WI: no high seas fleet?

Driftless

Donor
Wikipedia has good numbers on armoured cruisers.

The drakes (1900) cost about a million. The Monmouths (last ac) cost about 1.4 million.

I would need to dig and check sources to get the light cruiser costs.

Good enough to answer my question. Basically, expensive ships for their ability.
 

Deleted member 94680

A blockade does not need to be complete to have an effect.
If the effect you’re looking for is wasted resources, ships and men, then yes. An incomplete blockade is basically the Battle of the Atlantic - costly and failing to achieve its objectives.
Blockading the Black Sea, Baltic, and France (with A-H and possibly Italy) will not cripple France or Russia, but it will weaken them.
Any sort of definition for ‘weaken’? If the Germans can’t blockade Russia or France entirely, then all they will achieve is a reduction in trade. Expensive thing to aim for that won’t win the War.
Conversely, avoiding a blockade at Franco/Russian hands is hugely important for Germany.
Can that be achieved by Russia and France? Neither of them are naval powers or seem to be interested in blockading, short of developing the ability during the War.
 
Good enough to answer my question. Basically, expensive ships for their ability.
A quick search for German ships:
Around 1900
A Wittelsbach class pre-dreadnought cost 22.3 million marks
Prinz Adalbert, an armoured cruiser from 1900 cost about 16.3 million marks
A Gazelle class light cruiser cost about 4.5 million marks

SMS Nassau 1908 cost about 37,4 million marks
Von der Tann, the first BC at 36.5 million marks marginally less
Blücher, the last AC 1908 cost 28.5 million marks (although it is worth noting that the price jumped by 8 million from the preceding Scharnhorst-class)
A Magdeburg CL 1910 about 8 million marks
 
Good enough to answer my question. Basically, expensive ships for their ability.
An armoured cruiser and a predreadnought were essentially equivalents in terms of costs.

The headline when the naval budgets went before parliament might be 5 large vessels, 3 of which were battleships and 2 large armoured cruisers.

Both were large vessels. The armoured cruisers were fast and the predreadnought had heavier guns.
 

Driftless

Donor
A quick search for German ships:
Around 1900
A Wittelsbach class pre-dreadnought cost 22.3 million marks
Prinz Adalbert, an armoured cruiser from 1900 cost about 16.3 million marks
A Gazelle class light cruiser cost about 4.5 million marks

SMS Nassau 1908 cost about 37,4 million marks
Von der Tann, the first BC at 36.5 million marks marginally less
Blücher, the last AC 1908 cost 28.5 million marks (although it is worth noting that the price jumped by 8 million from the preceding Scharnhorst-class)
A Magdeburg CL 1910 about 8 million marks

With that version of the Blucher, it was a design dead-end too. (hard luck name in German naval service.....)

At this point, would there have been a role for a Heavy Cruiser in place of the AC? A ship with 6 to 9 main battery guns and some central fire control system and 25% - 40% more speed than the dreadnoughts. To me, the AC's were in someway the last big pre-dreadnought type ships (split caliber armament, and not much greater speed than the newer battleships)
 
Can that be achieved by Russia and France? Neither of them are naval powers or seem to be interested in blockading, short of developing the ability during the War.

Nope, just the second and third largest navy in the world ( before the HSF ) and the French having blockaded Germany during the war 1870.
 
With that version of the Blucher, it was a design dead-end too. (hard luck name in German naval service.....)

At this point, would there have been a role for a Heavy Cruiser in place of the AC? A ship with 6 to 9 main battery guns and some central fire control system and 25% - 40% more speed than the dreadnoughts. To me, the AC's were in someway the last big pre-dreadnought type ships (split caliber armament, and not much greater speed than the newer battleships)
For the right set of doctrines and circumstances maybe. After Dreadnought the difference in cost between capital ship and large cruisers would be actually noticeable and it might be an option. Not a main stay certainly as it is an expensive option. But with a raiding doctrine in mind why not force enemies to deploy major units to commerce protection?

The otl Blücher ultimately was designed for the fleet screen. That meant Blücher had a shitload of guns, triple expansion engines and armour almost comparable to early British BCs. Get rid of the secondary guns, most of the casemated tertiary ones and cut the main battery by a third and you save a fair amount of internal space and weight to play around with to increase speed and range, especially if you dare to use steam turbines. I´d actually keep a fairly high (if overall reduced) amount of armour to allow the ship engaging light warships while raiding without risking a mission kill.
 

Deleted member 94680

Nope, just the second and third largest navy in the world ( before the HSF ) and the French having blockaded Germany during the war 1870.
But by 1900 or so the French had fully embraced Jeune École and had given up the idea of blockading anyone. Depending on the PoD, the French may well have their hodgepodge fleet by the time the Germans give up on the HSF.
 
A quick search for German ships:
Around 1900
A Wittelsbach class pre-dreadnought cost 22.3 million marks
Prinz Adalbert, an armoured cruiser from 1900 cost about 16.3 million marks
A Gazelle class light cruiser cost about 4.5 million marks

SMS Nassau 1908 cost about 37,4 million marks
Von der Tann, the first BC at 36.5 million marks marginally less
Blücher, the last AC 1908 cost 28.5 million marks (although it is worth noting that the price jumped by 8 million from the preceding Scharnhorst-class)
A Magdeburg CL 1910 about 8 million marks
Taking into account that £1 was fixed at RM 20,-- (or RM 1,-- was equal to 1s), the costs of the HSF ships was in the same ballpark as those of their RN equivalents, and developing in pretty much the same way.
 
The German historical attitude is a textbook example of the sunk cost fallacy:
After the HMS Dreadnought was launched, not only their existing fleet but almost the entire German naval construction architecture became obsolete overnight. Existing locks and docks in the major German naval bases required extensive rework to handle the increases in displacement.
The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal had to be both widened and deepened.
In total the changes in technology increased the costs of up-to-date battleships by 96% and battlecruisers by 107%.
At that point Tirpitz and his staff knew that the naval estimates of 347 million for the fiscal year 1908 would have to rise to at least 434 million GM by 1910 to maintain the planned expansion rate (that would most likely not be enough to keep up with the Royal Navy), and the Reich Treasury would have to raise 1 000 million GM in new indirect taxation for Germany to continue the dreadnought race.
 
If Germany invested at least some of that money into developing armored vehicles could they have a functioning tank by 1914?

How many infantry formations could be raised?
 

Deleted member 94680

If Germany invested at least some of that money into developing armored vehicles could they have a functioning tank by 1914?
But why would they? No one really foresaw the need for armoured vehicles before 1914 and not even in WWI until ‘16 or so. To have the Germans build tanks instead of battleships is wank or SI territory.
How many infantry formations could be raised?
Instead of the HSF? I’d guess (and fully expect to be wrong) another Army or possibly even two for the East? Maybe expand the Reserve formations to match the structure of the Regulars, or improve their ToE? There’s “space” to base extra formations in, to expand the representation of the units?
09-C5-BECC-D72-C-4-DCF-AA69-46-ED4532-AD15.jpg
 
This comes up all the time, but is there any evidence for it? That the Heer was limited by the numbers of nobles? That the Great General Staff, who demanded that appointees pass their course including two examinations regardless of who they were before joining the Staff would refuse applicants on the basis of not being posh enough?

An extra Army or two for the East would mean more captains, major and colonels but relatively fewer generals - enough posts to fill that existing nobles (if it really matters that much) could be spread around.
This is exaggerated but there was certainly a preference for people from the right background (not necessarily aristocrats) and these people ran short.

 
If Germany invested at least some of that money into developing armored vehicles could they have a functioning tank by 1914?

How many infantry formations could be raised?
They outright rejected a very promising tank design in 1911 and their armored car development had failed in the leadup to otl WW1 at least with two different models. The German armies did not yet see motorisation as mature enough technology to be useful in combat. They invested more in trucks for logistics though. That was somewhat limited by the fact that Germany had far less access to oil than two decades later.
More likely fields of investments are artillery (were Germany already was leading in certain regards) and after the RJW machine guns. Germany was still expanding the Machine Gun Corps by 1914 and otl had older variants of the Maxim in peace time service it had not yet replaced with the MG08, not to mention being below target even for their pre-war intended strength. Then there is a limited amount of investment in powered flight culminating in forming IdFlieg in 1913.
That said I am not sure how much of the money saved on the Fleet would actually end up in the armies. The navy was financed after a certain point by expanding the imperial budget, including the introduction of taxes for that specific role. So we´d speak of a smaller overall budget which still will finance at least some naval expansion. And not everything else will go to the army.
The problem with increasing the size of the army is that there was some oppositon to that from all sides. Many social democrats of course were not supportive of it, The old officer corps was fighting a rearguard action against dilluting the officers corps with unsuitable new officers. By and large they were loosing except for certain regiments, so that is not an unsurmountable problem. More important is the opposition against drafting increasing numbers of the urban lower classes, both because the army viewed their suitability as lower than rural recruits and because conservative elements doubted the political reliability of said recruits. Despite the opposition the German army in the 15 years before the war already had expanded by 200 000 men to almost 800 000. A further expansion than otl certainly is possible, but with even more debates than otl. And there is a limit how much can be added under peace time conditions, especially if without a naval arms race overall tensions are lower.
 
They outright rejected a very promising tank design in 1911 and their armored car development had failed in the leadup to otl WW1 at least with two different models. The German armies did not yet see motorisation as mature enough technology to be useful in combat. They invested more in trucks for logistics though. That was somewhat limited by the fact that Germany had far less access to oil than two decades later.
More likely fields of investments are artillery (were Germany already was leading in certain regards) and after the RJW machine guns. Germany was still expanding the Machine Gun Corps by 1914 and otl had older variants of the Maxim in peace time service it had not yet replaced with the MG08, not to mention being below target even for their pre-war intended strength. Then there is a limited amount of investment in powered flight culminating in forming IdFlieg in 1913.
That said I am not sure how much of the money saved on the Fleet would actually end up in the armies. The navy was financed after a certain point by expanding the imperial budget, including the introduction of taxes for that specific role. So we´d speak of a smaller overall budget which still will finance at least some naval expansion. And not everything else will go to the army.
The problem with increasing the size of the army is that there was some oppositon to that from all sides. Many social democrats of course were not supportive of it, The old officer corps was fighting a rearguard action against dilluting the officers corps with unsuitable new officers. By and large they were loosing except for certain regiments, so that is not an unsurmountable problem. More important is the opposition against drafting increasing numbers of the urban lower classes, both because the army viewed their suitability as lower than rural recruits and because conservative elements doubted the political reliability of said recruits. Despite the opposition the German army in the 15 years before the war already had expanded by 200 000 men to almost 800 000. A further expansion than otl certainly is possible, but with even more debates than otl. And there is a limit how much can be added under peace time conditions, especially if without a naval arms race overall tensions are lower.
Since Germany did not have an unemployment problem at the time those 200.000 men are 200.000 less people working and that has an economic cost.
 
How advanced were submarine designs at that time?

Another variant is investing in submarines and torpedo boats instead of battleships
 
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