WI:No Miracle of the Marne in 1914

[BlondieBC]

3) No, Germany planned battles poorly and often could and did execute them worse. Like, for instance, the utter flop that was the Battle of the Vistula, or the inability of the Germans to adhere to their own concepts in both the 1916 and 1918 offensives. Their only saving graces were that their enemies were less tactically efficient than their own blundering, clumsy system was. In many ways the WWI German Army was just as suited for strategic warfare as its WWII successor.

You are cherry picking data. You need to look at all actions.

Yes in the Vistula battle, the CP took higher losses, but they were outnumber over 2-1. But in that general time frame, we have the destruction/cripplin of the 1st and 2nd Russian Army with the Germans having inferior forces. It is one of the great victories in history. Followed by the Spring 1915 CP offensive into Poland, again a excellent performance by the Germans.

Generally speaking, the Germans planned and executed battles well. There are exceptions. Even Verdun, which you mention, is a closer battle than the huge defeat you portray. It was a costly battle with roughly equal losses where the Germans failed to accomplish their strategic goals. Compare to the British performance in the same year (Somme), it was a huge success. It did not measure up to the success of Brusilov in the same year, but Brusilov opponent (Conrad) made a serious mistake by attacking Italy that year.

The Germans lost WW1 more to the Entente having superior numbers of men and material than any flaws to their planning process.

 

[Snake Featherston]

You are cherry picking data. You need to look at all actions.

Yes in the Vistula battle, the CP took higher losses, but they were outnumber over 2-1. But in that general time frame, we have the destruction/cripplin of the 1st and 2nd Russian Army with the Germans having inferior forces. It is one of the great victories in history. Followed by the Spring 1915 CP offensive into Poland, again a excellent performance by the Germans.

Generally speaking, the Germans planned and executed battles well. There are exceptions. Even Verdun, which you mention, is a closer battle than the huge defeat you portray. It was a costly battle with roughly equal losses where the Germans failed to accomplish their strategic goals. Compare to the British performance in the same year (Somme), it was a huge success. It did not measure up to the success of Brusilov in the same year, but Brusilov opponent (Conrad) made a serious mistake by attacking Italy that year.

The Germans lost WW1 more to the Entente having superior numbers of men and material than any flaws to their planning process.

On the contrary, what we see in the Eastern Front of WWI is the prototype of the 1918 battles: foolish plans foolishly executed. Hindenburg and Ludendorff never won a battle against the Russians outside Tannenberg that qualifies as a clear-cut strategic victory. Rather what you see is an endless succession of battles that provide meaningless tactical victories for no strategic results whatsoever. It was the Falkenhayn bunch that led to Gorlice-Tarnow, Hindenburg and Ludendorff did as much in 1915 as they would do in 1916 or 1918. When Russians attacked Germans, it was easier for them to win a tactical victory. If they attacked Russia......tactical gains, yes. Strategic gains? Not when those two chuckleheads were in charge.

Germany lost WWI from having been defeated in 1918 by their already-flawed plan seeing pitiful execution, followed by the Hundred Days bringing their army to the brink of the 1944-style collapses. If we look at what the Terrible Two were already planning, the plan was flawed from the first, but then when we factor in that Georgette was executed too late and too weak, while Blucher-Yorck was to be a local, not a war-winner, offensive......yeah. WWI Germany was rather too much like WWII Germany for the flaws in the second war to be different here than the first.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

On the contrary, what we see in the Eastern Front of WWI is the prototype of the 1918 battles: foolish plans foolishly executed. Hindenburg and Ludendorff never won a battle against the Russians outside Tannenberg that qualifies as a clear-cut strategic victory. Rather what you see is an endless succession of battles that provide meaningless tactical victories for no strategic results whatsoever. It was the Falkenhayn bunch that led to Gorlice-Tarnow, Hindenburg and Ludendorff did as much in 1915 as they would do in 1916 or 1918. When Russians attacked Germans, it was easier for them to win a tactical victory. If they attacked Russia......tactical gains, yes. Strategic gains? Not when those two chuckleheads were in charge.

Germany lost WWI from having been defeated in 1918 by their already-flawed plan seeing pitiful execution, followed by the Hundred Days bringing their army to the brink of the 1944-style collapses. If we look at what the Terrible Two were already planning, the plan was flawed from the first, but then when we factor in that Georgette was executed too late and too weak, while Blucher-Yorck was to be a local, not a war-winner, offensive......yeah. WWI Germany was rather too much like WWII Germany for the flaws in the second war to be different here than the first.

Two H-L victories with strategic consequences: Lodz 1914, prevented the Russians from invading Silesia and ending the war.
1915 Eastern Front offensive (just the H-L portion out of Prussia): forced the Russians over the Dvina and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians enough so that they were never able to seriously threaten the Germans north of the Pripet Marshes again.

 

[miketr]

In 1940 the French deployed poorly partially because they discovered the first German plan of attack and failed to consider whether the Germans might know it was discovered or Hitler might change the concept. That was the real decisive factor at a military level, given even with this the 1940 margin was narrow enough that a For Want of a Nail-style minor POD can derail the entire Blitzkrieg.

Since 2nd and 3rd string German divisions were able to breach the M Line defenses I don't by this line of logic. Even if the French are in the right place they are still going to react slowly and the Germans will be able to break apart their positions. All you do is increase the Germans butchers bill.

In 1940 the Germans were just better than the French.

Michael

 

[Snake Featherston]

Two H-L victories with strategic consequences: Lodz 1914, prevented the Russians from invading Silesia and ending the war.
1915 Eastern Front offensive (just the H-L portion out of Prussia): forced the Russians over the Dvina and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians enough so that they were never able to seriously threaten the Germans north of the Pripet Marshes again.

Wrong. Lodz was not a decisive victory, it was tactically inconclusive, and strategically inconclusive also. Russia never had a chance to invade Silesia in all seriousness or to somehow end the war with Germany all by itself. Lodz does not favor either Russia or Germany at either a tactical or a strategic level. Which 1915 Eastern Front offensive? The one that included the failed gas attack and useless victory at Augustovo Forest or when Falkenhayn bailed their sorry asses out of the fire?

Since 2nd and 3rd string German divisions were able to breach the M Line defenses I don't by this line of logic. Even if the French are in the right place they are still going to react slowly and the Germans will be able to break apart their positions. All you do is increase the Germans butchers bill.

In 1940 the Germans were just better than the French.

Michael

The Germans never broke the Maginot Line with second and third string forces. If the bulk of German strength confronts the bulk of Anglo-French strength, they will do just as well as Peng Dehuai against Ridgway.

 

[miketr]

Less gamble and more stupidity. The Germans did not have army enough to do everything they had to do in 1914 when plan met reality. Unfortunately for them as in 1918 and as in 1941 they failed to adhere to their own plans. Only Germans can come up with a bad plan and fail even to execute that and then still be seen as brilliant war-wagers.

You are missing the point sir. The Germans looked at the numbers, numbers of troops, manpower pool and industrial capacity and they are on the short end. If they fight a conventional war they figured they would loose. So it was roll the dice and hope for the early victory.

Sure, but actual battles between armies as a rule generally *are* bloody.

The BEF was destroyed as a combat force by end of 1914 and was replaced by the New Divisions. There is a reason there was a very large drop off in capability of the New Army.

They did not pull "it" off then quite as you phrase it. In 1866 and 1870 there were strong cultural taboos against prosecuting a general war to the limits.

But the French did push it in 1871 didn't they? Also the generation of 1866 & 1870 would have memories of the Napoleonics even if one or two removed from actual experience. The Germans KNEW about the possibility of long wars hence why they tried for short ones, the pain of long was was rather high.

In 1940 they faced an alliance that left them with a war there was never any power for their actions to end, namely with the UK. The 1866 victory at Sadowa was another razor-thin margin where the losing side winning can actually happen with just a minor set of changes. 1870 was decided as much by divisions in Napoleon III's Empire as by Prussian skill, and in any event by 1914 *all* armies were conscripted to the level of Prussia's in 1870, a factor Germany should have given actual consideration.

In 1940 the Germans had in effect won it all, the was nothing the British could do to Germany outside of the blockade but the Germans could nickel and dime the British. Hitler pushed for Soviet Union instead of trying to bring the British to terms after the Battle of Britain.

You reading of 1866 I don't agree with and even less in 1870. Your argument boils down to the Germans were fools and if there was any justice in the world would have paid for it sooner. This is the point you are missing, risk and reward. The Germans style of warfare was to take risks and get high rewards, its the strategy of the weaker power. Some times it works and some times it doesn't.

Michael

 

[miketr]

The Germans never broke the Maginot Line with second and third string forces. If the bulk of German strength confronts the bulk of Anglo-French strength, they will do just as well as Peng Dehuai against Ridgway.

Army Group C under Von Leeb was what exactly then? Several attacks were launched and Leeb was able to breach the line in two locations I believe.

As to what happens if the Germans meet the French head on why don't you look at what happened on the division level during the battle of France and get back to me.

Michael

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Wrong. Lodz was not a decisive victory, it was tactically inconclusive, and strategically inconclusive also. Russia never had a chance to invade Silesia in all seriousness or to somehow end the war with Germany all by itself.

What are you basing that on? So the Germans could have left Silesia undefended and the Russian offensive wouldn't have captured the major industrial area?

Lodz does not favor either Russia or Germany at either a tactical or a strategic level. Which 1915 Eastern Front offensive? The one that included the failed gas attack and useless victory at Augustovo Forest or when Falkenhayn bailed their sorry asses out of the fire?

The failed gas attack was in January, not in the Summer of 1915 when the offensive occurred. The February 1915 victory at Augustovo prevented a Russian offensive that was building up for Spring.

The general offensive of Summer 1915 resulted in Poland being taken, all of the Russians fortresses of north Poland being busted and taken with major amounts of equipment and shells being captured, not to mention all of the tens of thousands of prisoners, and the Russian forces of the Northwest front hurled back across the Dvina. Yes there were operational mistakes that could have made the prisoner count bigger (the Minsk cavalry operation), but the success was undeniable and not attributable to Falkenhayn alone.

Remember too that the Mackensen offensive out of Galicia after Gorlice Tarnow was burned out thanks to months of fighting and stretched supply lines; it bogged down on the marshes south of Cholm and Lublin only to continue again once the offensive out of Prussia started with H-L. The capture of Poland and the retreat of the Russian forces across the Dvina has much more to do with H-L than Falkenhayn saving anyone's ass except for the Austrians.

 

[Snake Featherston]

You are missing the point sir. The Germans looked at the numbers, numbers of troops, manpower pool and industrial capacity and they are on the short end. If they fight a conventional war they figured they would loose. So it was roll the dice and hope for the early victory.

If they're going to roll the dice, they shouldn't bet with chips they don't have in the first place. This is what they did in both 1914 and 1941. Only Germans do this and are considered brilliant for it.

The BEF was destroyed as a combat force by end of 1914 and was replaced by the New Divisions. There is a reason there was a very large drop off in capability of the New Army.

Yes, quantities of inexperienced troops do not in fact have a quality all their own. That reason had nothing to do with Wilhelm II's bully boys.

But the French did push it in 1871 didn't they? Also the generation of 1866 & 1870 would have memories of the Napoleonics even if one or two removed from actual experience. The Germans KNEW about the possibility of long wars hence why they tried for short ones, the pain of long was was rather high.

Except in the case of WWII the Germans were deliberately seeking a war with the Soviet Union, a war that in any analysis can only be a long war as Germany lacks the power to force a short one. In WWI the ease with which Germany went to war with France, the UK, Belgium, and Russia argues rather against their fear of a long war, or rather more accurately it argues that WWI Germany was as stupid as WWII Germany in a different fashion.

In 1940 the Germans had in effect won it all, the was nothing the British could do to Germany outside of the blockade but the Germans could nickel and dime the British. Hitler pushed for Soviet Union instead of trying to bring the British to terms after the Battle of Britain.

You reading of 1866 I don't agree with and even less in 1870. Your argument boils down to the Germans were fools and if there was any justice in the world would have paid for it sooner. This is the point you are missing, risk and reward. The Germans style of warfare was to take risks and get high rewards, its the strategy of the weaker power. Some times it works and some times it doesn't.

Michael

The German style of warfare was to plan on make-believe and hope the enemy would co-operate in his own destruction. The German way of war is to create plans running on nonsenseoleum, derived on nothing more than fantasy and idiotic misreadings of their enemies. The German way of war is to seek deliberately to find the largest number of enemies in a view that their own sorely overestimated vision of their own strength relative to said enemies is by itself compensation. The German way of war is to engage in gruesome battles with dubious at best results and then blame it all on politicians to create a self-serving myth of the infallible generals.

Army Group C under Von Leeb was what exactly then? Several attacks were launched and Leeb was able to breach the line in two locations I believe.

As to what happens if the Germans meet the French head on why don't you look at what happened on the division level during the battle of France and get back to me.

Michael

Precisely what it was supposed to be: engaging in attacks on the Maginot line that failed. I have looked at it: Army Group B was smashed on a large scale in the fighting that followed. The Germans destroy themselves if they charge right into the teeth of superior Allied strength in 1940. This is precisely why Hitler sought to attack them where they were weakest, not where they were strongest.

 

[Snake Featherston]

What are you basing that on? So the Germans could have left Silesia undefended and the Russian offensive wouldn't have captured the major industrial area?

Yes, Russia didn't have the logistical steam for that kind of offensive. WWI Russia strongly lacks any such variant of 1944-style logistics, WWII Russia only got it through foreign aid not available to WWI Russia.

The failed gas attack was in January, not in the Summer of 1915 when the offensive occurred. The February 1915 victory at Augustovo prevented a Russian offensive that was building up for Spring.

The general offensive of Summer 1915 resulted in Poland being taken, all of the Russians fortresses of north Poland being busted and taken with major amounts of equipment and shells being captured, not to mention all of the tens of thousands of prisoners, and the Russian forces of the Northwest front hurled back across the Dvina. Yes there were operational mistakes that could have made the prisoner count bigger (the Minsk cavalry operation), but the success was undeniable and not attributable to Falkenhayn alone.

Remember too that the Mackensen offensive out of Galicia after Gorlice Tarnow was burned out thanks to months of fighting and stretched supply lines; it bogged down on the marshes south of Cholm and Lublin only to continue again once the offensive out of Prussia started with H-L. The capture of Poland and the retreat of the Russian forces across the Dvina has much more to do with H-L than Falkenhayn saving anyone's ass except for the Austrians.

Actually it had rather more to do with Grand Duke Nicholas's draconian order for a Great Retreat than any of the German generals, who all failed to so much as notice it was happening before it went on. Russia in WWI lacks the logistical ability to carry out an offensive against Germany, though as WWI showed it was able to slap Austria around with impunity.

 

[1940LaSalle]

Having just completed reading The Guns of August, Barbara Tuchman's book about the first month of WW1, I think there are a few obvious PoDs. The most obvious one is for the BEF to not take part. OTL, Sir John French as well as Murray, his chief of staff had both refused to join Joffre's battle plan. It was only thanks to a last minute personal visit and emotional plea from Joffre that Sir John was convinced to fight. Without the BEF holding a crucial part of the line between the French Vth and Paris Armies, there would have been a giant hole throw which the Germans could have easily gotten through and outflanked the French.

Another obvious one is for von Moltke to stick rigidly to the Schlieffen Plan and to obey his dying words i.e. ' Only make the right wing strong'. To do this, Prince Ruprecht's Southern counter-offensive would have to be cut short and his men would have to be sent to reinforce the German right wing after the Battle of the Frontiers. This would also mean no last minute transfer of resources to the Eastern front to face down the Russian armies that would have been deal with at Tannenberg. No weakened right flank might mean a German Army with enough of a numerical advantage to resist the Allied counter offensive and keep marching on.

But my favorite PoD, although it relates to an earlier battle, is for General Lanrezac, who was commanding the French Vth army that was sent into Belgium, to stick to his hyper-offensive theories and not withdraw during the Battle of Charleroi. This would have ended in a Sedan-like encirclement and surrender for the outnumbered French. With no support on either flank, the BEF would probably have made a bee-line for the Channel while the rest of the French Army would have been completely surrounded as Schlieffen originally intended.

Since you've just finished The Guns of August (one of my all-time favorites ), surely you remember the part of the book focused around von Kluck's turn, wherein the French, seeing the turn, exulted "They offer us their flank!". Assuming von Kluck doesn't turn (and there's another PoD), it wouldn't shock me if the Germans won at the Marne and then fell on Paris.

Would then Paris have been declared an open city, despite Jules Guesde's warnings about possible sniper activity in the working quarter--and the then-subsequent burning of the city? I'd guess here that yes, Paris would have been declared open to avoid destruction, the government would have decamped to Bordeaux as it nearly did in OTL, and there would have been a governmental plea to desist from sniper activity lest Paris be torched.

I'm unsure as to whether the seizing of Paris by the Germans would have stiffened French resolve or caused it to collapse-although my sense is the latter is somewhat more likely than the former. Thus...we might just be looking at a fairly short war in this case, with the German Empire establishing some sort of hegemony over much of the continent. The one thing I can't see the British going along with, though, is outright German annexation of Belgium.

 

[MattII]

It's nearly impossible to have them not-notice it in a context of air power as reconnaissance, however.

It is possible for the Germans not to blunder though. Oh sure, they might not get beyond their OTL withdrawal line, but they'd still have maybe a couple hundred thousand more men than OTL, and might then take a bit more territory in the race to the sea.

 

[miketr]

If they're going to roll the dice, they shouldn't bet with chips they don't have in the first place. This is what they did in both 1914 and 1941. Only Germans do this and are considered brilliant for it.

3 sentences and you didn't even attempt to make a direct response to the statement.

Yes, quantities of inexperienced troops do not in fact have a quality all their own. That reason had nothing to do with Wilhelm II's bully boys.

The cemeteries with dead BEF troops says otherwise.

Except in the case of WWII the Germans were deliberately seeking a war with the Soviet Union, a war that in any analysis can only be a long war as Germany lacks the power to force a short one.

WW1 and WW2 very different animals. The German leadership in 1941 had its logic tree.

In WWI the ease with which Germany went to war with France, the UK, Belgium, and Russia argues rather against their fear of a long war, or rather more accurately it argues that WWI Germany was as stupid as WWII Germany in a different fashion.

I have to ask this question, have you read anything on the rational of the WW1 German war plans? Because your statement strongly suggests otherwise. That or you just have such a strong dislike of the Germans that anything they do did must have been bad. Repeated use of the word 'stupid' doesn't suggest a reasoned response, it suggests an emotional response.

The German style of warfare was to plan on make-believe and hope the enemy would co-operate in his own destruction. The German way of war is to create plans running on nonsenseoleum, derived on nothing more than fantasy and idiotic misreadings of their enemies. The German way of war is to seek deliberately to find the largest number of enemies in a view that their own sorely overestimated vision of their own strength relative to said enemies is by itself compensation. The German way of war is to engage in gruesome battles with dubious at best results and then blame it all on politicians to create a self-serving myth of the infallible generals.

Are you going to just post rants or do you have something real to say? Seriously this is just coming across as pure emotion.

Precisely what it was supposed to be: engaging in attacks on the Maginot line that failed. I have looked at it: Army Group B was smashed on a large scale in the fighting that followed. The Germans destroy themselves if they charge right into the teeth of superior Allied strength in 1940. This is precisely why Hitler sought to attack them where they were weakest, not where they were strongest.

So German victories on the Maginot line didn't happen, good too know. For good measure Army group B was 'smashed on a large scale'. I ask for French on German battles you hand back the one Army Group that largely faced everyone BUT the French.

I think we have wasted enough of each others time for today.

Michael

 

[Snake Featherston]

1) I answered your question by showing that the gamble was a bad one. The Germans were making the equivalent of having no cards at all to bluff a very strong hand, and this is why they ultimately failed both times. We should not believe the self-serving lies of Germans and Allied generals. The German army in both world wars was a bunch of feuding nincompoops incapable of adhering to their own plans. The Allied armies were led by bigger nincompoops sometimes surprisingly incapable of even knowing how to formulate a plan. Bad plan beats no plan.

2) You are missing that the British Army of WWI was a mass army of first volunteers and then conscripts? An intact BEF has no impact one way or the other on quality, there's not enough BEF for that to happen in the first place. The Pals were going to dilute the WWI British Army regardless of what did or did not happen to the BEF.

3) Neither German army had any kind of logic in what they were doing. This is in fact a major reason why they lost in mistaking opportunism for an enduring actual tactical foundation. For instance the statements of the Germans wanting more territory in a Race to the Sea that was not a race nor aimed at the Channel, but instead the results of both Allies and Germans trying and failing to outflank each other.

4) Yes, I've read their plans. They decide to bulldoze through Belgium, deleting their additional decision to do so in the Netherlands, and by magic advance over a very long distance in six weeks and defeat the French by virtue of magic. The plan did not account for potential actualities in a war situation and was very clearly designed by a desk jockey. That Germans lied and claimed some infallibility from what actually happened, which was a botched attempt at a double envelopment held on *both* ends is not a reason to believe similar lies about the all-knowing Alfred von Schlieffen.

5) Well you could try refuting it by showing where WWI Germany ever showed any comprehension of strategy or logistics against something that wasn't an overextended third rate power, for one thing. Or alternately actually showing this mythical self-serving lie of German brilliance existing as opposed to being a Big Lie to cover up how bad Allied armies in WWI were. While Germans of course had no problem accepting that they were stabbed in the back by dirty Jews and Commie scum as opposed to defeated in actual fighting.

6) No, they actually didn't. This is one of the many Big Lies about 1940 that tend to proliferate, and their actual margin of victory in the Ardennes is narrow enough that a very slight increase in artillery, no infantry or air power is all it takes to derail the whole thing in practice. If people would rather believe that democratic armies can't fight totalitarian ones on the battlefield then that's their problem. This is no more true than saying that Thomas's attack up Missionary Ridge was a brilliantly-planned stroke or that Erich von Manstein won the Kerch Campaign as opposed to Lev Mekhlis bringing the Reverse Midas Touch. Something being generally accepted by mythological historiography is not true because it's generally accepted. You could, for instance, name where Ritter von Leeb scored these penetrations and provide links, but you'd rather engage in talking about talking.