Between 1911 and 1913 SecWar Henry Stimson reorganised the US Regular Army and National Guard as a mobiliseable force for the defence of CONUS; he created 4 'Departments' for the RA, each with a division, and perhaps most importantly organised that the NG would be formed into 12 divisions upon mobilisation. Congress was happy with this plan as it incorporated the State controlled NG into national defence plans as the reserve for the RA.
From 1913 SecWar Garrison, with the spectre of war in Europe and trouble in Mexico, pursued a plan to increase US preparedness via a doubling of the RA to 230,000, keeping the NG the same and creation of a Federal Reserve of some 500,000 men with basic training and a 3 year reserve commitment. GThis plan wasn't supported by Congress as it marginalised the state controlled NG and was further criticised by those who felt it didn't go far enough. The result was that during Garrisons tenure as SecWar til early 1916 the US Army only developed incrementally and marginally.
The alternative, which due to the support of Congress via Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, Rep. James Hay (D-VA), eventually became law with the 1916 Defence Act, was for the NG to be the reserve for the RA. In June 1916 the RA was authorised to expand to 175,000 and the NG more than double to 440,000, and be the reserve for the RA upon mobilisation.
The upshot of all this is that 3 years were 'wasted' from the perspective of developing a large, powerful US Army, and in 1917 the Germans were't overly concerned about the US entering the war and began USW and the Spring Offensive before the US Army entered the field in large numbers.
So WI Garrison, or someone other than Garrison as SecWar, spent from early 1913 pursuing the concept of the NG as the Army's reserve? Would the RA and NG have expanded much sooner and become much larger and better by 1917? Would the Germans have been deterred from antagonising the US in 1917, and how would that impact on the war?
From 1913 SecWar Garrison, with the spectre of war in Europe and trouble in Mexico, pursued a plan to increase US preparedness via a doubling of the RA to 230,000, keeping the NG the same and creation of a Federal Reserve of some 500,000 men with basic training and a 3 year reserve commitment. GThis plan wasn't supported by Congress as it marginalised the state controlled NG and was further criticised by those who felt it didn't go far enough. The result was that during Garrisons tenure as SecWar til early 1916 the US Army only developed incrementally and marginally.
The alternative, which due to the support of Congress via Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, Rep. James Hay (D-VA), eventually became law with the 1916 Defence Act, was for the NG to be the reserve for the RA. In June 1916 the RA was authorised to expand to 175,000 and the NG more than double to 440,000, and be the reserve for the RA upon mobilisation.
The upshot of all this is that 3 years were 'wasted' from the perspective of developing a large, powerful US Army, and in 1917 the Germans were't overly concerned about the US entering the war and began USW and the Spring Offensive before the US Army entered the field in large numbers.
So WI Garrison, or someone other than Garrison as SecWar, spent from early 1913 pursuing the concept of the NG as the Army's reserve? Would the RA and NG have expanded much sooner and become much larger and better by 1917? Would the Germans have been deterred from antagonising the US in 1917, and how would that impact on the war?