The IdFlieg had five flying battalions under its command in 1914. They reported 254 pilots and 295 field useable airplanes at the beginning of the war (not certain whether that already includes seized planes though). There is also the naval air arm with only 12 seaplanes and a single land based plane useable.What about aircraft? Tanks were still an unproven concept, but what were the pre war thoughts on Zeppelins and planes?
Those 200 000 are otl expansion. Anything more would have to come on top of that, so there is a definite limit. And it would not be a huge number.Since Germany did not have an unemployment problem at the time those 200.000 men are 200.000 less people working and that has an economic cost.
Look at the jeune ecole in France. They made a bit of a mess of the French Navy, although the chaos of French naval policies is not something that needs to follow from that approach. These ideas had some influence beyond France, but with the constant flux of technology it did not settle into a stable naval development. Almost no one outside France (and only some French naval theorists) thought torpedo boats and submarines were ready to replace major surface combatants at the turn of the century. That said the Cruiser concept circulating in the German navy went into similiar directions as the moderates of the jeune ecole, so if they win out, subs and TBs might gain more funding as well. After the RJW general opinion was that the necessary (torpedo) technology was not quite there yet and the jeune ecole died a silent death, although with lingering effects.How advanced were submarine designs at that time?
Another variant is investing in submarines and torpedo boats instead of battleships
“By 1902 nearly half of all new officers were from “occupational circles from which the officer corps had earlier only seldom recruited,” according to a report of the Military Cabinet.”This is exaggerated but there was certainly a preference for people from the right background (not necessarily aristocrats) and these people ran short.
Not if they’re the men that OTL enlisted in the Navy.Since Germany did not have an unemployment problem at the time those 200.000 men are 200.000 less people working and that has an economic cost.
Considering by 1914 the Marine Nationale had battle squadrons of mixed-quality pre-dreadnoughts, 6 good semi-dreadnoughts & had launched 4 dreadnoughts, along with numerous armoured cruisers (mostly poor compared to their contemporaries), I wouldn't say they had fully embraced Jeune Ecole.But by 1900 or so the French had fully embraced Jeune École and had given up the idea of blockading anyone. Depending on the PoD, the French may well have their hodgepodge fleet by the time the Germans give up on the HSF.
Fair enough, I suppose I should have said Jeune Ecole had a strong influence but traditionalists were still exerting a degree of control. But then again, no one ever said the French building strategy was coordinated and joined up.Considering by 1914 the Marine Nationale had battle squadrons of mixed-quality pre-dreadnoughts, 6 good semi-dreadnoughts & had launched 4 dreadnoughts, along with numerous armoured cruisers (mostly poor compared to their contemporaries), I wouldn't say they had fully embraced Jeune Ecole.
Did he? I always thought he was influenced by it, but more as it was what kept him awake at night as he strove to find a defence to it?Ironically, for the man accused of launching the Dreadnought & the naval arms race, Fisher had been someone who looked at the Jeune Ecole as a possible strategy for the RN, flooding the Channel or North Sea with swarms of torpedo boats.
French building strategy was pretty much on a par with their warship designs!Fair enough, I suppose I should have said Jeune Ecole had a strong influence but traditionalists were still exerting a degree of control. But then again, no one ever said the French building strategy was coordinated and joined up.
Did he? I always thought he was influenced by it, but more as it was what kept him awake at night as he strove to find a defence to it?
I thought the problem was that with no way to fight a submerged submarine the Admiralty thought that if a convoy was attacked they'd lose the lot and not be able to do a thing about it? The fate of the Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy only reinforced this impression. Submarines were something new that challenged all previous experience and assumptions.The concept of convoys goes back at least to Spanish Silver Fleets of the XVI century. Probably to the Romans, and quite reasonably to the Ancient Greeks.
The issue for the RN in both WW1 was a cost/benefict ratio. Would the ships not sunk make up for the delays and reduced flexibility caused by the convoys?
Submarines were still playing by the rules and couldn't sink merchant ships without warning the way they ambushed warships. But the late and slow development of depth charges was a factor.I thought the problem was that with no way to fight a submerged submarine the Admiralty thought that if a convoy was attacked they'd lose the lot and not be able to do a thing about it? The fate of the Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy only reinforced this impression. Submarines were something new that challenged all previous experience and assumptions.
I'm sure it was considered but there's also an argument that if you force a submarine to stay submerged you win.I thought the problem was that with no way to fight a submerged submarine the Admiralty thought that if a convoy was attacked they'd lose the lot and not be able to do a thing about it? The fate of the Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy only reinforced this impression. Submarines were something new that challenged all previous experience and assumptions.
They couldn't sink unarmed or unescorted merchant ships without warning, ships in escorted convoys were fair game.Submarines were still playing by the rules and couldn't sink merchant ships without warning the way they ambushed warships. But the late and slow development of depth charges was a factor.