WI: Oilfields more accessible to the Axis

Deleted member 1487

I politely but firmly disagree that the Nazis are somehow completely irrational and incompetent.

The Germans did not, historically, have enough petrol production within its sphere to fuel even it's historic usage. They were importing roughly 1/4 of the fuel they took in that year despite the addition of the Romanian oil fields and laborious efforts at coal-to-liquid-fuel synthesis, of which almost the entirety came from the Soviet Union;
Not sure what you mean here, but the Soviets only provided about 900,000 tons of oil to the Germans from 1940-41, the Romanians were doing more than twice that per year. So of the imported oil Romania was the majority of it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940)#Total_trade
http://www.ijssh.org/papers/255-S00048.pdf
 
I said they don't completely lose. No doubt after the first few bombs, if the Germans see they can't counter them effectively, somebody will send out feelers for terms. How many mass slaughters can the governments of the Allies tolerate politically before the principal of unconditional surrender becomes a tad more flexible?
*If* Germany can defeat the USSR in 1942-1943 (not a certainty), would the war last until 1945? The Western Allies can keep attacking peripheral theaters like Africa, Italy and Norway. The general public as well as the political leadership will want to bring the war to the bitter end, but the former doesn't know about atomic bombs.

Without the Eastern Front (or reducing it to a combination of guerrillas and the most horrifying genocide humanity had ever seen), the Germans can divert a lot of resources into denying the Allies air superiority over Europe (specially so if they make peace with the USSR in '42 and have time to retool) and will have significant forces in France ready to repel any invasion. Suppose the Western Allies take Libya, get into a stalemate in Italy and liberate Norway and the Aegean islands. What's next, as far as the public is concerned?

I don't necessarily see a will to reach a ceasefire by ATL 1944, but what we have is a far bloodier (for the Allies) air campaign with no end in sight.
 
Not sure what you mean here, but the Soviets only provided about 900,000 tons of oil to the Germans from 1940-41, the Romanians were doing more than twice that per year. So of the imported oil Romania was the majority of it.

IF Germany had Matzen and a couple of other oilfields and IF they still sign trade agreements with USSR, what are they seeking instead of oil? my knowledge is somewhat limited on any materials they had identified pre-war with critical shortfalls?
 
IF Germany had Matzen and a couple of other oilfields and IF they still sign trade agreements with USSR, what are they seeking instead of oil? my knowledge is somewhat limited on any materials they had identified pre-war with critical shortfalls?


thanks

wonder the effects of their trade imbalance on decision to invade? (i.e. kill your creditor!) not that Germany would become OPEC on the basis of a few oilfields, but against historical circumstances they would be in better shape?

of course their paucity of fuel was known to Soviets at the time and affected THEIR behavior? under this scenario they may have delivered betters terms to join Axis? (since German situation not so dire)
 
How many mass slaughters can the governments of the Allies tolerate politically before the principal of unconditional surrender becomes a tad more flexible?

I'd advise one to look at the CBO and the allied Firebombing and aerial mining campaigns against Japan the governments of the Allies will tolerate plenty of slaughter against Germany and its population
 

Deleted member 1487

thanks

wonder the effects of their trade imbalance on decision to invade? (i.e. kill your creditor!) not that Germany would become OPEC on the basis of a few oilfields, but against historical circumstances they would be in better shape?

of course their paucity of fuel was known to Soviets at the time and affected THEIR behavior? under this scenario they may have delivered betters terms to join Axis? (since German situation not so dire)
I mean in the sense of not trusting Stalin enough to be materially dependent on him was a huge factor; they didn't want to have Stalin retain a kill switch over the German economy, nor strengthen the Soviets with technology/weapons transfers in payment. The food situation alone probably means nothing changes (Europe was in famine in 1940 due to the British blockade).
 
Crude Petroleum production 1932-69 Mk 3.png
 
According to the above Austria's peak production was 3.6 million long tons in 1956. Germany reached 7.5 million long tons in 1964 and remained at around that level until 1969, which is when my spreadsheet ends.
 
According to the above Austria's peak production was 3.6 million long tons in 1956. Germany reached 7.5 million long tons in 1964 and remained at around that level until 1969, which is when my spreadsheet ends.

that is an interesting graph, I do wonder if the huge increase in German production required post-war advances in drilling? I know that the Austrian field Matzen could have been produced with 1930's tech, and was in middle of Vienna Basin which had infrastructure.

(oops! that WAS answered above, and likely could have been tapped with 1930's tech)
 
Last edited:
As many as is necessary to obtain victory.

Define the requirements for "victory". What happens when the Germans, after the third or forth bomb, offer to negotiate a withdrawal from Western Europe in exchange for peace? After all, they have what they wanted; their living space in the east.
 
that is an interesting graph, I do wonder if the huge increase in German production required post-war advances in drilling? I know that the Austrian field Matzen could have been produced with 1930's tech, and was in middle of Vienna Basin which had infrastructure.

(oops! that WAS answered above, and likely could have been tapped with 1930's tech)
Austria and Germany's combined peak years (1955 and 1969) is 11.5 million long tons.

Liddell Hart (History of the Second World War p.24) wrote that Germany's wartime requirements were estimated to exceed 12 million tons a year. He also wrote that apart from coal derivatives Germany obtained half a million tons from her own wells and a trifling amount from Austria and Czechoslovakia. He also wrote that Germany imported 5 million tons a year to make up her peacetime needs and that, "Only the capture of Rumania's oil wells-which produced 7 million tons-in an undamaged state could offer a promise of meeting the deficiency."

Although Austria produced a trifling 62,000 tons in 1938 this had increased to a million tons by 1943. Germany managed to double its oil production from half a million tons in 1938 to a million tons in 1940, but it seems very strange that it declined to 700,000 tons by 1943, especially as it was up to 1.1 million tons in 1950.

Rumania's oil production in the period 1935-45 is peculiar too. 8.5 million tons in 1936, but only 5.2 to 5.7 million tons 1940-43.

I had no idea that Hungary had any oilfields. Production increased from nil in 1936 to 800,000 tons by 1943-44 and 1.7 million tons by 1968.

It was also surprising that Dutch oil production actually began in 1944 and reached half-a-million tons by 1948, a million tons in 1955 and 2 million tons in 1961.
 

Deleted member 1487

Austria and Germany's combined peak years (1955 and 1969) is 11.5 million long tons.

Liddell Hart (History of the Second World War p.24) wrote that Germany's wartime requirements were estimated to exceed 12 million tons a year. He also wrote that apart from coal derivatives Germany obtained half a million tons from her own wells and a trifling amount from Austria and Czechoslovakia. He also wrote that Germany imported 5 million tons a year to make up her peacetime needs and that, "Only the capture of Rumania's oil wells-which produced 7 million tons-in an undamaged state could offer a promise of meeting the deficiency."
He would be wrong then (not the first time for Liddell-Hart).
At peak (which largely wiped out the Czech fields) the Austrian+Czech fields in the Vienna basin produced over 1 million tons of oil.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_and_gas_deposits_in_the_Czech_Republic#History
http://viennabasin.spe.org/aboutus/whatisspevbs/oilandgasinaustria
Socony Vacuum came back to Austria, formed a 50/50 % joint venture with Shell (RAG) and secured large areas in the Vienna Basin for oil and gas exploration in 1935. At the end of 1937 total annual oil production in Austria was 32.858 tons. When Austria became a part of Germany (through the annexation of March 13, 1938) the bitumen law was issued which stipulated that exploration licenses were to be terminated by July 31, 1940, except a production license had been issued by this date. Thus a substantial part of the RAG exploration acreage was returned to the state, now the owner of the mineral rights for oil and gas. Because of the war situation the open exploration areas were licensed to German companies, which started extensive exploration activities. In 1943, 102 drilling rigs were in operation in the Vienna Basin area, as a consequence oil production rose to more than 1,3 million tons per year.
The Vienna Basin included parts of Czech territory as well, so output wasn't purely Austrian.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vienna_Basin_physical.png
 
He would be wrong then (not the first time for Liddell-Hart).
At peak (which largely wiped out the Czech fields) the Austrian+Czech fields in the Vienna basin produced over 1 million tons of oil.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_and_gas_deposits_in_the_Czech_Republic#History
http://viennabasin.spe.org/aboutus/whatisspevbs/oilandgasinaustria

The Vienna Basin included parts of Czech territory as well, so output wasn't purely Austrian.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vienna_Basin_physical.png
Did you not read the paragraph immediately below the quote from Liddell-Hart? That is...
Although Austria produced a trifling 62,000 tons in 1938 this had increased to a million tons by 1943. Germany managed to double its oil production from half a million tons in 1938 to a million tons in 1940, but it seems very strange that it declined to 700,000 tons by 1943, especially as it was up to 1.1 million tons in 1950.
The information from that paragraph came from the table in Post 28 which in turn was compiled from these:

https://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldArchive.html
 
Liddell Hart (History of the Second World War p.24) wrote that Germany's wartime requirements were estimated to exceed 12 million tons a year. He also wrote that apart from coal derivatives Germany obtained half a million tons from her own wells and a trifling amount from Austria and Czechoslovakia. He also wrote that Germany imported 5 million tons a year to make up her peacetime needs and that, "Only the capture of Rumania's oil wells-which produced 7 million tons-in an undamaged state could offer a promise of meeting the deficiency."
I put that quote to show that according to him Germany's peacetime consumption was 6 million tons a year and that the estimated wartime consumption was 12 million tons a year against a peak Austrian production of 3.6 million tons in 1955 and a peak German production of about 7.8 million tons in 1968 (not 1969 as I wrote in Post 33 although German production was around 7.5 million tons for the years 1963-69).
 

Deleted member 1487

Did you not read the paragraph immediately below the quote from Liddell-Hart? That is...
The information from that paragraph came from the table in Post 28 which in turn was compiled from these:

https://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldArchive.html
I did and wanted to put a fine point on how he was wrong, so his numbers in general are suspect. Also Vienna Basin production wasn't just Austrian fields. In terms of German production, likely it was field exhaustion given how ruthlessly the Germans exploited the resources out of desperation.
 
I'm sorry, but I find it hard to disassociate hypothetical outcomes from their most likely consequences - especially when those consequences are deeply interwoven in the whole gestalt of historical events. And I find it troubling at times that a fairly popular motif is trying to figure out how the really evil guys win; as if their evilness wasn't integral to the whole story.

Yes, I know, cognitive dissonance and all that jazz... Ah well.


However, my first comment still is so self-evident - a non-nuclear Nazi Germany is so going to lose in the end - that I am surprised that few, if any, take that into account. It is as if they want to play chess with the other side giving them a Queen and move handicap. Now that is more than fantasy.


Unless they were hydrogen bombs, then you could be right, but early nukes were not powerful at all. Nukes did not break 50 kt of power until 1948.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sandstone


The only reason nukes in this age did so much to Japan was because they were made out of so much wood, making them easily combustible. European cities are traditionally made out of stone, making the damage to the blast even smaller, and thus less likely for casualties. A nuke dropped on a Nazi-occupied Europe would have a hard time breaking 40,000 deaths, unless many people just so happened to be packed together in the area.


Even though Fat Man was 25% more powerful than Little Boy, it only resulted in about 40k deaths, due to the hilly area of Nagasaki.


You are completely full of shit.


In OTL, the Allies didn't put a boot on the ground in Japan, but two nukes got their surrender.


In an ATL 1945, if the Allies are stuck at the Rhine, and - say - Berlin, Munich and Dortmund have disappeared in nuclear fire, then the Nazis still lose.


If this ATL 1945 got the Germans lucky or have the Allies do worse mistakes, but with the Soviets in, I would agree. But a scenario where they have 50 million extra oil barrels, along with Soviet and Ropmanian oil added, that answer isn't as clear as it seems.


He would be wrong then (not the first time for Liddell-Hart).

At peak (which largely wiped out the Czech fields) the Austrian+Czech fields in the Vienna basin produced over 1 million tons of oil.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_and_gas_deposits_in_the_Czech_Republic#History

http://viennabasin.spe.org/aboutus/whatisspevbs/oilandgasinaustria


The Vienna Basin included parts of Czech territory as well, so output wasn't purely Austrian.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vienna_Basin_physical.png


We are talking about if they discover the oil fields in the early 1930s and reach production in 1940 from they had gotten in 1955. Which is still at 3.5 million tonnes. Which is what your link says:


After World War II the allies decided that the German property in Austria was to belong to the occupation forces, thus the whole Austrian oil industry came under the control of the USSR. After extensive disassembly of available oil field equipment, SMV (Soviet Mineral Oil Administration in Austria) started production and exploration activities in the Vienna Basin, and in 1949 the largest oil field in Europe was discovered : Matzen.


The development of this discovery brought the oil production in Austria to a record high of 3,6 million tons in 1955.


Discovering Mazten will make them go wild and discover more oil fields soon after. The Romanians had the ability to drill more than 2400 meters in 1932.


Most of Matzen's oil is found between 1300 and 1700 meters.


Not sure how you misread that wiking. You once brought in your link about the discovery of extra oil fields in Hungary before:


https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...s-discovered-before-ww2.354685/#post-10783802


I didn't include those because Hungary is too industrially poor to find those oil fields, and doesn't have as good connections to oil partners as Germany did such as the lucky Schoonebeek oil fields.



While thank you for the graph, a source would be nice to know for it.


Not trying to be rude, but there others who are interested and would like to know where your spreadsheet came and see what other details are from the sheet(or is that it?)
 
You could get the ASBs to work their magic and give Germany unlimited oil, which just kicks things along to the bottleneck. Once that oil has been refined how does Germany get it to the front lines? There is no fleet of trucks and ships waiting to move it, the Heer's logistics chain is dependent on horse drawn transport and a glut of oil won't change that. In 1944 with access to the resources of the USA and the British Empire the Allies struggled to supply their front line troops. Germany just doesn't have to resources for the scale of war it finds itself in by the latter half of 1941, a few more oil wells will not fix that.
 

Deleted member 1487

You could get the ASBs to work their magic and give Germany unlimited oil, which just kicks things along to the bottleneck. Once that oil has been refined how does Germany get it to the front lines? There is no fleet of trucks and ships waiting to move it, the Heer's logistics chain is dependent on horse drawn transport and a glut of oil won't change that. In 1944 with access to the resources of the USA and the British Empire the Allies struggled to supply their front line troops. Germany just doesn't have to resources for the scale of war it finds itself in by the latter half of 1941, a few more oil wells will not fix that.
In terms of tonnage moved horses actually accounted for a fraction of the German supply net; trains and trucks were the backbone. Horses were always a supplement due to how limited a volume they could actually handle and their wear out rate.
This book actually breaks down the numbers:
https://www.amazon.com/gp/search?index=books&linkCode=qs&keywords=9781304453297
The bottleneck with truck production is actually rubber for the times and factories/labor; the latter is somewhat soluble due to factory use having slack early in the war due to fuel access, while the former might be resolved earlier due to access to more resources for synthetic rubber given the lack of need for synthetic oil plants.
Also with unlimited access to fuel occupied countries could avoid having to de-motorize their economies (to serious negative impact) per OTL.

Oil though is but one problem the Germans had, but if that is resolved a number of problems resolve, including the raison d'etre for Case Blue which resulted in the Stalingrad disaster and overextension of the Axis armies.
 
Top