WI no nuclear weapons during/after 1945

You're forgeting the psychological impact of how the nukes are dropped. A conventional raid required a massive air fleet, dropping over severall hours, all the while being fired at by AAA and fighters (even if weakly). A nuke it's... 1 bomb=1 city. Boom, gone. That's what really freaked out the japanese and finally pushed them over the edge.

This makes sense in a microcosm, but it took 6 days after the last atomic attack for them to surrender (after having been hit twice in 3 days). What changed in those 6 days? The Soviets dropped their non-aggression pact with Japan, forcing them to the realization that a negotiated peace with the WAllies via the Soviets was not going to happen. I whole-heartedly agree that it freaked them out, just not enough to surrender until hope of a negotiated peace was gone.
 
Since the Soviets hadn't begun their invasions of the Kuriles (18 Aug 1945) by the time the US dropped the two A-bombs (6 & 9 Aug 1945), I don't proscribe to that historical argument at all.

Funny thing, I am a retired high school American History teacher, I taught the Advanced Placement classes. In 1988 the AH AP Exam had a DBQ (Document Based Question) that offered a different but similar negative scenario, which to me at the time came as quite a surprise. I was aghast that The College Board would offer the students such a negative view of American foreign policy/behavior.

Here is the question they asked the kids in 1988:

Th American decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post-World-War era rather then a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional surrender.

Evaluate the statement using the documents and your knowledge of the diplomatic and military history of the years 1937 through 1947.
 
This makes sense in a microcosm, but it took 6 days after the last atomic attack for them to surrender (after having been hit twice in 3 days). What changed in those 6 days? The Soviets dropped their non-aggression pact with Japan, forcing them to the realization that a negotiated peace with the WAllies via the Soviets was not going to happen. I whole-heartedly agree that it freaked them out, just not enough to surrender until hope of a negotiated peace was gone.

Yeah, the conjuntion of both events...

And there were still maniacs who wanted to keep going!
 
Lots more Allied casualties taken a Japan that becomes divided like Korea. Instead of a Hiroshima and Nagasaki/Kokura we get a Seoul and Inchon five years later
 
This makes sense in a microcosm, but it took 6 days after the last atomic attack for them to surrender (after having been hit twice in 3 days).
The bombing of Nagasaki was reported to the Supreme Council at 11 AM on 9 August. 15 hours later, at 2 AM on 10 August, Hirohito spoke for the first time: he agreed that Japan would surrender with no conditions except a "guarantee of the Emperor's position". IOW, Japan decided to surrender then. Japan telegraphed its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration that morning, with that one reservation.

What changed in those 6 days? The Soviets dropped their non-aggression pact with Japan...

Early on 9 August, before the bombing of Nagasaki. This had no effect on the Supreme Council.

... forcing them to the realization that a negotiated peace with the WAllies via the Soviets was not going to happen.

That was already known, but did not sway the hardliners.

The timeline is:

26 July - Allies issue Potsdam Declaration, setting terms for Japanese surrender
27 July - Japan rejects the Declaration
6 August - bombing of Hiroshima; no change in Japanese position
9 August - 4 AM: Soviet attack; no change in Japanese position; 11 AM: bombing of Nagasaki; Supreme Council splits 3-3 on surrender
10 August - 2 AM: Hirohito speaks out; 10 AM: Japan accepts Declaration with one reservation
12 August - Allies reject Japanese offer
13 August - Allies drop leaflets describing Japanese surrender offer
14 August - Allies resume bombing Japan; Japan accepts Potsdam Declaration without reservations; Hirohito records surrender speech
15 August - Surrender speech broadcast

I think the record is clear. Japan decided to surrender on 10 August, after the bombing of Nagasaki. Up to that point, Japanese leaders rejected any call for surrender. After Nagasaki, the hardliners proposed surrender but on Japanese terms (no occupation, etc), while the moderates wanted only the guarantee of the Emperor - splitting 3-3. Several hours later, Hirohito spoke, supporting the moderates, and the council agreed. The Japanese tried to quibble over the Emperor's status for a few days, but they had accepted surrender.

One should note that on 14 August, as junior hardliners plotted a coup d'état to prevent the surrender announcement, several senior officers signed an agreement to follow the Emperor's order. This group included two of the three hardliners on the Supreme Council.
 
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DougM

Donor
If no Nukes, the war probably ends later. With SOMEONE having to land troops.

But the big question is how in the world are you keeping nukes from being developed until after 1980. By the time in the real world the US, USSR, England France and China all were known to have them and Isreal and South Africa were believed to have them and India and Pakistan were about 20 years from getting them.

So you need huge POD to stop them from being around by then. You may see the delayed a few years but I can’t see them being developed later then 1955 and that is pushing it.

The US and USSR spent huge money on military during that time and they would not skip Nukes the power is just to much to overlook and the odds the other side develops them is just way way to high to not develop them yourself.
 
The bombing of Nagasaki was reported to the Supreme Council at 11 AM on 9 August. 15 hours later, at 2 AM on 10 August, Hirohito spoke for the first time: he agreed that Japan would surrender with no conditions except a "guarantee of the Emperor's position". IOW, Japan decided to surrender then. Japan telegraphed its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration that morning, with that one reservation.



Early on 9 August, before the bombing of Nagasaki. This had no effect on the Supreme Council.

... forcing them to the realization that a negotiated peace with the WAllies via the Soviets was not going to happen.

That was already known, but did not sway the hardliners.

The timeline is:

26 July - Allies issue Potsdam Declaration, setting terms for Japanese surrender
27 July - Japan rejects the Declaration
6 August - bombing of Hiroshima; no change in Japanese position
9 August - 4 AM: Soviet attack; no change in Japanese position; 11 AM: bombing of Nagasaki; Supreme Council splits 3-3 on surrender
10 August - 2 AM: Hirohito speaks out; 10 AM: Japan accepts Declaration with one reservation
12 August - Allies reject Japanese offer
13 August - Allies drop leaflets describing Japanese surrender offer
14 August - Allies resume bombing Japan; Japan accepts Potsdam Declaration without reservations; Hirohito records surrender speech
15 August - Surrender speech broadcast

I think the record is clear. Japan decided to surrender on 10 August, after the bombing of Nagasaki. Up to that point, Japanese leaders rejected any call for surrender. After Nagasaki, the hardliners proposed surrender but on Japanese terms (no occupation, etc), while the moderates wanted only the guarantee of the Emperor - splitting 3-3. Several hours later, Hirohito spoke, supporting the moderates, and the council agreed. The Japanese tried to quibble over the Emperor's status for a few days, but they had accepted surrender.

One should note that on 14 August, as junior hardliners plotted a coup d'état to prevent the surrender announcement, several senior officers signed an agreement to follow the Emperor's order. This group included two of the three hardliners on the Supreme Council.

The record is clear - the generally accepted reason for the vast majority of people was that Japan surrendered as a direct result of the atomic bombings and the record (you provided above) shows it isn't, but instead, is due to a variety of factors:
- The atomic bombings
- Resumption of conventional bombing campaign
- The threat of additional atomic attacks
- The realization that they will be fighting the Soviets in the North and the US in the south
- The realization that they simply aren't going to get any concessions.

Remove all factors except that two nukes have been dropped (and reaped the same level of destruction as a conventional raid they had already been been enduring for months) and the Japanese would not have accepted the surrender terms that they did OTL. This was my main point in my original post. It's a variety of factors and took them time to come to accept, not a singular event.
 
Since the Soviets hadn't begun their invasions of the Kuriles (18 Aug 1945) by the time the US dropped the two A-bombs (6 & 9 Aug 1945), I don't proscribe to that historical argument at all.
The Soviets realized the U.S. wouldn't "waste" an A-Bomb on the Kuril Islands, so they took them. The notion that the second Bomb scared them out of any of the main islands might have some validity.
 
The record is clear - the generally accepted reason for the vast majority of people was that Japan surrendered as a direct result of the atomic bombings and the record (you provided above) shows it isn't, but instead, is due to a variety of factors:
- The atomic bombings
- Resumption of conventional bombing campaign
Happened after the Supreme Council had agreed to follow the Emperor's lead and surrender, and indeed after Japan had decided to issue its unconditional acceptance of Potsdam.
- The threat of additional atomic attacks
Implicit in the bombing of Nagasaki.
- The realization that they will be fighting the Soviets in the North and the US in the south
Happened early on 10 August, after which the Supreme Council still rejected any form of surrender.
- The realization that they simply aren't going to get any concessions.
That made the difference between holding out for one condition, and immediate surrender. The Nagasaki bomb made the difference between rejecting any form of surrender and offering surrender on one relatively minor condition.
 
That made the difference between holding out for one condition, and immediate surrender. The Nagasaki bomb made the difference between rejecting any form of surrender and offering surrender on one relatively minor condition.

We're discussing slightly different points here: conditional surrender versus unconditional surrender (== Potsdam)

Soviets invaded Manchuria on the 9th, not the 10th - earlier on the same day as Nagasaki and BEFORE the decision to accept some form of surrender. My Point: Nagasaki was not the only new event the council had to consider on August 9th/10th.

Even after the Atomic attacks it took several more days of flip-flopping and debates, counter offers and more debates to accept unconditional surrender (emphasis on unconditional) while more Japanese cities were obliterated by conventional bombing and the Soviets rapidly swallowed Manchuria.

To quote one of the central characters in this whole affair, Hirohito (from his Surrender Rescript to his Troops on Aug 17th):

Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue the war under the present internal and external conditions would be only to increase needlessly the ravages of war finally to the point of endangering the very foundation of the Empire's existence

Note: While Hirohito did NOT mention the Soviet Invasion in his initial capitulation speech on August 14th, he did stress the impact of the Soviet Invasion (and failed to mention the Atomic attacks at all) above. Why he did this, I am not sure, but the record of internal debate in the Japanese Govt between Aug 6-15th shows that the atomic factor was not the only one (but a big one).

To me there is just too much data to the contrary to suggest that the Japanese govt made their decision to accept unconditional surrender based on the Atomic attacks alone (emphasis on alone). The timeline doesn't suggest it, their words don't suggest it, and the history of months of conventional bombing being as lethal and destructive as atomic attacks doesn't suggest it.
 
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he did stress the impact of the Soviet Invasion (and failed to mention the Atomic attacks at all) above. Why he did this, I am not sure,
Very simple to install fear both hardliners and veterans would equal Russian aggression= port Arthur Revenge
 
Dear Hammerbolt,
Are you suggesting that lack of warning was a major
concern?
Are you suggesting that nukes caused greater casualties before Japanese civilians could dive into bomb shelters?

ATL the B-29s - that dropped atomic bombs were painted like weather recconaisance aircraft ..... often launched several hours ahead of large numbers of conventional bombers.
 
To me there is just too much data to the contrary to suggest that the Japanese govt made their decision to accept unconditional surrender based on the Atomic attacks alone (emphasis on alone)
(I only quoted the above, but this is in response the general discussion about how the atomic bombing may have affected the decision to surrender)

One important point that I think must be remembered are the peculiarities of the Japanese culture and collective psyche, especially during the early Showa period. This a nation which had re-established a cult of sorts with the Emperor as its focus. To support this cult the military hardliners had completely ingrained a modern, fanatical, form of classic Bushido in not just the military but the entirety of the Japanese people--and surrender is contrary to the system by which they forced people to abide and would thus dishonor and undermine the entire established ruling system. In this context, one could argue--right or wrong--that although the Atomic Bombings were not the direct impetus for the move to surrender they DID provide the means of accepting the move toward surrender without undue loss of face (mentsu), thereby giving an "out" of sorts for the Emperor and High Council that would not completely undermine their authority.
 
(I only quoted the above, but this is in response the general discussion about how the atomic bombing may have affected the decision to surrender)

One important point that I think must be remembered are the peculiarities of the Japanese culture and collective psyche, especially during the early Showa period. This a nation which had re-established a cult of sorts with the Emperor as its focus. To support this cult the military hardliners had completely ingrained a modern, fanatical, form of classic Bushido in not just the military but the entirety of the Japanese people--and surrender is contrary to the system by which they forced people to abide and would thus dishonor and undermine the entire established ruling system. In this context, one could argue--right or wrong--that although the Atomic Bombings were not the direct impetus for the move to surrender they DID provide the means of accepting the move toward surrender without undue loss of face (mentsu), thereby giving an "out" of sorts for the Emperor and High Council that would not completely undermine their authority.

Part of this was in-fact said to Hirohito by Admiral Yonai (Minister of the Navy) on Aug 12th:

I think the term is inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, divine gifts. This way we don't have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances.

Disclaimer: Above quote is from Wikipedia but the reference is provided.
 
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OTL production of nuclear bombs was far from inevitable.

Both of the Japanese nuclear programs produced little more than drawings before the end of the war.

German nuclear scientists were hampered by material shortages and Hitler’s fear of “Jewish science.” Nazi persecution of jews forced the best European-Jewish scientists (e.g. Albert Einstein) to flee to the UK then the USA.
By 1945, Germany was nearing completion of their first nuclear pile in the Atomkellar.

The French nuclear program halted when Germany invaded. A few French scientists escaped to the UK, then North America.

The British-Canadian ‘Tube Alloys’ project struggled with wartime shortages and fear of invasion, so the best scientists in Britain moved to the United States and worked on the Manhattan Project. Only the USA had enough heavy industry and dollars to fund the massive MP.
Only the USA built nuclear bombs during WW2.

The first nuclear reactor - outside the USA - started in September 1945, in Chalk River, Canada.
 
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Soviets invaded Manchuria on the 9th, not the 10th - earlier on the same day as Nagasaki and BEFORE the decision to accept some form of surrender.

Also before the Supreme Council rejected surrender at the meeting in the morning of 9 August.

My Point: Nagasaki was not the only new event the council had to consider on August 9th/10th.

It was the major new event the Council had to consider between the morning of 9 August, when they rejected surrender on any terms, and the evening of 9 August, when they they accepted surrender, asking for only one relatively minor condition. Yes, they quibbled for a few days, but the fundamental decision was made. To quote an old joke: "We've settled that; now we're just determining the price."
 
6 August - bombing of Hiroshima; no change in Japanese position
9 August - 4 AM: Soviet attack; no change in Japanese position; 11 AM: bombing of Nagasaki; Supreme Council splits 3-3 on surrender

This is a gross oversimplification of events which rather ignores some very important details on the timing of everything. To begin with, that the Japanese position didn’t change until August 9th was partly because the Supreme Council didn’t meet until August 9th. The Japanese leadership, for obvious reasons, did not automatically believe the Americans when they claimed that they had nukes Hiroshima and dispatched their own investigative team to see if that was the case. They were awaiting that teams report before they met. The team reached Hiroshima and quickly came to the conclusion that, yes, this was an atom bomb. However, the report only reached Tokyo on the night of August 8/9th. The council received only met and received that report during morning. Then shortly afterwards, during the same meeting, they received news that the USSR had declared war during the night and launched an invasion of Manchuria. The news didn't reach Tokyo instantaneously, because such means didn't exist then, but had taken some hours to reach them. Only then, a few more hours into the meeting, did the council learn that Nagasaki had stopped communicating and indications were it was another atomic bomb.

In essence, the Japanese supreme council had the news of Hiroshima, the Soviet declaration of war, and Nagasaki dumped on them in a single meeting over the course of several hours. One can imagine how the shock of these individual events wound up amplified by the rapid proximity with which the Japanese received the news. This is quite visible even in the meeting: there's one minister who starts out speculating that the Americans only had one bomb, then more nervously trying to dismiss the Soviet intervention as "inevitable", and finally breaks down and starts making the frantic predictions that the US must have a thousand or so bombs and that the Soviet attack might set off a communist uprising. It'd be interesting to see whether the Japanese would have been so quick to surrender had these events been more spaced out (say, by 15 days each) so that the Supreme Council could have the time to process them one by one.
 
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