WI no February Revolution in Russia - Impact on WWI campaigns of 1917

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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What if there is no February Revolution in Russia. The grand circumstances are roughly the same as OTL but the presence of loyal troops in the right place, or some better crowd control or food distribution plan in Petrograd heads off the uprising for the moment, and the regime remains in charge at least through the spring and the summer.

What will the Entente be doing differently militarily under these circumstances?

The Russians, while exhausted, seem to have more options by maintaining officer control and not having Soldiers' Soviets forming.

I had heard that the Black Sea Fleet and Caucasus Army were keen to go onto the offensive to build on their successes of 1916. Could the Russians have launched a spring offensive in Anatolia knocking the Ottomans out of the war by the end of the year?

Would the principal effort of 1917 be an attempt to replay Brusilov's successes against the Austrians? (that's what OTL's Kerensky Offensive seemed to be)

With an army that can still shoot its own deserters, what efforts can the Russians make and what military impact will it have on the opposing coalition?
 

raharris1973

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Imagining the Tsarist government still in charge and order among the troops through mid-1917, the Russians may have a chance of attacking the CP for longer or more effectively than OTL's 1917.

I cannot imagine anything the Russians would have been capable of could have sped up the ultimate defeat of Germany much, but could Austria-Hungary find itself having a harder time withstanding a more effective Russian force in the field between March and July 1917 (and from July to December 1917, if possible), including one that may launch a better supported and longer-lasting offensive in Galicia in 1917.

And how would the Ottomans have coped with, or failed to cope with a renewed Russian land and naval offensive in 1917? The 1916 campaign had been quite successful.

The material I quote below points to Russian ambitions and intentions to mount significant offensives against the Ottomans. In it, I was projecting it as an option for the Provisional Government. However, whatever the ability or inability of the Provisional Government to execute such a plan, I would assume that a Tsarist government's ability to pull off a successful offensive against the Ottomans in 1917 would have to be quite a bit greater.


This post was inspired by my recent reading of Sean McMeekin’s “The Russian Origins of the First World War”.

The author asserts that Kerensky’s mistake was not in launching an offensive in 1917, but in launching it against Austria-Hungary, where already discouraged forces were vulnerable to a powerful German counterattack, instead of against the Ottomans, with confident, highly motivated forces taking on an enemy pressed to the limit.

In fact, he asserts that Constantinople and the straits were increasingly vulnerable as Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and eastern Anatolia had forced them to strip troops from the capital to defend beleaguered fronts. He also shows that planning for an amphibious assault on the straits was more advanced than ever under the Black Sea fleet commander, Admiral Kolchak, and regional commander Grand Duke Nicholas’s chief of staff, General Yudenich. The ideal time to launch the operation was the second half of June. He also notes that Russia’s situation in the black sea was far more advantageous than in earlier times in the war, because Russia had activated its first dreadnought, the Empress Catherine, around the end of 1916, and in the meantime, the two sub-dreadnoughts that had done so much to protect the straits since 1914, the Goeben and the Breslau, were both down for serious repairs with their deck guns removed to serve as shore batteries.

The western allies obviously preferred a 1917 Russian offensive against Germany and/or Austria-Hungary, but as McMeekin notes, correctly in my view, nobody *made* Kerensky choose Galicia as the focal point of his offensive.

I would also add, that the Russians avoiding a summer offensive in Europe in 1917 would not have been as risky for the overall Entente cause in 1917, as it would have been in 1916, when the Russians launched the Brusilov offensive. In 1916, the Brusilov offensive was needed to put diversionary pressure on the Austrians who were on the offensive against Italy and the Germans who were on the offensive against the French at Verdun. In 1917 by contrast, the Germans were not taking the initiative on any of the land fronts. True, the French were offensively hors de combat, because of their mutinies, but they were not under a strategic German attack. If the French could not be roused to aid the British attacking in Flanders, why should the Russians? Also, America had entered the war, and although not immediately effective, all belligerents were looking forward to their strength gradually being added to the Entente by 1918.

So, in May-June strategy sessions, Kerensky’s provisional government decides to remain on the defensive in Europe in 1917, but to go on the offensive against the Ottomans at all possible points of contact, including the straits. An amphibious attack is launched on the Bosporus, while forces in northeast Anatolia resume heavy pressure to tie down Ottoman forces. A secondary thrust in the east is coordinated with the British in Mesopotamia to converge around Mosul, placing Kurdistan under Russian protection.

How does this go for the Kerensky government. Will the straits invasion succeed? Assuming the Petrograd’s optimism about its ability to put the Ottomans on the run is well-founded, how capable are the Central Powers of giving the Ottomans effective support? In particular, how might the Bulgarians factor into the battle for the Bosporus?

Does a failed offensive mean an automatic revolution? With a successful anti-Ottoman effort in 1917, would the Russians be capable of sustaining an offensive in Europe in 1918, or do they risk defeat and revolution, just later than in OTL?

Assuming the Russian side of anti-Ottoman offensives goes well, are the British and French going to be in a position to collect any of their gains from the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov deal?

…..And if an amphibious assault on the Bosporus makes you skittish, what about a less ambitious alternative. The Russians decide to keep a steady anti-Ottoman focus in 1917 for political reasons rather than in the expectation of being able to secure the straits. The reasoning is that the forces in Anatolia have better morale and are facing a weaker enemy, so an offensive in that quarter is less of a risk than in Europe. Victories in Asia can keep super-patriots, from the center to the right, reasonably satisfied, without vindicating the anti-war arguments of the far left. The Russian operational scheme against the Ottomans is to advance westward and southward in Anatolia, to reach a junction with the British in Mesopotamia, while the main thrust goes along the interior and Black Sea coast, aimed at destroying Ottoman resistance and with a line of territorial objectives to Ankara, and ultimately, Bursa on the Asian side of the straits and the “Trojan peninsula” on the eastern side of the Dardanelles. An amphibious “threat” to the straits with the Russian dreadnought and embarked forces is used mainly to tie down potential Ottoman reinforcements.

What are the prospects of such an effort? What would it mean for Kerensky, the Bolesheviks, and other Russian political players by winter 1917-1918?

If we presume Russia has no revolution clear through December 1917, what kind of position will all members of the CP be in by that time?
 

SpaceCowboy

Banned
In regards to Anatolia, I wonder if logistics would prevent a complete Russian victory there in 1917.

As for Russia, if it holds out in 1917-1918, morale in the CP countries might be significantly less than it was in our TL. After all, if Russia is still more-or-less standing strong and the U.S. is sending a lot of its own troops into Europe, the Central Powers are really screwed!
 
In regards to Anatolia, I wonder if logistics would prevent a complete Russian victory there in 1917.

As for Russia, if it holds out in 1917-1918, morale in the CP countries might be significantly less than it was in our TL. After all, if Russia is still more-or-less standing strong and the U.S. is sending a lot of its own troops into Europe, the Central Powers are really screwed!

But America's entry isn't guaranteed. America hated the Tsarist regime and its anti-Semetism and despotism. It would greatly hinder America's willingness to enter the war

There is also the chance for separate peace. Certainly, the Kaiser would prefer to deal with a fellow descendent of Frederic the Great over the Republican French and Americans
 

raharris1973

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But America's entry isn't guaranteed. America hated the Tsarist regime and its anti-Semetism and despotism. It would greatly hinder America's willingness to enter the war

But wouldn't America hate U-Boat War and the Zimmerman Telegram even more?
 
But wouldn't America hate U-Boat War and the Zimmerman Telegram even more?


Maybe. America wasn't all that keen on joining the war in OTL. there's a significant "no" vote on the Declaration of war as it is. Now a war to defend the Tsar is going to get more. How much more, I can't tell you
 
What if there is no February Revolution in Russia. The grand circumstances are roughly the same as OTL but the presence of loyal troops in the right place, or some better crowd control or food distribution plan in Petrograd heads off the uprising for the moment, and the regime remains in charge at least through the spring and the summer.
That's extremely optimistic.
There would have been another spark, another strike or riot.
For example in OCT1916 the police and army attempted to quell the Russkii Renault strike, which led to troops (from the 181st Regiment) actually firing on police in support of the strikers. Remember Protopopov was Interior Minister.
The unusual nature of Russian industry, dominated by mammoth factory complexes, added to the chance of this.

The strikes that became the February Revolution actually started in January, on 12JAN, as a commemoration of the twelfth anniversary of Bloody Sunday in 1905

What will the Entente be doing differently militarily under these circumstances?

The Russians, while exhausted, seem to have more options by maintaining officer control and not having Soldiers' Soviets forming.
They'd still be pretty useless. Badly led, poorly motivated, low on supplies and tactically inept.

The Brusilov Offensive was partially successful more by luck than anything else; Austrian troops had been withdrawn. Even then it bogged down rapidly due the poor Russian supply situation.
By FEB1917 the Romanian intervention was also of little importance, them having suffered 350,000 casualties.

I had heard that the Black Sea Fleet and Caucasus Army were keen to go onto the offensive to build on their successes of 1916. Could the Russians have launched a spring offensive in Anatolia knocking the Ottomans out of the war by the end of the year?
No.

Would the principal effort of 1917 be an attempt to replay Brusilov's successes against the Austrians? (that's what OTL's Kerensky Offensive seemed to be)
Possibly. It'd also be a disaster for the Russians of course.

With an army that can still shoot its own deserters, what efforts can the Russians make and what military impact will it have on the opposing coalition?
Shoot enough deserters and they start shooting back.
 

yourworstnightmare

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But America's entry isn't guaranteed. America hated the Tsarist regime and its anti-Semetism and despotism. It would greatly hinder America's willingness to enter the war

There is also the chance for separate peace. Certainly, the Kaiser would prefer to deal with a fellow descendent of Frederic the Great over the Republican French and Americans
For every American ship sunk, the more support the war got in Congress. One can say the American declaration of war wasn't the American entry, it was just a clarification. America was dragged into the war the moment American ships were hit by submarines.
 
How do the Paris peace conference and treaties change if Tsarist Russia participates as one of the victors? I have no idea how that would go and that would be the biggest change.

Yeah, if Russia holds on with a cohesive army for another year, Germany collapses in the Spring of 1918 instead of being able to launch a massive offensive on the Western Front.
 

yourworstnightmare

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How do the Paris peace conference and treaties change if Tsarist Russia participates as one of the victors? I have no idea how that would go and that would be the biggest change.

Yeah, if Russia holds on with a cohesive army for another year, Germany collapses in the Spring of 1918 instead of being able to launch a massive offensive on the Western Front.
No independent Poland, probably instead an automous kingdom with the Russian Czar as monarch consisiting of old Congress Poland and whatever Russia gets from Germany and Austria. Russian annexations would most likey be Galizia- Lodomeria from Austria- Hungary, "Ottoman Armenia" (at least parts of it) and maybe Constantinople (but Britain really don't want Russian Control of the straits). No Finland or Baltic states.
 
How do the Paris peace conference and treaties change if Tsarist Russia participates as one of the victors? I have no idea how that would go and that would be the biggest change.

I honesty don't think Russia could be at the Paris Peace Conference. They have far greater things to worry about. The Russian Army was already on strike, suffering from deserted, mutinies, and lost all it discipline by the 1917.

Most was tried of the war and saw it as pointless as it was under the Tsar and under Kerensky, and wanted to go home. The Army was in fact not very patriotic by 1917, and just wanted it to end.

I just doubt Nicholas, nor the Tsarist government could survive for much longer. By 1917, Russia was on the verge of total and utter collapse. Food shortages was everywhere, with the streets of Petrograd fill with very angry people and who hated the Tsar and Alexandra Feodorovna. (Or as many like to call her, the 'German bitch'.)

There is really NOTHING to save the Tsar for much longer, noting stopping the February Revolution. There is no amount of loyal soldiers, or better planing that can stop the population from rising up, and throwing Nicky out one way, or another. The 'loyal soliders' would ditch thir jobs, and join the angry mobs in the streets, or still find a way to screw everything up.
 
No independent Poland, probably instead an automous kingdom with the Russian Czar as monarch consisiting of old Congress Poland and whatever Russia gets from Germany and Austria. Russian annexations would most likey be Galizia- Lodomeria from Austria- Hungary, "Ottoman Armenia" (at least parts of it) and maybe Constantinople (but Britain really don't want Russian Control of the straits). No Finland or Baltic states.

Poland could very well become a free state again as the Russians would be too busy collapsing, and falling apart, and killing each other and the Allies would be like 'So Poland, how does being your own state again feels?'

Why would the Russians what more Poles with Galicia?

Tartarus would have to freeze over first before London hands over Constantinople to Russia.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Poland could very well become a free state again as the Russians would be too busy collapsing, and falling apart, and killing each other and the Allies would be like 'So Poland, how does being your own state again feels?'

Why would the Russians what more Poles with Galicia?

Tartarus would have to freeze over first before London hands over Constantinople to Russia.
Russia would probably want the Ukrainian speaking parts of Galizia for themselves, and the more Polish speaking areas in West Galizia goes to the Czar's new puppet Poland. Russia at the table means they will stake claims and behave like a winning power. And if the February revolution is butterflied, it means things must have been more stable in Russia TTL (somehow).
 
For every American ship sunk, the more support the war got in Congress. One can say the American declaration of war wasn't the American entry, it was just a clarification. America was dragged into the war the moment American ships were hit by submarines.

Perhaps or with every American ship sunk public opinion becomes deaf to the news. The vote is 373-50 in the House 82-6 with 8 abstentions in the Senate. It takes two months after USW is resumed to get the measure passed Without the "wonderful things happening in Russia" (Wilson's phrase) the vote might be different. A chance it might change the outcome, probably not But the cut a deal with Nicky and save us from the Americans and the French movement in Germany could really get going
 
Russia would probably want the Ukrainian speaking parts of Galizia for themselves, and the more Polish speaking areas in West Galizia goes to the Czar's new puppet Poland. Russia at the table means they will stake claims and behave like a winning power. And if the February revolution is butterflied, it means things must have been more stable in Russia TTL (somehow).

Stopping the OTL February Revolution is only really like putting glue, and ducktape over a sinking ship alike to Titanic: Only delaying the inevitable, and that was the end of the Russian Empire, and the end of the Tsar.

Nicky was as stubborn as Charles I of England: He find a way to screw himself, and the Russian Monarchy. The Socialists and Liberals will take action.

Heck, no OTL February Revolution would screw the Russians even more. The February Revolution actually in many way restored Russian morale for a little while. (Till all that died with the Kerensky Offensive screw up. ) Without it, there slow depression of the decline of the Russian Empire with little victories to show for itself.

At some point in 1917, the Duma are going to kick the Tsar and the Monarchy out, and most everyone from the common man to the Army will support them.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Stopping the OTL February Revolution is only really like putting glue, and ducktape over a sinking ship alike to Titanic: Only delaying the inevitable, and that was the end of the Russian Empire, and the end of the Tsar.

Nicky was as stubborn as Charles I of England: He find a way to screw himself, and the Russian Monarchy. The Socialists and Liberals will take action.

Heck, no OTL February Revolution would screw the Russians even more. The February Revolution actually in many way restored Russian morale for a little while. (Till all that died with the Kerensky Offensive screw up. ) Without it, there slow depression of the decline of the Russian Empire with little victories to show for itself.

At some point in 1917, the Duma are going to kick the Tsar and the Monarchy out, and most everyone from the common man to the Army will support them.
As I said things must be more stable in Russia in the first Place for the revolution not to happen. If you only butterfly the actions of that day, it'd still happen just some days later. For the Czar to still be around in the Peace Conference, a PoD way before the revolution. If you just have the February revolution not happening but the same circumstances, the Czar would be out before Christmas, the army would be in free fall with desertions en masse like OTL, and whoever is in charge will be forced to sign a separate Peace with the Central Powers in early 1918.
 
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