WI no gallipoli

What if the British government decided that Gallipoli was simply too big of risk to take and decided not to allow the venture to take place? Would they try a landing somewhere else or would the resources simply go into reinforcing the other fronts?
 
Well, i do believe that the original plan had been to land at Alexandretta, then probably the Ottoman Empires most important rail junction, instead of Gallipoli. Probably a far more sensible option in hindsight.
 
Australia and New Zealand continue to hold the Empire in high regard. It was the casualties that ANZAC suffered during the Gallipoli campaign that really started national consciousness and damaged British prestige in the eyes of their colonies.
 

Cook

Banned
Australia and New Zealand continue to hold the Empire in high regard. It was the casualties that ANZAC suffered during the Gallipoli campaign that really started national consciousness and damaged British prestige in the eyes of their colonies.

Australia and New Zealand both suffered far higher casualties on the western front than Gallipoli, if it wasn’t Gallipoli it’d be Passchendaele or any one of a dozen other battles that would be principally remembered instead; Gallipoli was just the first.

More useful would have been if those troops had remained in Egypt instead of going to Gallipoli and had invaded Palestine via Sinai in 1915 instead of later in the war.
 
Australia and New Zealand both suffered far higher casualties on the western front than Gallipoli, if it wasn’t Gallipoli it’d be Passchendaele or any one of a dozen other battles that would be principally remembered instead; Gallipoli was just the first.

You're right about that. But Gallipoli really shook their confidence in the Empire, both Australia and New Zealand. Yes, they had horrible casualties in the Western Front, but Gallipoli really showed them that the Empire wasn't infallible.
 

Cook

Banned
You're right about that. But Gallipoli really shook their confidence in the Empire, both Australia and New Zealand. Yes, they had horrible casualties in the Western Front, but Gallipoli really showed them that the Empire wasn't infallible.

Regrettably no, if anything the experience of World War One hardened them onto the empire like limpets.

It was the loss of Singapore that shook confidence in the Empire.
 
Not really surprising as Nazi Germany was a direct threat to Britain's very survival which Japan wasn't.


Sure, but at that point in time Britain was the centre of empire with clear mutual obligations to the various members of the Empire, who incidentally had delivered consistently upon their side of the bargain. NZ and Australia for example had sent the the vast majority of their deployable forces to the European theatre by 1940. The barrell was pretty much nearly empty by the time the Japanese threat was recognised

Also, the current 21st century version of the nation state is a little different from the 1939 version. The notion of British identity as a shared identity between those in Britain and those in NZ, Australia, Canada etc was standard
 
They would have tried somewhere else; opening a second and a third and a fourth front was the Entente theme in 1915 and early 1916. Each time one front failed, or got bogged down, they tried to open up the war somewhere else. Hence, e.g., the Salonika and Mesopotamia fronts.

Gallipoli worked out very badly, but it wasn't foredoomed to failure. The Turks placed a few mines in the Dardanelles at the last minute. When they exploded, it panicked the invading forces because they had no idea the mines were there. The attack was stopped in its tracks for long enough for the Turks to rush defensive forces to the area. If the allies had known what was going on, they could have landed their troops immediately without real opposition.
 

Cook

Banned
Gallipoli worked out very badly, but it wasn't foredoomed to failure. The Turks placed a few mines in the Dardanelles at the last minute...

You are confusing the amphibious attack with the previous attempt by the Royal navy and the French to send battleships into the straits.
The Gallipoli landings were a pig’s ear thrown together with less than 36 days worth of planning for the whole event.
 
Gallipoli may have been thrown together, but the thinking came a long way off as I understand it.

Reading one of the better books: "Defeat at Gallipoli" by Steel and Hart it does come across as though Churchill got into this idea with a vengeance.

The war council consisted of Asquith, Kitchener and Churchill (among others)

If Churchill had set his sights not on Gallipoli it would have been something else. Just for doing something.

Same trend as WW2 and Churchill.

The strategic setting was not bad, the execution was not so good. The navy bombardment really only alerted the Turkish forces.

Strategically, I don't see Gallipoli doing anything. I don't think it impacted on anything except perceptions.

Whether it was the first step for Australlia and NZ to re-evaluate the idea of the British empire is probably the most important outcome of the entire affair.

It could also be said that South Africa started the trend. Mobilising for WWI. Telephone call from the army to the politicians: We have mobilised. Who do we fight? the Germans or the British (True story).

So, The consequence of no Gallipoli might have been less animosity in Aus and NZ,but then it would have been somethign else having triggered it (Paschendale as mentioned above).

Ivan
 

Cook

Banned
Whether it was the first step for Australlia and NZ to re-evaluate the idea of the British empire is probably the most important outcome of the entire affair.

So, The consequence of no Gallipoli might have been less animosity in Aus and NZ,but then it would have been somethign else having triggered it (Paschendale as mentioned above).

As mentioned before, there was no significant in Australia and New Zealand with the British Empire after the First World War. Conscription caused more disunity.
 

mowque

Banned
As mentioned before, there was no significant in Australia and New Zealand with the British Empire after the First World War. Conscription caused more disunity.

I thought Australia and NZ were 'more British then Britain' for a long time after that...
 
Sure, but at that point in time Britain was the centre of empire with clear mutual obligations to the various members of the Empire, who incidentally had delivered consistently upon their side of the bargain. NZ and Australia for example had sent the the vast majority of their deployable forces to the European theatre by 1940. The barrell was pretty much nearly empty by the time the Japanese threat was recognised

Also, the current 21st century version of the nation state is a little different from the 1939 version. The notion of British identity as a shared identity between those in Britain and those in NZ, Australia, Canada etc was standard

There was no question that the Fall of France, the Battle of Britain, the U-Boat War, and the Battles in North Africa indicated where the danger lay at first. But once the Japanese occupied Indo-China, putting them in air range of Singapore, the danger there became obvious to anyone. Anyone but Winston Churchill. Throughout Churchill's life, he had developed strong personal ties of one kind or another to all parts of the English-speaking world. Except Australia and New Zealand! His war planning right through VJ-Day revealed this.

Despite the loss of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Solomons, and most of New Guinea, Churchill refused to countenance the sending to Australia of a single British warship, RAF fighter squadron, or British Army division. He even refused to release the ANZAC troops fighting in North Africa,* and spent his time reinforcing India, under remote threat, rather than Australia, under comparatively severe threat.

In April of 1942 the British Indian Ocean fleet retreated all the way to Kenya, but when Admiral King one month later asked that ONE of the three carriers off Africa be sent to Australia the British refused.:mad: Yet Churchill insisted on sending 5 carriers to go fight the Japanese off Formosa in 1945.
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*-It took the direct intervention of Prime Minister Curtin to get just two divisions, the 6th and 7th Australian Infantry, to Australia. And twice during their journey Churchill tried to re-route the convoy to Rangoon! Even though the convoy wasn't combat-loaded.:eek:
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, i do believe that the original plan had been to land at Alexandretta, then probably the Ottoman Empires most important rail junction, instead of Gallipoli. Probably a far more sensible option in hindsight.

This would have gone better for the Entente, no doubt. Most Turkish forces were near European Turkey and given Ottoman logistical problems, it would have been harder for them to pile on like Gallipoli OTL. However once the landing forces tried to move beyond their naval fire support they would bog down and probably end up with a similar scenario. The question is if they would be able to move up from Egypt, which they wouldn't in 1915.

If they cannot launch Gallipoli, it makes no sense to launch a seaborne invasion elsewhere in the Middle East because it doesn't help Russia enough or demonstrate direct force to impress Balkan powers like Greece or Bulgaria, which were the most important goals of the operations (with the potential for a knock out blow being a nice benefit if it could be achieved).
 
There was no question that the Fall of France, the Battle of Britain, the U-Boat War, and the Battles in North Africa indicated where the danger lay at first. But once the Japanese occupied Indo-China, putting them in air range of Singapore, the danger there became obvious to anyone. Anyone but Winston Churchill. Throughout Churchill's life, he had developed strong personal ties of one kind or another to all parts of the English-speaking world. Except Australia and New Zealand! His war planning right through VJ-Day revealed this.

Despite the loss of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Solomons, and most of New Guinea, Churchill refused to countenance the sending to Australia of a single British warship, RAF fighter squadron, or British Army division. He even refused to release the ANZAC troops fighting in North Africa,* and spent his time reinforcing India, under remote threat, rather than Australia, under comparatively severe threat.

In April of 1942 the British Indian Ocean fleet retreated all the way to Kenya, but when Admiral King one month later asked that ONE of the three carriers off Africa be sent to Australia the British refused.:mad: Yet Churchill insisted on sending 5 carriers to go fight the Japanese off Formosa in 1945.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
*-It took the direct intervention of Prime Minister Curtin to get just two divisions, the 6th and 7th Australian Infantry, to Australia. And twice during their journey Churchill tried to re-route the convoy to Rangoon! Even though the convoy wasn't combat-loaded.:eek:

Preaching to the converted my friend!
 
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