I had a two-part series in soc.history.what-if on "Could the 1956 Hungarian Revolution have succeeded?" I am reproducing it here--my apologies for any links that may no longer work.
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Part One
On October 31, 1956 it seemed as if the Hungarian Revolution was triumphant.
To be sure, Imre Nagy had become Prime Minister under seemingly inauspicious circumstances--the same hard-liners who (yielding to a popular demand) reluctantly made him Prime Minister on October 23 had also invited Soviet intervention in Budapest to "maintain order" and declared martial law. These were not Nagy's decisions, but by at first failing to denounce them, he temporarily shared some of the odium they generated. He made a bad impression with the very first word of his first speech to the public after he was chosen--"Comrades!" (Angry voices replied "We're not comrades any longer!" Nagy did recover somewhat when he closed his speech by singing the national anthem.) In his first few days of office, Nagy, while promising a return to the reformist "New Course" of 1953, failed to differentiate himself sufficiently from the Stalinists who preceded him in power in 1956. He seemed to be echoing their rhetoric in warning about "counterrevolution." Worst of all, on October 25, AVH (Hungarian secret police) militias opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators in Kossuth Square, killing 60 to 80.
And yet, all this failed to stop the insurgency, the strength of which surprised the USSR, which had expected the Soviet intervention to be no more than a police action. From October 27 onward, Imre Nagy moved more boldly, and seemed to have the support not only of the new Communist Party leader Janos Kadar but even of the Soviet Union, which had sent two envoys to Budapest--the relatively "liberal" Anastas Mikoyan and the "hard-line" Mikhail Suslov. Despite the differences in their reputations, Mikoyan and Suslov both agreed that Nagy should be supported in his bid for a political solution.
So on October 28, Nagy proclaimed a cease-fire--the Hungarian military, he explained, had been ordered not to shoot unless attacked. There would be no reprisals against insurgents. He announced he had reached agreement with the Soviets on the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Budapest. Moreover, he completely abandoned the old line about the insurgency being counter-revolutionary. What was taking place, he said, was not a counter-revolution but a "broad democratic mass movement." He pledged to dissolve the hated secret police. By October 30 *with the explicit approval of Mikoyan* Nagy announced the abolition of the one-party system and the creation of a new cabinet which included not only reform Communists but Smallholders and one Social Democrat. Calm started to return to the streets of Budapest (with the exception of one important incident, which I will discuss in Part II); the government and the insurgents now seemed to be working together, and the Soviets seemed to be willing to let them have their way.
This impression was strengthened on October 31, when *Pravda* published an important article which despite a good deal of windy standard Communist rhetoric, announced a new departure in the relations between the USSR and the "people's democracies." Because this document is difficult to find in its entirety on the Internet, I am reproducing it here (from Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos Rainer, eds. *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* [Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002]).
***'
Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Sovie tUnion and Other Socialist States
Moscow, October 30, 1956.
A policy of peaceful coexistence, friendship and cooperation among all states has been and continues to be the firm foundation of the foreign relations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
This policy finds its deepest and most consistent expression in the mutual relations among the socialist countries. United by the common ideals of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their mutual relations only on the principles of complete equality, of respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and of noninterference in one another's internal affairs. Not only does this not exclude close fraternal cooperation and mutual aid among the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the economic, political and cultural spheres; on the contrary, it presupposes these things.
The system of people's democracy took shape, grew strong and showed its great vital power in many countries of Europe and Asia on this foundation after the Second World War and the rout of fascism. In the process of the rise of the new system and the deep revolutionary changes in social relations, there have been many difficulties, unresolved problems and downright mistakes, including mistakes in the mutual relations among the socialist countries--violations and errors which demeaned the principle of equality in relations among the socialist states.
The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union quite resolutely condemned these violations and mistakes, and set the task of consistent application by the Soviet Union of Leninist principles of equality of peoples in its relations with the other socialist countries. It proclaimed the need for taking full account of the historical past and peculiarities of each country that has taken the path of building a new life.
The Soviet government is consistently carrying out these historic decisions of the 20th Congress, which create conditions for further strengthening friendship and cooperation among the socialist countries on the firm foundation of observance of the full sovereignty of each socialist state.
As recent events have demonstrated, it has become necessary to make this declaration of the Soviet Union's stand on the mutual relations of the U.S.S.R. with other socialist countries, particularly in the economic and military spheres.
The Soviet government is prepared to discuss together with the governments of other socialist states measures ensuring further development and strengthening of economic ties among the socialist countries in order to remove any possibility of violation of the principles of national sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations.
This principle must also be extended to advisors. It is known that, in the first period of the formation of the new social system, the Soviet Union, at the request of the governments of the people's democracies, sent these countries a certain number of its specialists--engineers, agronomists, scientists, military advisors. In the recent period the Soviet government has repeatedly raised before the socialist countries the question of recalling its advisors.
In view of the fact that by this time the people's democracies have formed their own qualified national cadres in all spheres of economic and military affairs, the Soviet government considers it urgent to review, together with the other socialist states, the question of the expediency of the further presence of U.S.S.R. advisors in these countries.
In the military domain an important basis of the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies is the Warsaw Treaty, under which its members adopted respective political and military obligations, including the obligation to take "concerted measures necessary for strengthening their defense capacity in order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territory, and to ensure defense against possible aggression."
It is known that Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Rumanian republics in accord with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements. Soviet units are in the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty. Soviet military units are not in the other people's democracies.
For the purpose of assuring mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet government is prepared to review with the other socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the above-mentioned countries. In so doing the Soviet government proceeds from the general principle that stationing the troops of one or another state which is a member of the Warsaw Treaty on the territory of another state which is a member of the treaty is done by agreement among all its members and only with the consent of the state on the territory of which and at the request of which these troops are stationed or it is planned to station them.
The Soviet government considers it necessary to make a statement in connection with the events in Hungary. The course of events has shown that the working people of Hungary, who have attained great progress on the basis of the people's democratic system, are rightfully raising the question of the need to eliminate serious defects in the sphere of economic construction, the question of further improving the living standards of the population, the question of combating bureaucratic distortions in the state machinery. However, this legitimate and progressive movement of the working people was soon joined by the forces of black reaction and counterrevolution, which are trying to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of a part of the working people in order to undermine the foundations of the people's democratic system in Hungary and to restore the old landowner-capitalist ways in that country.
The Soviet government, like the whole Soviet people, deeply regrets that the development of events in Hungary has led to bloodshed.
At the request of the Hungarian people's government, the Soviet government has granted consent to the entry into Budapest of Soviet military units to help the Hungarian people's army and the Hungarian agencies of government to bring order to the city.
Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian government.
At the same time, the Soviet government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.
To guard the socialist achievements of people's-democratic Hungary is the chief and sacred duty of the workers, peasants, intelligentsia, of all the Hungarian working people at the present moment.
The Soviet government expresses confidence that the peoples of the socialist countries will not permit foreign and domestic reactionary forces to shake the foundations of the people's democratic system, a system established and strengthened by the self-sacrificing struggle and labor of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of each country. They will continue all efforts to remove all obstacles in the path of further strengthening the democratic foundations, independence and sovereignty of their countries; to develop further the socialist foundations of each country, its economy and its culture, for the sake of an uninterrupted rise in the living standards and cultural level of all the working people; they will strengthen the fraternal unity and mutual aid of the socialist countries to buttress the great cause of peace and socialism.
***
To Hungarians, the paragraphs of special interest were the ones saying that not only were Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Budapest but that "the Soviet government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary." It seemed that the popular demand for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary had been agreed to.
Was the *Pravda* declaration a ruse, a deceptive maneuver by the Kremlin? We now know that the answer is No. (The deception was to come later, when the Soviets reversed themselves and decided on intervention but still negotiated with the Hungarians on troop withdrawals for a few days.) On October 30, 1956, the Presidium (which had once been known and would again be known in the future as the Politburo) of the Central Committee of the CPSU met and unanimously decided *against* Soviet military intervention in Hungary and in favor of the declaration that was to be printed in *Pravda* the next day. Some excerpts from the meeting (and note that even Molotov agreed):
Cde. Molotov--Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so
that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of
troops...
Cde. Shepilov--The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations
with the countries of people's democracy. Anti-Soviet sentiments are
widespread. The underlying reasons must be revealed. The foundations
remain unshakable. Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in
this situation to a number of measures to be considered in our relations.
The declaration is the first step. There is no need for an appeal to the
Hungarians. On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-
interference. With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are
ready to withdraw troops. We'll have to keep up a struggle with national-
Communism for a long time.
Cde. Zhukov--Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said. The main thing is to
decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. We should
withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a
whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.
Cde. Saburov: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of
troops. At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep
control of the unleashed initiative of the masses. It's impossible to lead
against the will of the people...
Cde. Khrushchev: We are unanimous. As a first step we will issue a
Declaration.
Cde. Bulganin--we should say in what connection the question of a
Declaration arose. Page 2, Par. 2, don't soften the self-criticism.
Mistakes were committed...
Cde. Zhukov--We should express sympathy with the people. We should call
for an end to the bloodshed. Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Congress
condemned the disregard for principles of equality.
Cde. Khrushchev--there are two paths. A military path--one of occupation.
A peaceful path--the withdrawal of troops, negotiations.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.c...dentifier=6914DE3F-E92D-A351-187CEA2FF91AFD7A
But tragically, *just one day later* the Presidium reversed itself and called for military intervention. What caused this sudden turnabout and what might have prevented it will be discussed in Part Two...
*********
Part Two
A while back I posted the first part of what was to have been a two-part post, "Could the 1956 Hungarian Revolution have succeeded?"
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/68ccf3b6b4164258 As I note there, on October 31, it seemed that the Revolution was triumphant. The famous Pravda editorial of that day (declaring that "the Soviet government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary") was not a ruse; the Soviet Politburo (then known as the Presidium) had actually decided against military intervention and in favor of seeking a political solution on October 30. Tragically, Khrushchev and the rest of the Presidium reversed themselves the very next day.
I never got around to writing Part Two, which was to deal with the reasons for this reversal and whether it could have been avoided. (Unfortunately the documentation for the October 31 Presidium meeting which reversed the decision of the October 30 meeting is even more scanty than that for the October 30 meeting itself. [1]) The "A less bad 20th century for Hungary" thread has stimulated me to finally write Part Two. Anyway, here are a few thoughts I have on the Presidium's change of mind between October 30 and 31:
(1) *The role of the Republic Square lynchings*: To quote Eric Hobsbawm:
"A day later Moscow (supported by both Tito and Mao) changed its mind. Why, having unanimously and genuinely opted for the political solution did the Soviet regime now choose military force? It is true that Hungary, despite having been offered 'an even longer leash' than Poland, clearly wanted total independence, but this does not explain the suddenness of the change. Gati suggests that an incident which took place on the 30th, and is vividly described in Sebestyen, was crucial: the attack by insurgents on the headquarters of the Greater Budapest Communist Party on Republic Square, temporarily defenceless except for a contingent of secret police after the withdrawal of Russian and Hungarian soldiers. The building was taken, the Budapest Party chief -- a strong supporter of reform -- killed, and 23 secret policemen lynched by the mob in front of the world's newsreel cameras. It was this demonstration of anarchic fury, combined with Nagy's increasing concessions to the maximalist demands on the street, that persuaded both Moscow and Beijing that uncontrollable disorder was impending in Hungary. 'In the end,' Gati writes, 'Nagy became a reluctant revolutionary who could not control that sudden outburst of violence . . . and this was the main reason why he lost whatever confidence Moscow had had in him.'"
The question is whether the Republic Square lynchings--which Daniel Fairchild Calhoun in *Hungary and Suez, 1956* described as "the one certifiable barbarity the revolutionaries committed"--could have been prevented, and if so whether it would have made any difference. (IIRC one reason for the assault and the lynchings was that false rumors circulated that the secret police were holding political prisoners in underground cellars beneath the party headquarters. So perhaps without those rumors the violence would not have occurred.) In any event the lynchings received worldwide publicity and could hardly fail to exert *some* influence on Soviet decision-makers. Note Khrushchev's justification of Soviet military intervention to Tito: "All events in Hungary are turning into a counterrevolution. *"They are killing communists.* [emphasis added] Some want to restore capitalism. We cannot permit this. The capitalists would then reach the very frontiers of the Soviet Union."
http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/115-5-73.shtml
(2) *The role of the Hungarian decision to leave the Warsaw Pact*: In the past I have dismissed as clearly incorrect the idea that Nagy's declaration of November 1 renouncing the Warsaw Pact and calling on the UN and the "Big Four" (including the United States) to defend Hungary's neutrality caused the invasion; the Kremlin had already decided on military intervention by that time, and in fact Nagy's declaration was a desperate attempt to stave off intervention after he had learned of the
Soviet troop movements. However, Raymond L. Garthoff has argued that the Soviets had in fact been given reason to anticipate the decision, and that this may have been the key factor leading to the intervention:
"On October 31, when Mikoyan and Suslov met with Imre Nagy and Zoltan Tildy [a leader of the Smallholders Party, and a member of the coalition government Nagy formed after abolishing the one-party system] the latter rejected an appeal to withdraw immediately all Soviet troops that had not earlier been present in the country. Moreover, Tildy told Mikoyan that Hungary would definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact *in any case*--that is, even if Soviet leaders accepted their demand to withdraw *all* Soviet forces immediately. (This was disclosed in a monitored broadcast by [Hungarian Defense Minister] General Pal Maleter on November 1 or 2.) I believe that this was the final straw that tipped the decision to intervene. The new documents, while not conclusive, are consistent with that interpretation..."
http://books.google.com/books?id=qlNqWJMN_pcC&pg=PA285
Johanna Granville in *The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis* while noting that "Nagy, at least, decided to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact only *after* the Soviet leaders decided to launch a second invasion" adds that "However, when one considers decision making at the grassroots level in Hungary, this issue becomes a murkier, unanswerable, chicken-or-egg question."
http://books.google.com/books?id=RkaWTipqnecC&pg=PA71 She notes not only Tildy's remarks to Mikoyan that Hungary would be leaving the Warsaw Pact but Bela Kovacs (another Smallholders leader who had joined the Nagy cabinet) saying on October 31 that "The Hungarian people want a neutral Hungary" (though it is not clear the Kremlin leaders heard that speech on the day it was made). She acknowledges that "There is no explicit mention of neutrality and Warsaw Pact withdrawal in the Malin notes before the October 31 session when the final decision was reached. However, since Radio Budapest had broadcast more than one call for neutrality and Warsaw pact withdrawal on October 31, it is likely that one of the Soviet diplomats heard it and reported it to Moscow."
http://books.google.com/books?id=RkaWTipqnecC&pg=PA72
(3) *The role of the Suez Crisis*: As I recall from my reading of Charles Gati's *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (2006) on which I relied heavily for Part One, Gati like most historians, rejects the idea that Hungary would have turned out differently if not for Suez. OTOH, the minutes of the October 31 Presidium meeting do contain the words by Khrushchev: "If we withdrew from Hungary, it would encourage the American, English, and French imperialists. They would attribute it to our weakness and would swing into attack. We would demonstrate our weakness [with the withdrawal]. In that case our Party would not understand us. *Besides Egypt, we would give them Hungary as well.*" [my emphasis] Gusztav Kecskes comments:
"On October 30, the previous day, the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party assented to the Soviet government statement that Soviet military units--whenever the Hungarian government asked--would be withdrawn from Budapest and the Soviet government was ready to discuss the eventual complete withdrawal from Hungary. What explains such a radical change in Khrushchev's and Presidium's views by the 31st? Soviet archival resources at our disposal--which is still minimal despite the recent discoveries--do not make an unambiguous answer possible. Is it the Suez case? There is no direct evidence for that since the most recent developments of the Suez crisis--the deployment of British and French troops--did not come up during that session of the Presidium's.33 On the other hand, in similar situations--Berlin in 1953 and Czechoslovakia in 1968--the Soviet leadership never needed a Suez-type stimulation to come to such a decision. The first Soviet military intervention in Hungary--on October 23, 1956--could also be brought up in this context. In other words, in all likelihood the Soviet troops would have been deployed to crush the Hungarian uprising even without the Suez events since, by the end of October, the extent of changes in Hungary exceeded the threshold the Soviet leaders found acceptable: a vision of the total collapse of a communist dictatorship had emerged while a democratic regime was developing. All these automatically threatened the unity of the Soviet bloc.34
"At the same time the Suez action might have *facilitated* the decision about the Soviet military intervention by extending an excellent distraction to thwart a probable international uproar in the wake of the bloody crush of the uprising in Hungary."
http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/kecskes_suez.html
Although the final Soviet decision for intervention was not taken until October 31, it may be that October 30-31 was just too late a POD to prevent the intervention, even if there were no lynchings in Republic Square, even if Tildy had not told Mikoyan of an intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and even if there had been so Suez Crisis. Nagy's decision to abolish the one-party system and create a coalition cabinet--which was certainly the least he could have done by that time to meet the
revolutionaries' demands--was cleared with Mikoyan, but Nagy may have been mistaken in thinking that just because Mikoyan would (reluctantly) approve it, the Soviet Presidium as a whole would. (Apparently Nagy did *not* clear the decision with the Presidium's *other* man on the scene in Hungary, the more hard-line Suslov.)
Still, as Gati points out, if you would expect Soviet intervention anywhere in 1956, it would have been in Poland, which was of far greater strategic significance to the USSR (after all it connected the USSR with East Germany) than Hungary was. The Hungarians should have been able to get away with whatever the Poles got away with *and somewhat more.* But "somewhat more" does not mean "whatever they wanted." If there had been no Suez Crisis, no Republic Square lynchings, and if Hungary had made it clear that it would remain in the Warsaw Pact, a return to a 1945-7 "popular front" type government--with some representation for non-Communist parties, but with the Communists having the most important positions and an understanding that there would be no return to large-scale capitalism (though there would be a private sector in agriculture and small business)--*might* have been acceptable to the Kremlin. (Yes, Dubcek tried something like that in 1968, and the Soviets invaded anyway, but 1956 was not 1968.) There might also have been a limited role for workers' councils in the administration of nationalized industries.
Whether such an arrangement would have been acceptable to the Hungarian revolutionaries by the end of October is of course another matter. The demand for neutrality--which after all even Communist Yugoslavia had--for totally free elections and for no guaranteed role for the Communist Party beyond what its showing in such elections would entitle it to--these were inevitable demands by that time, they were in themselves certainly morally justifiable (however unrealistic given the proximity of the Soviet Union and the unwillingness of the West to risk war for Hungary), and it is hard to see how Imre Nagy could have resisted them *by that point* and still stayed in power, with the army, secret police, and Communist Party in shambles. He may have feared being the next lynching victim...
It has sometimes been argued that the revolutionaries might have been more willing to settle for half a loaf if Radio Free Europe did not urge them on with maximum demands. (RFE may never have explicitly promised US aid in case of a Soviet invasion but many Hungarians certainly got that impression.) Until it was too late (i.e., until after the Soviet Union had decided on the second intervention) RFE was always critical of Nagy--whereas RFE's Polish desk tried to restrain the Poles and get them to support Gomulka. It is not true, as is sometimes alleged, that RFE's Hungary desk was dominated by "Horthy fascists"--but it did have some people who felt that a reform Communist like Nagy was just about as bad as a Rakosi or Gero.
OTOH, one RFE historian, Gyula Borbandi, rejected thecomparison with Poland, and denied the possibility of restraint by RFE or by the insurgents under the circumstances:
"What were we to say to the Hungarians: 'Be moderate; go back to your homes, be restrained'? We had from the beginning of RFE been urging Hungarians to resist Communism. Should we now have told the workers to return to the factories? Or the soldiers to return to their barracks? We couldn't say to the Hungarians, 'Please be moderate.' The Soviet army was in Budapest...The revolution was anti-Communist; Nagy was a Communist. Some wondered how a Communist could lead an anti-Communist revolution."
Gati, *Failed Illusions,* pp. 207-8.
http://books.google.com/books?id=iqc59NE5yNkC&pg=PA207&lpg=PA207
Another defender of RFE, A. Ross Johnson, acknowledges that it was unduly harsh towards Imre Nagy but argues that there were extenuating circumstances, and that RFE could hardly have ignored the "radical" anti-Communist demands that were becoming increasingly prevalent:
"RFE's treatment of Imre Nagy in its Hungarian broadcasts is explained in part by the fact that there was almost no independent information from Hungary during the first days of the Revolution, when international communications were blocked. RFE (as others in the West) labored under the misconception spread by Communist Party chief Gero that Nagy shared responsibility for the initial decision to 'request' Soviet military assistance against the rebels and impose martial law. It was only on October 28 that Nagy acknowledged that the uprising was 'a broad democratic mass movement' and not a 'counterrevolution.' It was only on October 30 that he endorsed a return to a multi-Party political system and made clear that the imposition of martial law and initial call for Soviet troops had been taken without his knowledge. These circumstances
notwithstanding, the many derogatory and vituperative RFE Hungarian broadcasts about Nagy cannot be justified by any standard. They deviated from both U.S. Government policies at the time (as discussed below) and from written RFE policy guidances. These broadcasts should not have been aired.
"On the other hand, it is difficult to accept the argument of Charles Gati, Jan Nowak, and others51 that in October 1956 RFE should have backed Nagy, as it did implicitly at a critical juncture with Gomulka in Poland.52 or, even more ambitiously, actively promoted a national, reformist, but still Communist 'Nagyism.' Simply stated, Hungary was not Poland. In Poland in October 1956 power resided in Party and government offices, with the levers of Communist power intact and the danger of future mass protests and future armed conflict between Soviet and Polish military units the backdrop for the confrontation between the Soviet and Polish Party leaderships that resulted in Soviet acceptance of Gomulka. In Hungary, in contrast, an insurgency had begun, the Soviet army and Hungarian Communist forces had already killed hundreds, the institutions of repression and control were crumbling, and power was shifting to thestreets....
"...Nagy was not Gomulka. He was often indecisive. He issued contradictory statements, initially condemning insurgents and justifying the Soviet intervention, and then saying the opposite. 54 He was not Communist Party chief but prime minister with uncertain powers. He could not oppose Soviet intervention; it had already occurred. He could not avert violence; it was increasing daily. He could not win support by endorsing limited in-system reform; popular demands for decollectivization of agriculture, reestablishment of non-Communist parties, free elections, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact were escalating. Under these circumstances, RFE's proper role was not to condemn or endorse Nagy (or Nagyism), but rather to report the range of domestic and international opinion about him and refrain from original commentary.55
"RFE Hungarian broadcasts both improperly denigrated Imre Nagy and properly reported the farreaching demands from newly formed independent groups and independent media around the country for basic freedoms and democratic change. Given the nature and pace of the Revolution, it is difficult to imagine that an opposite approach on either count--active support of Nagy and active downplaying of popular demands for system change--could have significantly increased the chances of the emergence of a reform Communist 'Nagyism.' It was not, in any case, RFE's function to do either."
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/happ.OP-3.pdf
One can understand Borbandi's and Johnson's point, and still note that in late October, Nagy *had* repudiated the idea that he had backed the first Soviet intervention, Soviet troops *had* been pulled back from Budapest, a cease-fire *had* been declared, and with the shocking exception of the Republic Square incident, violence *had* subsided. One can surely argue that at least during those crucial last few days in October, RFE should have shown urged the Hungarian people to be more cautious and give Imre Nagy a chance--though one may doubt whether it would have had much effect.
[1] V. N. Malin's working notes for the October 31 Presidium meeting may be found at [1] V. N. Malin's working notes for the October 31 Presidium meeting may
be found at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409
&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=6915E4D2-C619-6304-6860C0E2046814AC I have included them (though without the footnotes) as an Appendix here. Note that the language on Egypt in the Gusztav Kecskes article I cited earlier uses a slightly different translation.
Observe how the Presidium tries to resist the obvious conclusion that they are reversing the previous day's decision. (After all, they're infallible, so how can they be reversing themselves?) Molotov says that "yesterday was only a compromise decision." And "Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin" argue that "We should reject the view that we are reexamining our position." Also note that the Soviets still hope to include Imre Nagy in the new Hungarian "revolutionary" government. Finally, note that Mikoyan and Suslov were not present--they were still in Budapest. Mikoyan was the only Presidium member to oppose the invasion.
****
APPENDIX--MALIN NOTES ON OCTOBER 31 PRESIDIUM MEETING
On Hungary
Cde. Khrushchev sets forth the various considerations. We should reexamine
our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and
Budapest.(4) We should take the initative in restoring order in Hungary.
If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans,
English, and French--the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness
on our part and will go onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the
weakness of our positions. Our party will not accept it if we do this. To
Egypt they will then add Hungary.(5) We have no other choice. If this
point of view is supported and endorsed, let's consider what we should do.
Agreed: Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Molotov,
Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov(6)
We should say we tried to meet them halfway, but there is not now any
government.
What line are we now adopting? We should create a Provisional Revol. Gov't
(headed by Kadar).(7) Best of all--a deputy. Munnich--as premier and min.
of defense and internal affairs.(8) This government--we should invite them
to negotiations about the withdrawal of troops and resolve the matter. If
Nagy agrees, bring him in as dep. premier. (9) Munnich is appealing to us
with a request for assistance. We are lending assistance and restoring
order. We should negotiate with Tito. We should inform the Chinese
comrades, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians. (10) There will
be no large-scale war.
Cde. Saburov--after yesterday's session this discussion is all pointless.
It will vindicate NATO.
Cde. Molotov--yesterday was only a compromise decision.
Cdes. Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin: We should reject the view that we are
reexamining our position.
Cde. Furtseva--What further should be done? We showed patience, but now
things have gone too far. We must act to ensure that victory goes to our
side.
Cde. Pospelov--we should use the argument that we will not let socialism
in Hungary be strangled.
Cde. Shvernik--Cde. Khrushchev's proposal is correct.
Cde. Molotov--we should not defer the creation of organs in localities. We
should act simultaneously in the center and in the localities. Cde. Zhukov
is instructed to work out a plan and report on it.(11) Shepilov, Brezhnev,
Furtseva, and Pospelov are to handle the propaganda side.(12) An appeal to
the people from the military command or the government. An appeal to the
people from the Prov. Revol. Gov't. An order from Cde. Konev.(13) We
should send a group to the region of Cde. Konev's headquarters.(14) Cde.
Rakosi--favors Munnich (as premier) (15)
Cde. Hegedus--
Cde. Gero-- --Apro(16)
Kadar
Kiss Karoly(17)
Boldoczki Horvath
On Negotiations with Tito
(Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin) Draft a telegram to Tito about the
meeting.
(18) To Brest: Khrushchev, Molotov, Malenkov. (19) To Yugoslavia:
Khrushchev, Malenkov. To discuss with you the situation that has emerged
in Hungary. What is your view of it? If you agree, our delegation will
visit incognito from
1. XI in the evening to
2. XI in the morning your time.
Confirm the telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade.
