Lateknight
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What would be the effects of the french never formeing a government in exile in WW2?
WI No free france
- Thread starter Lateknight
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France would be an occupied country like Germany, rather than one of the occupiers (like some wanted to OTL until de Gaulle foiled this).
Speaking of de Gaulle, he would remain fairly obscure, rather than being one of the most prominent leaders in French history, and a lot of the things that he did, for better or for worse, would be butterflied away.
I doubt that after the war that European integration would be as viable as an idea, which would butterfly a lot of post-war European history to this day...(it would remind too much of Vichy, and thus France wouldn't be as supportive...kinda like with South Korea regarding Japanese rule).
Thus, count out Franco-German reconciliation (at best, relations would be like OTL South Korea and Japan), which is regarded, in TvTropes terms, as the "Trope Codifier" of interstate reconciliation (as expressed in the book Reconciling Enemy States in Europe and Asia). Thus, German relations with France, Poland, and Czech Republic, at the very least, would be worse than OTL, which is compounded by the lack of European integration...
Speaking of de Gaulle, he would remain fairly obscure, rather than being one of the most prominent leaders in French history, and a lot of the things that he did, for better or for worse, would be butterflied away.
I doubt that after the war that European integration would be as viable as an idea, which would butterfly a lot of post-war European history to this day...(it would remind too much of Vichy, and thus France wouldn't be as supportive...kinda like with South Korea regarding Japanese rule).
Thus, count out Franco-German reconciliation (at best, relations would be like OTL South Korea and Japan), which is regarded, in TvTropes terms, as the "Trope Codifier" of interstate reconciliation (as expressed in the book Reconciling Enemy States in Europe and Asia). Thus, German relations with France, Poland, and Czech Republic, at the very least, would be worse than OTL, which is compounded by the lack of European integration...
A Free French movement would always form in some way to my knowledge - there was some sort of allied-backed movement for every country. Even Germany had the Soviet National Committee for a Free Germany. The official French government didn't go into exile, since Vichy stayed, so a Free French that isn't part of the official Vichy government will form as French colonies are liberated and the tide of war turns. Without de Gaulle and other people early on it could be inconsequential though.
French resistance would be definitely more divided between the historical conservatists (Giraud) whom problem was less Vichy France than German occupation and the more republican and progressits movement (Communists, Socialists, Left Republican, Christian Democracy).
Without organized and outer movements as Free France (as you only had a french government in exile from 1944, but I think your OP was no gaullist resistance at all), the inner Resistance would probably never unite, which could lead to infighting (less obvious and bloody than in, say, Yugoslavia but definitely present).
In French North Africa, I'll guess that *Giraudiste movements would have the upper hand and serve as mediator with Anglo-Americans. I'm not really sure they would be in charge, as the GPRF was, tough and could end being more allied-occupied at least for a time.
In metropolitan France, count left-wing resistance (more or less dominated by Communists, without them being strictly hegemonic) having more political presence in the wake of liberation. Expect more experiences as it happened in Limousin historically.
Situation is going to be more explosive politically speaking, though I think Allies would eventually favour more right-wing resistance to avoid a too great communist presence, as they began to support Giraud, Darlan and others people with no real hatred of Vichy itself.
I would say post-war France would look more like Post-War Italy : strong communist and socialist presence (Maybe a merge of two formations, as envisioned IOTL), important Christian Democracy and recycled collaborationists merging with right-wing resistance.
La Roque and former PSF (Parti Social Francais) would most certainly have a better fate than IOTL, without serious rival at their right.
I would see an alliance between Christian Democracy, PSF-equivalent and Radicals, trying to exclude Communists and Socialists which would still represent close to 50% of the votes at first, maybe 40/35% a bit later, but having eventually a stronger influence than IOTL.
Really, post-war Italy equivalent looks as a safe bet, just with things more heated up. A lot. Especially with colonial conflicts (which could lead US being more involved in them, again due to an increased communist/socialist involvement in these matters)
I don't think, as oreocruncher, that it would have an impact on European construction at least in its initial stages meaning diplomatically.
Actually, I expect things as CED/EDC to be applied ITTL, would it be only because of a more anti-communist right wing in France.
Without organized and outer movements as Free France (as you only had a french government in exile from 1944, but I think your OP was no gaullist resistance at all), the inner Resistance would probably never unite, which could lead to infighting (less obvious and bloody than in, say, Yugoslavia but definitely present).
In French North Africa, I'll guess that *Giraudiste movements would have the upper hand and serve as mediator with Anglo-Americans. I'm not really sure they would be in charge, as the GPRF was, tough and could end being more allied-occupied at least for a time.
In metropolitan France, count left-wing resistance (more or less dominated by Communists, without them being strictly hegemonic) having more political presence in the wake of liberation. Expect more experiences as it happened in Limousin historically.
Situation is going to be more explosive politically speaking, though I think Allies would eventually favour more right-wing resistance to avoid a too great communist presence, as they began to support Giraud, Darlan and others people with no real hatred of Vichy itself.
I would say post-war France would look more like Post-War Italy : strong communist and socialist presence (Maybe a merge of two formations, as envisioned IOTL), important Christian Democracy and recycled collaborationists merging with right-wing resistance.
La Roque and former PSF (Parti Social Francais) would most certainly have a better fate than IOTL, without serious rival at their right.
I would see an alliance between Christian Democracy, PSF-equivalent and Radicals, trying to exclude Communists and Socialists which would still represent close to 50% of the votes at first, maybe 40/35% a bit later, but having eventually a stronger influence than IOTL.
Really, post-war Italy equivalent looks as a safe bet, just with things more heated up. A lot. Especially with colonial conflicts (which could lead US being more involved in them, again due to an increased communist/socialist involvement in these matters)
I don't think, as oreocruncher, that it would have an impact on European construction at least in its initial stages meaning diplomatically.
Actually, I expect things as CED/EDC to be applied ITTL, would it be only because of a more anti-communist right wing in France.
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I think the butterflies will start during the war.
First, without the 13 DBLE at Bir-hakeim (and it won't be there without De Gaulle), Rommel bags a lot of the 8th army and captures enough supplies to reach the Canal. That means the RN evacuates the eastern med.
Whether that means Rommel can go further and into soviet caucasus, I doubt, but it may have consequences on Iraq and Iran (as in local revolts). So there may be problems with UK petroleum supply. In any case, it is likely Egypt will fall, and maybe Palestine.
In turn, that means that, if Torch is even attempted, the north African campaign will be much longer, as the 8th army will not be there to meet the Torch troops. So, delays in further operations in Europe (Sicily, Italy and France).
Also, without Free France, Allied will have much less information on Atlantic wall, and will not be able to count so much on resistance aid to paralyse rail network, so will need more time to prepare for Overlord.
Given the two above, Overlord is likely to be in 45 rather than 44. So WW2 ends with A-Bombs on German cities and the Red army further west than OTL.
First, without the 13 DBLE at Bir-hakeim (and it won't be there without De Gaulle), Rommel bags a lot of the 8th army and captures enough supplies to reach the Canal. That means the RN evacuates the eastern med.
Whether that means Rommel can go further and into soviet caucasus, I doubt, but it may have consequences on Iraq and Iran (as in local revolts). So there may be problems with UK petroleum supply. In any case, it is likely Egypt will fall, and maybe Palestine.
In turn, that means that, if Torch is even attempted, the north African campaign will be much longer, as the 8th army will not be there to meet the Torch troops. So, delays in further operations in Europe (Sicily, Italy and France).
Also, without Free France, Allied will have much less information on Atlantic wall, and will not be able to count so much on resistance aid to paralyse rail network, so will need more time to prepare for Overlord.
Given the two above, Overlord is likely to be in 45 rather than 44. So WW2 ends with A-Bombs on German cities and the Red army further west than OTL.
Well, I was kinda projecting this based on what happened in East Asia, in where there was no regional integration happening...
Would the allies not almost certainly set up some sort of 'French' force ?
(Even if its just a few soldiers with Canadian accents)
Without THE free French you will still get groups willing to support the allies as soon as its oblivious that they are wining (and the Germans have demolished Vichy France due to landing in north Africa/Normandy).
The only difference I see is that French politics would be more divided between many different groups post war.
Would another allied/GB unit not be placed at Bir-hakeim ?
Did GB not have more troops in eygypt than they could suport forward so not having the 13DBLE means one less unit back in Alexandria rather than one less at Bir-hakeim.
Relations between Korea and Japan, due to the colonial relationship were deemed to be hard to resolve.
In France, you always had in modern times a really strong philogerman stance (even if clearly shadowed out by the world wars) at least among the ruling groups (but as well in left-wing, helped trough internationalism, communism and/or socialist) and the distinction Nazis/Germans was somewhat helped out by the presence of German resistance movement in France or proof being a dictatorial criminal was not reserved to Germans only.
I do see your point though, and I'm not saying the relations were deemed to be the same than IOTL, but that the culturally and politically more close Italy would be a better model than South Korea.
There is another possibility. Assuming no FF government in exile to November 1942, when Op Torch is executed; then the Allies, or the US might work harder to reach a understanding with Petains government, or rather with Petain himself and Darlan. So when the Allies land in Algeria & Morroco Darlan not only has the French military assist them & arrests the German armistice commission observers, but Petain announces by radio that Darlan is appointed the legitimate head of the French government, the government is moved to Africa. Petain dies resisting German arrest as Operation Anton is executed, against French army resistance.
So, the Allies scoop up the yet unoccupied French colonies, gain a somewhat more legitimate French government as ally, and a void a extended African campaign. The Axis forces in Lybia surrender in January & Allied operations out of Tunisian and Algerian bases are already underway against Italy.
So, the Allies scoop up the yet unoccupied French colonies, gain a somewhat more legitimate French government as ally, and a void a extended African campaign. The Axis forces in Lybia surrender in January & Allied operations out of Tunisian and Algerian bases are already underway against Italy.
I know that...the closest East Asian equivalent is between Japan and Taiwan, and that had a really specific set of circumstances (Taiwan was also colonized like Korea, but Taiwan didn't really have a strong sense of national identity, and the KMT were considered worse...I feel that if 228 and White Terror didn't happen that these Japanophilic feelings would be weaker than OTL, in which there are very strong Japanophilia among Taiwanese, epitomized by Lee Teng-hui's cosplay and Yasukuni Shrine visit).
Though the Southeast Asian countries could also fit too...
Incidentally, what do you mean by "philogerman stance?"
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That would never happen with Pétain. Not only because at this point, Laval was the main shaper of French policies, but because his main personal stance was "We're neutral, we don't care about the war of Americans, British and Germans, it doesn't concern us" would it be only because it would damage his work on building a "renovated" France.
What it asked for Darlan to give it a try was to be sacked out of Vichy France governement, and being the power-starved ambitious he was, turned to the most likely employer at hand.
Having Giraudistes, Darlanistes or any similar ones would be extremly hard : IOTL, what prevented Americans to support them fully was the public outcry at home about supporting "Vichy France-light but still abiding to the Marechal more than just in name" Giraudistes.
I could see the same happening there, tough without clear alternatives (US government and army supporting communist-socialist movements in France being right from the Twilight Zone, and the others maybe too unsignificant to really be counted on) maintaining their support in exchange of a clear separation on these questions (would it be only because keeping Pétain untouched would give so much leverage to PCF/FTP, that it would be extremly risky politically).
Heck, they could even root Henri of Orléans out of his sheer irrelevance.
Basically IOTL, he basically tought he'd became the symbol of resisting France until even royalists commanders told him there was no way in hell and please go out of my office my lord. (Before that, he supported Pétain in hope of gaining something, only being proposed mock jobs, making him to see if grass was greener elsewhere).
Don't get me wrong : there's no way in republican Hell that Orléans would ever go close to a throne that is not a museum piece. But he may play a slightly more important role (would only to frighten and pressure Giraud/Darlan to do what they are asked for) than a failed monarch wannabe in Northern Africa.
As francophilia, but with germany. Probably more correct as Germanophile, I gather?
Basically a strong sense among french military, governemental and cultural elites that there was more to gain with befriending Germany (something that could be traced back to De Stael).
I don't think the Franco-German relationship after WWII could have been done without this tendency being strong enough to lead to this.
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That video, I tell you, is nigh-unthinkable for a Chinese or Korean leader to do, even/especially under current circumstances...
That I feel is one of the reasons why East Asians feel so jealous of you guys, even now...
As I said in other posts, I really don't understand why de Gaulle did that, despite everything...
And yes, Germanophile is the right term...
Well, as I said, there's a tradition of both germanophilia and germanophobia in France, addressing to two idealized/fantasied versions of the reality : the former referring to 1848 Germany, romanticist movement, socialism, organization, etc. while the latter referred more to Prussianism, militarism, expansionism, Barbarians, etc.
It should be noted that it transcend (and still does) left-right political lines or rather than both co-existed along, even in the same persons.
Eventually, as everyone was fed up to send oneself against the other to death (not that it involved a real pacifism, it was just about having a bearable situation there), even during WW1 (Basically the famed Christmas Truce was only but one part of the weird trenches relationship between both sides during almost all the wars, that included games, warning against aggressive commanders, truces to get injured and corpses, etc.), appeasement tentatives bolstered more germanophile tendencies in french governmental and military elites, while political internationalism on left-side partially addressed more issues (tough alignment of PCF on USSR's interests made that partially failing).
It doesn't mean that the three wars didn't intensely weakened germanophile tendencies, but I think they were rooted too importantly to be cast out
Weirdly, these tendencies were as well addressed by several Vichyists as well, as part of collaborationist and/or "realpolitik" than they were eventually by post-Liberation government in the interest of peace (pointing out we're more talking of a cultural feature than truly political there, in my opinion).
It's why, among other reasons, I'm not too sure this PoD and the likely situation would lead to the absence of political reconciliation : France not recovering of its pre-war power loss would certainly be less incline to do so at first, but while I could see this taking more time, I would still see it present and definitely more supported by the clearly more important than IOTL American influence on France which would weight diplomatically (even if I concede that it could mean left-wing and far-left may harbor more germanophobic tendencies than IOTL)
Now I admit it's more of a general reflexion on the reason of Franco-German reconciliation than an actual study, so I won't blame you for not agreeing with me there.
Eh, maybe it's because I'm of Chinese ethnicity (but Canadian by nationality) that this type of thing is really counterintuitive...
I mean, for decades after the Japanese rule in South Korea, they censored anime because of Japanese cultural stuff (like samurai and mikos-this is why the South Korean dub of Sailor Moon is even more censored than the US one!).
And my father refuses to work for Japanese pharmaceutical companies...for some reason...any other nationality, he's OK with (he currently works at the Connaught Campus of Sanofi here in Toronto).
And my father is far from a Japanophobe...he actually got his PhD in virology from Sapporo!
I think it's because for us, anti-Japanese sentiment is a basis of Korean and Chinese nationalism...for both, the upsurge in nationalist sentiment are tied to Japanese stuff (for the Koreans it was the March 1 demonstrations, for the Chinese it's the May 4 movement, both of whom agitated against the Japanese). By contrast, Taiwanese nationalism is actually tied to Japanophilia I think...
But then, how is it possible to have both sentiments in the same people? Then again, it's possible for separatists to support European integration (like with Scottish independence)...Seems stuff in Europe doesn't make sense in an East Asian context, which is why our attempts to emulate the reconciliation measures that the European countries have done hasn't worked, but then what can we do in light of that? No wonder Park Geun-hye's "Asian Paradox" of strong economic ties coupled with persistent hatreds between East Asian countries is a thing...
So ultimately I do get your point, though it doesn't make too much sense from an East Asian perspective that I'm using to look at this...
Maybe because that perspective is a pessimistic one...
Well, using a contemporary exemple : most people in France consider Germans as one of the favourite people of French, with a huge majority supporting Franco-German privilegied relationship being an important diplomatic feature, considering Merkel a fine german leader (even among far-right sympathizers) and that french politicians could take lessons from her, that politicians critizicing (at the edge of insult) Germany's advices should shut up*...
And in the same time considering Germany have a too great influence on European Union, that there's an issue with low salaries in Germany, that Germany is simply too shown off as THE model, that German austerity is a bad thing...
*Interestingly, one of them, Mélanchon, directly inspired his political group from Die Link.
Frankly, I stopped even wondering about it.
Eh, things in the EU stopped making sense ever since de Gaulle metaphorically "backstabbed" the British in favour of the Germans in 1963 (veto and treaty signing afterwards)...if it ever made sense ever before that...
(I know it wasn't actually a backstabbing, and de Gaulle had legit reasons for that, especially in light of the UK's attitude towards the EU ever since they got in, but I think that was a basis for the whole "ungrateful French" foreign policy stereotype).
It does seem similar to the French and British attitudes towards each other, don't you think?
But we're off topic now...eheheheheh...sorry...
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Erm...Can't say for how British feel, but the overall idealized/fantasied conception of Britain is overall more negative (only a minority of French have a positive conception of UK) and calling up the Labour as a model did participate (in my opinion) to Jospin's defeat in 2002.
Basically, overall conceptions as being "Isolated, americanised*, egoist, different, hypocrit, anti european*, arrogant" (tough from what I saw, there's many similarities with what Brittons think about us).
Which is a certain break from the post-war attitude, where French were more brittophile, actually mainly supporting British candidature to CEE.
* Which is borderline schizophrenic when it appears that France is as much eurosceptic than UK overall, and likes US better than UK.
Not that much, actually, given the topic. We're discussing of european integration with a weakened (politically and geopolitically) France, and while the better Franco-British relationship may be related to the British support to De Gaulle and eventually return to great power status for France, absence of both would probably prevents this to appear.But we're off topic now...eheheheheh...sorry...
Actually, with France under another regime of occupation, whom Britain would be possibly part, the Franco-British relationship may know an all-time low for the XXth century at this point (less diplomatically so, but certainly popularly so and that may be a problem for integration of UK in European structures)
That was in the 50s before de Gaulle came back, right? Because as I said with the "metaphorical backstabbing", that he wasn't as aligned with that view...
Then again, OTL the British already had problems...maybe they'll be more wedded to the Commonwealth as a market, akin to what some British Euroskeptics say...
Or they'll be more closely aligned to the US (which is really saying something!
).I apologize before for my pessimism...I didn't know that my analogy would be that inappropriate...
Yes this is a tough one to trace out logically. It probably requires a PoD further back in 1942 or 1941. Better ground work and preparation by the US ambassador, and better contact between Darlan & US reps in latter 1942. I dont know all the diplomatic details of the work up to Op Torch, but Clarks mission itself was not exactly conceived.
The public acceptance in the US could also be worked around, and a lot easier with the right propaganda preparation. My mothers Irish-American family at best despised the "English", but the went along with the war effort & did their bit despite that they had enjoyed London in flames. Folks in that era had a certain pragmatism & ability to hold their nose & get on with getting the job done quickly. There were a lot of Americans with Polish, Dutch, Scandinavian, Greek, or Slavic connections who perhaps had a different appreciation of the French situation.