That's the usual justification for pork, doctrinal differences. Of course there are doctrinal differences but if one ends up with 100 pieces of 100% doctrine combatible tanks compared to 150 95% doctrine compatible tanks there's something wrong. Especially when usually one gets those 100% doctrine compatible tanks many years later... And unfortunately that's what the situation has been especially with latest generations of Western European fighter aircrafts. Short production runs seriously limit the numbers AF's can acquire, as well as their capabilities.
That's true. French stuff is notoriously expensive per unit, for this very reason. However, you have not answered how you'd resolve this wrt domestic defence industries, employment and foreign exports.
So, the real question is that at what point does the doctrine start to eat from real combat capability? Of course, even Tornado ADV was justified by doctrine...
The Tornado ADV is an example of producing something that, IMO, was largely unnecessary; although more a product of poor timing with the end of the Cold War than anything else. (I would have thought licence-building the
F14, bolstered by improved F4s with Skyflash/Blue Fox radar (?) would have been better and served UK Cold War interests just as well, because we were already producing and developing the Harrier/Sea Harrier F2, the Tornado Gr, the Hawk, etc.)
However, its production reiterates the importance governments place in keeping their R&D and production facilities by placing orders.
The essential difference between Horizons and Type 45, capability wise, is that Type 45 has more powerful SAMPSON radar and 4,5" surface target gun instead of Horizon's shorter range dual use 3" guns. The decision to go with national designs has probably cost about 2 ships for Britain and 1 each for Italy and France. First ships in a new class are always expensive.
We could not come to an agreement with France and Italy. The French see their AAW ships as complimentary to carrier aircraft (indeed, the FN has for a long time been geared towards a maintaining a composite carrier group with second echelon patrol frigates making up the bulk); the Italians see theirs in a similar vein, albeit under landbased/coalition cover. The UK, however, wanted something better (more expensive), more suited to the likelihood of having to operate in a hostile environment independently.
One must admire the US ability to design a good basic configuration and stick with it with Spruance-Ticonderoga-Kidd-Burke (Kongo, Atago, KDX-III as well) -combo. One must also wonder what condition the European navies would be in if similar far-reaching decisions could be made instead of every shipyard whining for state subsidies.
And that's not a condition in US shipyards? No pleading for orders, no orders placed or construction staggered, from constituents? I think it is.
Again, I can appreciate that streamlining defence would have allowed for more units, and that it co-operation could have been better to avoid unnecessary duplication, but it fails to take into account the nature of the defence industry and its special place in the government's heart.
A politician will gladly equip the armed forces with an inferior weapons system and in lesser numbers, if it's made in his own constituency.