WI no Far Eastern Triplice 1895? Germany has Russia talk to the hand/

[raharris1973]

WI no triple intervention? Germany decides not to reward Russia for its French alliance by providing it support in the Far East. Instead of encouraging Russia to face the Yellow Peril, Germany quietly and diplomatically encourages Japan to stick to its gains in the war against China, recognized at Shimonoseki.

At the time of Shimonoseki, where Japan won Port Arthur from China and a protectorate over Korea, Russia objected. However, it decided to seek to build a diplomatic coalition against Japan instead of going to war. The coalition did succeed in getting Japan to pare back its gains and set the stage for the Russo-Japanese War the next decade.

So the PoD here is that when Russia shops for German diplomatic support, Germany says, "Fix this problem yourself. What, you think you set up an alliance with and we owe you a living? Maybe have your new best friends help you out. Bite me."

Meanwhile Germany discreetly tells Japan it should consider standing firm. Germany is not offering an alliance or any type of commitment, but will as they did with the Turks even during the era of the Three Emperors League, sell Japan arms.

How would things proceed from there:

1) Does France help out Russia and secure a "double intervention" forcing Japan into the same settlement as in OTL? It's not what France had in mind when they signed up, but they might decide the support of Russia is the least worst strategy.

2) If Japan is threatened by just France and Russia, does it fold, or do they seek to hold out?

3) If Russia gets neither German nor French support, how is European politics effected. Can Russian threats alone force Japan out of Port Arthur?

Some considerations are that Japan has just fought a war and is less industrialized than it was in 1904. On the other hand, much less of the Trans-Siberian railroad was constructed, so the Russians have a harder time supporting deployed forces than they would in 1904.

 

[raharris1973]

Here's some info on why the Germans regretted their decision in OTL

Here's some background from Norman Rich, diplomatic historian –

[For Russia], Korea, with its many excellent ice-free ports farther to the south, was an obvious temptation…The Russians refrained from actually invading Korea [prior to 1895] because of the obvious transportation problems that would be involved (the Trans-Siberian Railway was not begun until 1891) and because they feared an invasion would encounter opposition not only from China and Korea themselves, but also from Britain, Japan, and the United States. They had therefore played a very cautious game in Korea and sought to preserve Korean independence until such time as they were in a better position extend their own dominion over the country. This game had now been wrecked by Japan [by the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war and the Treaty of Shimonoseki]…

The Japanese had dealt Russian interests another damaging blow by taking over the Liaotung peninsula and its harbor of Port Arthur…

Confronted by these blows to their prospects in East Asia, the Russians sought to compel the Japanese to give up those gains from their war with China that were most damaging to Russian interests. Rather than risk war with Japan, however, they sought diplomatic support of other powers in demanding revision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Somewhat surprisingly, the first country to respond to this appeal was Germany, the only great power that as yet had no significant interests in East Asia…

A more immediate reason for Germany’s support of Russia, however, was the German government’s decision to exploit the situation in Asia to score a victory for German foreign policy.

The Germans badly needed a foreign policy success. Following their refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1890, they had been obliged to witness the formation of a Franco-Russian alliance while they themselves had been signally unsuccessful in securing an alliance with England. By responding positively to the Russian appeal for support in East Asia, the Germans believed they would accomplish several purposes simultaneously: they would ensure Russia’s continued involvement in Asia, which relieved Russian pressure on German and Austrian interests in the west; they would be promoting the likelihood of a Russian conflict with Britain in which both powers would look to Germany for support; they would pave the way to regaining Russian friendship and take some of the luster out of the French alliance; and, finally, they would compel the French, who were eager above all to redirect Russian attention to the West, to join Germany in supporting Russian policy in East Asia or risk the disintegration of their Russian alliance.

The German calculations with respect to France were correct. The French reluctantly joined Germany and Russia in what became known in diplomatic parlance as the Far Eastern Triplice. On April 23, 1895, just six days after Shimonoseki, France, Germany, and Russia notified Japan that its possession of the Liaotung peninsula “would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far east.” The Japanese capitulated on May 5, agreeing to retrocede the Laiotung peninsula in return for an increased monetary indemnity.

In all other respects German calculations went awry, for once again they had failed to appreciate the impression their policy would make on others. Instead of discrediting the French alliance in they eyes of Russia, they enhanced its value for the Russians, who saw that the Germans’ apprehension over the Franco-Russian alliance made them far more amenable to Russian requests for diplomatic support than in the days of Russia’s partnership with Germany. The Germans also failed to see that the Russians would do nothing to jeopardize their valuable new alliance with France by accepting German support in Asia, and that even in Asia the French had sufficient financial and diplomatic clout to prevent a closer Russian rapprochement with Germany. The result of Germany’s Asian policy, in fact, proved to be exactly the opposite of what the Germans had intended and hoped: the Russians, instead of establishing closer relations with Germany at the expense of France, proceeded to conclude a financial agreement with France over Asia to the complete exclusion of Germany. ..

The Germans soon realized that they had been thoroughly outmaneuvered. As a dejected German diplomat acknowledged in summing up the failure of German policy: “The experiment of the present regime in collaborating with Russia for the first time in several years has not turned out very well.”

 

[wkwillis]

A British naval force breaks the Japanese navy like a dry stick. Britain wasn't enthusiastic about the Japanese except as a foil against Russia and France. So Britain asks Russia and France if they have any objection to giving the Japanese a spanking, and delivers the spanking immediately thereafter.
Japan played the European powers off against each other skillfully. But there are limits to the shifting of alliances. Only France and Germany and Russia and Italy together could make Britain back down. Otherwise Britain just gets a bunch of new colonies.

 

[Dave Bender]

1895 Point of Departure

1) Does France help out Russia and secure a "double intervention" forcing Japan into the same settlement as in OTL? It's not what France had in mind when they signed up, but they might decide the support of Russia is the least worst strategy.

No. If Germany is angry with Russia over the 1892 Franco-Russian alliance then she is also angry with France. German threats to crush France for her treachery will keep the French military at home.


2) If Japan is threatened by just France and Russia, does it fold, or do they seek to hold out?

Japan and Russia will compromise. But Japan will walk away with a bit more then she got historically.


3) If Russia gets neither German nor French support, how is European politics effected?

The Franco-Russian alliance will hold together. But Germany is much more hostile to this arrangement then it was historically. Tensions between Germany and her neighbors go up several notches.

If Germany is diplomatically on the ball she will accept a defensive alliance when Britain offers it during 1898-1901. This will prevent WWI, as the Franco-Russian alliance is not strong enough to challenge Germany without British assistance.

If Germany foolishly refuses the British alliance offers (as happened historically) then WWI will occur early. As soon as the French - Russian - British colition is in place (with Italian agreement to remain neutral) then France and Russia will be looking for a chance to "put Germany in her place". Despite being politically outmaneuvered, Kaiser Wilhelm II will not back down, and WWI will result.