possible for instance, or rather be really safe, and more generally Otto's policy to use ecclesiastical power to bound secular principalities as in Franconia and Lotharingia)

- Imperial kingship that would reinforce the sacrality of Ottonians more than any "simple" feudal kingship could have done.

It would have some consequences for what matter Germany, eventually, critically when it comes to how Ottonian strengthened their domination over Germany IOTL.

There's no doubt, however, that Ottonians would still be the leading dynasty of western Europe in the Xth/XIth century.

I could see Liutdolf still having to deal with important principalities (being the main German prince, not the only one), and eventually playing one against the other, rather than a chimerical attempt at centralisation (see above). Without a complete support, it means less ecclesiastical lands, more regionally-issued court of fidei, but as well a greater capacity of reaction.

I do agree that we'd end with a de facto hereditary Ottonian succession, much like Robertian IOTL : meaning formal elections with a growingly reduced number of nobles, and coronation of the heir during his father's reign being a great legitimazing tool.

There would be different situation, though : Ottonians were certainly much more powerful in Germany than Capetians were in France.

Meaning a probable more important opposition, as it existed IOTL (and one of the reasons why Ottonians went after imperial legitimacy) and that would be a factor of instability, contrary to France where feudal principalities were generally particularly divided themselves (save Normandy or Flanders, that didn't avoid themselves disunity, but where it was more limited) and where Capetians managed to first unify their demenesne and then to play on their neighbours divisions.

On the long term, the absence of the Rex Romanorum/King of Germany mix, means probably no or little pontifical intervention in the succession, which would make it stabler, IMO.

Culturally, however, no Ottonian hegemony in Europe could mean a longer Post-Carolingian world, or an even more blurry feudal structures.
You may end with smaller "renaissances", and more "national", altough I've trouble to discern on what would make them distinct from each other (maybe a plolycentric "Renaissance"?), instead of an "Ottonian Renaissance".

France/England/Danemark/Slaves/Southern Italy
Not reviving the imperial crown would make Ottonians less influents. Their political meddling in Francia, for exemple, wouldn't benefit from the huge clerical support they recieved IOTL.

Lesser pontifical authority means likely nobiliar (royal and feudal at the same time) takeover of the clergy. Maybe no Peace of God movement as we know it. Medieval society of the XIth century may looks more what it looked like in the Xth : more violent, less culturally-driven, etc.
It may butterfly Crusades, at least in their historical definition, without a strong pontifical/clerical restructuration. Without pontifical hegemony, and ecclesiastical "independence", I don't think you'd end with the mix of milites/clergy features.

French Carolingians may have a better time holding their dynastical claims without Ottonian meddling comparable to IOTL.
It could means, eventually, that Liutdolf and his successors would have to focus a bit more on Rhineland and compromise with houses as Ardennais in order to stabilize a bit the border territories.
In fact, I could see Ottonians not objectively supporting as much they did Robertians, either by active support or absence of intervention on behalf of one or the other side.

Links with Anglo-Saxon England are going to be even stronger than IOTL, between Ottonians and Wessex. Maybe it could evolve up to intervening in Danemark against Sven I? A bit far fetched, I concede.

But main focus is indeed going to be against Western Slavs, not only Bohemia but Poland and Wendes (which could incidentally increase tensions with Danes). I could see Ottonians playing eastern principalities against each other in order to weary them (not unlike Capetians did with Angevins and Normans before 1066) : an absence of Polish presence in Pomerania, for exemple?

As for Southern Italy...To be honest, I'm not seeing why Normans wouldn't go for south Italy as IOTL, as the region would be basically unchanged. That said, with a clearly more unstable Italy, I could see them advancing further in the central part of the peninsula, acting as pontifical protectors (maybe somethin akin to the short lived Principality of Rome?)
 
I've been writing a timeline concerning this myself, so I'm happy to see this thread.

It seems like Otto's claim to the imperial crown after Liudolf's civil war and the Battle of Lechfeld was nearly undeniable. Would it have been conceivable for Otto to go to Rome and gain the crown without personally holding the Kingdom of Italy himself, if Italy was held by a subservient king in the vein of Conrad of Burgundy? Berengar of Ivrea was theoretically a king under Otto's rule, but obviously that relationship was never stable or friendly. I'm wondering if a replacement of Berengar in a somewhat stronger position could credibly have dissuaded an attempt at annexation by allowing Otto to achieve his imperial, if not quite his Italian, ambition.

I do wonder what the social and political framework of Italy ends up looking like as an independent kingdom. It seems likely to me that the kings of Italy would follow in the Ottonian mold of using the bishops and abbots as building blocks of political power, perhaps with more long-term success than the Germans if the Italian king can keep the Pope reasonably securely under his thumb.

Speaking of southern Italy, what seems like the most likely posture of an independent Italy towards the Byzantines? Otto warred against them and sought the submission of the southern Lombards, eventually to be "bought off" by an imperial bride for his son, but if an independent king of Italy is going to be continually looking over his shoulder at German intervention over the mountains a hostile stance against the Byzantines in Italy seems ill-conceived. Does it seem plausible that an Italian king would cultivate an alliance with them so as to afford more attention to the northern frontier, or would there inevitably be friction over the Catapanate and the Lombard principalities?
 
It seems like Otto's claim to the imperial crown after Liudolf's civil war and the Battle of Lechfeld was nearly undeniable.
Certainly : it was probably more or less clear already by the time of pontifical calls. Giving that imperial title was given to whoever was able to protect Rome (usually Italian kings), Otto could have taken it anyway, even without Lechfeld.

Would it have been conceivable for Otto to go to Rome and gain the crown without personally holding the Kingdom of Italy himself
I don't think so : the imperial kingship became really mixed with italian kingship during Late Carolingian times and its immediate aftermath.
Contrary to the Burgundian kingships, that were more of a joke than anything else (and growingly related to Italian title themselves), the Italian title was far too prestigious and allowing some ambitions to be left to a vassal on long term.

What you could do have, would be part of the Italian nobility (especially in Frioul and North-Eastern italy) being directly subservient to Ottonians (or possibly great nobles as Bavarians), as it happened with Northern Burgundian nobility.

I'm wondering if a replacement of Berengar in a somewhat stronger position could credibly have dissuaded an attempt at annexation by allowing Otto to achieve his imperial, if not quite his Italian, ambition.
I think it may have the contrary effect : Italy was going to be a focal point for Germanic geopolitics for various reasons, a stronger Italy could be a threat on this regard, and may not have been really tolerated. (The relative strength of Berengar compared to previous reign may have been a factor IOTL)

I do wonder what the social and political framework of Italy ends up looking like as an independent kingdom.
Certainly fragmented : think southern France-scale political puzzle. A Bosonid kingship with Lothar's survival looks plausible, but i'm not sure about dynastical stability, especially with other powers' involvement in Burgundy and Italy.
At best, Bosonid kings would have to deal with rivals with similar power, but all of them having to deal with political fragmentation, while Italy de facto stretching from Rhone to Friul.

It seems likely to me that the kings of Italy would follow in the Ottonian mold of using the bishops and abbots as building blocks of political power
Would it appear as IOTL, tough, without Roman-based legitimacy of Ottonians to hugely meddle with ecclesiastic matters within and outside his realm?
You may likely have a royal controled bishops/abbots network as it existed in contemporary Francia, but less trough imperial legitimacy than for sheer political power (allowing great nobles to do the same).

Speaking of southern Italy, what seems like the most likely posture of an independent Italy towards the Byzantines?
Too busy with their own inners problems and pressure from France and Germany to realistically have a posture? :p

Does it seem plausible that an Italian king would cultivate an alliance with them so as to afford more attention to the northern frontier
Didn't tought it this way. An interesting consequence, guaranteeing Italy some peace there, at least for a time. Wonder what would it imply for southern Italy's history.
 
I don't think so : the imperial kingship became really mixed with italian kingship during Late Carolingian times and its immediate aftermath. Contrary to the Burgundian kingships, that were more of a joke than anything else (and growingly related to Italian title themselves), the Italian title was far too prestigious and allowing some ambitions to be left to a vassal on long term.

Certainly Ottonian Germany was in a position to dominate Italy geopolitically. But I still question whether Italy would have actually been annexed had it possessed a king that did not give Otto every conceivable excuse for annexation - usurping the throne, imprisoning Adelaide, persecuting the clergy, attacking the nobles, rebelling against Otto as soon as Otto's back was turned. I imagine at least some of that "naughty behavior" was exaggerated by Liutprand of Cremona, but even so it seems like Otto couldn't have asked for a better king of Italy than Berengar for his own purposes.

I guess this sort of comes down to how much a "claim" actually matters. If Lothair still ruled and had committed none of Berengar's outrages, would that keep Otto over the mountains? Without Adelaide, the Italian clergy and nobles, and eventually the Pope crying for Otto's aide, would an invasion of Italy be unthinkable, or was his acceptance of these "invitations" only a fig leaf over a policy of annexation he was going to carry out regardless?

What you could do have, would be part of the Italian nobility (especially in Frioul and North-Eastern italy) being directly subservient to Ottonians (or possibly great nobles as Bavarians), as it happened with Northern Burgundian nobility.

Was there much of a hint of this before Verona/Friuli was turned over to Otto by Berengar? It seems difficult to reconstruct what was going on in that part of Italy at the time, perhaps because it was the most directly impacted by the Magyars. The greater and lesser territorial lords that were noted as supporting Otto, like Otbert of Milan and Adalbert Atto of Canossa, seem to have been largely concentrated in the northwest rather than the northeast.

Certainly fragmented : think southern France-scale political puzzle. A Bosonid kingship with Lothar's survival looks plausible, but i'm not sure about dynastical stability, especially with other powers' involvement in Burgundy and Italy.

It's interesting how different the regions really are. Lombardy itself is divided among large territorial magnates, while Tuscany is whole and apparently almost untouched by the incastellamento until later in the 10th century. Latium and Romagna seem more ecclesiastically dominated, relics of the Exarchate days, and on Verona and Spoleto I have little information.

Though the nominal capital of the kingdom was Pavia in Lombardy, I wonder if the center of royal power - assuming a lasting independent kingdom - wouldn't have gravitated to Tuscany. The Arno valley seems like a much surer base for a royal demesne than anywhere in Lombardy, yet isn't so far away from the Alps as to neglect that all-important frontier totally.

Would it appear as IOTL, tough, without Roman-based legitimacy of Ottonians to hugely meddle with ecclesiastic matters within and outside his realm?

I could be wrong about this, but I always viewed the integration of the German church into the administration of the kingdom as having more to do with the weakness and irrelevancy of the Papacy in its Tusculan phase than any kind of legitimacy emanating from it. As long as the Pope could hardly even control his own city, Otto could distribute the pallium as he saw fit and count on the loyalty of his ecclesiastical vassals. When the Papacy emerged from this shadow in later centuries, this would be a grave danger to the German monarchy, but an Italian king would have the potential benefit of having the head of the Church more securely within his realm and potentially more vulnerable to royal pressure than the Investiture Controversy-era popes were to pressure from Germany.

You may likely have a royal controled bishops/abbots network as it existed in contemporary Francia, but less trough imperial legitimacy than for sheer political power (allowing great nobles to do the same).

Could you expand on this a little? I'm not very familiar with the ecclesiastical situation in contemporary Francia.

Didn't tought it this way. An interesting consequence, guaranteeing Italy some peace there, at least for a time. Wonder what would it imply for southern Italy's history.

Well, you could argue that Hugh was on this track already - his (illegitimate) daughter Bertha, renamed Eudokia, was betrothed to Romanos II, but the plan came to naught because Bertha/Eudokia died in childhood.

Just from the perspective of diplomatic logic, it seems like an Italy constantly preoccupied with Germany (and Burgundy) would put a premium on not having to fight on two fronts. The Byzantines, for their part, are in a similar position - from their strategic perspective, never having to worry about a northern power interfering with their business in southern Italy seems highly desirable and well worth a diplomatic relationship and perhaps even a bride exchange or two. So the Italian king gets to concentrate on his real adversaries, and the Greeks get a little potential pressure taken off a volatile frontier.

That said, as you say the Italian kings would have been strongly associated with the imperial crown, and however strategically beneficial a Byzantine-Italian relationship would be there might nevertheless have been friction caused by the continued Italian claim to be Emperors of Rome.

Pandulf Ironhead, who made the best showing of his 10th century Lombard contemporaries, probably wouldn't have prospered under these circumstances - without Otto, he never gets granted Spoleto, and he never has the backing of Otto's army against the Greeks. The Byzantines have a much better opportunity to consolidate the south, though with the activity of the Kalbids at this time I could potentially see the Lombards turning to the Sicilian Muslims for succor. It certainly wouldn't be the first time a Lombard ruler allied with the "Saracens" against a greater threat from a Christian neighbor. Whether the situation leads to a more secure Greek Italy or just more interminable Greek-Lombard-Muslim warfare is hard to say.
 
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But I still question whether Italy would have actually been annexed had it possessed a king that did not give Otto every conceivable excuse for annexation - usurping the throne, imprisoning Adelaide, persecuting the clergy, attacking the nobles, rebelling against Otto as soon as Otto's back was turned.

As you said, we're on the usual clerical complaining about "where this world is going to". Saying you could switch names and still have a similar description of the situation in France or Germany may be a bit exagerated, but I don't see Berengar doing much worse than what other kings or important nobles did on the territories they ruled in the Xth or early XIth century : it's not like Bosonids didn't gained Italian kingship trough invasion themselves, that early Capetians didn't have huge familial feuds (as for kidnapping, Late Carolingians could say even worse about it), the anti-Carolingian clergy was claiming being persecuted on the tone of "Help! Help! I'm being repressed!", etc.

Sure Berengar was no saint, and give pretexts to Ottonian takeover, but he acted in order to strengthen would it be a bit a weak Italian kingship, which passed trough acting on a troublesome and rebellious Italian nobility.
Another king would certainly have to deal sooner or later with the same problems, giving similar excuse for Otto to intervene.

I guess this sort of comes down to how much a "claim" actually matters. If Lothair still ruled and had committed none of Berengar's outrages, would that keep Otto over the mountains?
Maybe not as IOTL, if it's what you meant (and on which I would agree with the reasons you gave).
Maybe more as a "protector" as it happened eventually for the Kingdom(s) of Burgundy with half of the nobility being either merged with Germanic nobility or at least tending to be on its sphere of influence.

I'd wouldn't see such situation, which would have hard time to stabilize, doing so with a clear link of vassality. A good "counter-mesure" would be to preserve a Carolingian Francia that was more able, contrary to Robertian/Capetians, to intervene in its south-eastern borders (relatively so, of course).

Was there much of a hint of this before Verona/Friuli was turned over to Otto by Berengar? It seems difficult to reconstruct what was going on in that part of Italy at the time, perhaps because it was the most directly impacted by the Magyars.
Less a hint, than it would be important geostrategical point for Otto, a bit like Northern Burgundy was (I know, I know, but I really think the IOTL situation for Burgundy would be really interesting to consider for what matter ITTL's Italy).

Not only because of Magyar's threat, but because of the alliances with southern German families, because most roads to Germany passed there...
The level of integration is clearly debatable, but I think you'd have something there, still.

The greater and lesser territorial lords that were noted as supporting Otto, like Otbert of Milan and Adalbert Atto of Canossa, seem to have been largely concentrated in the northwest rather than the northeast.
I wasn't talking of North-Eastern Italy as an exclusive, but just for what I think would be a more important focus for Ottonians ITTL.
If Northern-Central Italy comes with it (which wouldn't be that obvious in the case for Lothar of Arles being in charge and not undergoing as much pressure at first on them), it would only make the "protection" mentioned earlier more likely, but I'd tend to think it would be less strategic, strictly speaking, that the aformentioned regions, regardless of local active support).


It's interesting how different the regions really are. Lombardy itself is divided among large territorial magnates,
while Tuscany is whole and apparently almost untouched by the incastellamento until later in the 10th century.
I'm not sure the delay in encastellation was representative of a real political unity : I could be convinced otherwise, but the exemple of Late Carolingian France, with an encastellation not exactly complete which didn't clashed with a real political clusterfuck (and with several sphere of influences change, enough for that can't really be traced entierly)

Now I know the situation in Italy differs (altough you have similarities with what happened in Provence and Languedoc), but I'm not sure it have to imply a greater unification. Unfortunatly, as you said, information about territories are meager on this period.

Though the nominal capital of the kingdom was Pavia in Lombardy, I wonder if the center of royal power - assuming a lasting independent kingdom - wouldn't have gravitated to Tuscany.
Depends a lot on which dynasty gets in power : an Ivrean or Bosonid royalty may have more to do in Lombardy, at least partially so (I wouldn't exclude something in Appenini, or Mantua, would it be for strategical purposes).

I'd think we'd end up with the region between the Alpine and Appenine foothills, being the core of an italian royal power: athough I won't say capital : "erring" court was still the norm, the symbolism of Pavia would be (IMO) strong enough to keep it part of royal "cores" (I don't expect something clear and continuous, at least in a first time).

I could be wrong about this, but I always viewed the integration of the German church into the administration of the kingdom as having more to do with the weakness and irrelevancy of the Papacy in its Tusculan phase than any kind of legitimacy emanating from it.

As long as the Pope could hardly even control his own city, Otto could distribute the pallium as he saw fit and count on the loyalty of his ecclesiastical vassals.
I'm less sure about this : while it's more a dual relationship than pontifical legitimacy allowing changes, the monopolisation of ecclesiastical policy prevented German nobles to really push their families at the head of bishopries, holding them as quasi-familial lands.

Not that the absence of pontifical "collaboration" would prevent Ottonians to attempt that (he managed to pull a Synod in France, with French and German bishops to settle the matter of late Carolingians), but I think German nobles would attempt the same. Remember that dukes of Bavaria could (and didn't really avoided doing so) name bishops on their own principalties : while Otto managed to curb their claims eventually, his role as "protector of the church" allowed him to treat bishops not as allies but definitely as direct vassals (with similar rites than for secular vassals).

Depending on the PoD (earlier death of Otto, for exemple), Ottonians would have more trouble holding this without the imperial title, IMO, as it wouldn't make the mutual reinforcement of Ottonian and pontifical legitimacy trough the Ottonian Diploma that obvious (it was more or less coming from the Carolingian conception of imperium).

Could you expand on this a little? I'm not very familiar with the ecclesiastical situation in contemporary Francia.
Oh, well...It might be a bit sketchy.

Basically, monasteries were directly tied with great nobles families with a lot of secular abbots (as Robertians, that took their nickname of "Capetians" from the cape of St Martin in Tours).
At the point of many sanctuaries and their beneficies being considered as property of the secular nobles, at the very least seeing their holders chosen by them.
At best, bishops were feudal rivals

It wasn't exactly unknown in Germany (Eigenkirche), but it took enough proportions for that the Peace of God movement flourished in France.

Admittedly it began to change early in the Xth century, with the foundation of Cluny by Guilhèm the Pious, that was technically directly depending from Rome, but it was a novation from the situation where great princes (bishops as secular) had the upper hand.
But it didn't suddenly challenged the latter : Saint-Julien de Brioude continued to be considered as a more or less private holding by the very same person.

As for bishops, you can take a look at Wigericids to see how far it could go, even if by the mid-Xth and XIth, you're seeing a struggle of bishops (their charge being largely due to extra-ecclesiastical concerns) and secular lords about cities and their countryside.

You'd say it wasn't wholly different from what happened elsewhere, complete with the reforms in the Xth/XIth centuries. But I think that a lot of these managed to succeed thanks to Ottonian/Pontifical reformations, and a regain of prestige for Rome, which pointed that ecclesiastical structures were to be (at least formally) independent.

Without this historical link, I'd think the situation would be more locally contextual.

That said, as you say the Italian kings would have been strongly associated with the imperial crown, and however strategically beneficial a Byzantine-Italian relationship would be there might nevertheless have been friction caused by the continued Italian claim to be Emperors of Rome.
It didn't caused that much ruckus, though, especially if Italian hold by the old formulation of "August Emperor" without precising *wink-wink* which imperium it was (the main problem would be the claim of an imperium over Christiendom, that was mostly empty by the Late Carolingians, before being revivified by Otto).

Byzzies were enough of diplomats to see the vacuity about going into a fight with a possible ally in the region for something as minor, IMO, if alliance was worth it.

Whether the situation leads to a more secure Greek Italy or just more interminable Greek-Lombard-Muslim warfare is hard to say.
Interesting, in both cases, though favouring too much Kalbids or Arabo-Andalusian pirates may be largely frowned upon by Burgundian/Italian kings, and cause an hostility on which Germans would have trouble to choose a side.

Would you think it would make Bosonids (or whoever rules in Italy) even more likely to side with Byzzies?
 
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Sure Berengar was no saint, and give pretexts to Ottonian takeover, but he acted in order to strengthen would it be a bit a weak Italian kingship, which passed trough acting on a troublesome and rebellious Italian nobility.
Another king would certainly have to deal sooner or later with the same problems, giving similar excuse for Otto to intervene.

Sooner or later, yes, but Otto's not immortal. What I'm wondering is whether a later king (or Lothair, if he lived long enough) could sustain a policy of "appeasement" or at least a more temperate resistance until a more opportune moment (i.e. after Otto the Great's death) to take the kind of consolidating steps that got Berengar in so much trouble. In the near term that means a weak kingdom, quite possibly infiltrated by German noblemen and German interests, but perhaps one that could reclaim some autonomy in a later time of German disunion.

If the Italian kingdom can only get a little breathing room, I think their chances improve substantially. The Magyars were a huge burden on all the Italian kings. Berengar's taxes that Liutprand complained about were levied to pay off the Magyars, who were free to raid all the way to Apulia, and the legitimacy of all previous kings back to Berengar of Friuli had been continually undermined by their inability to actually protect the kingdom. Otto really does Italy a huge favor at Lechfeld, and maybe if an annexation can be postponed until after his death, the Italian kings - even as de facto German tributaries - would be in a substantially improved position.

I'd wouldn't see such situation, which would have hard time to stabilize, doing so with a clear link of vassality. A good "counter-mesure" would be to preserve a Carolingian Francia that was more able, contrary to Robertian/Capetians, to intervene in its south-eastern borders (relatively so, of course).

Well, if you somehow get rid of Berengar of Ivrea, you probably automatically butterfly the Anscarid County of Burgundy away. Ermentrude of Roucy marries someone else, making that person the Count of Macon in jure uxoris instead of Berengar's grandson Otto-William. While that has nothing to do with saving the Carolingians, perhaps the right husband for Ermentrude could give a good part of the northern Kingdom of Burgundy to an already-established French noble family, giving the French kingdom a more substantial foothold there.

Would you think it would make Bosonids (or whoever rules in Italy) even more likely to side with Byzzies?

Maybe so. Hugh, after defeating the Muslims of Fraxinet, allowed them to survive so they could continue to harry the Alpine passes as a possible obstacle to outside invasion (though it didn't help him against Berengar). The Sicilians, however, are no strategic asset to Italy and any tolerance of them would corrode the legitimacy of the Italian king/emperor and probably his control over the pope, which is absolutely key for survival against Germany. If Italy loses control over Rome and has a pope calling for a savior from Germany, I think it's basically game over for independent Italy just as it was in OTL.

Speaking of Fraxinet, it was a Byzantine fleet that made Hugh's near-destruction of them possible. One could look at that Italian-Byzantine cooperation as a template for potential future action against the Saracens. The southern Lombards have little to offer Italy as allies, but the Byzantines at have a fleet capable of carrying out effective actions as far away as Provence.
 
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