WI: No Japanese-American Internment

[Tripledot]

Were they ever able to return to their homes during the war?
According to what I see it seems to be more a "Of Mice and Men" situation where the Japanese-Americans are working basic labour between farms, which can be a different environment from suburbs or urban areas.

Furthermore I don't think any of us would deny the United States was still a very racist place back then, added with their historical persecution of those with Chinese or African descent; added to the anti-Japanese sentiment, I continue to have no doubt that if, if Japanese-Americans were fully allowed to go back to their homes and workplaces, the conflict between Japanese-Americans and others would increase dramatically.
I further have no reason to doubt the relocation centres were administered and run partly by very well-meaning individuals. This however merely seems a divergence of the social conditions of the time.

Considering the actions of other minorities who were the victims of hate crimes, I think Japanese would not become terrorists. Ethnic violence in the US seems to be mostly white-on-minority, and I doubt the Japanese would prove to be an exception.

 

[Bmao]

Interesting to note, Japanese-Americans actually served in the military, though only in the European theatre.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/442nd_Infantry_Regiment_(United_States)

The 442nd Infantry Regiment, which was almost all Nisei, was the most decorated by its size and by the length of its service than any other US infantry unit in WWII. There were 21 Medal of Honor recipients, 52 Distinguished Service Cross Citations, 22 legion of merit recipients, 560 Silver Stars, 4000 Bronze Stars and 9486 Purple Hearts out of a total of 14,000 men that were part of that unit.

If that doesn't tell you the loyalty of the Japanese Americans in WWII, even after they and their relatives were put in internment camps, I don't know what will. That does not seem like a population that would turn to terrorism.

 

[Bmao]

Some seem to be decreasing while others seem to be increasing. Maybe they were moved around?
Also, were your aunt and uncle originally apple farmers or were they sent there? Because I think what I'd believe as being 'sent back' is going back home or something similar.

Many Japanese Americans at the time were vital to the rural economies of California and the rest of the US west coast. When they were relocated to the internment camps, this removed a large skilled rural labor pool which was only partially alleviated by the Bracero program which attracted immigrants from Mexico to take their place. Thus, many of them were sent back to perform that labor.

 

[ChucK Y]

Were they ever able to return to their homes during the war?
According to what I see it seems to be more a "Of Mice and Men" situation where the Japanese-Americans are working basic labour between farms, which can be a different environment from suburbs or urban areas.

Furthermore I don't think any of us would deny the United States was still a very racist place back then, added with their historical persecution of those with Chinese or African descent; added to the anti-Japanese sentiment, I continue to have no doubt that if, if Japanese-Americans were fully allowed to go back to their homes and workplaces, the conflict between Japanese-Americans and others would increase dramatically.
I further have no reason to doubt the relocation centres were administered and run partly by very well-meaning individuals. This however merely seems a divergence of the social conditions of the time.

Japanese-Americans were barred from an area of the Pacific coast that included California, most of Oregon and Washington, and part of Arizona. These restrictions were not lifted until December 1944.

Most of those released did not work in agriculture; most found work in the urban areas where the WRA had field offices. Due to the critical wartime labor shortages, many Japanese-Americans were able to work for the first time in occupations for which they had training, but had been denied opportunity before the war due to discrimination. They were teachers, printers, machinists, stenographers, chemists, architects, and many other occupations.

 

[ChucK Y]

Interesting to note, Japanese-Americans actually served in the military, though only in the European theatre.

Actually, more than 6000 Japanese-Americans also served in the military in the Pacific Theater. They served mainly in the Military Intelligence Service, as translators and interrogators. Their service was unpublicised, to keep the Japanese military lax in their security in thinking that the Americans would not be able to understand their documents. One of my uncles would tell of his wartime experiences in New Guinea.

 

[mlp]

Japanese-Americans were barred from an area of the Pacific coast that included California, most of Oregon and Washington, and part of Arizona. These restrictions were not lifted until December 1944.

Most of those released did not work in agriculture; most found work in the urban areas where the WRA had field offices. Due to the critical wartime labor shortages, many Japanese-Americans were able to work for the first time in occupations for which they had training, but had been denied opportunity before the war due to discrimination. They were teachers, printers, machinists, stenographers, chemists, architects, and many other occupations.

Of course, I'd like to see some sources on the underlined part. So I suppose they also worked in suburbs and urban areas originally too?
So here's the thing - it seems the Japanese-Americans were treated extremely well were even given opportunities that shouldnt've been available to them. Then why is it the case that this reloaction is cited often as a major form of discrimination against Japanese-Americans? Why can't the government argue that they were treated extremely well and move on with their lives? Because by how you describe it it seems almost - utopic.
This is, of course, leaving behind the fact that a majority, a strong majority of the United States, were racist to the brim; I don't think anyone could deny that. Added with concrete evidence of an existence of anti-Japanese sentiment within the United States that accumulated over time throughout the Pacific War, I don't think the evidence matches - either the Internment is overblown in proportion and racism(particularly anti-Japanese sentiment) as we know of it in the United States never existed, or the examples of "finding work" was so minimal that it never saw a full reaction from the American population.

Many Japanese Americans at the time were vital to the rural economies of California and the rest of the US west coast. When they were relocated to the internment camps, this removed a large skilled rural labor pool which was only partially alleviated by the Bracero program which attracted immigrants from Mexico to take their place. Thus, many of them were sent back to perform that labor.

Very interesting sir, because I just heard from above that the Japanese usually worked in urban areas. Something seems to be not matching here..

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
So here's the thing - it seems the Japanese-Americans were treated extremely well were even given opportunities that shouldnt've been available to them. Then why is it the case that this reloaction is cited often as a major form of discrimination against Japanese-Americans? Why can't the government argue that they were treated extremely well and move on with their lives? Because by how you describe it it seems almost - utopic.
..

Because they lost their employment & had to start over at lower wages in new jobs, lost a large part of the their property they had to abandon when forced to move to the internment camps, because those who owned businesses, farms, ect had to sell at a loss or lost the property without compensation.

A Call to Arms by Klien has a chapter on the economic effects of the internment. both on the JA & the general US war economy

 

[mlp]

Because they lost their employment & had to start over at lower wages in new jobs, lost a large part of the their property they had to abandon when forced to move to the internment camps, because those who owned businesses, farms, ect had to sell at a loss or lost the property without compensation.

A Call to Arms by Klien has a chapter on the economic effects of the internment. both on the JA & the general US war economy

So I'm supping the internment themselves were excellent and everyone handled everything swimmingly?

 

[ChucK Y]

Of course, I'd like to see some sources on the underlined part. So I suppose they also worked in suburbs and urban areas originally too?
So here's the thing - it seems the Japanese-Americans were treated extremely well were even given opportunities that shouldnt've been available to them. Then why is it the case that this reloaction is cited often as a major form of discrimination against Japanese-Americans? Why can't the government argue that they were treated extremely well and move on with their lives? Because by how you describe it it seems almost - utopic.
This is, of course, leaving behind the fact that a majority, a strong majority of the United States, were racist to the brim; I don't think anyone could deny that. Added with concrete evidence of an existence of anti-Japanese sentiment within the United States that accumulated over time throughout the Pacific War, I don't think the evidence matches - either the Internment is overblown in proportion and racism(particularly anti-Japanese sentiment) as we know of it in the United States never existed, or the examples of "finding work" was so minimal that it never saw a full reaction from the American population.
Very interesting sir, because I just heard from above that the Japanese usually worked in urban areas. Something seems to be not matching here..

Most of those released settled in cities, the city of Chicago alone received more than 6000. Here is a more fine-grained description of the situation of the 300 in Des Moines in 1944:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl...ocumentdate=1944-10-26&collectionid=JI&nav=ok

 

[mlp]

Most of those released settled in cities, the city of Chicago alone received more than 6000. Here is a more fine-grained description of the situation of the 300 in Des Moines in 1944:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl...ocumentdate=1944-10-26&collectionid=JI&nav=ok

(I'll be hoping you could answer the other part of my post above.)
So what I'm noticing here is that the report in the last paragraph further underlines how the situation in Des Moines is merely an outlier from the general trend of heightened anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States; "But unfortunately that is not quite the case" sums it up quite well. Is it possible to assume then that there did exist, as you have consistently mentioned, some examples where Japanese-Americans upon being released were treated well - but the general trend of the time was, in the context of the Pacific War, a strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States? Which could've led to direct confrontation if Japanese-Americans were directly interacting with other American citizens on a much wider scale?

 

[ChucK Y]

(I'll be hoping you could answer the other part of my post above.)
So what I'm noticing here is that the report in the last paragraph further underlines how the situation in Des Moines is merely an outlier from the general trend of heightened anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States; "But unfortunately that is not quite the case" sums it up quite well. Is it possible to assume then that there did exist, as you have consistently mentioned, some examples where Japanese-Americans upon being released were treated well - but the general trend of the time was, in the context of the Pacific War, a strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States? Which could've led to direct confrontation if Japanese-Americans were directly interacting with other American citizens on a much wider scale?

You have asked for sources whenever I have corrected your unsupported assertions. Please provide contemporaneous evidence of your assertions of a trend of increasing anti-Japanese American sentiment in the United States during the course of the war. This does not match my family's experience nor contemporaneous evidence. If you cannot, perhaps you should reconsider the basis for your preconceptions.

Yes, there was a spectrum of sentiment ranging from the Des Moines experience to areas where the WRA advised those released to stay away from. But the average of that sentiment moved toward acceptance during the course of the war. There is an undeniable strain of racism in American history, but there is also a strain of desire for justice and fair play. It is simplistic to make an all-or-nothing judgment about a complex and nuanced situation.

Here is an except from the 1945 WRA annual report; see in particular the center paragraph:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl...ocumentdate=1945-07-14&collectionid=JI&nav=ok

 

[British Republic]

If I may ask, who were they investigating? The ones interned or the ones in the Army?

The report was done before PH happened while those he interviewed for the report included various military, law enforcement and other government officials More specifically he also said:

He filed his first preliminary report to Carter in October. The report would reflect the general tenor of his conclusions in all of the reports he would subsequently file. "We do not want to throw a lot of American citizens into a concentration camp of course, and especially as the almost unanimous verdict is that in case of war they will be quiet, very quiet," he wrote. "There will probably be some sabotage by paid Japanese agents and the odd fanatical Jap, but the bulk of these people will be quiet because in addition to being quite contented with the American Way of life, they know they are 'in a spot.'"[1]]

Of the Issei, he noted that they are "considerably weakened in their loyalty to Japan by the fact that they have chosen to make this their home and have brought up their children here." "They expect to die here," he wrote.[4] He described the Nisei as "universally estimated from 90 to 98 percent loyal to the United States if the Japanese-educated element of the Kibei is excluded. The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty. They are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan." While conceding that the Kibei "are considered the most dangerous element," he also notes "that many of those who visited Japan subsequent to their early American education come back with added loyalty to the United States. In fact it is a saying that all a Nisei needs is a trip to Japan to make a loyal American out of him."[5]

As for Japanese Americans being potential saboteurs, Munson makes the key point that they "are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily recognized physical appearance. It will be hard for them to get near anything to blow up if it is guarded."[6]

He concludes, "As interview after interview piled up, those bringing in results began to call it the same old tune. The story was all the same. There is no Japanese 'problem' on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese."[7]

Furthermore is there possibility of this changing if the Japanese-Americans were to come in direct contact with the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the war?

Well after PH happened, Munson went to Hawaii to follow up on his investigations, what he found out was:

Following Munson's West Coast investigations, he went on to Hawai'i to continue his work. His report on Hawai'i—which reached largely the same conclusions as his West Coast report—went to the President on December 8, a day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He sent additional reports to Carter between December and February. A report received by the President on December 22 noted that the attack on Pearl Harbor had resulted in no fifth column activity, writing that the "attack is the proof of the pudding" of his conclusions.[11]

Subsequently, Munson, along with Carter and Kenneth Ringle of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recommended to the president what Michi Weglyn calls a "power-to-the-Nisei" policy, essentially giving them responsibility of policing the community: "The aim of this will be to squeeze control from the hands of the Japanese Nationals into the hands of the loyal Nisei who are American citizens.... It is the aim that the Nisei should police themselves, and as a result police their parents."[12] The trio also called for a public statement in support of the Nisei. Though the President expressed support for the plan, nothing ever came of it. No such statement was issued and Western Defense Command head John L. DeWitt refused to meet with them.

Long story short, what he said was that by and large Japanese-Americans where not disloyal to the United States and nor fifth columnists as a whole. Thus mass interment was not needed to weed out the Japanese Spies in the United States.

As for why FDR and other ignored this claim, I am not sure beyond the usual reasons of bigotry and the fact they where small enough a community to intern. However this might have also been a reason why they were interned (You thank FDR's friend John Franklin Carter for this, for he was also involved in these investigations):

Unfortunately for Japanese Americans, Carter sent the report to FDR with his own one-page summary of key points. This summary—which may be all that the president read—managed to largely obscure Munson's conclusions and may have inadvertently had the effect of alarming the President further.

Among the points highlighted by Carter: while stating that "There is no Japanese 'problem' on the coast," he followed that up with "There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'" "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb, but today they are few," he wrote. The last highlighted point was that "Your reporter... is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere."[8] Of the "dynamite" statement, Greg Robinson notes that Carter left out a prior sentence by Munson that seems to indicate that that the "dynamite" statement referred to paid Japanese agents and not Japanese Americans.[9]

Likewise Kenneth Ringle submitted a report on January 1942 in which he stated that:

Based on information from the various sources noted above, Ringle submitted a report in January 1942 that vouched for Japanese American loyalty and argued against mass exclusion. He felt that the vast majority of Japanese Americans were at least "passively loyal" and that any potential saboteurs or enemy agents could be individually identified and imprisoned, as in fact most already had been by that time. He identified Kibei as "those persons most dangerous to the peace and security of the United States," but argued that other Nisei were regarded by Japanese agents as "cultural traitors" who could not be trusted and who thus posed no security threat.[2]

Though his views seemed to be shared by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the navy opted not to challenge the army's actions, and so his report and recommendations were largely ignored. In collaboration with Munson and John Franklin Carter (a close associate of President Roosevelt who had hired Munson), Ringle later proposed a plan whereby Nisei—presumably JACL leaders—be entrusted with supervision of the Issei and their property as an alternative to mass removal. Though tacitly supported by the president, General John DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, refused to meet with them.[3]

When they (like with Munson) basically ignored what he had said his son recalled that:

With mass incarceration a reality, his son Ken Ringle described him at this time as "drained, depressed and feeling somehow an inadvertent accomplice to the betrayal of America's Japanese," in a Washington Post piece.[4]

Overall it seems that even in 1941-1942, there was plenty of evidence which states that interring the Japanese-American population was not really needed for the war effort.

Note: My sources for this information consisted of:

http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Munson_Report/

http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Kenneth Ringle/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munson_Report

 

[British Republic]

Many Japanese Americans at the time were vital to the rural economies of California and the rest of the US west coast. When they were relocated to the internment camps, this removed a large skilled rural labor pool which was only partially alleviated by the Bracero program which attracted immigrants from Mexico to take their place. Thus, many of them were sent back to perform that labor.

Are you suggesting that the interment of Japanese-Americans helped bring about large scale (compared to previous years) immigration from Mexico?

If so then one finds that in light of the racist reasons for internment it seems ironic that such an action would get a chain of events which meant that California itself has become a Minority Majority State. Which of course is no bad thing...

Japanese-American internment is an dis-comforting subject for Americans who like to view their country as an unquestionable good guy in WWII. Anything to rationalize a racist policy as being "oh but it could've been worse for them" may thus seem appealing.

Goring often liked make such points in relation the hypocrisy of the United States when the latter criticized Nazi Germany. Now while he certainly had a point he himself is the last person to be lecturing other nations about racism.

 

[vega]

Bumping this to see if anyone has some thoughts on any possible butterflies this might cause.

 

[mlp]

Sorry for the late replies, everyone.

You have asked for sources whenever I have corrected your unsupported assertions. Please provide contemporaneous evidence of your assertions of a trend of increasing anti-Japanese American sentiment in the United States during the course of the war. This does not match my family's experience nor contemporaneous evidence. If you cannot, perhaps you should reconsider the basis for your preconceptions.

I find the positive correlation between rising American casualties and anti-Japanese sentiment during the course of the war quite intuitive; sure, I think everyone was aware Americans of Japanese descent were "different" and were supremely loyal to the American flag. But that doesn't change the fact that, by the end of the war, a significant minority were calling for the "total destruction of the Japanese polity" and/or "division of Japan into several parts"; I still believe it seems completely possible that, if Japanese-Americans were completely left alone by the government in good faith, numerous hostile Americans would try to act upon the anti-Japanese propaganda they received every day from early on, only to increase and worsen as the war continued.

Yes, there was a spectrum of sentiment ranging from the Des Moines experience to areas where the WRA advised those released to stay away from. But the average of that sentiment moved toward acceptance during the course of the war. There is an undeniable strain of racism in American history, but there is also a strain of desire for justice and fair play. It is simplistic to make an all-or-nothing judgment about a complex and nuanced situation.

I don't recall ever claiming it was a simplistic situation, I continuously argued it was a balance between the "desire for justice" to use your phrase and anti-Japanese sentiment, and that the balance was tilted for the latter.

Overall it seems that even in 1941-1942, there was plenty of evidence which states that interring the Japanese-American population was not really needed for the war effort.

That was a great read, thanks for that - however, I believe throughout the wikipages the American officials were keen to differentiate between "Issei" and "Nissei", which seems to indicate Issei may have been more* sentimentally attached to Japan; also I don't think I've seen descriptions of anti-Japanese sentiment within the US during the period, which I believe was growing throughout the war. I, as stated before, do not believe Japanese-Americans are some natural saboteurs or spies that are willing fifth columns; however, I continue to believe that, if Japanese-Americans were left bare to the rising anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the war, we may see some consequences on the circumstance.

 

[BBN4ever]

FDR's economic policy > FDR's social policy

 

[ChucK Y]

Sorry for the late replies, everyone.I find the positive correlation between rising American casualties and anti-Japanese sentiment during the course of the war quite intuitive; sure, I think everyone was aware Americans of Japanese descent were "different" and were supremely loyal to the American flag. But that doesn't change the fact that, by the end of the war, a significant minority were calling for the "total destruction of the Japanese polity" and/or "division of Japan into several parts"; I still believe it seems completely possible that, if Japanese-Americans were completely left alone by the government in good faith, numerous hostile Americans would try to act upon the anti-Japanese propaganda they received every day from early on, only to increase and worsen as the war continued.

I don't recall ever claiming it was a simplistic situation, I continuously argued it was a balance between the "desire for justice" to use your phrase and anti-Japanese sentiment, and that the balance was tilted for the latter.
That was a great read, thanks for that - however, I believe throughout the wikipages the American officials were keen to differentiate between "Issei" and "Nissei", which seems to indicate Issei may have been more* sentimentally attached to Japan; also I don't think I've seen descriptions of anti-Japanese sentiment within the US during the period, which I believe was growing throughout the war. I, as stated before, do not believe Japanese-Americans are some natural saboteurs or spies that are willing fifth columns; however, I continue to believe that, if Japanese-Americans were left bare to the rising anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the war, we may see some consequences on the circumstance.

In my last post was a report to the Secretary of the Interior from the head of the agency directly responsible for resettling Japanese-Americans, in which he stated that acceptance of Japanese-Americans was at an all-time high. Yes there still were virulently anti-Japanese voices at the end of the war; but there had been since the war began. You have not shown that opposition increased in the course of the war. You are entitled to keep to your opinion in the face of contrary evidence, but don't claim it is based on facts, as you have presented no evidence.

 

[mlp]

In my last post was a report to the Secretary of the Interior from the head of the agency directly responsible for resettling Japanese-Americans, in which he stated that acceptance of Japanese-Americans was at an all-time high. Yes there still were virulently anti-Japanese voices at the end of the war; but there had been since the war began. You have not shown that opposition increased in the course of the war. You are entitled to keep to your opinion in the face of contrary evidence, but don't claim it is based on facts, as you have presented no evidence.

I actually asked Calbear, because after 40 minutes of thorough searching on anti-Japanese sentiment during WWII I was only able to find documentation on Japanese internment itself, not opinions of Americans on Japan in particular. His conclusion - which I believe has quite some credibility - was that anti-Japanese sentiment increased as casualties mounted. As the original request was for me to find evidence on whether or not anti-Japanese sentiment increased or not during the war, I'll submit that as my evidence. Apologies for not having anything more concrete, I'm sure you can ask Calbear for that - or through myself, if so necessary.

 

[joeferrito]

6) Smuggle some ICBM from Soviet Union to impose a balance of fear, if possible from social point (need over 90% local community support to keep secret long enough)

...One Does Not Simply smuggle ICBMs into Hawaii.

 

[fscott]

Were they ever able to return to their homes during the war?
According to what I see it seems to be more a "Of Mice and Men" situation where the Japanese-Americans are working basic labour between farms, which can be a different environment from suburbs or urban areas.

Furthermore I don't think any of us would deny the United States was still a very racist place back then, added with their historical persecution of those with Chinese or African descent; added to the anti-Japanese sentiment, I continue to have no doubt that if, if Japanese-Americans were fully allowed to go back to their homes and workplaces, the conflict between Japanese-Americans and others would increase dramatically.
I further have no reason to doubt the relocation centres were administered and run partly by very well-meaning individuals. This however merely seems a divergence of the social conditions of the time.

You need to read up on the camps. "relocation centers" is just another word for concentration camps. A previous article mentioned the drop in prisoners at the camps in 1944. Could part of that been due to the men who the US drafted?