WI: No Molotov-Ribbentrop

Molotov issues a warning to Ambassador Schulenberg on September 10 that the continued presence of German forces on Polish territory of Soviet "national interest" (East of the Curzon Line) would be interpreted as a "hostile act". Hitler rejects the warning as a bluff later that day.
Only problem I see with the scenario is here. Why would Hitler reject this Soviet warning? Poland is essentially defeated and by conceding the eastern half to the Soviets he accomplishes his goal of preventing a two front war. The French Saar Offensive is going nowhere, they just didn't have the material necessary to sustain an offensive effort yet. Once that stops, I would think the Soviets would immediately want a way out and cut a deal as in OTL.

Despite this, it's still interesting to explore a two front war in 1939. Very nice analysis in your OP.
 
Only problem I see with the scenario is here. Why would Hitler reject this Soviet warning? Poland is essentially defeated and by conceding the eastern half to the Soviets he accomplishes his goal of preventing a two front war. The French Saar Offensive is going nowhere, they just didn't have the material necessary to sustain an offensive effort yet. Once that stops, I would think the Soviets would immediately want a way out and cut a deal as in OTL.

Despite this, it's still interesting to explore a two front war in 1939. Very nice analysis in your OP.

Honestly I just threw that in there for dramatic character. With Germany having already rejected the British ultimatum to withdraw from Poland, the French launching an offensive in the Saar, and the Anglo-French agreeing to much of the substance of what the USSR wanted (Military/political alliance, "indirect aggression" against the Baltics, etc.) I doubt Molotov would still be trying to cut a deal. The USSR's preferred option was an Entente 2.0 as long as the Anglo-French countenanced its imperialism in Eastern Europe.

As for why Hitler would reject an ultimatum if it was issued, here's my thoughts:

1. Hitler was in a manic phase after the swift destruction of the Polish armed forces. He immediately began plotting an attack on France in November despite vast material shortages, and ranted to his generals about how Germany had "three times the resources" of WW1 with which to launch an offensive. He wasn't rationally considering the balance of power at this point.

2. Hitler, as he noted repeatedly to his generals in 1939, was unhappy that he had to turn East before he had dealt with the West but was willing to see it through. That's why he offered a "peace deal" to the UK/France on October 6, 1939. He was almost certainly plotting to convince them to give him a free hand to attack the USSR/Baltic States next. A war with the USSR strengthens his hand, in his mind, by allowing him to present himself as the "defender of Europe" and get a peace deal with the UK/France.

Hitler was a constant gambler and made decisions impulsively and emotionally based on the "truthiness" of what seemed right, not facts. Sometimes he settled down and made an informed decision, but when he was in a manic phase he was fixated on his own invincibility and driven by preexisting fixations/biases.
 
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I’d love to see this turned into a full time line.
I'm messing around reading a few books on the Soviet defense industry to get a sense of its military potential in 1939 (Simonov, Военно-промышленный комплекс СССР в 1920–1950-е годы, Sorokin, Оборонно-промышленный комплекс СССР накануне Великой Отечественной Войны (1938 — июнь 1941), Sokolov, От военпрома к ВПК, Vernidub, Боеприпасы Победы, Kuleshov, Артиллерийское снабжение в Великой Отечественной войне, Balysh, Военно-промышленный комплекс СССР в 30-40 годы). Once those give a better grounding I might drop something sometime.
 
Fascinating idea. I'm also curious what kind of impact if the Matzen oil field in Austria (found in 1949 and started producing same year) was found after the Anschluss, how could that impact Germany in this proposed TL where the Soviets attack. Matzen was the largest oil field found in Europe so that could be an interesting change in how strategies are formed.
 

thaddeus

Donor
Fascinating idea. I'm also curious what kind of impact if the Matzen oil field in Austria (found in 1949 and started producing same year) was found after the Anschluss, how could that impact Germany in this proposed TL where the Soviets attack. Matzen was the largest oil field found in Europe so that could be an interesting change in how strategies are formed.
under this scenario the German dealings with Romania have not occurred yet, so a Matzen oil windfall would be helpful but it only offsets the Romanian oil they received historically?

it is not impossible they still dominate Romania, OTOH there is an Allied-Soviet bloc much more powerful than historical? a German-Hungarian-Bulgarian(?) invasion of Romania was speculated upon in the period, and might be the only way the "Axis" obtains the oil there?
 
I'm more interested in the Soviet problems in leadership. This is a Red Army not yet tested by the Finns and whose commanders are political appointees that lack the vaunted T-34. If Stalin (who opposed the tank in the first place) treats the emerging T-34 as he did the SVT-40, especially in combination with the Red Army leadership of such combat titans as Voroshilov and Pavlov without Shaposhnikov's rebuilding efforts for the Red Army yet underway, the USSR is not as formidible as it would be even two years later.
 
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