WI: No Vietnam War draft

I have read many posts about the Vietnam War on the Forum. I am amazed at the general ignorance, and the ready acceptance of the "We can't Win" mentality. Nothing can be further from the truth. Col. Harry Summers was a part of the Paris "Peace" Accords group that was tasked with reclaiming US POWSs in an orderly manner. According to Col. Summers, his NVA counterparts believed that 3 times they had lost the war, and named them 1) TET '68 which was a terrible military defeat for the communists 2) The Cambodian Incursion of 1970, and finally 3) the 1972 Easter Offensive in which the North admitted to "at least 100,000 killed." This defeat was inflicted by ARVN troops and massive American airpower. The NVA officers at the "Peace" Accords could never understand "why you did not cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We were so [vulnerable] there."

Elite units such as the 101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne were mainly volunteers early in the war. Later on they were filled with draftees, but still performed well. Combat refusals did not begin, at least to my knowledge, until 1970. The war was ARVN's war to win or lose. The majority of ARVN units were ineptly led by political generals who were little better than warlords, cared little for their troops, and had no interest in winning the war. Several ARVN units fought well, the Airborne, the Marines, most Ranger outfits, and the ARVN First Infantry Division. American politicians refused to allow the military to run the war, or to even overhaul the ARVN Officer Corps. Unfortunately, over 58,000 Americans would die in a lost cause that tore the fabric of our nation apart, and in some ways we are still reaping the harvest.
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
LBJ and McNamara didn't want to take the political hit of calling up Reserves or Guard units while most of the active forces were already busy with the Cold War. But there was the Draft

New Draftees got churned thru S.Vietnam, with half of their Tour in Country, and they back to the States for the remainder, where they did very little except mark time, Drills that sort of thing.
So by time the troops were no longer green, and knew what they were doing, were rotated out. This meant when the FNGs got dropped into an existing unit, they would be a hindrance to the rest of the guys thill they picked up skills, at which point, they would start feeling 'Short' with the end of their Tour in sight.

So obviously no wanting to get send home in a Bag or or shot up, would start being very risk-adverse. So a Draftee might be only combat effective for 4-5 months in Vietnam.

You may ask, 'what about the guys who volunteered'? Well, those guys had a longer tour, but in most cases, they would have a different MOS, and a choice of where to go, within limits.
Only the most Gung-Ho and crazy chose Vietnam.
Could the US have diverted some forces from Europe and Korea to Vietnam, then replaced those forces with National Guard or Reserve units?
 
Could the US have diverted some forces from Europe and Korea to Vietnam, then replaced those forces with National Guard or Reserve units?

Really didn't need extra troops, just avoid tactics like 'March thru Indian Country till hostile fire is received, fight, call in airstrikes and Arty, declare victory, and march back to camp after a desultory search for VC remains' for the all important Body Count metric. Then do it again in a different area, Or a few months later, over the same area

Or Khe Sanh.

Move in, build a big base, fight, win vs what the PAVN threw at them, declare a win, wreck the base and leave.

What was the point?
If the goal was to begin to cut the supply trail networks, why leave?

Do it, or don't even try
 
Really didn't need extra troops, just avoid tactics like 'March thru Indian Country till hostile fire is received, fight, call in airstrikes and Arty, declare victory, and march back to camp after a desultory search for VC remains' for the all important Body Count metric. Then do it again in a different area, Or a few months later, over the same area

Or Khe Sanh.

Move in, build a big base, fight, win vs what the PAVN threw at them, declare a win, wreck the base and leave.

What was the point?
If the goal was to begin to cut the supply trail networks, why leave?

Do it, or don't even try

How long can the domestic population stomach sustain a long term defensive deployment? Also, what if tension in Europe increase and the Army need to reinforce the NATO?
 
I have read many posts about the Vietnam War on the Forum. I am amazed at the general ignorance, and the ready acceptance of the "We can't Win" mentality. Nothing can be further from the truth. Col. Harry Summers was a part of the Paris "Peace" Accords group that was tasked with reclaiming US POWSs in an orderly manner. According to Col. Summers, his NVA counterparts believed that 3 times they had lost the war, and named them 1) TET '68 which was a terrible military defeat for the communists 2) The Cambodian Incursion of 1970, and finally 3) the 1972 Easter Offensive in which the North admitted to "at least 100,000 killed." This defeat was inflicted by ARVN troops and massive American airpower. The NVA officers at the "Peace" Accords could never understand "why you did not cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We were so [vulnerable] there."

Elite units such as the 101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne were mainly volunteers early in the war. Later on they were filled with draftees, but still performed well. Combat refusals did not begin, at least to my knowledge, until 1970. The war was ARVN's war to win or lose. The majority of ARVN units were ineptly led by political generals who were little better than warlords, cared little for their troops, and had no interest in winning the war. Several ARVN units fought well, the Airborne, the Marines, most Ranger outfits, and the ARVN First Infantry Division. American politicians refused to allow the military to run the war, or to even overhaul the ARVN Officer Corps. Unfortunately, over 58,000 Americans would die in a lost cause that tore the fabric of our nation apart, and in some ways we are still reaping the harvest.

What about USSR and PRC intervention?
 
The Chinese were in the chaos of the cultural revolution.
I would have tried to follow the Australian and New Zealander strategy, increase land reform and try to increase kit Carson, bushmen scouts program for turned vc.
The Russians would settle for the East German recognition and salt one.
 
As noted the draft had been around for a long time. The reason the draft was reinstituted in the late 1940s, and continued until 1972/73 was due to Cold War "requirements" for the active force and Guard/Reserve. The planners looked at WWI and WWII where the active and reserve forces had been relatively small, especially the Army, and how long it took to induct, train, and equip the military. Between the Soviet/WP halfway across Europe to the Atlantic Coast, and the destructive power of WMDs, this sort of "buildup time" was not going to be available. Not only was the draft needed to achieve the numbers needed, but also the draft, even during Vietnam, was an incentive to push the better educated/skilled in to the Navy and Air Force which had greater needs for these folks.

The problem with the draft during Vietnam was that it was unfair. During WWII, and even Korea, the draft did a reasonable job of reaching across socioeconomic lines to be seen as spreading the risk fairly evenly. Sure the better educated became officers, more skilled technicians, but they all wore a uniform. The peacetime draft also was seen as fairly equitable, even Elvis had to do his time in uniform. Not perfect, but not seen as basically unfair. All of that changed with Vietnam.

IMHO absent the draft, there is no way the US military could have filled its ranks in ANY of the services on active duty to have enough manpower to fight in Vietnam, even with a smaller "better" force, and maintain forces for NATO etc. since the end of the draft, recruiting , except for a brief period post 9/11 has been a struggle both for active duty and Guard/Reserve. Bonus payments and special programs for certain areas are huge, and even so you have major difficulties for pilots, doctors, computer specialists, and others who can do better outside the military and whose risk of being killed or wounded in Iraq/Syria/Afghanistan is minimal.

The reality is that NO country can fight a major conflict without a draft. Whether this is part of peacetime conscription or simply a wartime measure, it can't be done since the middle of the 19th century. Repeatedly we see that while immediately after the outbreak of a war you very often have a patriotic wave that sends men (and now women) to the recruiters, once this wave subsides you need a draft.

The war(s) the USA has been involved in since 9/11 are/were not "major" conflicts. Except for a brief period the numbers of troops involved were much smaller than Vietnam, and also the USA is not maintaining the forces of the Cold War period in Europe for NATO purposes. This is not to play down the reality that for the guy getting shot at any fighting is a "major conflict". I would also point out that afteer Desert Storm, and the post 9/11 conflicts Guard/Reserve recruiting has been a constant problem due to their frequent activations.
 
Marathag you hit the nail on the head!! The US officer corps saw the war generally speaking, as a way to get their ticket punched, six months in the field, hopefully a silver star for O 5 and above, and then a cushy job in the rear, and fast track to promotion for their "combat experience" which usually was managing the battle from a C&C chopper 3000 ft. above the battlefield. (See Lt. Col Weldon Honeycutt 3/187 infantry May 10-20, 1969..."get those people up that hill"). Their best idea was to use infantry units as human bait regardless of casualties, and then call in air and artillery. Col. David Hackworth, in his eminently readable book "Steel My Soldiers Hearts" records his experiences with the 4/39 infantry in the Mekong Delta in '68-'69. Because he used innovative tactics, his battalion had fewer losses, and inflicted considerably more enemy casualties then any other 9th infantry division unit. Hackworth was of the opinion that due to the nature of the war and the terrain Vietnam actually needed 4 different types of tactics, each one tailored to the particular tactical area. Really, this could only be done by highly motivated volunteers, not unwilling draftees. However, the US Army officer Corps was still wedded to the "big battle" concept, and Hackworth's writings on successful tactics and how to implement them were ignored. This is not intended as a slam on the GIs who fought in Vietnam. They were hugely successful, as evidenced in the over 2 million NVA/VC deaths that the communists admit to.
 
LBJ and McNamara didn't want to take the political hit of calling up Reserves or Guard units while most of the active forces were already busy with the Cold War. But there was the Draft.
Could they perhaps have used them to offset the regulars? The Reserve and National Guard are used to replace regular Army units from Cold War duties who are then sent to Vietnam. It's a lot harder to organise protests against the draft if draftees are off in Germany or Korea carrying out peacetime duties whilst it's the volunteers that are in Vietnam. It might actually be somewhat popular since it would provide a steady wage and possible international travel which was still a novelty.


Draftees, most ended up as MOS 11B, Rifleman, unless they tested well on the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) where they might go to another Branch and/or MOS. The lucky guys who had taken typing in high school, were very likely to be MOS 71B, Clerk-Typist, who would spend his tour in an air conditioned MACV office than an 11 Bulletstopper.
The really unlucky guys would score well and answer yes when asked if they liked fast cars or had ever considered flying, their being practically Shanghaied into helicopter flight school.
 
Last edited:
1) the war was fought by the ARVN/RVN and PLAF/NFL/PRG as a political war. 1972 never solved Ap Bac. Tet destroyed the PLAFs manoeuvre elements but not their political ones, and the PAVN substituted in

It was a Vietnamese civil war. US ground forces did not change this: they rarely impeded the political operation of the NFL, nor did the ARVN. Modifying US deployments won't change this.

It was not Americas war to win, merely to prolong.

2) The Aussies got soft soap. Early on a political decision was to go soft against these near Korean-level bastards. On exit Australian assisted areas returned to NFL normal. The USMC has a similar light infantry basis, but I would suggest that they were more lawful at war than Australians.

3) Using National Guard units meant mobilisation. This was more politically and economically disruptive than the draft. European draw down is an impossibility.

4) Tet was not a response to the US. General Uprising/General Offensive was a Duan line used against Giap and northern development supporters.

5) Unfucking the ARVN and RVN will probably take into the mid 1980s. The DRVN budgeted 3 year general offensives, and had the capacity (China, Kampuchea). This is 4 to 5 1972 air assists, assuming air support is decisive and the DRVN is drip fed air assets. I suspect that even outside of a draft this is a commitment the US is unwilling [damn autoincorrect] to engage in.

yours,
Sam R.
 
Last edited:
Could they perhaps have used them to offset the regulars? The Reserve and National Guard are used to replace regular Army units from Cold War duties who are then sent to Vietnam. It's a lot harder to organise protests against the draft if draftees are off in Germany or Korea carrying out peacetime duties whilst it's the volunteers that are in Vietnam. It might actually be somewhat popular since it would provide a steady wage and possible international travel which was still a novelty.

In Hindsight, yes.

But that's still the problem of say, 4AD and their M60 tanks aren't a great fit for how Armor ended up being used in SEAsia by the US*

With the near endless supply of green Draftees with 8 weeks of basic and a bit more in AIT before being shipped out and then dropped in a combat unit for 12-13 months, if you weren't killed or wounded, then you when back to the States to finish out the rest of your time, with some of the bad habits(drugs&attitude) and PTSD that came with being in the Front

While overall numbers of Enlistees were higher than Draftees, in the Combat Arms, like Rifleman and Engineer had a higher percentage of Draftees, sometimes far higher, depending on the year.

So forex, when the 9ID being reactivated for SEAsia might have a lot of Volunteers, they well have been in MOS that had less direct exposure to enemy action on a day to day basis. Even Draftees, if they would hitch up for another year, probably could get out of being an 11C or 11C. Many divisions. despite being at near TO&E force levels, were understrength in the Infantry Companies, and overstrength in the supply and HQ levels, much more 'Tail' than 'Teeth'

Even though the 9th was very green after reactivated in 1965 and 23rd Americal even worse in '67,and both pretty much learned on the job, these units had more KIAs
1st Cavalry Division 5,464
25th Infantry Division
4,561
101st Airborne Division 4,022
1st Infantry Division
3,151
9th Infantry Division 2,629

So in 1964, the decision would need to be made to recreate the 9th and 23rd, but not in SEAsia, to pull an existing Infantry Division from Europe, say 4ID and as draftees tours run out, be replaced with volunteers.

Same for 1ID, that arrived IIRC just before the 9th did, OTL along with 1st Cav from S.Korea.

Now with near all volunteers, the units should be more effective, with so many men churned thru every 13 months, so overall killed and wounded should be lower than OTL, as well as hurting the VC more, even with Westy's terrible tactics.


*While being a Helicopter Crewman was dangerous, with around 3000 dying, as a percentage, the 11E, Armor Crewman was the most dangerous MOS to be in, with near 28% Killed in Action


 
It was a Vietnamese civil war. US ground forces did not change this:

During Tet, not a single popular uprising occured in the South. That surprised the North, who with Thanh's faction, had believed their own Propaganda a bit, that the oppressed South of the DMZ just needed a spark to toss off the shackles.
Giap knew it was going to be a fiasco, but his plans had been ruled out for the time being.

After that disaster, the Guerilla Uprising was taken off the table- no longer an option with most of the VC dead, it would be Giaps plan of wait, buildup and do a conventional invasion from the North
 
Indeed, marathag. Giap had been rehabilitated prior to Tet, but it was too late to vault to another strategic operation. The shit would be eaten.

In part the VWP was blind to the actual class composition of the RVN. It was a rural proletariat and semi proletariat that was revolutionary. Urban workers and religious nationalist intelligentsia were not. However in the context of Ap Bac era actions Tet made sense as a "General offensive" solely against the ARVN. The RVNs strategic reserve in the form of the US and its competent foreign allies made this a joke.

Now the PAVN was flailing anyway: Khe Sahn was necessary to advance the revolution or offensive how?

The VWP could have done worse, but had determination and reserves. The RVN lacked equivalent systems of governance, and the class basis of Viet and Chinese compadors was far weaker than the rural proletariat.

My estimate for the mid 80s is based on soviet collapse and the total prostitution of the RVN economy. We had to whore the village to save it.

Yours,
Sam R.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
That seems backward, why didn't they think drafting people would have less negative impact than using the Guard?

Needed the Guard to put down unrest from civil rights. The Guard was quickly mobilized for Korea, Gulf War 1, Gulf War 2. Vietnam is the break in the pattern due to concerns due to civil rights. Imagine that we have almost all the guard and regular army in Vietnam, Korea, or Europe. One of the big city riots really gets out of control and the cops can't stop it. USA effectively loses control of a few cities. Gets kind of tough then. We can debate the realism, but that is the fear.

And to be clear, it is just not someone like Malcolm X taking over Detroit. What if say Arkansas or Alabama just decide not to follow federal law? And there are not troops to prevent resegregation of the schools.
 
Needed the Guard to put down unrest from civil rights. The Guard was quickly mobilized for Korea, Gulf War 1, Gulf War 2. Vietnam is the break in the pattern due to concerns due to civil rights. Imagine that we have almost all the guard and regular army in Vietnam, Korea, or Europe. One of the big city riots really gets out of control and the cops can't stop it. USA effectively loses control of a few cities. Gets kind of tough then. We can debate the realism, but that is the fear.

I don't believe National Guard wasn't called up in number for that, till 1967
 
@BlondieBC : That was only part of LBJ's reasoning, remember the reserves, which cannot be used for civil unrest in most circumstances (see Posse Comitatus Act 1878) were not called up either (a few small exceptions for both reserve and NG). Calling up/federalizing reserve/guard for war service sends a huge political message, also not only were folks in these units whose activation would piss off some very important folks but their readiness was crap. Finally keeping those units in pocket, even with poor readiness, was a way to have potential for NATO reinforcement. In many cases for civil unrest in the 60s the guard units were called up by the state governors to deal with riots. Guard units in the south were federalized when necessary, because the local governors would not call them up to protect civil rights groups.
 
You missed my point. It is not when they were called up. It is why LBJ made the decision not to use the guard.

But the idea that riots over Civil Rights would worsen to the point of need large deployment of Guard and even Regulars was not even on LBJs Radar when the Maddox was cruising for trouble in the Gulf of Tonkin.

He didn't want to federalize the Guard units for overseas use. Doing that, would piss off the State Governors for little return-- and LBJ was always about doing deals.
 
I would have to disagree with the statement that the US did not impede the political component of the NLF. Not true. The Phoenix Program and its RVN counterpart pretty much had destroyed the NLF political structure by early 1971. I have read reports that in many districts in the Mekong Delta, fewer than a half dozen operatives remained. While the Phoenix Program was controversial to say the least, there can be no doubt that it was hugely successful. After having had a free pass throughout the early years of the conflict, The Viet Cong "shadow government" that had terrorized the villagers was now effectively neutralized, at least in the Delta.
 
Top