WI: No "Destroyers for Bases" Agreement

So while researching another topic I ran across a reference to early opposition by FDR to handing over even mothballed reserve destroyers to the UK in 1940 - which he eventually dropped.

Let's say that the PoD is FDR deciding he can't afford the political capital to transfer US warships to the UK with an election coming up. He blocks the deal, and DD for Bases never happens.

Destroyers for Bases was the first in a series of belligerent acts by the US towards Germany; absent that first step, is Lend-Lease delayed or reduced? The US will continue to sell weapons to the Allies, mind, just not the loan and lease arrangements of OTL.

FDR will probably take some other steps to help the Allies; what does he come up with, and when are these steps taken?
 
Well, if lend lease is totally cancelled.....it will hamper UK's wartime capacity significantly. The UK received supplies, worth more than 30 billions US $ (1940's value = some +400 billions today), so it will have an impact.

The destroyers will hamper escort duty for convoys, but I am sure the UK will manage.

It might also make the Germans view the US as a little less hostile....and who knows might prevent Hitler from declaring war on the US, after Pearl Harbour....but I admit that is doubtfull.
 
FDR will still help the Allies, I don't see why he would cancel Lend-Lease just because he decided to forgo Destroyers for Bases. And he might simply delay it until after the election.

On the other hand, the program gave Britain's merchant fleet a much-needed boost in the war against Germany's submarines. Without the extra fifty destroyers I don't know how well the British would manage-- probably not very well. They wouldn't lose the war of course but they'd do a lot worse; the Royal Navy suffered the worst from subs in 1941-1942 so during those years, Britain would be hit particularly hard. Expect an even more strained British economy less able to handle the stresses of the pre-Overlord buildup.
 
The Destroyers for Bases deal was mostly a way of making more British forces free for ASW and national defense duties, than anything else, since the UK were alone in the war, facing the Italian and German Axis powers, when the USA were still neutral officially. Britain was overstretched and needed regrouping its military forces to focus on defense of the own core bussinesses first, before going on the offensive. Therefore the deal was usefull, as it allowed the withgdrawal of forces from area's as Iceland and New Foundland, in exchange for some addittional old destroyers, which were not with much in millitary terms, but still had their uses. (Mainly to make up numbers in convoy escorts, while individually poor and unseaworthy fighting vessels. The British navy did not like these poor seaboats much, as they were unsuited for the heavy North Atlantic conditions.)

The deal was however a succes, as the British got more help from a certain corporal in Germany, when he decided to send a significant number of U-Boote into the Mediteranean Sea, to assist his Italian Ally. Naturally this was a oneway tickit for these boats, releasing the Atlantic Convoy's from the U-Boote peril for a period of time. In this period, the German U-Boote were still not available on the numbers originally wanted, so the diverting of boats to the Med and later the Arctic as well, was a serious succes for the British, without having the Royal Navy to force up this victory. It simply was a stupid mindstroke of that certain corporal, that gave away the German advantage in the Atlantic.
 
The Destroyers for Bases deal was mostly a way of making more British forces free for ASW and national defense duties, than anything else, since the UK were alone in the war, facing the Italian and German Axis powers, when the USA were still neutral officially. Britain was overstretched and needed regrouping its military forces to focus on defense of the own core bussinesses first, before going on the offensive. Therefore the deal was usefull, as it allowed the withgdrawal of forces from area's as Iceland and New Foundland, in exchange for some addittional old destroyers, which were not with much in millitary terms, but still had their uses. (Mainly to make up numbers in convoy escorts, while individually poor and unseaworthy fighting vessels. The British navy did not like these poor seaboats much, as they were unsuited for the heavy North Atlantic conditions.)

The deal was however a succes, as the British got more help from a certain corporal in Germany, when he decided to send a significant number of U-Boote into the Mediteranean Sea, to assist his Italian Ally. Naturally this was a oneway tickit for these boats, releasing the Atlantic Convoy's from the U-Boote peril for a period of time. In this period, the German U-Boote were still not available on the numbers originally wanted, so the diverting of boats to the Med and later the Arctic as well, was a serious succes for the British, without having the Royal Navy to force up this victory. It simply was a stupid mindstroke of that certain corporal, that gave away the German advantage in the Atlantic.
How much mistake like those he did?
 
Maybe it forces Churchill to stand up to Bomber Command and get more planes released for Coastal Command. Maybe it also forces the Brits to crack down on trade union craft rules at the shipyards and get more escort ships fast for the battle against the U-boats. Maybe it forces a more rapid development of naval radar technology. Maybe
FDR, thinking he has to do something else in compensation, offers Ireland lots of goodies to give the RN temporary use once again of the naval bases the British govt had foolishly turned over to Ireland earlier. (And goodies for Ireland helps to solve FDR's problem with Irish-American voters in the upcoming election.) Maybe, in other words, the failure of the destroyers for bases deal turns out to be mostly a good thing.

As to freeing up Britain's forces in its Western Hemisphere colonies for more important tasks, the most important thing was the U.S. replacing the Brits on Iceland, which was not part of the destroyers and bases deal, and which FDR would be able to do on grounds that denying the Nazis control of Iceland was vital to U.S. hemispheric security.

Kudos to Gridley for coming up with a really good butterfly question based on a modest and believable POD.
 
Well, if lend lease is totally cancelled.....it will hamper UK's wartime capacity significantly. ...

It might also make the Germans view the US as a little less hostile....and who knows might prevent Hitler from declaring war on the US, after Pearl Harbour....but I admit that is doubtfull.
Actually, if it leaves the impression the U.S. will not inevitably come to Britain's aid, you may butterfly Pearl Harbor entire.:eek: (Tho it may've had more to do with internal IJN/IJA politics than grand strategy anyhow.:rolleyes:) See, if Japan doesn't think it's necessary to prevent U.S. interference when Japan attacks British possessions in SEA...:rolleyes:
Maybe it forces Churchill to stand up to Bomber Command and get more planes released for Coastal Command.
My thoughts exactly.:cool: And maybe gets a few squadrons based in Gander before 1944...?:rolleyes: It seems likely CC'd get ASV sooner, & H2S/H2X, rather than BC, with seriously beneficial impact on A/S.

Might also force a change in BC policy from city bombing, as now they can't afford as much fuel, or the heavy a/c losses.

Is it too late for RN to crack down hard on U-boats? I'm thinking of Middlebrook's suggestion in Convoy: RN, early on, could've strangled the U-boat offensive in the cradle...
Kudos to Gridley for coming up with a really good butterfly question based on a modest and believable POD.
Agreed. A neglected PoD indeed.:cool:
 
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Interesting POD. If the politics are against the bases for destroyers deal, then Lend-Lease is definitely out. For the isolationists, they were not really anti-military - just wanting to keep US out of Europe, defend western hemisphere. Therefore, destroyers for bases was a "good deal" got something for the excess obsolete ships, bases that could be used to defend western hemisphere & under US not UK control (so if UK surrendered as many thought would happen no chance of Nazi occupation). LL, on the other hand, was "something for nothing" and even worse, from "isolationist" point of view, was that it gave away stuff many (including in military) felt we needed to build up our forces.

If the UK stays on cash & carry basis (needing $$ to buy & ships to carry) they simply cannot get ANYTHING from the US with the possible exception of food. certainly no finished military goods or specific raw materials. Absent LL, Britain is in a very bad way indeed.

IMHO while this is an interesting POD..and worthwhile, more likely is one where LL does not get passed, and also the draft is not extended in 1941.
 
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