WI: No Vietnam war 1945-1975?

Now, let's say due to various events during WWII in 1945 France decides to quit Indochina in quick order, while UK is in no mood to intervene and Ho Chi Minh succesfully woos US adminstration. As a result, Vietnam turns into Yugoslavia by the South China Sea, a communist state but not aligned with Sino-Soviet block. In exchange for US guarantees, Vietnam agrees not to support Laotian or Cambodian communists.

What happens next? Some form of Chinese support for Laotian guerrillas is probably inevitable and will result in a larger or smaller conflict.

Is this feasible at all? What will the butterflies be?
 
If we believe people like Phillip Jennings, the “butterflies” would be Mao Zedong and/or Russia taking over Laos, Cambodia, and possibly Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. If Vietnam agrees to neutrality I could not see it breaking it in the event of Mao choosing to expand further into Southeast Asia. It’s also possible that without US intervention indigenous Communist movements would take over in the rest of Southeast Asia as they did in OTL China, Vietnam and Cambodia. Either way, I do not see Communism stopping unless the US or Australia or a coalition of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines intervene.
 
Well there’ll be a hysteric land overcollectivisation by incompetent ex-scholar class nomenklatura in a hysteric misjudgement of who comprises comprador farmers. This, probably, after US murky games with the coastal culturally Chinese capitalist communities turns the party away from a liberal democratic period of capitalism under party guidance.

What way Vietnam goes depends on which “vibe” controls the central apparatus based on its appeals to the party as a mass endeavour. The two vibes being forced collectivisation (to achieve party unity and subjugate other classes to nomenklatura capitalism) OR, a socialist it humanist vine (voluntary collectivisation, towards workers democracy, accepting toy markets). I don’t think the rural proletariat is developed enough to force option 2 until 20 years later
 
The communists had a large degree of support in northern and central Vietnam, but Southern areas also had large nationalist and monarchist factions who were opposed to communism. A large communist movement doesn't necessarily lead to a communist takeover, Vietnam might've ended up more like Indonesia where a military junta or dictatorship conducts a bloody purge of communist supporters.

Without the formal division of Vietnam into northern and southern republics, the Vietnam conflict might'e just been a decades long guerrilla war like the Angolan war of independence and civil wars. One side would control the state and have a UN seat, while the "second" Vietnam is a guerrilla movement supported by a foreign power that can't decisively defeat the government, but also can't be defeated decisively like the FARC was in Colombia for a while.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Now, let's say due to various events during WWII in 1945 France decides to quit Indochina in quick order, while UK is in no mood to intervene and Ho Chi Minh succesfully woos US adminstration. As a result, Vietnam turns into Yugoslavia by the South China Sea, a communist state but not aligned with Sino-Soviet block. In exchange for US guarantees, Vietnam agrees not to support Laotian or Cambodian communists.

What happens next? Some form of Chinese support for Laotian guerrillas is probably inevitable and will result in a larger or smaller conflict.

Is this feasible at all? What will the butterflies be?

If Ho Chi Minh is in charge, why would he have hostility with the Soviet Union or Chinese Communist Party. Had either of them wronged the Vietnamese Communist Party or Ho Chi Minh by this time. Wouldn’t Ho see them as sources of knowledge and techniques for controlling and developing their country, in addition to potential sources of material support? Even if stingy with material support, Ho would probably see them as important sources of expertise and training.

Stalin would not have the satisfaction of the Red Army and Soviet administrators being present in significant numbers, and therefore may be concerned about Ho’s loyalty and reliability. However, will he try to micromanage Vietnamese affairs or change local leadership in the early years? Those were the types of things that alienated Tito. The distance issue cuts both ways. On the one hand, it means less detailed control. On the other hand, it means a lack of expertise or urgency in ensuring conformity, compared with the European satellite states.

And if Ho’s power is not seriously contested by outside powers or threatening to become an international crisis threatening the core Socialist sphere, how much fine-tuning will Stalin think is needed, and how much time will he spend thinking about it in the first place?

Meanwhile, will the US see Ho’s Vietnam as being a relevant target for investment, or for making a deliberate attempt to outbid the USSR? What could/would Washington expect Vietnam to do for the U.S. and how much would it matter. It seems Europe and Japan and the Middle East would all be higher priorities.

Was Ho sitting there, waiting to be bribed by the US?

An answer could be seeking US support against China, I suppose. But, the Chinese Nationalists are not likely to stick around after looting the place, the scenario might forestall ChiNat occupation anyway, and China is not much threat at this time, being absorbed in Civil War in the late 1940s and building socialism in the early 1950s.

Ho might have a reason to fear Nationalist China in the late 1940s (until the regime’s weakness becomes apparent), but why should he fear the Chinese Communists before they even have control of the Chinese state?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Well there’ll be a hysteric land overcollectivisation by incompetent ex-scholar class nomenklatura in a hysteric misjudgement of who comprises comprador farmers. This, probably, after US murky games with the coastal culturally Chinese capitalist communities turns the party away from a liberal democratic period of capitalism under party guidance.

What way Vietnam goes depends on which “vibe” controls the central apparatus based on its appeals to the party as a mass endeavour. The two vibes being forced collectivisation (to achieve party unity and subjugate other classes to nomenklatura capitalism) OR, a socialist it humanist vine (voluntary collectivisation, towards workers democracy, accepting toy markets). I don’t think the rural proletariat is developed enough to force option 2 until 20 years later

Gven time to operate from late 1945 onward, would the Vietnamese Communists persist in “hysteric overcollectivization” for years on end, or might they take corrective measures and roll back the worst within a year or two as in OTL’s mid-1950s? Conceivably there is no reason they would not – on the other hand, perhaps the high-sense of American and American-backed threat, and anticipation of a new war, would be crucial in justifying moderation, and it would be missing in a scenario where the Viet Minh received uncontested control of Vietnam-Indochina from the surrender of Japan on.


The communists had a large degree of support in northern and central Vietnam, but Southern areas also had large nationalist and monarchist factions who were opposed to communism. A large communist movement doesn't necessarily lead to a communist takeover, Vietnam might've ended up more like Indonesia where a military junta or dictatorship conducts a bloody purge of communist supporters.

Where and how do armed noncommunist elements emerge to successfully oppose and then oust, purge and suppress Communists, when the Communists already are the best organized group, controlling the proclaimed independent government as soon as the Japanese surrendered?

Sure, the Communists would be weaker in some respects than OTL, because they would not be tempered and tested by the war with France, and will not have mobilized and forged as many deep popular links. However, how are nationalists and monarchists going to compete, when they do not have any wherewithal provided by the French or Americans?
 
Where and how do armed noncommunist elements emerge to successfully oppose and then oust, purge and suppress Communists, when the Communists already are the best organized group, controlling the proclaimed independent government as soon as the Japanese surrendered?

Sure, the Communists would be weaker in some respects than OTL, because they would not be tempered and tested by the war with France, and will not have mobilized and forged as many deep popular links. However, how are nationalists and monarchists going to compete, when they do not have any wherewithal provided by the French or Americans?
The communists' strength in the north was much more precarious than it looked, the August Revolution depended on a series of unfortunate coincidences. General MacArthur refusal to allow the allied re-assertion of control over Indochina until he had personally accepted the Japanese surrender created a power vacuum for the Viet Minh to exploit.

If the Chinese Nationalists occupy northern Indochina for a longer period after WW2, or the Chinese occupiers make different decisions, then the communists could be much weaker than OTL. In Indochina south of the 16th parallel, the British disarmed the Viet Minh and reasserted control pretty quickly, but the Chinese occupation force in north decided to rule through a Vietnamese provisional government.

In the northern Vietnamese proto-state administration, the Chinese occupation forced the Viet Minh into a coalition government with a nationalist group called the Viet Quoc or VNQDD (modeled on the Chinese KMT). As soon as the Chinese left the Viet Minh turned on the Viet Quoc, but a longer Chinese occupation would have tipped the scales toward the nationalists. If the Chinese had opted for a direct military government without leaving the Viet Minh administration in place, the communists also would've been weakened relative to OTL.
 
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