WI: No Ethnomartyrdom of 1821?

(Or: Mahmud II has a better sense of who to blame for what)

POD: There were no records of the quiet conversation between Patriarch Gregory V and a cloaked figure outside the St. Peter gate of the Patriarchal compound in Constantinople shortly before Easter 1821. Many believe threats were made, but surviving journals noted several of the arrests that followed had less to do with loyalty to the Filiki Eteria than political disagreements with the Patriarchate on one level or another.

In any case, in early May of that year Patriarch Gregory put forth a formal bull excommunicating the rebels in the Peloponnese as heretics following the doctrines of atheists. Furthermore, he announced that his personal representatives would accompany Ottoman forces sent forth to restore temporal order and be authorized to receive repentance. If the town or stronghold surrendered and affirmed loyalty to Earthly and Religious authorities, then a polite garrison is established and advisers selected from the populace for the new administration of the Eyalet. Otherwise? Punishment in this world and the next commences.

Result 1 (Success): Many of the leaders either fled into the hills or took ship elsewhere. As for those places taken by force? The survivors where shipped to distant parts of the Ottoman Empire. But for the most part the Christian populace on the mainland had stood down by the end of 1822, recognizing the the feudal maladministration was being replaced by something they had the ear of. The centrally appointed administrators, for their part, knew how many of those who surrendered had arms discreetly buried somewhere and were more than inclined to listen and placate where they could not heed lest they be held accountable for another revolt.

The parts of the Aegean that revolted? Given how weak the Ottoman navy was at that point and how much of what strength there was relied on Greeks, they gained even more concessions. Muslim life and property were to be respected, and the Ottoman Admiralty appointed Sanjak-beys to those islands, but the councils ran things and everyone knew it.

Result 1a (Loss, but not to the Revolution): The forces of Muhammed Ali, effectively independent Wali of Egypt, still had to be called in... and the price he demanded was the Morea itself. The temporal authorities were subordinated to Cairo, the Christian hierarchy reassigned to the (Orthodox) Patriarchate of Alexandria, and over time both parties started grumbling about distant 'African' rule.

Result 2 (Failure, in a sense): There were enough in the Morea and elsewhere willing to denounce a living 'Puppet Patriarch', where in OTL they hailed a dead one as a martyr of the Orthodox Greeks, to carry the day. Places that surrendered were attacked and overrun, places that resisted gained enough reinforcements to survive, and so forth. Still the fractious forces fell on each other almost as fast as they did the Muslims and Jews; with a split between factions best described as pro-Russian (inviting clergy beholden to the Russian 'Most Holy Synod'), pro-British (far more atheist than polite circles there were comfortable with), pro Austrian (Uniates to a man), and jumped-up bandits making few pretensions otherwise. Those nobles who arrived from the West seeking a crown rapidly left; while the Ottomans who pulled north of the Gulf and Isthmus of Corinth watched, laughed, and openly received a steady stream of Christian refugees fleeing the chaos.
 
Gregory V did denounce and excommunicate the revolutionaries. He was neither the first nor the last high-ranking cleric to do this sort of thing; and, like most of the other cases - he was simply ignored. It did not save his life; it did not prevent the other murders, executions and pogroms against local Greeks; and, most importantly, it did not cripple the Greek independence movement.

So result #2 is the likeliest one by far. Or, rather, result #2a: the Greek rebellion is weakened by a tiny, barely noticeable fraction, and pretty much nothing changes.
There will be no large-scale "repentance" or loss of support for the rebellion. It was about much more than purely clerical issues, and the Patriarch will be destroying nothing except his own reputation.
The idea of (Christian) refugees fleeing into the Ottoman Empire is even more unlikely - in fact, it's extremely unrealistic. There is 0 reason to expect the Greek revolutionaries to descend into some kind of a ridiculous omnicidal anarchy, just because they've been denounced by a man whose support they never had in the first place.

Having said all that, result #1a does sound pretty interesting. In OTL, the Great Powers had to pull Muhammad Ali away when he was very close to marching into Constantinople. Twice. If he has a large foothold in Europe, they might not be able to do so in time...
 
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Gregory V did denounce and excommunicate the revolutionaries. He was neither the first nor the last high-ranking cleric to do this sort of thing; and, like most of the other cases - he was simply ignored. It did not save his life; it did not prevent the other murders, executions and pogroms against local Greeks; and, most importantly, it did not cripple the Greek independence movement.
The core change I propose is not that Gregory V denounce the revolt but that the Sultan openly backs him rather than kill him for not being heeded. This would hurt the cause more than a bit internationally with the Napoleonic wars so recent, and avoiding a 'win-or-die' situation makes regaining control of the area much easier.
 
The core change I propose is not that Gregory V denounce the revolt but that the Sultan openly backs him rather than kill him for not being heeded. This would hurt the cause more than a bit internationally with the Napoleonic wars so recent, and avoiding a 'win-or-die' situation makes regaining control of the area much easier.

It would delay the international outrage, but only to a point. Domestically, I don't think it would really change anything; the collaborating Patriarch or Metropolitan was typically ignored in these situations. And then, of course, there's the problem of discipline. In OTL a few communities, like Chios, were pardoned by Mahmud II - only to be butchered and enslaved by his army anyway. The Sultan was occasionally in a merciful mood, but he was unable to enforce those moods even on a local level, let alone across all of Morea.
 
It would delay the international outrage, but only to a point.
The difference between "They are slaughtering every Christian in sight," and "They are putting down a bloody revolt in a few provinces" is a pretty major one.

Domestically, I don't think it would really change anything; the collaborating Patriarch or Metropolitan was typically ignored in these situations.
So OTL's (as we both agree) unjust execution of the Patriarch, along with a purge of Orthodox Christians well away from the areas in revolt, did nothing to strengthen the Revolutionaries' hand/support at the ground level? Especially considering how narrow and dependent on outside intervention the Greek victory was?

And then, of course, there's the problem of discipline. In OTL a few communities, like Chios, were pardoned by Mahmud II - only to be butchered and enslaved by his army anyway.
Keeping the armies under control is a major difficulty here, one which will probably require more than a few monks to manage.
 
The difference between "They are slaughtering every Christian in sight," and "They are putting down a bloody revolt in a few provinces" is a pretty major one

So OTL's (as we both agree) unjust execution of the Patriarch, along with a purge of Orthodox Christians well away from the areas in revolt, did nothing to strengthen the Revolutionaries' hand/support at the ground level? Especially considering how narrow and dependent on outside intervention the Greek victory was?

It must have done something...but how much, exactly? The Sultan can try to be a better man, but the system had a life and mind of its own. There are going to be atrocities anyway; probably a lot of them. The murders in Constantinople were certainly unjust, but they were also small-scale and unimpressive when compared to the massacres in battleground regions. Foreign diplomats and publics will find out (the Ottomans rarely tried to hide that sort of thing - some, especially Janissaries, even liked to brag in front of ambassadors and display trophies), and outrage will spread. As for the Greeks themselves, they will still have many opportunities to learn that surrendering and cooperating does not guarantee even their short-term safety and freedom - to say nothing of long-term stability and real reforms.
 
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There are going to be atrocities anyway; probably a lot of them. The murders in Constantinople were certainly unjust, but they were also small-scale and unimpressive when compared to the massacres in battleground regions. Foreign diplomats and publics will find out (the Ottomans rarely tried to hide that sort of thing - some, especially Janissaries, even liked to brag in front of ambassadors and display trophies), and outrage will spread.
So you think pushing the 'Auspicious Incident' ahead would help insure surrenders would be respected.

I also recall that the massacres of Jews and Muslims at the hands of the Rebels were no less blatant. That may have had something to do with how things fell out.
 
So you think pushing the 'Auspicious Incident' ahead would help insure surrenders would be respected.

So I imagine. Mahmud II was trying to subdue and purge the Janissaries for years. If he managed to pull it off earlier, it would have several benefits.
On the other hand, it would also cause a temporary disorganization in the whole Ottoman army, so the best time would be before 1821 - if that's actually possible.
I also recall that the massacres of Jews and Muslims at the hands of the Rebels were no less blatant. That may have had something to do with how things fell out.

The Greeks did commit quite a few massacres. However, it doesn't seem fair or accurate to blame them for the Ottomans' own crimes. By 1821 the Ottoman Empire had a long and established tradition of extreme brutality when suppressing uprisings. A well-developed official and legalistic tradition - not just bad discpline or ad-hoc measures.
 
By 1821 the Ottoman Empire had a long and established tradition of extreme brutality when suppressing uprisings. A well-developed official and legalistic tradition - not just bad discpline or ad-hoc measures.
As I mentioned in the OP, the biggest change was that surrenders would be respected (far more often than not) if accepted. Survivors deported in mass was the best that could be hoped for otherwise.

BTW: How long before this were things like the Highland Clearances?
 
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