WI: No Second Sino-Japanese War but WWII in Europe happens as IOTL. Does Japan strike south?

[Asp]

So my POD is that the Soviet-Japanese Border War gets nasty in 1936-early 1937 and something like the Battle of Khalkin Gol basically happens then, but it stops short of declared war as IOTL. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident is butterflied, and the Kwantung Army views the USSR as the bigger threat, preventing any junior officers from going crazy and deciding to invade China with a single company, and the Hokushin-ron/Strike North faction wanes as IOTL. Then, the European theater of WWII happens as IOTL. Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, kicks off war with France and Britain, takes Poland, Norway, Denmark, then in a shocker France and the Low Countries, etc., etc. France surrenders and the Vichy regime takes over too, should make that clear. Meanwhile, an uncommitted Japan watches from the sidelines. So what are the odds that Japan in this scenario decides to strike south without the direct catalyst of sanctions and the need for resources to fuel their war in China? I’m thinking the temptation would probably be irresistible at some point. The military absolutely dominated the government and pretty much the whole leadership was crazy, Nanshin-ron/Strike South had been national policy for years though whether they should take the European and American colonies was controversial, and Hachirō Arita, the general who got the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere written into national policy, was already Minister of Foreign Affairs. I don’t think that crew could resist taking a run at their colonies with the metropoles of the most important ones concurred and the British decimated and distracted.

Am I correct, or no? If they do strike, how does the war go down? It’s a certainty as IOTL that they would lose, but not being engaged in China frees up literally millions of troops and a huge amount of merchant shipping. A lot of stuff that is talked about but that the Japanese could never have pulled off like invading Australia suddenly looks a lot more plausible (not that this would work). Not being engaged from 1937-1941 (assuming they strike that year) also frees up a lot of resources and makes it possible to build up more and not have the munitions shortage like IOTL 1940. So what happens? How far could they get?

 

[Asp]

Been thinking about this some more, and I wonder what the Japanese campaign in India would be like with so many extra troops (and, critically, extra armor). I doubt it would be possible for them to support a force with the state of Burmese infrastructure that could make the Imphal Campaign a success, but there might be a long-lasting front in India on the scale of the North Africa Campaign that could burn for a really long time.

 

[ArtosStark]

Ok. How do they get to Burma? If they do not have a war in China are we assuming that they still take FIC for the heck of it?

 

[Asp]

Ok. How do they get to Burma? If they do not have a war in China are we assuming that they still take FIC for the heck of it?

Even if they don’t have to cut off the Burma Road/Railway, it seems like a logical move to provide a buffer zone between the fulcrum of British power outside the aisles, India, and their Southeast Asian possessions. Plus yes, I would say that the fact they can take it, that it belongs to an enemy power, and its there will make them want it.

 

[ArtosStark]

Even if they don’t have to cut off the Burma Road/Railway, it seems like a logical move to provide a buffer zone between the fulcrum of British power outside the aisles, India, and their Southeast Asian possessions. Plus yes, I would say that the fact they can take it, that it belongs to an enemy power, and its there will make them want it.

Not actually an enemy power, but I grant that the difference may be academic to the Japanese.

Well, how things shake out in getting to this point will probably make a difference. I am not an expert on internal Japanese politics, but I believe at least one cabinet fell over either the Chinese invasion or the fact that it dragged on so long. AIUI this was generally to the benefit of the militarists. Avoiding China may reduce their influence, though as I said, not my area.

Avoiding China will certainly help the economy, and the relationship with the US. Without sanctions and the cost of the war in China, the need for resource areas may not seem so pressing, and the militarists power may be reduced.

There is also China itself to consider. Without the Japanese invasion the Chinese Communists are probably done. If Chaing has a more united China under him the Japanese may have to be concerned about Chinese troops on the border of Manchuria, and their reaction to occupying a territory to their south. Since the Japanese do not have troops on the south Chinese coastline they also have a slightly harder time getting men to Indochina, though that is probably a minor issue.

And finally, a build-up of greater proportion to than OTL could trigger a greater response from the British and Dutch than OTL, though granted they are still likely to be distracted by Germany and have limited resources to send and worse organization.

If, however, we ignore all of that, then yes it seems possible that the Japanese could at least enter and fight in India. Which seems like it would be a similar bog to fighting in China, in the long run. But it would be a much bigger deal for both India and Britain than OTL.

 

[thaddeus]

without the fall of Nanking (which gave KMT China at least the appearance of a failed state) Sino-German cooperation has continued, and China is a threat to reclaim Manchuria?

add German-Soviet dealings, including over naval construction (at least that was what the Soviets sought), and this all might be the biggest concern of Japan, since they are not public enemy number 1 (or 2) in the US and trade restrictions not a concern?

 

[mattep74]

If there is no war in China, then the US do not embargo Japan and Japan has no need to strike anywere

 

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

Without the war in China and without the US embargo, the IJA wins the argument and Japan strikes North.

 

[Asp]

Not actually an enemy power, but I grant that the difference may be academic to the Japanese.

Well, how things shake out in getting to this point will probably make a difference. I am not an expert on internal Japanese politics, but I believe at least one cabinet fell over either the Chinese invasion or the fact that it dragged on so long. AIUI this was generally to the benefit of the militarists. Avoiding China may reduce their influence, though as I said, not my area.

Avoiding China will certainly help the economy, and the relationship with the US. Without sanctions and the cost of the war in China, the need for resource areas may not seem so pressing, and the militarists power may be reduced.

There is also China itself to consider. Without the Japanese invasion the Chinese Communists are probably done. If Chaing has a more united China under him the Japanese may have to be concerned about Chinese troops on the border of Manchuria, and their reaction to occupying a territory to their south. Since the Japanese do not have troops on the south Chinese coastline they also have a slightly harder time getting men to Indochina, though that is probably a minor issue.

And finally, a build-up of greater proportion to than OTL could trigger a greater response from the British and Dutch than OTL, though granted they are still likely to be distracted by Germany and have limited resources to send and worse organization.

If, however, we ignore all of that, then yes it seems possible that the Japanese could at least enter and fight in India. Which seems like it would be a similar bog to fighting in China, in the long run. But it would be a much bigger deal for both India and Britain than OTL.

If they strike south, they have to assume Britain and the Commonwealth, the U.S., and the Netherlands will be enemy nations.

My thinking was that Indochina would go as IOTL, with the Germans bully the ATL Vichy regime into letting them base troops there.

The British and especially the Netherlands were tapped out after getting shoved off the continent, that buildup’s not gonna happen.

Yeah, long term the Pacific War is still DOA for Japan because the population and economic advantages of the Allies aren’t going away, but they could have gotten a hell of a lot further.

without the fall of Nanking (which gave KMT China at least the appearance of a failed state) Sino-German cooperation has continued, and China is a threat to reclaim Manchuria?

add German-Soviet dealings, including over naval construction (at least that was what the Soviets sought), and this all might be the biggest concern of Japan, since they are not public enemy number 1 (or 2) in the US and trade restrictions not a concern?

Maybe, but I figured the opportunity would be irresistible given the mindset of the people who ran Japan at the time.

If there is no war in China, then the US do not embargo Japan and Japan has no need to strike anywere

Japan was already in the thrall of totally crazy militarists who did stuff like charge into Manchuria without any authority whatsoever. That became even more true after the February 26th Incident. They wanted an empire, and they were already being hyper-aggressive to get it.

Without the war in China and without the US embargo, the IJA wins the argument and Japan strikes North.

I don’t think so. Japan had already made Strike South-lite national policy and the undefended, resource-rich places in Southeast Asia would have been a much, much more tempting prize than trying to invade Siberia. My scenario also has an allegory to Khalkin Gol, so I assumed the Strike North faction would wane as IOTL because of this.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

No war in China means the military has been put in its place.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Even if they don’t have to cut off the Burma Road/Railway, it seems like a logical move to provide a buffer zone between the fulcrum of British power outside the aisles, India, and their Southeast Asian possessions.

No it doesn't.

Plus yes, I would say that the fact they can take it, that it belongs to an enemy power, and its there will make them want it.

How is the UK an enemy power?

 

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

If they strike south, they have to assume Britain and the Commonwealth, the U.S., and the Netherlands will be enemy nations.

My thinking was that Indochina would go as IOTL, with the Germans bully the ATL Vichy regime into letting them base troops there.

The British and especially the Netherlands were tapped out after getting shoved off the continent, that buildup’s not gonna happen.

Yeah, long term the Pacific War is still DOA for Japan because the population and economic advantages of the Allies aren’t going away, but they could have gotten a hell of a lot further.



Maybe, but I figured the opportunity would be irresistible given the mindset of the people who ran Japan at the time.



Japan was already in the thrall of totally crazy militarists who did stuff like charge into Manchuria without any authority whatsoever. That became even more true after the February 26th Incident. They wanted an empire, and they were already being hyper-aggressive to get it.



I don’t think so. Japan had already made Strike South-lite national policy and the undefended, resource-rich places in Southeast Asia would have been a much, much more tempting prize than trying to invade Siberia. My scenario also has an allegory to Khalkin Gol, so I assumed the Strike North faction would wane as IOTL because of this.

They struck south because of the embargo and to get the resource rich Western colonies. There’s absolutely no reason to do so here. The USSR is an ideological enemy of Japan, not to mention the IJA would have more favor here. Politics is everything.

 

[HarryLeferts]

The thing is that if there is no Second Sino-Japanese War, then Nazi Germany is likely still supporting Nationalist China with various things including military assistance. Something that would cause Japan more than a little unease. Then, we get the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which pissed off Japan in that they saw it as a breaking of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. They might decide to either just sit out the war, or even ally with Britain and the US against Germany.

Of course, this could mean Axis China as well...

 

[profxyz]

The DEI will still be important to Japan in this scenario. The overarching goal guiding Japanese aggression throughout the 1930s was the need to avoid the WWI-style defeat of Germany, and they would do that by establishing a self-sufficient resource/industrial base comparable to that of the US or USSR. The Japanese took over and developed Manchuria for this purpose, but even in their most optimistic projection, they would still need Southern Resource Area oil, rubber and metals to be fully self-sufficient, and that in turn would require securing the South China Sea trade routes via, at the very least, bases in Indochina and DEI.

That said, the nature of the Southern Expansion might have been vastly different. OTL even into Apr 41, the Japanese did not rule out the possibility of diplomatically pressuring the Dutch to give them what they wanted resource-wise. These OTL efforts failed because a) Japan had very little to give to the Dutch in exchange, due to the strains of financing the war in China and b) Japan had exhausted its diplomatic goodwill, again mostly due to events ultimately stemming from China (of which occupation of Northern Indochina was one).

So with no 2nd Sino-Japanese War, Japan not only gets 3 extra years of military-economic strengthening, it is also in a better position vis-a-vis the Dutch and equally importantly, can better afford the luxury of slow-moving negotiations without worrying about imminent economic/military collapse.

Note that this rather rosy picture depends entirely on the Japanese avoiding the 2nd Sino-Japanese War yet also keeping/expanding their existing "informal empire" in North China, which is a very tall order. Japan's Manchurian industrialization ultimately required exploitation of North Chinese resources, which the Chinese of course very much resented, and by 1937, Chiang Kai-Shek was ready to push back against further exploitation. You'd need a much bigger butterfly than just "avoiding Marco Polo Bridge" to stop the 2nd Sino-Japanese War.

Finally, no 2nd Sino-Japanese War and the resultant continued development of Manchuria would have greatly strengthened the the army-bureaucratic nexus (involving a few well-placed factions within each institution) which dominated Manchukuo policy, so Japanese expansionist policy would have been further directed towards the Soviet Union as per army wishes.

 

[CanveyFanNumberOne]

I think they would be more than likely to take advantage of the success of Fall Gelb, as French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies will have almost no defensive abilities. But that would be all they would invade.