WI: No WWII, how far does Hitler/Germany get in terms of territory after 1938 Munich

RousseauX

Donor
So how much can Germany annex peacefully if they do it slowly enough?

Let's say Hitler has a close brush with death after Munich pact (car accident, close assassination attempt etc) which tampers his gambler's instincts and decides that he doesn't want to fight a general war anymore, or at least Germany needs 20-25 years of buildup before taking on the Judeo-Bolsheviks in Russia. But he still wants to annex as much territory in Europe as possible.

This would actually be a lot closer to what the generals thought OTL so I think it's fairly plausible.

Let's further assumes that he successfully tunes down the tempo of the arms buildup, there's recession but between allocating more resources to consumer goods production, bartering away some of the weapons from earlier buildups to countries like romania/hungary/bulgaria etc for foreign exchange, and buttressed by his popularity from annexing Austria/Sudetenland, hitler survives politically.

Can Germany given 10-20 years manage to annex Danzig? Rump Czechoslovakia? The Polish corridor? Anything further without provoking a war?
 

Deleted member 1487

Goering was doing the backroom negotiating leading up to the invasion of Poland and he was convinced that he could have gotten the Brits to get the Poles to give Germany Danzig and then with that they could economically subordinate Poland's economy due to access of shipping on the Vistula river to the Baltic being controlled by Danzig. Gdynia is a poor consolation. So likely Germany forces an alliance with Poland in the long term based on economic domination of their access to low cost trade. Effectively Hungarian-izing them. At that point theoretically they'd dominate Central Europe and the Balkans, probably the Baltics too, in terms of trade and could go to war with the Soviets using Polish territory if they wanted. So very far is the answer IF Goering was right about Germany being able to get the Brits to convince the Poles to hand over Danzig.
 
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Art

Monthly Donor
I think you mean Danzig/Gdansk. Dunkirk is a port in Northern France, Danzig was in Poland.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think you mean Danzig/Gdansk. Dunkirk is a port in Northern France, Danzig was in Poland.
Yeah, I was also just commenting on the Dunkirk thread, so D-named cities got crosswired. Thanks for the correction.
 
So how much can Germany annex peacefully if they do it slowly enough?

Let's say Hitler has a close brush with death after Munich pact (car accident, close assassination attempt etc) which tampers his gambler's instincts and decides that he doesn't want to fight a general war anymore, or at least Germany needs 20-25 years of buildup before taking on the Judeo-Bolsheviks in Russia. But he still wants to annex as much territory in Europe as possible.

This would actually be a lot closer to what the generals thought OTL so I think it's fairly plausible.

Let's further assumes that he successfully tunes down the tempo of the arms buildup, there's recession but between allocating more resources to consumer goods production, bartering away some of the weapons from earlier buildups to countries like romania/hungary/bulgaria etc for foreign exchange, and buttressed by his popularity from annexing Austria/Sudetenland, hitler survives politically.

Can Germany given 10-20 years manage to annex Danzig? Rump Czechoslovakia? The Polish corridor? Anything further without provoking a war?

Huh, turning what remained of Bohemia and Moravia into a Protectorate, and Slovakia into a puppet state, was achieved without war - and quickly.
You'll also remember the similarly bloodless annexation of Memel.

So, that far is clearly achievable.

As to Gdansk, I don't buy that the Poles can be strong-armed into letting it go from a free city to German territory. What I know about the Polish decision-makers' mindset tells me it's not happening. Assuming they do, then that's really the end - no further concessions. They'll go to war alone if need be.
 

Deleted member 1487

As to Gdansk, I don't buy that the Poles can be strong-armed into letting it go from a free city to German territory. What I know about the Polish decision-makers' mindset tells me it's not happening. Assuming they do, then that's really the end - no further concessions. They'll go to war alone if need be.
Why did they demobilize when Britain asked them to during negotiations? In a lot of ways Poland's position was a bluff to try and leverage the Allies into doing more on their behalf and no one anticipated the Germans would just haul off and invade.
 
Why did they demobilize when Britain asked them to during negotiations? In a lot of ways Poland's position was a bluff to try and leverage the Allies into doing more on their behalf and no one anticipated the Germans would just haul off and invade.

What demobilization during what period?

The German diplomatic offensive for Poland lasted some six months. Offers were made in Berchtesgaden to the Polish ambassador on October 24; and again in Berlin on November 19; and in Warsaw to Foreign Minister Beck; and again to Beck in Munich on January 5, 1939; and again at the end of that month in Warsaw. The last attempt was made in mid-March, before the annexation of Memel.

The Poles rightly understood, after what had happened in Wien and Prague, that beginning with one small concession to Hitler meant eventual servitude. So they obfuscated, procrastinated, accepted the rash British guarantee, and finally turned everything down.

The Poles did mobilize partially in March, in response to the Memel annexation, and stated in no uncertain terms that a similar move in Gdansk would mean war.

In any case, if the British exerted pressure on Poland, that wasn't in order that the Poles accept to lose their rights in Gdansk, or worse. The British wanted the Poles to sit down at a table with them, the french and the Soviets. Obviously, the reasonable alternative and the serious possibility of supporting Poland was recruiting the SU. That would have meant, eventually, Soviet troops on Polish territory, and the Poles totally refused that, too.

Nor were the British seriously intentioned to apply pressure for a settlement with Germany. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - news that should have shaken anybody - the British went forward and turned their unilateral guarantee into a proper military alliance with Poland.

Yes, in the last few days before the war the British tried to convince the Poles to send a plenipotentiary to Berlin, i.e. to accept a clearly bogus invitation by the Germans. The Poles - guess what - did not budge (rightly so; Hitler intention's was to break down the negotiations and to lay the blame on the Poles, so as to justify war).

The one thing the British achieved was that the Poles delayed the mobilization of some second-line divisions a few days, and even that was only done in order to make it clear who the aggressor was, than in hopes that the Poles would come to terms. Maybe that's what you are referring to with "demobilization".

There simply is no evidence that Polish decision makers could be pressured into doing anything like giving up Gdansk, let alone any part of their territory.
 

Deleted member 1487

What demobilization during what period?
I'll have to respond to the rest later, but in late August there was the secret mobilization order, which was then countermanded on request of the British and then reordered a few days later:
http://www.polandinexile.com/army1.htm
By the end of August 1939, Poland had secretly being mobilizing its army to a strength of 700,000. On 25th August the Wehrmacht despatched orders for 'Case White' (invasion of Poland), unfortunately, the negotiations between Hitler and Mussolini were not going well, therfore the orders were rescinded, but not all units received them in time. Border raids by the Abwehr, increases in reconnaissance flights and an intrusion at the Jablonka Pass were noted and not necessarily acted upon by the Poles, not through 'over-confidence' as Liddell Hart saw it, but through sheer inability due to lack of resources. The Germans did not achieve tactical surprise as many English and German historians would us believe (Zaloga and Madej,1991).

On the 30th August 1939, Marshal Rydz-Smigly put the country on war footing. The Navy was instructed to activate Operation Pekin. The destroyer flotilla left for Britain and had time to clear the Danish Straits before war was declared. General Mobilization had to be delayed in order to meet agreements with Britain and France not to inflame the diplomatically tense situation. To may historians, this action has been interpreted as the Poles being taken by surprise. The Wehrmacht were going to war on the 1st September irrespective of what the Poles, English or French thought or did. When General Mobilization took place, the English and French protested despite the evidence supporting the presence of a massed German army on its borders.

Going by Richard Overy's latest bio on Goering, apparently the British were wiling to put substantial pressure on the Poles over Danzig if Germany didn't go to war, but Hitler decided to attack despite Goering asking him to hold off.
 
I'll have to respond to the rest later, but in late August there was the secret mobilization order, which was then countermanded on request of the British and then reordered a few days later:

Then it's indeed the delay I mentioned - as opposed to a "demobilization", which implies that troops have been indeed mobilized, with men showing up at barracks, being assigned to units, being given uniforms and arms etc., and then sent home again.

As to the reason for the Westerners' pressure, "not to inflame the diplomatic situation" means simply and actually "not to provide Hitler with an excuse for doing what he had already decided to do in any case".

If Goering really believed the Poles could be convinced - as opposed to making this up later for his own reasons - then he was wrong. It wouldn't be either the first or the last time.
 
The integration of eastern Europe , the Balkans and the Baltic economies was the center part of Hjalmar Schacht plan that Hitler rejected when he elected to fast track this process with his "FOUR YEAR PLAN" in 1936. Once the economies are integrated a German lead military alliance against Stalin is inevitable. Soviets were even war-gaming this in 1940.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Goering was doing the backroom negotiating leading up to the invasion of Poland and he was convinced that he could have gotten the Brits to get the Poles to give Germany Danzig and then with that they could economically subordinate Poland's economy due to access of shipping on the Vistula river to the Baltic being controlled by Danzig. Gdynia is a poor consolation. So likely Germany forces an alliance with Poland in the long term based on economic domination of their access to low cost trade. Effectively Hungarian-izing them. At that point theoretically they'd dominate Central Europe and the Balkans, probably the Baltics too, in terms of trade and could go to war with the Soviets using Polish territory if they wanted. So very far is the answer IF Goering was right about Germany being able to get the Brits to convince the Poles to hand over Danzig.
I thought that appeasement had already lost its popularity in Britain after Hitler occupied Czechia in March 1939?

So how much can Germany annex peacefully if they do it slowly enough?
If they want to, they could probably outright annex Czechia (which they already occupied since March 1939). Also, perhaps they could convince Belgium to sell them Eupen and any German-majority areas around Malmedy.
 
Then it's indeed the delay I mentioned - as opposed to a "demobilization", which implies that troops have been indeed mobilized, with men showing up at barracks, being assigned to units, being given uniforms and arms etc., and then sent home again.

Actually that was almost what happened. Polish government declared full mobilisation on 29th of August; after a few hours, under Allies' pressure it was called off. Then it was started again on 30th of August which caused quite a confusion. People were unsure if the orders they were receiving were for the mobilization that ad been called off or if they were valid.
However, a significant part of the Polish forces was already mobilized - Poland started quietly mobilizing certain units in March and then a large number of them about 15th of August. It was still not full mobilization, with many reservists still at home. At 1st of September Poland had more than half of its units more or less ready to fight and on positions - about 21 active infantry divisions and 7 cavalry brigades. The rest was still moving or just mobilizing (especially reserve units).
 
Actually that was almost what happened. Polish government declared full mobilisation on 29th of August; after a few hours, under Allies' pressure it was called off. Then it was started again on 30th of August which caused quite a confusion. People were unsure if the orders they were receiving were for the mobilization that ad been called off or if they were valid.
However, a significant part of the Polish forces was already mobilized - Poland started quietly mobilizing certain units in March and then a large number of them about 15th of August. It was still not full mobilization, with many reservists still at home. At 1st of September Poland had more than half of its units more or less ready to fight and on positions - about 21 active infantry divisions and 7 cavalry brigades. The rest was still moving or just mobilizing (especially reserve units).

The additional details you provide confirm that this was not a demobilization, thank you.
 
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