WI: No Operation 'Dragoon'?

[Shapur2]

First, let me apologize if this WWII What-If has already been discussed in detail.

The American plan 'Operation Anvil', which was cancelled but later revived as 'Dragoon', was opposed by Churchill and many other high ranking British Military officials, as it would cement the place of the Italian Campaign as the 'side show' of the European Theater of Operations (ETO). Many also argued that the Normandy Landings could be supported by landings other than in Southern France.

Churchill advocated for a variety of alternatives: landings in Istria, followed by thrusts towards Vienna and through the Ljubljana Gap (as advocated by General 'Jumbo' Wilson) and in the bay of Biscay, while a perhaps more likely alternative to the landings in Southern France would've been landings in the Gulf of Genoa.

My question is: What If, by some political jockeying and pressure high up on the allied chain of command, Operation 'Anvil'/'Dragoon' had taken place in Istria OR in the Gulf of Genoa (specifically the Genoa alternative)? Could they have been successful, or would they have turned into Anzio/Gallipoli 2.0? More importantly, without landings in Southern France to jeopardize the German position in France, could the Germans have succeeded in bottling up, or at least greatly curtail the allied break out from Normandy?

Knowing Winnie's track record with large scale military campaigns (Gallipoli, Norway, Italy), I've got my doubts, but I would also like to get some outside opinion on this. Any feedback would be greatly appreciated!

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There is a long answer to this which will only scratch the surface. Bottom line is without the supply capacity of the Marsialles/Toulon port group and the largely intact railroads running north the Allies cannot support three army groups of seven armies on Germanys western border in October 1944. The German port denial strategy was partially sucessful and in October the ports of northern France and Belgium could barely sustain the 12th & 21st Army Groups. The French railroads between the western ports and the German border were barely operating, so only the equivalent of three armies could be supplied in offensive operations.

Marsailles = 6-7 Allied armies supplied on Germanys border after October

No Marsailles = 4 Allied armies supplied on Germanys border in November

I will leave to the reader to mull over which is preferable.

Capturing Bourdeux & the other Biscay ports is no substitute as the Germans devoted the same port denial effort to those, and there were demands in naval capacity that made a Biscay landing less powerful than the Riviera landing of Op. Dragoon.

No Dragoon operation allows a methodical withdrawl by the two German armies in southern France, and allows application of the port denial strategy to Marsailles as well, something the Germans were unable to do sucessfully with the speed and force of Op Dragoon.

Genoa is backed by the same mountains that otherwise halted the Allied armies in October 1944.

Istria & the other ports of the Adriatic were not 'high capacity' ports. Worse the railroads leading north to the Lubjana Gap were wholly inadaquate for supplying a Allied Army Group.

 

[Aber]

.
My question is: What If, by some political jockeying and pressure high up on the allied chain of command, Operation 'Anvil'/'Dragoon' had taken place in Istria OR in the Gulf of Genoa (specifically the Genoa alternative)? Could they have been successful, or would they have turned into Anzio/Gallipoli 2.0? More importantly, without landings in Southern France to jeopardize the German position in France, could the Germans have succeeded in bottling up, or at least greatly curtail the allied break out from Normandy?
!

A complaint of the generals in the Mediterranean was about the timing of Dragoon, in that it reduced Allied forces in Italy during the summer when they were most useful. It is possible that they could have reached the Po valley in the summer of 1944 without Dragoon.

Dragoon had little impact on Normandy as the Allies had already broken out.

A later amphibious landing would probably have been most useful in the south of France, to free territory and start building up the French army.

Logistically it is difficult to judge how important the southern French ports were, as after the capture of Antwerp intact, there was enough port capacity for the campaign into Germany. The planners lament at the time was that the number of divisions required to capture a port was generally more than that port could support logistically after it had been captured!

 

[Cook]

Knowing Winnie's track record with large scale military campaigns (Gallipoli, Norway, Italy)...

You mean bloody good ideas that were executed ineptly?

 

[ivanotter]

Brooke was not keen on anything Southern France as it would German divisions away from his strategic trap: Italy.

He believed tht the German divisions could be far better utilised on the French railway system in Southern France to both stop the invasion there as well as being a fast mobile reserve in France.

If they stayed in Italy, their movement North-South would be severely restricted.

Interesting that Brooke also advocated that just a threat of invasion somewhere in Italy would keep more divisions tied up than an actual landing.

Where Churchill's fertile brain had lots of ideas and conflicting things going at the same time, Brooke was focused on reducing the number of German divisions available to oppose Overlord. Overlord to Brooke was the last step in the victory in Europe, not the first step (as Marshall advocated).

Ivan

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Logistically it is difficult to judge how important the southern French ports were, as after the capture of Antwerp intact, there was enough port capacity for the campaign into Germany. The planners lament at the time was that the number of divisions required to capture a port was generally more than that port could support logistically after it had been captured!

It seems to me fairly easy to count the tons of supplies delivered where and when. I cant see any way even four Allied armies could have been supplied along Germanys frontier in October/November, let alone the 6-7 that were with the ports and railroads of Southern France in Allied hands.

Antwerp was something of a false hope when captured 1-6 September. The Scheldt Estuary remained covered by German artillery into October and mined well into November. The first cargo ship did not reach Antwerps docks until 19 November and the first convoy did not unload until several days later. Even then its value was less than hoped as the Belgian railroads were not suffciently repaired to clear the docks of cargo. in mid December discharge into Antwerp was slowed to a trickle until the backlog could be removed. Having Marsailles/Toulon captured in a few weeks and taking in cargo by latter September went far in salvaging the Allied logistics plans.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

..

Interesting that Brooke also advocated that just a threat of invasion somewhere in Italy would keep more divisions tied up than an actual landing.

There was a German infantry corps kept parked at Genoa, probablly in response to the Allied invasion deception operation aimed there. Kesselring kept a fair size reserve in northern Italy through the entire campaign.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There was a theoretical alternative to Op Dragoon. That was executing op Anvil in April as originally planned. Eisenhower reluctantly dropped Op Anvil due to its interferance with the expansion of Op Neptune in Normandy from three to four & eventually five beachheads. Had Eisenhower decided a smaller Neptune/Overlord operation was acceptable, or had the necessary amphibious ships been fairy dusted into existence then the Anvil operation could have been kicked off in April as intended.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The planners lament at the time was that the number of divisions required to capture a port was generally more than that port could support logistically after it had been captured!

I dont understand their comment. Who and when was this made???

Cherborgs nominal peacetime cargo capacity was 8,000 tons per day which could sustain a army of eight divisions & the corps/army overhead. it took a US corps of two divisions to capture the port. Marsailles had a nominal peace time capacity of 12,000 tons per day & was captured by a corps nominally of three French divisions, which would have required 2,800 tons supply per day under the most pessimistc calculation, in this case it was probablly closer to 1,800 tons per day.

Antwerp was captured by its own citizens who ran the German garrison out of the port facilities and kept them out for over 48 hours until the Brit. XXX Corps arrived. Antwerps nominal peacetime capacity was over 18,000 tons per day.

In all three of these examples the actual wartime intake was better than 25% over the peace time intake. One can use examples like St Malo or Brest to make a claim like that, but it does not hold up in the overall scheme. By December the beach supply in Normandy & the Riviera was ended and the Allies were supplying seven armies though four to five major ports

 

[Aber]

I dont understand their comment. Who and when was this made???
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Invasion planners, quoted in Ruppenthal, but intended as a joke - based on the issue that it took an Army Group landing to get Corps into position to capture a port, that could support an Army...

 

[Aber]

There was a theoretical alternative to Op Dragoon. That was executing op Anvil in April as originally planned. Eisenhower reluctantly dropped Op Anvil due to its interferance with the expansion of Op Neptune in Normandy from three to four & eventually five beachheads. Had Eisenhower decided a smaller Neptune/Overlord operation was acceptable, or had the necessary amphibious ships been fairy dusted into existence then the Anvil operation could have been kicked off in April as intended.

I've always had my doubts about this plan - there seems a high risk that it would turn into an Anzio bridgehead, without having a significant impact on Overlord.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Invasion planners, quoted in Ruppenthal, but intended as a joke - based on the issue that it took an Army Group landing to get Corps into position to capture a port, that could support an Army...

Doh! Now dont I feel silly. Even read the book.

I've always had my doubts about this plan - there seems a high risk that it would turn into an Anzio bridgehead, without having a significant impact on Overlord.

Have wanted to test this on the game board for several years now, but not had the time. Main thing I'm missing is the exact German OB of March/April 44,and the reinforcement schedule through May.

 

[Aber]

Have wanted to test this on the game board for several years now, but not had the time. Main thing I'm missing is the exact German OB of March/April 44,and the reinforcement schedule through May.

Don't forget the impact on the Italian campaign - if forces are withdrawn for an early Anvil, then a breakthrough at Monte Cassino is less likely, and potentially German reserves in Northern Italy are tasked with covering Southern France.