I don't know if you've read a map, but to reach Estonia, you have to use all the same roads in Latvia and Lithuania that the traffic is jammed up on. Then, in order to reach Leningrad from Estonia, they have to merge back with those jammed up roads southeast of the city. And then their constrained by the terrain and defending Soviet forces in those directions anyways. Peat bogs do not make for good maeneuvering terrain.
Different route to Riga than the other two Panzer corps were taking and by July already Riga was a shipping supply center, so would actually bypass the rail and road routes that the other two Panzer corps used IOTL.
Plus Riga got the first rail extension and train arrival on July 9th; they'd use the historical support lines that the German 18th army used for it's advance into Estonia.
The first supply barge arrived July 11th.
http://www.allworldwars.com/Comments-on-Russian-Roads-and-Higways-by-Max-Bork.html
Really the supply issue for an advance through Estonia is the least problem and one route that is totally without partisans. Clearing Estonia more quickly actually prevents the Soviet destruction battalions from wrecking the logistics and opens up Tallinn in August to shipping instead of late September. Plus again it eliminates the Soviet 8th army from appearing in front of Leningrad.
Check a map of advance through Latvia and Estonia, the roads were actually clear for a Panzer Corps and free from the supply lines of the rest of the Panzer Army.
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941NW/Baltic_NW_41.jpg
Compare the advance map above to the rail line map, which matches much of the roads and highways below:
http://www.finkle.org/map.jpg
From Narva if Rommel's corps is using that route then Rheinhart's corps can use some further south, which actually lightens the logistic burden of advancing that far north. Plus in July as part of the corps is rerouted to help Manstein near Soltsy they'd have enough strength and an independent supply route to keep advancing with 3-4 combined divisions and two different routes to support them logistically. As Tallinn is opened 6 weeks earlier at least to supply ships then Narva becomes a major supply route and doesn't require using rail lines from Germany or even Riga that far north, nor the roads from that far south, saving tremendous wear and tear on Grossraumtransport trucks.
What likely happens is Rommel runs out of gas in Estonia and spends much of the time waiting for his logistics to unjam themselves throughout July, much like what happened with the forces south of Leningrad after their dash through Lithuania. He probably remains stuck longer, though, since the main rail line running from
Riga into Estonia was much further down the rails running through Estonia was way far down the priority list of the already overstretched FBDs.
Not really if you actually look at the specifics of AG-North's logistics, rather than try and shoe horn van Creveld's view about OTL campaign into the situation. That is an ATL where different resources are available, different routes would be used, and ports are a supply option much sooner than IOTL as a result. Rommel would have his pause at Riga as would happened along the Dvina to the other corps, but Riga being taken sooner means it opens to shipping sooner. It also means 8th army's primary retreat route is cut, so when the advance into Estonia happens there isn't much resistance left to stop them. 18th army doesn't end up bogged down there from August-September, so advances further faster and can help along the Luga sooner, as well as clear the Baltic islands a month sooner. Logistics through Lithuania-Latvia-Estonia is a different situation compared to Lithuania-Latvia-Russia, especially given the port supply abilities and Riga being a major shipping hub, decoupling 18th army/Rommel's corps from the Germany-Latvia rail net, same with capturing Tallinn opening up the ability to decouple from having to convert rail from Germany-Estonia and allows for the existing rolling stock in Estonia to be used from Tallinn-Narva and beyond (they had the same gauge as Russia).
In reality, they get bogged down on the traffic jammed roads and then swallowed up as replacements to the operational losses from the first few weeks, which in trucks alone was more then 20 times their number.
See above. Baltic state infrastructure was much better than Russia roads and even rail in many chases, while Rommel moving first to Riga from East Prussia, then through Latvia-Estonia would use entirely different routes than the rest of the Panzer army and get preference over 18th army's supply, not that that would matter for the slow moving infantry.
Said tactical-operational successes simply won't happen so long as those issues, which were the results of poor operational and strategic planning, persist. Even with their OTL resources, the Germans could have taken Leningrad had they actually recognized that they'd face severe fighting to do so and planned ahead accordingly. But they didn't and when they ran into unexpectedly stiff Soviet resistance, they were forced to improvise. But improvisation was and is no substitute for sound planning and the Germans hit the upper-limit of what it could achieve historically and even that took quite a bit of luck and positively heaps of Soviet missteps...
The problem with this statement is that it is based on faulty premises; you're assuming a bunch of things that aren't going to hold for an advance via Estonia compared to OTL push through Russia, east of Estonia.
How about you layout the way that with OTL resources Leningrad could have been taken. I'd like to see your scenario so we can assess your assumptions.