WI: North wins the Korean War

And that would maybe lead to strengthened deployments in Japan and elsewhere, but not territorial expansion or even remilitarisation of Japan - as was my main point.

No one talk about territorial expansion for Japan. Just remilitarisation. Japan won't like the fact they is a Red Korea, with a mostly Red Asia, and the same goes for DC. Building up Japan as fast as possible and give them a real military would be on they list on things to do.
 
No one talk about territorial expansion for Japan. Just remilitarisation. Japan won't like the fact they is a Red Korea, with a mostly Red Asia, and the same goes for DC. Building up Japan as fast as possible and give them a real military would be on they list on things to do.

During the Korean War the US had a list of options it would do if the "worst occurred". Remilitarisation Japan was not one of them. Considering how close ROK was always to falling, we can expect this policy to be kept unchanging.
 
During the Korean War the US had a list of options it would do if the "worst occurred".

What are these, by the way? That would answer much of my OP question.

What would the reaction within the Japanese government be to the fall of Korea? And what about Mao, what would be his government's next steps after Communist victory in Korea?
 
What are these, by the way? That would answer much of my OP question.
To go with the simplest answer, it is possible to gauge what the response would have been from the US with quotes from wikipedia:
The Truman administration was caught ill prepared and at a crossroads. Before the invasion, Korea was not included in the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.[115] Military strategists were more concerned with the security of Europe against the Soviet Union than East Asia. At the same time, the Administration was worried that a war in Korea could quickly widen into another world war should the Chinese or Soviets decide to get involved as well.
A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]".[117] Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.[118]
From these two excerpts alone the following could be identified:
  1. The United States was not prepared to engage in a war as large as the last one;
  2. Thus, the United States was keen in deescalating the situation, either by stopping it or ignoring it completely;
  3. The Communist threat was closely felt, along with the possibility of one conflict leading to a larger one;
  4. Korea was never a valuable asset to the United States, and the intervention was ultimately for keeping Japan safe.
Thus the following two conclusions could be drawn:
  1. The decisive question was whether or not Japan, along with other island states of the Far East, would be safe from Communism;
  2. There were a variety of options for the United States, although the administration was less than willing to escalate the conflict.
From this it can be concluded that with the fall of Korea the worst form of escalation would in quite parallel that of the Iron Curtain in Europe(although significantly less so, since this "Curtain" in Asia would be the wide ocean). And if the border remains calm enough the situation would be further "deescalated" - seeing how much a lack of mainland aggression there was against Taiwan IOTL, Korean aggression against Japan would be much less. Furthermore considering what we see in West Germany IOTL during the Cold War a remilitarisation of Japan TTL does not need to be expected.
What would the reaction within the Japanese government be to the fall of Korea? And what about Mao, what would be his government's next steps after Communist victory in Korea?
the Rhee government was planning to move a mass of South Koreans into Japan, specifically the prefecture Yamaguchi; estimated number of refugees that could be logistically handled was 60,000. (There also was an American plan to move 600,000 Koreans to West Samoa and establish a "New Korea".) For Mao, his main issue would be to catch up in industrialisation with the West, and seeing how Kim was left alone with his thing IOTL I doubt there would be much intervention, if at all. An interesting note on Kim - if Korea actually became reunified under him, his power would actually become severely undermined as the south actually had a stronger Communist base, one that has matured over the years under colonial rule. A saner KWP can be expected, might even be neutral during the Cold War.
 
Rhee and South Koreans to Japan

Good luck with that...Koreans aren't welcome in Japan now, what more so then?

Oh I'm sure the Americans could probably bully the government to let them in...just don't expect many opportunities.
 
Good luck with that...Koreans aren't welcome in Japan now, what more so then?
From the Japanese wikipedia:
"釜山陥落も危惧される情勢となり、韓国政府は日本の山口県に6万人規模の人員を収用できる亡命政府を建設しようとし、日本側に準備要請を行っている[37]。"
Since it's mentioning "sixty thousand" and "Yamaguchi" I'm guessing it mentions what I said, but see for yourself.
Oh I'm sure the Americans could probably bully the government to let them in...just don't expect many opportunities.
Is that such a problem? Japan is still effectively under the administration of GHQ. Any sort of a "balanced alliance" was sought out by the US after the establishment of the 55 system and the LDP was ensured to remain in power until perpetuity. And even then was the balance not so balanced - only now can Japan truly say it is an ally of the US simply because their foreign policies align.
 

You're missing the point. They'll be let in, but they won't be welcome. Once independence is restored (if not before), they'll be quietly sidelined by the government and populace alike, and there will probably be intense pressure on them to assimilate or immigrate elsewhere.
 
You're missing the point. They'll be let in, but they won't be welcome. Once independence is restored (if not before), they'll be quietly sidelined by the government and populace alike, and there will probably be intense pressure on them to assimilate or immigrate elsewhere.

And that's excellent news, because most likely the 60,000 will be Rhee's cronies along with pro-Japanese landowners and they certainly deserve some harsh treatment as the lower echelons of society.
 
And that's excellent news, because most likely the 60,000 will be Rhee's cronies along with pro-Japanese landowners and they certainly deserve some harsh treatment as the lower echelons of society.

Hmm...not sure if sarcastic...but if not, not surprised. Rhee was infamously corrupt and ditto for his cronies. Pro-Japanese landowners...even if they're pro-Japanese, Japanese farmers and landowners at the time would probably slit their wrists first before selling to Koreans. Considering the state of Japanese industry at the time, land was probably the only stable economic pillar at the time. They won't be staying pro-Japanese for long...not that the Japanese would actually care.
 
Hmm...not sure if sarcastic...but if not, not surprised. Rhee was infamously corrupt and ditto for his cronies.

Rhee is the Asian counterpart to MacArthur. His removal from power is best if quickest. He was also perhaps the only reason pro-Japanese elements remained unpurged within South Korea after both 1948 and 1953.
 
Rhee is the Asian counterpart to MacArthur. His removal from power is best if quickest. He was also perhaps the only reason pro-Japanese elements remained unpurged within South Korea after both 1948 and 1953.

Mixed views on MacArthur personally...but that's neither here nor there.

On that post...stupidity on his and the Allies' part. Korean sentiments about us Japanese mirror Japanese sentiments about Koreans, even more so back then...not removing pro-Japanese elements is about as unpolitical as flying the Nazi flag openly in Tel Aviv.
 
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