WI:No Miracle of the Marne in 1914

[Snake Featherston]

Well I wouldn't say inevitable, but yes, the German logistics were just about at their limit by this time, so Paris is more-or-less impossible, although the might be able, if they were willing to forgo that, to push closer to the coast.

I would say inevitable. Like 1941 what the 1914 German army was required to do meant working miracles with non-existent armies far more powerful and mechanized than was the German reality in 1914. No modern army can destroy another in a single operation.

 

[Jim Smitty]

I would say inevitable. Like 1941 what the 1914 German army was required to do meant working miracles with non-existent armies far more powerful and mechanized than was the German reality in 1914. No modern army can destroy another in a single operation.

I'm not talking about destroying a whole nation or army, I trying to get the French to sue for peace.

What about the Battle of France 1940? In under a week the Nazis had force the Dutch and Belgains off the continent, and in four more weeks force France to surrender to them.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I'm not talking about destroying a whole nation or army, I trying to get the French to sue for peace.

What about the Battle of France 1940? In under a week the Nazis had force the Dutch and Belgains off the continent, and in four more weeks force France to surrender to them.

1940 is a different scenario. France botched its distribution of reserves and was incapable of finding more before Sickle-Slice cut off the bulk of the Allied armies in the north, including most of the best Allied forces. In 1940 the Germans likewise to 1914 had no appreciable margin of superiority, while in 1914 Germany cannot inflict a major defeat on France in six weeks to induce its surrender.

 

[MattII]

I would say inevitable. Like 1941 what the 1914 German army was required to do meant working miracles with non-existent armies far more powerful and mechanized than was the German reality in 1914. No modern army can destroy another in a single operation.

At Marne, the Entente utilised a German tactical blunder, if ITTL they don't notice it, or if the Germans don't blunder then they aren't going to be so successful in driving the Germans back, although by this point the Germans are going to have to retreat somewhat if they want to retain a stable line.

 

[Mikestone8]

If we are talking about "All over by Christmas" (let alone the Kaiser's promise of "before the autumn leaves fall from the trees") then by the FBotM the Germans have already missed their chance. To deliver a knock out blow, their primary need is not so much to capture Paris as to enclrcle and destroy the French armies, or at least outflank them so that they have to fall back into southern France, leaving Paris uncovered. A glance at the map as of early September shows how unlikely that is. By this point the French are far more likely to outflank them than vice versa. The question is no longer whether there will be trench warfare, but only where the line of trenches will be.

This of course is not at all the same as saying that the FBotM didn't matter. If a German victory results in a Western Front running through the suburbs of Paris, and hitting the sea at Abbeville or Dieppe, that could make a huge difference to the course of the war. Iirc Wiking started a WI on that theme, but I forget how far he got with it.

For my money, Germany's only chance for a KO was a week or two earlier, during the Battles of the Frontiers. Had they managed to destroy or capture the BEF and the Fifth Army, that leaves the French line hanging in mid-air somewhere near Sedan, with massive German forces on its flank. But even then it depends on the Germans keeping clearly in mind that the French Army is their objective, not Paris. If the French armies are crushed, Paris will soon fall anyway, but as long as they are putting up effective resistance, Germany simply hasn't got the manpower to besiege it.

 

[Snake Featherston]

At Marne, the Entente utilised a German tactical blunder, if ITTL they don't notice it, or if the Germans don't blunder then they aren't going to be so successful in driving the Germans back, although by this point the Germans are going to have to retreat somewhat if they want to retain a stable line.

It's nearly impossible to have them not-notice it in a context of air power as reconnaissance, however.

 

[miketr]

It's nearly impossible to have them not-notice it in a context of air power as reconnaissance, however.

Air recon in 1914 - 15 was very hit and miss and gave at times very confusing information.

Michael

 

[miketr]

1940 is a different scenario. France botched its distribution of reserves and was incapable of finding more before Sickle-Slice cut off the bulk of the Allied armies in the north, including most of the best Allied forces. In 1940 the Germans likewise to 1914 had no appreciable margin of superiority, while in 1914 Germany cannot inflict a major defeat on France in six weeks to induce its surrender.

The French botched their deployments but even more importantly their entire command decision loop was just slower than the Germans. As a result the Germans were always inside of the French and able to just out think them from Army group on down. France was setup to fight a different style of warfare, they were set to redo 1918.

Michael

 

[Snake Featherston]

Air recon in 1914 - 15 was very hit and miss and gave at times very confusing information.

Michael

As true as this is, it was still a major role in the Marne battle, given that it was discovery of how the Germans deployed via air that let the French secure an attack.

The French botched their deployments but even more importantly their entire command decision loop was just slower than the Germans. As a result the Germans were always inside of the French and able to just out think them from Army group on down. France was setup to fight a different style of warfare, they were set to redo 1918.

Michael

In 1940 the French deployed poorly partially because they discovered the first German plan of attack and failed to consider whether the Germans might know it was discovered or Hitler might change the concept. That was the real decisive factor at a military level, given even with this the 1940 margin was narrow enough that a For Want of a Nail-style minor POD can derail the entire Blitzkrieg.

 

[miketr]

Germany's faults were threefold and graver than that: 1) The two variants of the German invasion of France through Belgium lacked any kind of genuine logistical basis whatsoever, compounded in this even by lacking an army remotely as powerful as that mandated by the plan. In this sense 1914 replicates 1941: gamble everything on one swift blow which never had any of the basic strategic requirements for success.

The Germans had the army the plan called for, Schlieffen from retirement was waging a campaign of words in professional papers because he didn't like changes that Moltke was making to things. So without having to deal with reality Schlieffen drew up more and more fantastical war plans.

Yes it was a gamble but the Germans liked their odds in the long war even less.

2) Germany did not factor in the killing power of both rifles and machine guns. The German army of 1914 had a lot of conscripts hurled straight into mass firepower in pure Napoloenic fashion, this is how for instance the BEF inflicted the critical losses at Mons, while the Germans likewise failed to account for the need to detach forces during an offensive to mask and/or neutralize remaining pockets of enemy resistance, such as Maubeuge, Antwerp, and so on.

Since NO ONE but the British really understood the changes in firepower that rifles and MG had brought to the battlefield and the British only imperfectly your criticism here is rather silly. Everything was in flux and the Germans like everyone else were experimenting with new tactical formations. The idea that the Germans used old school tactics is largely drawn from 1st Battle of Ypres, the Germans called it, the Massacre of the Innocents. It was a combination of hastily and admittedly poorly trained reserves being taught by out of date reservist NCO's. Even then it was hardly line and column tactics. If you are going to chuck stuff like this at the Germans I can point to equal tactical blunders by the French during their offensive into A-L.

The British were long service professional troops, the best army man for man in Europe. The Germans were the best conscript army in Europe. By the end of 1914 the British pre-war army had been ground into dust and the Germans still had an army. Yes the British played a key role in the 1914 battles but they paid for it in blood.

3) Like in 1918 and 1941 the Germans weren't even able to execute their dubious plans for past the first, short phase displaying both an inability to plan well *and* an inability to execute plans.

Yet they did pull it off in 1940, 1870 and 1866. Rapid movements and high aggression were able to bring victory. The Germans knew there were problems with their plan in 1914, why do you think they spent the past 10 years or so arguing over their course of action in the event of war? The Germans knew in 1914 that in the event of a long drawn out war they were on the short end of the industrial and manpower equation. Only in NE France was there the possibility of getting a knockout blow. Again it was a gamble and they knew it was one. It was very Prussian-German in outlook and they paid the price for their gamble.

Michael

 

[BlondieBC]

Well my POD I was planning on was in 1912 as part as a larger TL(maybe a book IDK yet) I'm currently working on.

I was thinking Belgium allows the Germans to use their nation as a road into France, given the Germans nine more days(one day to cross Belgium) and a few more corps for the German push into France. And I'm looking for a very short European war in 1914.

Germany could have afforded up to 2 more full armies, so a couple of corps would be easy to fund, but the issue would be butterflies. A lot depends on how realistic you want the TL/Book to be. Other options with possibly easier butterflies.

1) Mess up Russia mobilization schedule. The Tsar changed his mind a lot, so have him make one more bad decision such as decide to do a defensive plan to start the war plan (Plan Germany), then a few days/weeks later go to another offensive plan (Plan A-H). With a badly messed up logistical schedule, the Russian attack a few weeks later, and this gives you 3 more corps for a few weeks plus the 9 days you gained. There are other ways to slow Russia such as saboteur of main rail bridges, weather, etc.

2) Have the UK hesitate a bit more. Since some UK cabinet ministers were possibly ok with Germany only going through Southern Belgium, Belgium saying it is ok to pass through could easily delay the UK decision to enter the war by weeks. The benefit here is you only have one POD. You start with a Belgium leader making a different decision, they you can have the UK cabinet debate the issue for a few weeks.

3) Colonial issues somewhere. France decides to send a few extra Divisions to the colonies in the summer of 1914, and they can't get back before the war is decided.


As to the peace treaty, Germany will want crippling reparation, a couple forts (Verdun is possible), I doubt they take anything from Belgium. And of course crippling reparations. They might also want to keep some of the NE industrial regions of France.

 

[Snake Featherston]

The Germans had the army the plan called for, Schlieffen from retirement was waging a campaign of words in professional papers because he didn't like changes that Moltke was making to things. So without having to deal with reality Schlieffen drew up more and more fantastical war plans.

Yes it was a gamble but the Germans liked their odds in the long war even less.

Less gamble and more stupidity. The Germans did not have army enough to do everything they had to do in 1914 when plan met reality. Unfortunately for them as in 1918 and as in 1941 they failed to adhere to their own plans. Only Germans can come up with a bad plan and fail even to execute that and then still be seen as brilliant war-wagers.

Since NO ONE but the British really understood the changes in firepower that rifles and MG had brought to the battlefield and the British only imperfectly your criticism here is rather silly. Everything was in flux and the Germans like everyone else were experimenting with new tactical formations. The idea that the Germans used old school tactics is largely drawn from 1st Battle of Ypres, the Germans called it, the Massacre of the Innocents. It was a combination of hastily and admittedly poorly trained reserves being taught by out of date reservist NCO's. Even then it was hardly line and column tactics. If you are going to chuck stuff like this at the Germans I can point to equal tactical blunders by the French during their offensive into A-L.

The British were long service professional troops, the best army man for man in Europe. The Germans were the best conscript army in Europe. By the end of 1914 the British pre-war army had been ground into dust and the Germans still had an army. Yes the British played a key role in the 1914 battles but they paid for it in blood.

Sure, but actual battles between armies as a rule generally *are* bloody.

Yet they did pull it off in 1940, 1870 and 1866. Rapid movements and high aggression were able to bring victory. The Germans knew there were problems with their plan in 1914, why do you think they spent the past 10 years or so arguing over their course of action in the event of war? The Germans knew in 1914 that in the event of a long drawn out war they were on the short end of the industrial and manpower equation. Only in NE France was there the possibility of getting a knockout blow. Again it was a gamble and they knew it was one. It was very Prussian-German in outlook and they paid the price for their gamble.

Michael

They did not pull "it" off then quite as you phrase it. In 1866 and 1870 there were strong cultural taboos against prosecuting a general war to the limits. In 1940 they faced an alliance that left them with a war there was never any power for their actions to end, namely with the UK. The 1866 victory at Sadowa was another razor-thin margin where the losing side winning can actually happen with just a minor set of changes. 1870 was decided as much by divisions in Napoleon III's Empire as by Prussian skill, and in any event by 1914 *all* armies were conscripted to the level of Prussia's in 1870, a factor Germany should have given actual consideration.

 

[BlondieBC]

Why do so many here say the fall of France in 1914 was impossible? From what little I've heard and read-and I will willingly confess that World War I is not my area of expertise-most historians claim that Paris almost fell, that the commital of French reserves was the only thing that stopped the Germans from taking the city. How hard would it be to have the reserves delayed in getting to the front by a fluke of bad weather? If Paris falls the French may or may not surrender but the pressure to negotiate a peace treaty with Germany will be greater.

Geon

It is not impossible, but very difficult. One very bad blunder by the French commanders would probably be enough, such as the 5th Army surrendering or the French attacking into A-L with either more forces or for a longer time period.

The German problem was they were outrunning their logistics even by the time of the Marne. You can read the first few chapters of Falkenhayn book, which is free on line, for a good description. So without some French blunder, the Germans were close to having to take an operation pause due to the supply situation. As these battles unfold, A-H is collapsing in Galicia, and will require help by early Spring to stay in the war. East Prussia is being attacked and it will be hard to avoid sending any reinforcements. We also know that Urban terrain favors the defender, and the French would throw all available reserves into saving Paris.

So with all these facts, the Germans have a narrow time window to accomplish series of open terrain wins and a major urban battle, all with limited supplies. It is not impossible, just exceptionally difficult, and IMO, impossible without a major French mistake. A more realistic, best-case scenario for Germany would be holding the Marne, possibly conquering a lot more of Flanders (Amiens, Calais), and possibly destroying a French Army. Then the Germans have to turn east in 1915, but they will gain a chance to win in 1916 in France.

The Miracle of the Marne is inevitable no matter what happens from dreary ol' logistics. Germany had no more power to bull their way into a victory in one go in a modern war than any other state did.

If you mean the battle ends like OTL, this is not correct. There are many POD which end up with the Germans in a better situation. If you mean the Germans had reach as far as reasonably possible until logistic improved, you are correct. If the Germans make different choices and/or more troops are available, holding a line near the Marne is possible.

 

[Snake Featherston]

It is not impossible, but very difficult. One very bad blunder by the French commanders would probably be enough, such as the 5th Army surrendering or the French attacking into A-L with either more forces or for a longer time period.

The German problem was they were outrunning their logistics even by the time of the Marne. You can read the first few chapters of Falkenhayn book, which is free on line, for a good description. So without some French blunder, the Germans were close to having to take an operation pause due to the supply situation. As these battles unfold, A-H is collapsing in Galicia, and will require help by early Spring to stay in the war. East Prussia is being attacked and it will be hard to avoid sending any reinforcements. We also know that Urban terrain favors the defender, and the French would throw all available reserves into saving Paris.

So with all these facts, the Germans have a narrow time window to accomplish series of open terrain wins and a major urban battle, all with limited supplies. It is not impossible, just exceptionally difficult, and IMO, impossible without a major French mistake. A more realistic, best-case scenario for Germany would be holding the Marne, possibly conquering a lot more of Flanders (Amiens, Calais), and possibly destroying a French Army. Then the Germans have to turn east in 1915, but they will gain a chance to win in 1916 in France.

French leaders in 1914 weren't stupid. When, not if, they realized the Germans were attacking with a far greater force than their own calculations allowed for, the Germans outrunning their logistical tail will lead the Germans to suffer an Allied counteroffensive. Certain elements about WWI are impossible to alter for any belligerent, destroying a Great Power in a single blow is not possible in a modern war.

If you mean the battle ends like OTL, this is not correct. There are many POD which end up with the Germans in a better situation. If you mean the Germans had reach as far as reasonably possible until logistic improved, you are correct. If the Germans make different choices and/or more troops are available, holding a line near the Marne is possible.

I disagree on the simple grounds of logistics, given that logistics is a factor requiring the Germans to tactically hold a line that was overextended, which is not brilliant tactics but stupid tactics.

 

[BlondieBC]

I don't see that working for what I have in mind, because I want both France in Britian to exit the war fairly quickly, And that hard of peace wouldn't be taken by either the French or British. I see Briey and other areas near Alsace-Lorrain behind handed over to Germany, with medium size war repariations, and maybe part of French Colonial Africa.

Beligum would be left around, to get the British to agree.

As to Russia, I was thinking Poland and the Baltic costal being handed over to Germany. With Russia falling into a Civil War after the peace treaty.

Even with Paris falling quickly, I don't see Russia giving up land that is not conquered. The Germans did not have enough forces to launch major attacks both to the east and west at the same time.

Why in your TL does the UK have to enter the war? Wouldn't it be easier to have them just not enter because Belgium allowed the Germans through?

I know the Germans winning would set up a stage for another larger war in the 1930s.

But the way I see things France would have to give up some of their holding in both Europe and Africa as part of the peace treaty with Germany.

Britian and France may not be on the brink but Russia is. Two stenning defetes within 9 years? And Nicholas II is not the type of leader I see leading his nation in the aftermath of a second lost in a deceade.

Yes, once France decide it would make peace, it would trade colonies for land in Europe.

If it is short war, Russia is not defeated, it just did a negotiate peace, and their will be some face saving provisions in the peace treaty. If you want both France to give up quickly, and Russia to lose land, you have to take the war until at least winter of 1915/16.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I know the Germans winning would set up a stage for another larger war in the 1930s.

But the way I see things France would have to give up some of their holding in both Europe and Africa as part of the peace treaty with Germany.

Britian and France may not be on the brink but Russia is. Two stenning defetes within 9 years? And Nicholas II is not the type of leader I see leading his nation in the aftermath of a second lost in a deceade.

IOTL Russia went through three governments and two wars with the Germans before Hindenburg and Ludendorff finally forced it to quit because of its internal weaknesses.

 

[BlondieBC]

Germany's faults were threefold and graver than that: 1) The two variants of the German invasion of France through Belgium lacked any kind of genuine logistical basis whatsoever, compounded in this even by lacking an army remotely as powerful as that mandated by the plan. In this sense 1914 replicates 1941: gamble everything on one swift blow which never had any of the basic strategic requirements for success. 2) Germany did not factor in the killing power of both rifles and machine guns. The German army of 1914 had a lot of conscripts hurled straight into mass firepower in pure Napoloenic fashion, this is how for instance the BEF inflicted the critical losses at Mons, while the Germans likewise failed to account for the need to detach forces during an offensive to mask and/or neutralize remaining pockets of enemy resistance, such as Maubeuge, Antwerp, and so on. 3) Like in 1918 and 1941 the Germans weren't even able to execute their dubious plans for past the first, short phase displaying both an inability to plan well *and* an inability to execute plans.

1) The 1941 plan is much worse than the 1914 plan. In 1941, German soldiers froze to death due to lack of uniforms. In 1914, they always had enough food and ammo to fight, and the proper clothing. Germany did fail at the Marne due to coordination issues and the three corps sent East. Both are failing of the German prewar planners, but neither is a logistical failure.

2) All sides underestimate the importance of the machine gun, but the Germans were closest to understanding its true value, and more machine guns per battalion than any other army.

2A) While the BEF stopped the German at the Marne, the BEF was much inferior the Germans over the first years of the war, as can be show by the loss ratios if one looks at all the battles. Yes the BEF looks good at 5000 to 1600 losses. But if we look at the First battle of Ypres, the Germans lost around 120,000 versus around 130,000 Entente. All sides had trouble adjusting to the lethality of WW1, but the Germans generally adjusted faster than the Entente.

3) Germany generally planned battles well, and executed the battles well. While Germany ultimately lost the war, most of the blame falls not on the German Army but the German diplomatics/German Navy who brought the USA into the war and the poor performance of A-H from August 1914-April 1915, and again in the summer of 1916.

Your analysis is not supported by the facts of WW1. While no summary statement of a major war is perfect, the Central powers lost to inferior armies who had much greater resources both of manpower and material. And even then, WW1 was a very close war that could have gone either way.

 

[Snake Featherston]

1) The 1941 plan is much worse than the 1914 plan. In 1941, German soldiers froze to death due to lack of uniforms. In 1914, they always had enough food and ammo to fight, and the proper clothing. Germany did fail at the Marne due to coordination issues and the three corps sent East. Both are failing of the German prewar planners, but neither is a logistical failure.

2) All sides underestimate the importance of the machine gun, but the Germans were closest to understanding its true value, and more machine guns per battalion than any other army.

2A) While the BEF stopped the German at the Marne, the BEF was much inferior the Germans over the first years of the war, as can be show by the loss ratios if one looks at all the battles. Yes the BEF looks good at 5000 to 1600 losses. But if we look at the First battle of Ypres, the Germans lost around 20,000 killed versus over 80,000 Entente. All sides had trouble adjusting to the lethality of WW1, but the Germans generally adjusted faster than the Entente.

3) Germany generally planned battles well, and executed the battles well. While Germany ultimately lost the war, most of the blame falls not on the German Army but the German diplomatics/German Navy who brought the USA into the war and the poor performance of A-H from August 1914-April 1915, and again in the summer of 1916.

Your analysis is not supported by the facts of WW1. While no summary statement of a major war is perfect, the Central powers lost to inferior armies who had much greater resources both of manpower and material. And even then, WW1 was a very close war that could have gone either way.

1) In 1941 they willfully chose to launch three offensives without sufficient strength anywhere on a foundation they knew was false before they started, orchestrating the collapse of their own plan after eight weeks of destroying Soviet counterattacks at Smolensk showed Barbarossa had failed, to a point where for the first time the Soviets actually pushed the Germans back from territory they'd claim. In 1914 they chose to attack through Belgium with what they knew was insufficient forces to achieve their own ends, and failed to consider vital things like how to advance with sufficient forces to mask various cities, and especially not assuming an attempt for a double-envelopment that they had even less resources for than the single envelopment.

2) Only in the sense that the Germans avoided any major attacks from 1914-7 bar Verdun, and Verdun was actually rather stupidity on Falkenhayn's part given his own plans in 1914-5 had shown that even rudimentary trenches ruined Allied attacks before they started. No dice.

3) No, Germany planned battles poorly and often could and did execute them worse. Like, for instance, the utter flop that was the Battle of the Vistula, or the inability of the Germans to adhere to their own concepts in both the 1916 and 1918 offensives. Their only saving graces were that their enemies were less tactically efficient than their own blundering, clumsy system was. In many ways the WWI German Army was just as suited for strategic warfare as its WWII successor.

 

[Lord Insane]

Why in your TL does the UK have to enter the war? Wouldn't it be easier to have them just not enter because Belgium allowed the Germans through?

I seem to recall that the specifics of the relevant article of the relevant treaty can be argued to apply even if Belgium is complicit (the only actual text I've found of the treaty when I searched now is in French, a language I do not have any proficiency in), but of course propaganda-wise it is a bit harder to motivate people with 'Belgium has let Germany violate her neutrality' compared to 'Germany has forcibly violated Belgium's neutrality by invading'

 

[BlondieBC]

I seem to recall that the specifics of the relevant article of the relevant treaty can be argued to apply even if Belgium is complicit (the only actual text I've found of the treaty when I searched now is in French, a language I do not have any proficiency in), but of course propaganda-wise it is a bit harder to motivate people with 'Belgium has let Germany violate her neutrality' compared to 'Germany has forcibly violated Belgium's neutrality by invading'

True, the UK could find a reason to enter. But IOTL, some member of the UK cabinet were ok if Germany only used Southern Belgium. In a case where Belgium allows Germany through, and Germany keeps mostly to the Southern routes, if is likely the UK spends more time debating the issue than OTL, and IMO a few weeks delay making the decision is in the range of plausible decision making.

He was asking for ways to write his TL, and I was giving him more options.