The Most Dangerous Enemy is a book in which the author sets about "Challenging virtually every time-honoured myth and assumption about Britain's victory, the book questions the traditional myth of an
amateurish, honourable British "Few" up against a pitiless and regimented German war machine." - Amazon.co.uk
The author uses a wide range of source material in this well written, well researched book in an attempt to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that he is correct in his analysis and theory. This book is often cited on this and other forums when discussions about the Battle of Britain are raised and is considered by some as the definative work on the subject, the one book that should be owned.
SO THE QUESTION I HAVE IS: Would peoples attitudes be different with regards to the BoB if this book had not been written??
The subtitle of the book is "A History of the Battle of Britain" which in my own opinion is not entirely true. This is less of a history book and more in line with a legal argument ... the author is using evidence to prove his case. It is not a recollection of the historical events but a series of carefully selected facts and and statistics which the author fits into his analysis which leads the reader down the path the author wants them to take. The unfortunate thing is that this book is not particularly balanced, it looks at things from just one angle.
For example the topic of combat claims is raised, on the one hand the author states that this is understandable on the part of the RAF due to the "fog of war" then suggests that Luftwaffe over claims were in part due to fraudulent reporting. There is no evidence provided to back up either claim whether it is correct or not. The author also states that over-claims are regularly 2:1 but with clever manipulation (something the author is good at) it can be proved that the RAF over claims were almost 3:1 (from 10th July to 11th August the author says that there were 216 German aircraft destroyed in combat; actual RAF claims for the same period including confirmed, unconfirmed and duplicate claims is somewhere in the region of 600). The author also says that the German pilots were glory hunters, considering themselves as nights of the air and that RAF pilots didn't care about the number of kills they had and yet in a later chapter he contradicts this statement by saying RAF pilots would chase after damaged Luftwaffe aircraft to get the 'Kill'.
Another example relates to German intelligence reports at the beginning of the battle and how this proves the Germans were incompetent. The author takes four points raised in a report produced on 16th July whereas the report actually includes more than twenty separate statements. Having read a translation of the report it is clear that the author has chosen carefully which parts to summarise and in the process twisting the facts to suit his theory:
From the book -
From the book -
From the book -
In document WP (40) 427: Second Report on the Ministry of Aircraft production it states for September 1940
amateurish, honourable British "Few" up against a pitiless and regimented German war machine." - Amazon.co.uk
The author uses a wide range of source material in this well written, well researched book in an attempt to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that he is correct in his analysis and theory. This book is often cited on this and other forums when discussions about the Battle of Britain are raised and is considered by some as the definative work on the subject, the one book that should be owned.
SO THE QUESTION I HAVE IS: Would peoples attitudes be different with regards to the BoB if this book had not been written??
The subtitle of the book is "A History of the Battle of Britain" which in my own opinion is not entirely true. This is less of a history book and more in line with a legal argument ... the author is using evidence to prove his case. It is not a recollection of the historical events but a series of carefully selected facts and and statistics which the author fits into his analysis which leads the reader down the path the author wants them to take. The unfortunate thing is that this book is not particularly balanced, it looks at things from just one angle.
For example the topic of combat claims is raised, on the one hand the author states that this is understandable on the part of the RAF due to the "fog of war" then suggests that Luftwaffe over claims were in part due to fraudulent reporting. There is no evidence provided to back up either claim whether it is correct or not. The author also states that over-claims are regularly 2:1 but with clever manipulation (something the author is good at) it can be proved that the RAF over claims were almost 3:1 (from 10th July to 11th August the author says that there were 216 German aircraft destroyed in combat; actual RAF claims for the same period including confirmed, unconfirmed and duplicate claims is somewhere in the region of 600). The author also says that the German pilots were glory hunters, considering themselves as nights of the air and that RAF pilots didn't care about the number of kills they had and yet in a later chapter he contradicts this statement by saying RAF pilots would chase after damaged Luftwaffe aircraft to get the 'Kill'.
Another example relates to German intelligence reports at the beginning of the battle and how this proves the Germans were incompetent. The author takes four points raised in a report produced on 16th July whereas the report actually includes more than twenty separate statements. Having read a translation of the report it is clear that the author has chosen carefully which parts to summarise and in the process twisting the facts to suit his theory:
From the book -
From the report -
It must be remembered that from combat experience the German's would be partially correct in this assumption, the only time the two types had met in serious combat was over France and Belgium and following the Battle of France the performance of both the Hurricane and Spitfire were increased by improving the propellers and introducing a higher grade fuel.
From the book -
From the report -
In my opinion the German report is correct and the version in the book is a misrepresentation of what appears in the report. The report says there were a considerable number of airstrips with only a limited number being operational ... there may have been 40 or 50 airfields identified in the south but only 9 of those were sector stations, the main operational hubs. This is a limited number just 20-25%. The author has summarised this by saying the Germans believed there were a SEVERLY limited number which is incorrect.
From the book -
From the report -
I believe the estimates regarding British fighter production are not wrong as such, just outdated. If the June figures for production are available (the latest at the time of the report) the average production rate over the previous six months would have been 250 fighters per month, if production figures were only available from May (the first month the British broke through the 300 per month mark) then the average over the previous six months would have been 190 fighters per month. By throwing in the production figure for July, a figure that no one could have known at the time of the report, the author of the book is manipulating the evidence, yet again, to prove his theory. As for the decrease in production predicted by the Germans this did actually happen and it would not be until Feb 1941 that the production rates would be back up to the figure achieved in July 1940. The average production rate of fighters for the six months following July were in the region of 420 per month.
In document WP (40) 427: Second Report on the Ministry of Aircraft production it states for September 1940
From the book -
From the report -
The above seems to be a good assessment of the experience gained in the skies above France, the main source of the Luftwaffe's knowledge at the time of the report. It was also contrary to the way the Germans did things. As history would prove, this rigidity in the command and control structure would be one of the RAF's greatest assets. To the Luftwaffe this concept was alien and therefore, in their eyes at least, flawed. Why the author of the book had to emphasise the incorrect statement that station commanders were non-flyers is just another example of his need to bend the truth to suit his theory. The German report says that station commanders are no longer accustomed to flying NOT that they were non-flyers. In fact this is true, station commanders rarely took part in operational flying except as observers. The Germans felt this was a weakness because it meant that those devising the everyday tactics were out of touch. What they didn't realise was that once the enemy was sighted it was the low level commanders (the squadron and flight leaders) that determined how the enemy should be engaged. They were the ones adapting and modifying the tactics as their experience grew.
but the question still remains ... Would peoples attitude to the events of the BoB be different if this book had not been written?