This post was inspired by my recent reading of Sean McMeekin’s “The Russian Origins of the First World War”.
The author asserts that Kerensky’s mistake was not in launching an offensive in 1917, but in launching it against Austria-Hungary, where already discouraged forces were vulnerable to a powerful German counterattack, instead of against the Ottomans, with confident, highly motivated forces taking on an enemy pressed to the limit.
In fact, he asserts that Constantinople and the straits were increasingly vulnerable as Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and eastern Anatolia had forced them to strip troops from the capital to defend beleaguered fronts. He also shows that planning for an amphibious assault on the straits was more advanced than ever under the Black Sea fleet commander, Admiral Kolchak, and regional commander Grand Duke Nicholas’s chief of staff, General Yudenich. The ideal time to launch the operation was the second half of June. He also notes that Russia’s situation in the black sea was far more advantageous than in earlier times in the war, because Russia had activated its first dreadnought, the Empress Catherine, around the end of 1916, and in the meantime, the two sub-dreadnoughts that had done so much to protect the straits since 1914, the Goeben and the Breslau, were both down for serious repairs with their deck guns removed to serve as shore batteries.
The western allies obviously preferred a 1917 Russian offensive against Germany and/or Austria-Hungary, but as McMeekin notes, correctly in my view, nobody *made* Kerensky choose Galicia as the focal point of his offensive.
I would also add, that the Russians avoiding a summer offensive in Europe in 1917 would not have been as risky for the overall Entente cause in 1917, as it would have been in 1916, when the Russians launched the Brusilov offensive. In 1916, the Brusilov offensive was needed to put diversionary pressure on the Austrians who were on the offensive against Italy and the Germans who were on the offensive against the French at Verdun. In 1917 by contrast, the Germans were not taking the initiative on any of the land fronts. True, the French were offensively hors de combat, because of their mutinies, but they were not under a strategic German attack. If the French could not be roused to aid the British attacking in Flanders, why should the Russians? Also, America had entered the war, and although not immediately effective, all belligerents were looking forward to their strength gradually being added to the Entente by 1918.
So, in May-June strategy sessions, Kerensky’s provisional government decides to remain on the defensive in Europe in 1917, but to go on the offensive against the Ottomans at all possible points of contact, including the straits. An amphibious attack is launched on the Bosporus, while forces in northeast Anatolia resume heavy pressure to tie down Ottoman forces. A secondary thrust in the east is coordinated with the British in Mesopotamia to converge around Mosul, placing Kurdistan under Russian protection.
How does this go for the Kerensky government. Will the straits invasion succeed? Assuming the Petrograd’s optimism about its ability to put the Ottomans on the run is well-founded, how capable are the Central Powers of giving the Ottomans effective support? In particular, how might the Bulgarians factor into the battle for the Bosporus?
Does a failed offensive mean an automatic revolution? With a successful anti-Ottoman effort in 1917, would the Russians be capable of sustaining an offensive in Europe in 1918, or do they risk defeat and revolution, just later than in OTL?
Assuming the Russian side of anti-Ottoman offensives goes well, are the British and French going to be in a position to collect any of their gains from the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov deal?
…..And if an amphibious assault on the Bosporus makes you skittish, what about a less ambitious alternative. The Russians decide to keep a steady anti-Ottoman focus in 1917 for political reasons rather than in the expectation of being able to secure the straits. The reasoning is that the forces in Anatolia have better morale and are facing a weaker enemy, so an offensive in that quarter is less of a risk than in Europe. Victories in Asia can keep super-patriots, from the center to the right, reasonably satisfied, without vindicating the anti-war arguments of the far left. The Russian operational scheme against the Ottomans is to advance westward and southward in Anatolia, to reach a junction with the British in Mesopotamia, while the main thrust goes along the interior and Black Sea coast, aimed at destroying Ottoman resistance and with a line of territorial objectives to Ankara, and ultimately, Bursa on the Asian side of the straits and the “Trojan peninsula” on the eastern side of the Dardanelles. An amphibious “threat” to the straits with the Russian dreadnought and embarked forces is used mainly to tie down potential Ottoman reinforcements.
What are the prospects of such an effort? What would it mean for Kerensky, the Bolesheviks, and other Russian political players by winter 1917-1918?