Maybe.The history of appeasement shows how keen the WAllies were to avoid war, so a less extreme German government can likely get all or most of the concessions Hitler got - probably even Danzig if the are i n less of a hurry than Hitler.
But certain things need to work out correctly or well-finessed to keep the consequences of Germany's revisionist desires toward Poland 'contained' short of European war.
Germany's desire to revise the Polish border to get at least Danzig, or the Polish corridor was popular across the political spectrum. Britain anticipated this revision's popularity so much, it refused to guarantee Germany's eastern borders (really the borders of Germany's eastern neighbors) at Locarno) while guaranteeing the borders on the western side of Germany.
But Poland was not going to give up this land without a fight. [Well outside chance of Danzig, if the Germans make it a political-demographic fait accompli without a frontal assault or Polish retreat- but that still doesn't resolve the corridor issue]. Once a German-Polish war starts, avoiding a second world war, or another 'Great War' in Europe depends on the German-Polish war being ended at some point by some western equivalent version of the Peace of Riga (that ended the Polish-Soviet War) being signed, before any escalation happens that another major power (like France or the USSR or UK) believes is unacceptable. It is no impossible. But it is not guaranteed or easy. The Poles and Germans could be angry with each other and escalate in reaction to being 'surprised' by the other party not meeting their expectations. For example, the Poles may try to escalate or draw out resistance and asymmetic tactics even after losing disputed ground because they are surprised the Germans are not impressed enough by their will to fight to restore the status quo ante bellum. The Germans may escalate their goals for destruction of Polish armed forces, infrastructure or acquisition of territory if, as is probable, the Poles 'surprise' them by not simply recognizing the tactical/operational loss of the Polish corridor as a fait accompli that should mean the end of the war on the basis of the new territorial status quo. Poland's likely continue resistance and futile counter-attacks would seem in Berlin to 'irrationally' prolong an unneccessary (now) war, and Germans could find that increasingly outrageous and justifying of more extreme and *decisive* German measures. Any of France, the USSR, or Britain may disagree those German escalations are justified.
It's why I've had a couple fine-grained polls over the years over the degree of Polish defeat Europe would tolerate and the ultimate 'containability' of any German-Polish war in the last three-quarters of the twentieth century.
----a second consideration is this - Neither Hitler, nor any substitute leadership in his place would have gotten the 'bloodless' territorial concessions he got before WWII without the *threat* of military force, made credible in some way. A credible military threat isn't cheap. Unless you balance costs and benefits carefully within your means and are willing to wait until you have the resources, you could over-leverage yourself with military expansion and create a need to bail yourself out through loot from conquest or bluff-based takeover......which erodes the appeasement paradigm, and eventually mobilizes coalitions. And coalitions mean if there's a war, it can be a big one.