WI: No large scale Kriegsmarine?

So while this does release resources that Germany can use elsewhere – it does free up an incalculable amount of resources on the Allies side through less of a need for their own Modern Fast Battleships and reduced potential disruption to trade

Whilst it might on balance be a better trade-off for the Allies in absolute terms, it's important to remember that the Germans were working with a much reduced resource pool. They couldn't afford the comfort of investing large amounts of lives and resources in a doomed strategy in the hope that it would cost the Allies more.
 

Driftless

Donor
What about the iron road from Narvik?

There was great risk of getting the ore-carrying ships down the length of the Norwegian coast and across the Skaggerak. The Swedes were pressed to improve the railway options for ore shipments
Soon after the Germans fully occupied Norway they began pressing Sweden to allow unarmed German troops to travel on the Swedish railway system to and from Norway on leave. On 8 July 1940 an agreement on this traffic was reached.[4]

The supplies of iron ore continued to be shipped to Germany, often under Swedish naval protection through the Baltic and in some cases in Swedish transport ships.
 

Driftless

Donor
Isn’t shipping from Sweden functionally closed during the winter, hence the importance of the Narvik road?

Without a Kriegsmarine, what happens when Britain occupies Narvik to prevent winter metal shipments from Sweden to Germany?

The western sea route was more efficient in peace-time, but one of the ways around the winter port closure that the Germans and Swedes worked out was to stockpile ore and increase the Baltic shipments as weather allowed.
 
Isn’t shipping from Sweden functionally closed during the winter, hence the importance of the Narvik road?

Without a Kriegsmarine, what happens when Britain occupies Narvik to prevent winter metal shipments from Sweden to Germany?

In addition to what Driftless said...

The western sea route was more efficient in peace-time, but one of the ways around the winter port closure that the Germans and Swedes worked out was to stockpile ore and increase the Baltic shipments as weather allowed.

...Germany can conquer French iron ore fields or lose the war of attrition which comes if campaign in France ends up with failure.
 
One piece that enhanced the impact of the fleet-in-being aspect of the surface Kriegsmarine was the absolute neutering of the French fleet in 1940. That was a two-fer for the Germans: not only did they take out a powerful naval force without loss, but it also significantly stretched the coverage requirements for the British. Did the Germans really expect that drastic outcome in their building plans?

An excellent point! In a war in which Germany is alone against France and Britain the fleet-in-being is not effective at all, as the Allies have such a total superiority.
 
The only way for Germany to make a strategic decision not to build not only a reasonably sized surface fleet, but also to not build up it's U-boat fleet, is to have a drastically revised foreign policy that does not envisage war with Britain, or else expects war with Britain but for some reason completely ignores the British and makes no plans to defeat them aside from conquering Europe and expecting Britain to simply come to terms.
 
The only way for Germany to make a strategic decision not to build not only a reasonably sized surface fleet, but also to not build up it's U-boat fleet, is to have a drastically revised foreign policy that does not envisage war with Britain, or else expects war with Britain but for some reason completely ignores the British and makes no plans to defeat them aside from conquering Europe and expecting Britain to simply come to terms.

For Germany, UK comes after France and Poland (asuming that Austria and Czechoslovakia are easy pickings). The big gun ships don't help a single bit there, but they stretch German economy anyway. With less big gun ships to suck out the funds, Heer and Luftwaffe can be better outfitted, so perhaps actual trapping and capturing BEF is acomplished?
 
The only way for Germany to make a strategic decision not to build not only a reasonably sized surface fleet, but also to not build up it's U-boat fleet, is to have a drastically revised foreign policy that does not envisage war with Britain, or else expects war with Britain but for some reason completely ignores the British and makes no plans to defeat them aside from conquering Europe and expecting Britain to simply come to terms.

U-boats failed during the Great War, and are not the only means to fight Britain. Air power is a capable tool with powerful, fat advocate. Air power is also immensely useful in continental conflicts.
 
Big ships are political symbols of a great power. The Panzeerschiffes said, "We're back as a real nation, and the Twins cemented Germany's place as a real power with a real navy. At least one big ship like the twins is a good idea for prestige reasons, but it can be built at a more leisurely pace. It also can be optimized for Baltic operations, with that same ~30,000 tons used for even tougher armor at the expense of speed and endurance. It's still a real battleship, but with a different mission--one that might not spook the British as much. It is also, of course, possible to build one of the Twins.
I'm not saying that this should or shouldn't be done, but battleships --> prestige.
 
Maybe we can just accept the premise of this thread and start going from there instead of keep shooting at the POD?
 
U-boats failed during the Great War, and are not the only means to fight Britain. Air power is a capable tool with powerful, fat advocate. Air power is also immensely useful in continental conflicts.
Yes air power is great, but air power alone is never going to defeat Britain in WW2 - this is clear to us with the benefit of hindsight and the results IOTL of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz (not to mention Bomber Commands raids on Germany), but it should also have been obvious to German war planners. Therefore the point stands that if German policy pre-war is amended such that the KM has few or drastically less U-boats, then they must surely also amend their foreign policy such that no war with Britain is likely.
 
Yes air power is great, but air power alone is never going to defeat Britain in WW2 - this is clear to us with the benefit of hindsight and the results IOTL of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz (not to mention Bomber Commands raids on Germany), but it should also have been obvious to German war planners. Therefore the point stands that if German policy pre-war is amended such that the KM has few or drastically less U-boats, then they must surely also amend their foreign policy such that no war with Britain is likely.

The historical investment in Kriegsmarine had no chance of defeating Britain in a war as well, as shown in field trial between 1939-1941, even with France eliminated. At most Kriegsmarine could hope to defend Germany and cause nuisance in the oceans of the world. This could be achieved with less investment than OTL. Germany also had no chance of defeating United States but still did not aim to prevent this conflict in any meaningful way (although I wonder what policy might have been effective in this?).

I think that actually German war planning never really got around to a plan to defeat Britain anyway, I would guess a truce might be the only realistic goal. Only plans to defeat Britain were made after France was defeated. Air power and a small fleet is more than enough to keep Western flank secured - as long as you don't make the US your enemy and after that I'm not sure what would help.
 
I took the OP's question to ask IF by not building large Naval units would it prevent England from guaranteeing Poland, hence starting the war. I think that would have been a real possibility. If Germany only had the pocket battleships, some cruisers and a few U-boats I don't think GB would have been as worried. But with Germany having laid down keels for the 2 Bismarks, the Graf Zepplin, along with rapidly expanded U-boat construction they got GB's attention and concern. Had those ships never been started and the U-boat fleet kept at 20 (with heavy R&D and constantly producing prototypes) I think England would have been much less concerned. If England doesn't declare war because of Poland, the Norway campaign never happens so the Naval requirements of that campaign are moot.

If I was Germany (at that point) I would have spent the money (some of it) I saved on the capital ship production and created naval patrol planes. You could protect Germany's coast using air power at that point if needed.
 

Driftless

Donor
The impact on Norway operations has been a recurring issue here. One more point to consider: for the utility that naval and air bases in Norway provided to the Germans, it was also an extraordinary sink-hole for manpower. Somewhere in the range of half a million under-employed German military personnel were based there - a rate of one German soldier to every eight Norwegians.
 
Another point to consider is the quarter million tons of top quality steel used in the ships pre-war. Plus high tech steel construction capabilities that now are available for other purposes. That is a massive amount of Panzers and Artillery being built for the Heer, like 3000 Pz III and 10000 Howitzers.

But the real kicker is that Hitler wouldn't tear up the Naval Agreement, thus no British Polish guarantee. Even if it only delays the British entry into the war by a week or two, that is already a massive gain. Allowing the Germans to bring home their Merchant Fleet fully loaded with critical goodies.
 
But the real kicker is that Hitler wouldn't tear up the Naval Agreement, thus no British Polish guarantee. Even if it only delays the British entry into the war by a week or two, that is already a massive gain. Allowing the Germans to bring home their Merchant Fleet fully loaded with critical goodies.

Yes, every day and every week between 1938, 1939 and above all, June 1940, Britain was getting stronger. If British rearmament is delayed by even, say, six months, the effects are large. Could Britain of late 1939 capabilities resist Luftwaffe as well as it did in OTL 1940? I'm not saying Sealion, but rather a Britain which can blink in seemingly impossible situation, making a peace with honor. Especially if part of the released resources are given to Luftwaffe.

If we take historical players, of course butterflies would hit heavily, Churchill would not be PM with no Norwegian campaign...
 

Riain

Banned
Firstly, a lack of steel because of battleship building was not a reason why Germany didn't build more Army materiel in 1939-41. Or more uboays or aircraft for that matter, Germany could have produced much more of these things and still built the battleships.

Secondly, the German navy was never going to beat Britain alone, nor even in concert with the Army and Airforce. However its an integral component of the armed forces for any war with Britain, and capital ships are an integral part of the 1940 era navy.

Thirdly, even without capital ship, which Britain was content with considering the 1935 treaty, German foreign policy will likely drive the British into opposition to Germany. Its not as if Britain will say that its ok to invade Poland and the rest because Germany has no or fewer battleships.
 
lack of steel
Was a major issue in 1936-38, refrain from building the Twins and the issue mostly goes away. Also shipyards are a major industrial resource that over several years can be repurposed to provide a large boost in other sectors.

German navy was never going to beat Britain alone
Nope it wasn't, but neither was the Wehrmacht as a whole. At least not before 1942. Leave them to rot on their Island, and you free massive resources for when Barbarossa starts.

will likely drive the British into opposition to Germany
That is why I mentioned the moving of the declaration of War by only a couple of weeks. Still the British public and even leadership would have been far less supportive of continental deployment without the Kriegsmarine tread.
 
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