WI: No Lend-Lease to the Soviets

Dean, I believe we had been here before and it went nowhere. I very strongly believe that you have very faint idea of what's dealing with German units worthy of Russian Front means, as absolute majority of troops encountered by Allies were refuse, thrown out of the proverbial barrel after it had been scrapped clean to find troops for Russian front. Several times Allies encountered anything worthy of Eastern front were times of spectacular carnage of Allied troops, limited by only dwingling German supplies (again, spent on fighting Russians). With more static Eastern Front (and Germany will understand this weakness of the Read Army pretty quickly, figure Winter 1943-4944 as very last date, although I would say "Kursk"), Allies face very real probability of weekly mastergardens and monthly carnages on the Bulge. What do you think it would take for them to occupy "Whole Germany" in this scenario? I would say that by Spring-Summer 1945 (and I think this is the time when Soviets will be knocking in Polish door) Allies will be somewhere between Paris and German border (and I'm kinda optimistic here, once you remember that Germans held number of French towns in May 1945 IOTL.
You, er, missed the point. If the US was somehow fighting its way into Germany from the West (which was your idea, not mine), then by the time it got to Poland the whole of German industry and food would already have been bombed and conquered, and there wouldn't be a massive force in Poland waiting to chew the US up. Because they would have been destroyed up to Germany. At which point, picking up Poland is a bonus to having destroyed Germany, not the entire point of the exercise.

Which, of course, I know, which is why I made explicit mention of it in the later half of the post: that there wouldn't be a Western front without a Soviet Union in the fray. Please don't treat me for a rube when I made the exact same point. :rolleyes:



You know, they were happy to SEND millions to die, but we will never know how they would REACT when this threat materializes. Especially Americans. I'm not convinced by far that American public opinion would be happy about a message "we killed millions of our kids when we could really just send iron toys to Ruskies to fight instead of us". And American public opinion will be subjected to this kind of message, interparty rivalry guarantees it.
I suppose it would look like all those protests and anti-war sentiment from all those deaths for those tiny little islands to even approach the Home Islands, while the vast majority of the Japanese army hadn't even been involved yet. Or the massive losses from a sustained daylight bombing campaign over Germany, even as Britain switched to night-time bombing and the life expectancy of a US air crew was distinctly less than their tour of duty. Or the steady stream of dead sailors that came from the convoys and battles in the Atlantic and Pacific.

One of the little recognized things at the time was that, in many respects, a fascist country. The government controlled the media, censored information (and casuality) figures as it pleased, smothered anti-war sentiment, arrested individuals and forced the movement of a significant part of the population, effectively waged war in a way that genocide was a consequence, and both parties were so in-line that you could vote Republican till you got blue and all you would get was a hawk. The US of the early 1940's as not a liberal democracy that allows the formation of a widespread anti-war movement.
Yes, but you need to know by Autumn 1941 that Nuke is going to be success, to hold LL back. Unlikely without some sort of time travel.
No, you wouldn't. There are any number of potential political reasons not to give tons of military equipment to a communist country when your own country is only beginning to effectively rearm itself. Red Scare, other fronts of American interest, the fact you're giving away weapons when you haven't even rearmed yourself and your better friends yet, the Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe pre-war, or even a lack of a German declaration of war (at which point Japan is the dominant interest).

The nuke was irrelevant to deciding Lend Lease. The nuke was not the deciding factor in each and every campaign or policy decision, not least because so few people knew of it.
Devil is in details. Germany pulled their airforce West when Rommel had been dealt with, and it did so to protect German cities. Being able to pull some units to ATTACK allied navy is completely different. Then, I'm not talking "destroyed supremacy". I'm talking something like OTL Northern conwoys, when Allies could push 70-80% of ship to USSR safely. What if Germans would be able to do the same in Mediterranean? Distance is much less...
Then German forces in Africa would still be starving, blooded American and British troops would still be pushing the Germans off, the obsolescent aircraft would be a new causality figure to Western models, and German officers in German figures would be screaming about how aircraft are being used to support an irrelevant theater for a helpless ally even as German cities are bombed.
I was intentionally sharpening the point there and will continue to do so every time some affectionate Eastern European editor will start to hint on "Western Duty To Protect Poland From Russian Bear". There's no such duty. American leadership needs good reason to send millions of voters and family members of voters to die to get to Poland. Good for America, not for Poland.
Who says it's all about Poland? It's all about Germany, and Poland is an afterthought. You're trying to recast the situation in terms you think are the main point when they're not. The US spent millions of pounds in blood, iron, and treasure to defeat the Japanese in the Pacific, but they didn't do it because it would be good for French Indochina or British colonies in the region.

The fate of Poland is an after effect of the showdown with Germany. For the US, Poland is not the alpha or the omega of fighting in Europe.
All true. And I never said that USSR was irreplaceable. It's just that if you remove it off the table, you need to find millions of others to do the dying (and colonial troops were increadibly inferior, as you undoubtedly aware). Besides, we're starting to trade The Brilliant of the British Crown, India, for Poland, which was only good for dragging Britain into this war (I'm trying to emulate British reaction here). Traitor you!!! :)
Yes, I'm plenty aware that untrained colonial troops are about as good quality as the untrained Russian peasants who won the war by being acting as lethal target practice. But then, it was ill-equiped and badly trained Russian peasants who won the war. But by the mid-20th century, it was already becoming apparent that European colonies were going on their way out anyway. At least this way it can be claimed that they aren't being let go for nothing, and Britain will already have to balance the idea of little Empire in a world with a continent dominated by Germany, or a world with little Empire in a world without a continent dominated by Germany.

If the war didn't end in a draw by that point.

And it would be hard for me to be a traitor to the British Empire, as an American.


Yes, only opportunity worthy of future discussion in this "no lend-lease" timeline is Soviet-German truce. It did not happen IOTL because Stalin was convinced that he's to gain more from Germany's complete defeat, even if it will cost extra millions of Soviet lives (he didn't care about human life anyway). Here... Wanna discuss? Let's say stalemate becomes obvious to most talented minds in OKW and Red Army General Staff in November 1943. Soviets failed to reach Kiev due to logistic problems and situation can only get worse. What's next?
Alright. Since this is more interesting than the other stuff, I'm going to focus on this. Feel free to respond to all the other stuff, but from this point on I'll only focus on this.

November 1943 seems a bit late to me (a full campaign season that drives the Germans as far back), but let's go with it (though if you don't mind let's say that the Russian forces fell a moderate ways east of Kiev).

Germany comes to its conclusion: at this point, it can't conquer Russia through anything but killing every Russian who charges at them, except that they would likely die first, as the attempted Russian offensive showed that there were still plenty of Russians to kill. Russia can be held off (perhaps indefinitely), but the Western side is becoming worrying, as Africa and Sicily have already fallen at this point. A landing in Europe would be costly, if solvable, but it could upset the balance in the East if the Russians are lucky at any place. The Russians might be able to keep both fronts stable, but don't want the risk.

The Soviet leadership, also with a illness of rational, see the lessons of Keiv: that even on a fighting retreat, that German mechanized forces can still outmaneuver, isolate, and destroy too many Russian forces. Some egg head also comes up with numbers: simple weight of numbers at this point would leave all of Russia with a population no longer so much larger than the West, but if time waited for industry east of Urals to arm the forces, it could become manageable. The Soviets might be able to win as is, but it would likely destroy them to Western gain.


Here comes the truce/treaty. Might guarantee a certain number of years of peace (no one believes it), but for the moment it's good. Germany is clearly better off: at a minimum, Poland and a bit of Ukraine, likely lots. The Soviets get some bits, but for the most part it's "have what you captured."

German forces go West, though with significant garrison forces with eyes to the East. As was planned after victory on the Eastern front, many divisions demobilize and return to the German workforce, partly easing the economy. Africa is well out of reach by this point, and Sicily is Airstrip Two (the last German troops of OTL were off by August 1943, and here they had to deal with the Kiev drive). Overlord as is, the invasion of France, is called off when German divisions start moving West in force, and all ties between the West and the Soviets are chilled.

We have a setup here, but from here the real butterflies hit. The Italy mainland OTL was invaded September 1943. Italy instantly becomes a front on its own, with German and Italian troops keeping Anglo-American-French troops from advancing, which shouldn't be to hard. Just how far Allied forces get before being stopped is in question. So is how far German troops can push them back.

In the East, Russia spends its time arming up, as well as preparing defensive construction on its Western border, while a careful eye to the East.

Here is where major choices have to come in. If the West opens up a new front, where and how large? If Germany is seen as preoccupied, the Soviets can think about possibly diverting troops to fiddle in Asia. But if Germany is seen as still holding a fair deal back, diverting enough troops might leave the Soviet Union too vulnerable.
 

hammo1j

Donor
This is a great thread and one of the great unrecognised facts of WWII almost as unrecognised as the impossibility of S______n.

What would be of interest is how the Allies could have used Lend Lease to their best advantage - as a throttle of the Soviet Union's strength which by the figures quoted it clearly could have been.

I think the prevailing wisdom of the time was that the Germany be defeated as quickly as possible and if that meant a strong SU at the end then so be it, but I think things could have been arrange to minimise the threat of the SU and how much territory it took.

When the SU was being trashed at the beginning then aid would be unrestricted due to the danger which IIRC in OTL actually occurred of Stalin offering a deal to Hitler. As the SU became stronger to the point where it was convinced it would win, you would throttle back the aid to the point where the SU was progressing, but slowly. The excuse would be that munitions were needed in the West. You could also wring concessions from Stalin in negotiation this way.

The West would then offer better terms than the unconditional surrender to the Germans and it would be hoped that internal action against the Nazis might ensue making the Western war less of a fight.

Unrestricted aid the SU was a great mistake and was probably perpetrated by too much infiltration of Roosevelt's government. In fact one has to wonder if the man himself was a "fellow traveller".
 
Dean

Interesting suggestions on a separate Nazi-Soviet peace. Might have happened although even with the markedly worse German performance in the east it looks like Hitler continued to oppose any real negotiation on the issue.

However if he did it does make for an interesting situation. I suspect that, given their still in a total war with the west and a very unstable situation in the east, there would be little or no demobilisation of German forces. Given that fact Hitler would definitely not trust Stalin, if only because Hitler is so untrustworthy himself and the sheer advantage of a surprise attack if either side lets its guard down too much. Stalin can afford to maintain large forces in the region especially as the Germans will have limited intelligence on what the Soviets have where. The main benefit of a peace deal in the east is the end of battlefield losses, both human and material and the ability to exploit the area still under its control. A few elite and mechanised units will probably head west and probably a lot of the air power, although I think 44 will be too late to make a significant difference.

The western allies will definitely reconsider a landing in France and I suspect [and hope] they will cancel it. Even a small increase in experienced German forces may be crucial while the Germans are now in a position to win an attritional war, even with the massive allied air superiority.

Doubt the Germans will try counter-attacking in Italy. Once the country defects they have little interest in anything outside the industrial region of the north that they hold. Also the same conditions, a narrow front, poor communications, mountains and mud, which made the allied advance so difficult would apply for the Germans. Furthermore you could add overwhelming allied air and naval control and probably also much more artillery. I could see the Germans however holding the Gothic and Gustav lines longer and might even hold Rome by the end of 44.

The allies also have to consider what Stalin does. After all the former ally is still in control of much of Iran and while highly unlikely they might try and grab the oilfields in the south. [Or possibly want some defence in depth for their own oilfields if the allies are sounding aggressive enough about the Russian defection]. I don't think its likely that Stalin will do this, especially while the Germans still look so powerful. More likely he will immediately begin negotiations with the western powers to see how much they will pay for him to re-enter the war. [This could get stormy].

The Red Army will be weakened by the loss of L-L. Will result in some disruption as allied supplies are replaced by local production, cutting down on military production. [Well at least if Stalin is sensible he will do this]. However with the end of the murderous losses on the battlefield, strength especially in production of equipment, will be increased fairly dramatically, even with reduced actual production.

I would expect Stalin to wait things out and probably also start a major nuclear programme. He has input from his agents so will be aware of developments and now has the spare capacity. More to the point when Germany looks like going down Stalin will rejoin the conflict. That's why, unless you have the Soviets just about totally defeated, any idea of western forces in Poland is highly unrealistic. Unless Germany collapses very, very quickly, which might just occur with a nuclear option, the Red army will reach Poland and almost certainly at least Silesia say before western forces. [Only expectation is a very successful Balkans campaign which enables western forces to advance into Poland before attacking Germany itself. Even then you have the question of whether the substantial German garrison watching the eastern border would be left to be cut off, or moved west to fight the advancing western forces, leaving the occupied region to be overrun by the Red Army].

Steve
 
Steve, my thoughts on your thoughts. Please forgive the cutting off of much of the text for reasons of speed.
However if he did it does make for an interesting situation. I suspect that, given their still in a total war with the west and a very unstable situation in the east, there would be little or no demobilisation of German forces.
While I understand your reasoning (suspicion and paranoia), I have to disagree. While there would certainly be much less than I may have implied (not being a victory on the Eastern front for one thing), for at least a short time the 200 divisions on the Western front would have been pointless: the Soviets are still struggling to rebuild, and are in no condition to attack. IIRC, Nazi planning involved the German forces out east re-manning the factories and such. While nowhere near what was intended, at least a respectable fraction of them would be returned, to ease the Nazi war machine's economic pains, for necessity if nothing else. Even if half of the Eastern front forces stay East, that leaves 100 divisions to return home, and as Cal pointed out that's about the size of the entire US Army of the time. If only half stay active, to oppose any heady Allied landings, that's still 50 more divisions on the homefront bringing in food, making weapons, and running an economy.
The western allies will definitely reconsider a landing in France and I suspect [and hope] they will cancel it. Even a small increase in experienced German forces may be crucial while the Germans are now in a position to win an attritional war, even with the massive allied air superiority.
One thing I considered but didn't mention was the possiblity of alternate landings on minor areas. Not necessarily the Cacuses, but outlying areas. It would likely be suicidal if clear from the run-up, but perhaps attempts to open up fronts in Greece, or up in Northern Europe?
Doubt the Germans will try counter-attacking in Italy. Once the country defects they have little interest in anything outside the industrial region of the north that they hold. Also the same conditions, a narrow front, poor communications, mountains and mud, which made the allied advance so difficult would apply for the Germans. Furthermore you could add overwhelming allied air and naval control and probably also much more artillery. I could see the Germans however holding the Gothic and Gustav lines longer and might even hold Rome by the end of 44.
Actually, the Allies were held up in mid-Italy for quite awhile OTL, where the Germans made a defensive line in the mid-Italian hill areas. If wiki is to be believed, one of the reasons there was to keep Italy as small a bombing base as possible, to deny America and Britain more and better airfields. It not only being a way to mitigate Allied bombings of Germany, but also a front on which to repulse the allies, I can see at least the attempts of Germany to drive the Allies off the continent, especially with Hitler or a hardliner still in charge.
The allies also have to consider what Stalin does. After all the former ally is still in control of much of Iran and while highly unlikely they might try and grab the oilfields in the south. [Or possibly want some defence in depth for their own oilfields if the allies are sounding aggressive enough about the Russian defection]. I don't think its likely that Stalin will do this, especially while the Germans still look so powerful. More likely he will immediately begin negotiations with the western powers to see how much they will pay for him to re-enter the war. [This could get stormy].
For Stalin re-entering, I don't think so. The Allies would be most dubious clients: what guarantee would they have that the Soviets would simply take the aid, pretend to fight, and form another peace?

But when did Stalin get influence over Iran, especially in a TL like this? (Curious, not objecting) That said, Britain and the US are going to be wary about Soviet gambits.
The Red Army will be weakened by the loss of L-L. Will result in some disruption as allied supplies are replaced by local production, cutting down on military production. [Well at least if Stalin is sensible he will do this]. However with the end of the murderous losses on the battlefield, strength especially in production of equipment, will be increased fairly dramatically, even with reduced actual production.
Manpower I can agree with, though the war will still have been the bloodiest war in history for Russia and Eastern Europe. But production? The truce date is after Germany has reached as far as it will, and Germany will certainly keep much of more Eastern Europe. The Soviets won't even have European industry that's been fought over twice to ship to themselves.



Russian atomic plan is interesting, though I don't know if a East-West break would butterfly anti-espionage into the Manhattan Project, or if British intelligence could reveal the Russian spy rings.

And yes, rest assured I'm not pressing for Allies in Poland with this PoD.
 
Most of Russian losses were not frontline (civvies killed by Nazis and their local helpers), so I would say that "extra several millions of Russians killed on frontline" is not very relevant statement. IMHO ballpark estimate for each particular operation would be comparable, it is just that territorial gains would be less due to decreased mobility. So USSR would be probably somewhere near Polish border by spring 1945 (I dunno, Curzon line or bit West of it), which is incredibly optimistic earliest date for Allies dealing with Nazi at their own to get to Poland.

Civilian casualties are VERY relevent here. Tanks, planes and artillary don't build themselves, fuel themselves or make their own ammunition. That takes people. Soldiers don't grow their own food, make their own clothes, provide their own ammunition etc. All these things have to be made or grown for the army to function and it takes people to do that. Millions less people means large quantities of supplies are not made and you have to cut down on the number of frontline troops to make it up. Tanks and planes without fuel are called targets, nothing more. Hordes of soldiers will do you no good if they are starving and/or freezing to death.
 
Dean

Quick reply on a few points as its getting late here.


Steve, my thoughts on your thoughts. Please forgive the cutting off of much of the text for reasons of speed.While I understand your reasoning (suspicion and paranoia), I have to disagree. While there would certainly be much less than I may have implied (not being a victory on the Eastern front for one thing), for at least a short time the 200 divisions on the Western front would have been pointless: the Soviets are still struggling to rebuild, and are in no condition to attack. IIRC, Nazi planning involved the German forces out east re-manning the factories and such. While nowhere near what was intended, at least a respectable fraction of them would be returned, to ease the Nazi war machine's economic pains, for necessity if nothing else. Even if half of the Eastern front forces stay East, that leaves 100 divisions to return home, and as Cal pointed out that's about the size of the entire US Army of the time. If only half stay active, to oppose any heady Allied landings, that's still 50 more divisions on the homefront bringing in food, making weapons, and running an economy.

I was reading it as the Soviets don't do as good in the post Stalingrad spring 43 campaign. Say even heavier losses and Manstein eliminates the Kursk salient before the spring mud halts operations as well as retaking Kharkov. In that case both sides have suffered heavily but have a lot left. To some degree the Red Army is still coming up to steam and gaining strength as well as experience. Its just that the losses are such that Stalin decides a pause to regroup and allow the west to wear down the Germans somewhat. Possibly an agreement to pull back to the Dniper and Dvina along with keeping the result of the Baltic states and a link to the Crimean is the best the Germans are likely to get.

Whatever way, given the size of the front it will require a huge garrison to guard against attacks, especially since there would be a danger of a weaker garrison seeing large forces isolated and cut off. This would probably get pulled down over time as the demands in the west etc grow but would expect it would be mainly the bulk of the armoured and mechanised units moved west, keeping the bulk of the forces in place. This is not to mention they will have a serious partisan problem, no matter what Stalin says. German occupation policies will see to that. therefore some peace dividend but not a lot. Think the main advantage for Germany would be that the ending of large scale fighting in the east would mean the huge drain of dead, wounded and damaged/destroyed equipment is removed. This will allow the forces to be re-equipped at a high level with more modern equipment far more rapidly. As such the German army in the west may not be massively larger but is likely to be much better equipped.

Anyway, those are my thoughts.



One thing I considered but didn't mention was the possiblity of alternate landings on minor areas. Not necessarily the Cacuses, but outlying areas. It would likely be suicidal if clear from the run-up, but perhaps attempts to open up fronts in Greece, or up in Northern Europe?

Greece is definitely an option, if Crete and some of the smaller islands are cleared 1st. Enables the allies to make use of their air and naval superiority , the support of the local population and also the poor communications in the region which makes German reinforcement more difficult. [Also makes a breakout more difficult but the 1st allied priority would be to get the troops ashore and avoid disaster.


Actually, the Allies were held up in mid-Italy for quite awhile OTL, where the Germans made a defensive line in the mid-Italian hill areas. If wiki is to be believed, one of the reasons there was to keep Italy as small a bombing base as possible, to deny America and Britain more and better airfields. It not only being a way to mitigate Allied bombings of Germany, but also a front on which to repulse the allies, I can see at least the attempts of Germany to drive the Allies off the continent, especially with Hitler or a hardliner still in charge.

They were held up south of Rome from about Dec 43 til Jun 44 when the Germans moved to a line a little south of the Po, which held out until spring 45. [Always get confused as to which is the Gothic and which the Gustav lines!] Think the main airfields were in southern Italy near Foggia, which were occupied in the initial invasion by the allies. Given that the Germans have already lost the air war in Europe I think any German attempt to drive the allies into the sea would be a costly failure for them. [Presuming here that the allied initial stages go as they did historically with Naples and most of the south falling pretty quickly. Would depend on how quickly the Germans and Russians hammer out a deal in the east and where they send forces, including the success of western mis-direction operations. If there are substantial forces enabling the Germans to make a fight of southern Italy that is a different matter].


For Stalin re-entering, I don't think so. The Allies would be most dubious clients: what guarantee would they have that the Soviets would simply take the aid, pretend to fight, and form another peace?

I think he will re-enter at some point, when it suits him. Don't think the allies will trust him, or supply any aid even when he does but think he would probably try to get something and also pass the buck on the blame.



But when did Stalin get influence over Iran, especially in a TL like this? (Curious, not objecting) That said, Britain and the US are going to be wary about Soviet gambits.

There was a join British-Soviet occupation of Iran about Jul-Aug 41, to secure control of the area and remove any pro-Axis elements. It was also later used as a supply route. OTL Stalin lingered in northern Iran until ~47/48 and think there was implicit threat of nuclear use to remove him.


Manpower I can agree with, though the war will still have been the bloodiest war in history for Russia and Eastern Europe. But production? The truce date is after Germany has reached as far as it will, and Germany will certainly keep much of more Eastern Europe. The Soviets won't even have European industry that's been fought over twice to ship to themselves.

A lot of Russian industry was moved east. It is only really now recovering from the dislocation of the invasion and this movement. Think they reached their maximum production in 44 but, especially with no military action occurring they will replace losses and re-equip forces fairly quickly. Especially since I think the Red army will see some reduction to free up men for industry and agriculture. Some of this will need to go to replacing lost L-L but as with the Germans their no longer fighting a major shooting war to drain their stocks of equipment.



Russian atomic plan is interesting, though I don't know if a East-West break would butterfly anti-espionage into the Manhattan Project, or if British intelligence could reveal the Russian spy rings.

I think the main incentive of the various spies was idealogical, along with possibly in some cases a desire to avoid any power having a nuclear monopoly. True the non-idealogs will be alienated by the separate peace but think most of the ones who worked for them histroically will still be inclined to do so.


And yes, rest assured I'm not pressing for Allies in Poland with this PoD.

Its an option if things went good for the allies and Stalin leaves it too late to rejoin the conflict but I wouldn't put an high priority on that.

A couple of questions we have to consider:
a) What about POWs in the east? Would either/both powers be willing to return them? A fair number of veteran Germans recently captured at Stalingrad amongst other places while they hold several million Russian.

b) What will be the situation with the Communist dominated resistance groups in occupied Europe. Would Stalin give them orders to cease opposing the Nazis and if so would they pay any attention? Could see a lot of them getting very disgruntled with the Commintern and his leadership of international communism.

Steve
 
As I suspected, attack of ultrapatriotic fairytales and Cold War propaganda.

Umm, if Väinö Linna's book is ultrapatriotic Cold War propaganda then I guess MASH was a pro-militaristic TV series trying to encourage Americans to continue the Vietnam War...

As for the OP statement, operation in Northern Finland in 1941-1944 were conducted by German troops which tried and failed to take Murmansk. As for Finnish troops, they were completely exhausted by taking OTL gains and had really no chance to continue the offensive further. By late 1941 Finland had suffered 48 000 KIA within two years. Statistically compared to the US population then this would mean 1,7 million KIA.

Taking Murmansk with Finnish troops would require some quite colossal changes. Finnish III Corps with 3rd and 6th Infantry divisions, mobilized in Lapland and Oulu provinces, would be the best choice for troops. Historically this corps was deployed further towards south. This corps would have to be transported towards north and replaced by German troops. Furthermore, this corps would require very heavy German air support for such an ambitious operation. It is very doubtful whether the forces could be motivated for such an excursion.
 

burmafrd

Banned
The trucks, food and raw materials is what Russia would miss the most.
All three would have SIGNIFICANT impact on the ability to wage war.

The tanks we sent were strictly second rate.
But a lot of the aircraft like the P-39 fulfilled a great need. That 37 in the nose made it deadly to german tanks.
Jeeps were hugely important for communications and supply.
The trucks speak for themselves.
Food was a huge factor and allowed a lot of farm hands into the army.
Not to mention Russia loosing its breadbasket (Ukraine) early in the war. they did not get benefit of getting it back untill almost the end, just recapturing farmland does not mean getting food from it next month.
Above all else was the raw materials and clothing and boots.

By the way Canadian show me where Russian front veterans were involved in Market Garden. ANd after the first few days of the bulge our green troops did very well against a much stronger force of supposedly so great vets from Russia.

Personal opinion is that the Russians will hold, as they did OTL, but their ability to counter attack and launch offensives will be greatly decreased.
At least an extra year added; maybe two.
 
The only way that I can see America not extending the land-lease to the USSAR is from them either having gone fascist before the start of WWII or having the atom bomb earlier on.

Keep in mind that the major reason that Russia even got the land-lease in the first place was in order to be able to bleed the Nazi's white and keep their attention to the East. And while it's possible that the USSAR might be able to hold, FDR wasn't the type of person willing to gamble on it.
 

burmafrd

Banned
There was a fair amount of opposition to giving LL to USSR. Not all that much but the Finland war made a lot of people mad at the Russians. Only the fact that Hitler was looked at as such a big threat really acted in their favor. So it is not out of the question = and if FDR had not run in 40 its much more likely.
 
There was a fair amount of opposition to giving LL to USSR. Not all that much but the Finland war made a lot of people mad at the Russians. Only the fact that Hitler was looked at as such a big threat really acted in their favor. So it is not out of the question = and if FDR had not run in 40 its much more likely.

That probably wouldn't be a good thing given how the majority of America of that time saw the war in Europe as either the problem of the people living there or had some sympathy toward the Nazi's and without FDR to drag them into it, we might just see a world where America leaves Europe to the Nazis while we deal with the Japanese in the pacific.
 
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