WI: No Phony War?

Instead of remaining passive on the Western Front during 1939-1940, the British and French launch a vigorous offensive into Germany to help their Polish allies and force the Third Reich to fight a proper two-front war. How would this affect the course of the war compared to OTL?
 
In the short run it hurts France, as they did not have the units to withstand a German counter-attack in October. If France is serious, they might also attack through Belgium, which will bring them into the war on the German side.

However, this means no sicklecut and the Germans attacking before they can regroup and increase reserves of ammo and such. German gets onto a full-war footing sooner, but would lack the ability to exploit a true break through. The war may end in 41 with German victory, but at much higher cost.
 
Instead of remaining passive on the Western Front during 1939-1940, the British and French launch a vigorous offensive into Germany to help their Polish allies and force the Third Reich to fight a proper two-front war. How would this affect the course of the war compared to OTL?
A breach within three days when the battle of the Bzura begins. Sarrebrück falls a day later. The Ruhr overwhelmed within three weeks as the German have only 25 divisions against the 50 french ones (and 100 within two months), the German industrial might is reduced by 75 percents. The french then turn southeast, trap the german divisions along the Siegfried Line, Poland holds the line. Stalin the cautious hesitates. Germany sues for peace around November. Statu quo ante bellum but Poland gets Upper Silesia and Southern East Prussia. The Germans living in Tchecoslovakia are about to know a world of pain. Germany becomes the "surrender monkey" of that TL.
 
Wouldn't you a need a POD several years earlier to change the brains of France's leaders (military and civilian)? For a variety of reasons they were literally hard wired to think in defensive terms and the Allies taking the offensive in the early days of the war is not a simple binary choice of standing on the defensive or attacking. A lot has to change to make it possible. Sounds like a great TL though.
 
Wouldn't you a need a POD several years earlier to change the brains of France's leaders (military and civilian)? For a variety of reasons they were literally hard wired to think in defensive terms and the Allies taking the offensive in the early days of the war is not a simple binary choice of standing on the defensive or attacking. A lot has to change to make it possible. Sounds like a great TL though.
A slightly more successful Bzura offensive could convince Gamelin to be a litttle bolder and to turn his "reconnaissance in force" as a true offensive (there is a good TL about it, sadly on hold). He didn't need to cross the Rhine at all cost. He just has to follow the river and take everything west of it. The industrial cities in the east are within range of medium and heavier artillery ( 105 and 155mm) and the French had a lot of these guns. We have to remember that the German command had nearly a breakdown when France declared war (Goering said "We're doomed") and Keitel couldn't believe his luck: For all the West, the Germans had 25 divisions, none of them being a Panzerdivision and most of them being fortress division with poor training and equipment. According to the German staff, if the French had decided to take a risk, the Ruhr would have been taken in less than a month. After that, the panzers don't have replacement parts, the aircraft production takes a huge punch in the face, artillery shells become a luxury. If the czechs decide to go on full strike after that, the German army is in a really bad position. Even if the French retreat after that, they would be smart enough to destroy everything. It would take at least a year to restart production, and during that time, the French and the English are rearming at a frantic pace. In 1941, the Germans cannot win against france and England and they will crumble.
 
A breach within three days when the battle of the Bzura begins. Sarrebrück falls a day later. The Ruhr overwhelmed within three weeks as the German have only 25 divisions against the 50 french ones (and 100 within two months)

Ridiculous. That's be enough divisions to hold off the French, within two months 100 divisions return from Poland and would repulse the French.
 
Ridiculous. That's be enough divisions to hold off the French, within two months 100 divisions return from Poland and would repulse the French.
Not 100 divisions, around 60 combat ready and nonetheless tired by a month of fighting. And the offensive in the Sarre was not a general one: it followed the sacred ruled of the artillerymen and pronounced by Napoleon at Toulon: to concentrate everything you have against one specific point namely Sarrebrück. Plus the Siegfried Line in 1939 war far, very far from being finished (hell it was not totally finished in 1944). Plus the 25 German divisions are not concentrated in one location but scattered all along the Siegfried Line, many being fortress divisions like I said before so far less mobile that a motorized one or even a infantry one. 25 divisions is barely enough to protect a line that long and so the reserves are barely present if not practically nonexistant. If the French decides to make to make a breach, they can easily and without risk encircle those divisions one by one. Sure the Germans will return from Poland but not before late October (the time to regroup and send the divisions back), later if the Bzura counter -offensive a more successful. If Gamelin remains Gamelin with just a little more boldness, the Germans will have lost the equivalent a two armies and a Ruhr properly destroyed. After that, it's a matter of time. The French return to Maginot, wait and rearm for the Germans who busily rebuilding their industry. By the time the Germans are strong enough to launch a fall gelb like offensive again, it's going to be much harder for them. PDF27 more than excellent TL had already shown how much the german offensive was a huge gamble. Imagine the results if the French are able to form these 8 to 10 armored divisions entirely made of excellent tanks for the time. Plus the BEF being much larger. The Germans will perhaps be able to take Belgium but not France. After that, to borrow again an expression from PDF27, it will become a "methodical battle". War would be over by 1941/early 1942 at the latest.
 
If France is serious, they might also attack through Belgium, which will bring them into the war on the German side.

that would be a shocking scenario, how likely would that be? there were real communication problems between France, Britain, and Belgium during later German invasion, albeit a far cry from switching sides.

Plus the Siegfried Line in 1939 war far, very far from being finished (hell it was not totally finished in 1944).

my understanding it was perceived as much greater barrier? having invested so much into Maginot Line (the actual physical line AND the defensive line strategy) maybe they did not have critical non-biased viewpoint? and thought they were looking at mirror image.
 
AIUI, the French high command in 1939 was not prepared, psychologically or organizationally, for offensive war. They accepted that they would do it - eventually, when the time was ripe, when all preparations were complete. They had expected the German conquest of Poland to take at least several months to a year. In the meantime, France would complete the mobilization of its army, deploy strong forces in Lorraine, and only then attack.

The swiftness of the German advances in Poland came as a shocking surprise. Obviously the Germans were much more dangerous than predicted. Also, forces that had been expected to be tied down in Poland were moving to the west. France's mobilization process was... a bit leisurely. It was easily a month before all the divisions were up to strength and fully ready for action.

By that time, German reinforcements were pouring into the western front, and the "big advantage" was slipping away. A strong French attack might have broken through the initial front, and possibly pushed the Germans back 50-100 km. But French forces were not organized to sustain longer advances, even German resistance collapsed.

Another point is that (IMO) the Germans would have had air superiority over the battle zone. The French Air Force lagged in numbers, and was still making frantic efforts to catch up in spring 1940. Also, lots of its aircraft were misdeployed: every local command in the country had its own little interceptor force. The larger and far better organized Luftwaffe would dominate (though the French would still be a presence). The RAF could help, of course, but I don't see many squadrons being assigned to Lorraine.
 
I also find it hard to believe a French offensive has much hope of achieving decisive success. however I don't think it has to to radically change WW2.

Simply ordering the French artillery to start a slow but steady bombardment of German positions from the day war is declared shows the French mean business. It also reduces the establishment of a live and let live attitude that in OTL had become the norm for French forces along the Maginot Line. If Gamlin also orders some aggressive patrolling then the weakness of the German frontier defences might be realised encouraging the French to launch some limited attacks. The French airforce could also conduct limited operations against Luftwaffe air bases and such (although I just can't see them comitting to this). Any real attacks are honing to be repulsed immediately or when the bulk of the German army returns from Poland. However this fighting will reveal what is to come in the following year allowing the French to prepare.

There was a feeling amongst all the protagonists that a deal could be done and the longer the phoney war lasted the more this feeling spread amongst the soldiers of the western allies. With a more active war earlier this peace feeling would be dispelled which could only help the allies resist in 1940.

The Germans would concerned about French intentions if they where more active and would fear it was a prelude for a major offensive. Hitler would feel obliged for political reasons to strengthen the french border zone especially with aircraft which could only be taken form the attack on Poland thereby slowing the conquest there a little. When Poland is finished the German army deploys west however larger forces are going to be deployed to the south east just in case due to the (even slightly) more aggressive French Army. This reduces the amount of forces available for the main event in May 1940 or butterfly's away to Norwegen adventure due to lack of forces. Also due the possibility of a French offensive real or imagined affect Stalins decision to invade Poland. It's not an unreasonable assumption that he might wait an additional day or two before the Soviets cross the border. Again this hurts the Germans a little more than OTL.

Further it's not unreasonable to think that some of the deficiencies of the French army and airforce especially might have been realised and partially addressed which changes 1940 significantly. This time would be available due to the very bad winter weather experienced in1939/40 which postponed the planned German attack on the west until the spring IOTL. IOTL this time was wasted.
 
Here is a thought, assuming there were a real intent to save Poland.

Evening Sept 1-2 large numbers of RAF planes land, as agree on French base.

DOW is 6am Sep 3

Germany air bases within a hundred miles of France devastated by 7am

Using air superiority France advances well enough to scare the German general staff (who thought Hitler had questionable judgement anyway)
 
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