WI No Dedicated Ground Support Aircraft

WI ground support aircraft (like the A-10 or the Hawker Typhoon) were not seen as being as necessary as they are IOTL, and thus aren't really built all that much?

How would this change the Cold War and the rest of history? I've heard stories of how badly Russian tank crews were afraid of the A-10; would the lack of such an aircraft change anything?

Without any other dedicated ground support aircraft to go off of, what would the first one look like? Please don't say "exactly like the A-10."
 

bard32

Banned
WI ground support aircraft (like the A-10 or the Hawker Typhoon) were not seen as being as necessary as they are IOTL, and thus aren't really built all that much?

How would this change the Cold War and the rest of history? I've heard stories of how badly Russian tank crews were afraid of the A-10; would the lack of such an aircraft change anything?

Without any other dedicated ground support aircraft to go off of, what would the first one look like? Please don't say "exactly like the A-10."

You forgot the Il-2 Sturmovic. Well, for starters, the narrowmindedness of TPTB, would be colossal. Ground attack aircraft were important for the Allied
victory. Hitler, unfortunately, didn't see the need for it. He was still using the
Stukas as ground attack planes right up until the end. He should have used something like the Henschel Hs 129 or the all-wood Foche-Wulff Moskito,
which was a German knockoff of the British DeHaviland Mosquito.
 
You forgot the Il-2 Sturmovic. Well, for starters, the narrowmindedness of TPTB, would be colossal. Ground attack aircraft were important for the Allied
victory. Hitler, unfortunately, didn't see the need for it. He was still using the
Stukas as ground attack planes right up until the end. He should have used something like the Henschel Hs 129 or the all-wood Foche-Wulff Moskito,
which was a German knockoff of the British DeHaviland Mosquito.
Now just back up a little...are you saying Hitler and the OKW weren't interested in CAS aircraft?
 
WI ground support aircraft (like the A-10 or the Hawker Typhoon) were not seen as being as necessary as they are IOTL, and thus aren't really built all that much?

Lets ignore the reason why they don't get developed for a moment and go with this.

How would this change the Cold War and the rest of history? I've heard stories of how badly Russian tank crews were afraid of the A-10; would the lack of such an aircraft change anything?

The Russian tank crews were afraid because the knew about the reputation of their own Il-2 in WW2. Presumably without the existence of that aircraft the fear would not be there. They were also wary of the Chieftains because the knew from their advisors in the Middle East how badly the IDF Centurions chewed up their best tanks and the Chieftain was better.
They would not have their own dedicated tankbusters to use against NATO so that would even out.

Without any other dedicated ground support aircraft to go off of, what would the first one look like? Please don't say "exactly like the A-10."

The first dedicated machine might be a helicopter like the Hind or a "bomb truck" as somebody called the AV-8 Marine Harriers. It would have to be tough enough to take ground fire, maneuverable and carry plenty of ordinance.
 

bard32

Banned
Now just back up a little...are you saying Hitler and the OKW weren't interested in CAS aircraft?

Not modern CAS aircraft, no. If Hitler and the OKW, sounds like the name of a
neo-Nazi rock group, :D no. Hitler was still married to the idea of the dive-
bomber. The Battle of Britain proved how vulnerable the dive-bomber was without fighter support. The Me. 310, and Me. 410, like the Me. 210, were
slower than the Allied CAS planes, and that included the fighter-bomber version of the Hawker Hurricane. It even included the P-47 Thunderbolt, which
excelled as a CAS aircraft after the P-51 Mustang got the Rolls-Royce Merlin
engine. The Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovic was known as the "flying tank" because it was so well built.
 
WI ground support aircraft (like the A-10 or the Hawker Typhoon) were not seen as being as necessary as they are IOTL, and thus aren't really built all that much?

How would this change the Cold War and the rest of history? I've heard stories of how badly Russian tank crews were afraid of the A-10; would the lack of such an aircraft change anything?

I'll take devil's advocate point on this.

Is there an source for this? I really doubt this, as 1991 showed how vulnerable A-10 was against any competent air defense system. Even Iraqis could prevent A-10's from working when they had their TO&E strength air defense, in a terrain resembling a bowling alley, in almost perfect weather, so I doubt very much there was any fear from A-10's in any level of Soviet professional military staff. See Gulf War Air Power Survey available via USAF for references.

As for original WI, if no dedicated ground support aircraft, like Il-2 Sturmovik etc. were developed, I think wars would have been faster for the opponent which had air superiority. Instead of wasting valuable flight hours for very limited gains, the flight hours and bomb load could have been used far mor efficiently. CAS has always been very dumb use of flight hours. Thus only a very few dedicated CAS airframes have ever been built. They have been mostly failures, like Su-25 and A-10. In 21st Century any airframe is CAS airframe via use of GPS guided munitions, so CAS airframes are now a waste of money and effort as they were before.

I'll take a case example of CAS fallacy. In Karelian Isthmus in 1944 when Soviet Union attacked against Finnish positions the initial defense position and the planned main defense position were crushed in succession with succesful artillery-tank co-operation. However, instead of acting like during the Winter War, the Soviet Air force dedicated themselves to close air support. As a result, enough Finnish reserve formations and artillery could be brought from between Lake Ladoga and Lake Ladoga to form an yet another front, which held. An another effect of concentrating on CAS was that Soviet Air Force could not prevent Finnish Air Force and Luftwaffe interdiction sorties, which had a deadly effect.

Of course we have not even touched the attack helicopters yet, which were quite efficient in Algeria or early Afghanistan but not anywhere else.
 
Unless I'm mistaken, the Typhoon was not designed as a Ground Support Aicraft but as a fighter. It failed in this role and found another niche.
 

bard32

Banned
I'll take devil's advocate point on this.

Is there an source for this? I really doubt this, as 1991 showed how vulnerable A-10 was against any competent air defense system. Even Iraqis could prevent A-10's from working when they had their TO&E strength air defense, in a terrain resembling a bowling alley, in almost perfect weather, so I doubt very much there was any fear from A-10's in any level of Soviet professional military staff. See Gulf War Air Power Survey available via USAF for references.

As for original WI, if no dedicated ground support aircraft, like Il-2 Sturmovik etc. were developed, I think wars would have been faster for the opponent which had air superiority. Instead of wasting valuable flight hours for very limited gains, the flight hours and bomb load could have been used far mor efficiently. CAS has always been very dumb use of flight hours. Thus only a very few dedicated CAS airframes have ever been built. They have been mostly failures, like Su-25 and A-10. In 21st Century any airframe is CAS airframe via use of GPS guided munitions, so CAS airframes are now a waste of money and effort as they were before.

I'll take a case example of CAS fallacy. In Karelian Isthmus in 1944 when Soviet Union attacked against Finnish positions the initial defense position and the planned main defense position were crushed in succession with succesful artillery-tank co-operation. However, instead of acting like during the Winter War, the Soviet Air force dedicated themselves to close air support. As a result, enough Finnish reserve formations and artillery could be brought from between Lake Ladoga and Lake Ladoga to form an yet another front, which held. An another effect of concentrating on CAS was that Soviet Air Force could not prevent Finnish Air Force and Luftwaffe interdiction sorties, which had a deadly effect.

Of course we have not even touched the attack helicopters yet, which were quite efficient in Algeria or early Afghanistan but not anywhere else.

The A-10 Thunderbolt II, affectionately known its crews as the Warthog, is solidly built. It's more like a plane from fifty years ago than today. It's all dials and gauges and not fly-by-wire. There's no HUD in the cockpit. Its engines are spaced far apart to prevent one part from going into the other engine.
 
The A-10 Thunderbolt II, affectionately known its crews as the Warthog, is solidly built. It's more like a plane from fifty years ago than today. It's all dials and gauges and not fly-by-wire. There's no HUD in the cockpit. Its engines are spaced far apart to prevent one part from going into the other engine.

Yes, it's a solid airplane. The reason it may seem like plane from fifty years ago than today is that the specifications for A-X were written in 1967, 41 years ago. The solid structure of the airplane increases the chances of it's pilot getting out of the situation alive. However, when hit, A-10, like any aircraft, has to cancel it's mission and is subject to lengthy repairs.

As for your dials and gauges and no HUD, this is not true as you can see from any A-10 cockpit picture.
 

bard32

Banned
Yes, it's a solid airplane. The reason it may seem like plane from fifty years ago than today is that the specifications for A-X were written in 1967, 41 years ago. The solid structure of the airplane increases the chances of it's pilot getting out of the situation alive. However, when hit, A-10, like any aircraft, has to cancel it's mission and is subject to lengthy repairs.

As for your dials and gauges and no HUD, this is not true as you can see from any A-10 cockpit picture.

That's right. However, it wasn't built until 1976. That was after a year after Vietnam ended.
 
I'll take devil's advocate point on this.

Is there an source for this? I really doubt this, as 1991 showed how vulnerable A-10 was against any competent air defense system. Even Iraqis could prevent A-10's from working when they had their TO&E strength air defense, in a terrain resembling a bowling alley, in almost perfect weather, so I doubt very much there was any fear from A-10's in any level of Soviet professional military staff. See Gulf War Air Power Survey available via USAF for references.

Which brings us to important rule of CAS, it's useful when you have air superiority. Going against fully prepared enemy is troubles. Or when you can hide long enough to strike before enemy knows you are there

As for original WI, if no dedicated ground support aircraft, like Il-2 Sturmovik etc. were developed, I think wars would have been faster for the opponent which had air superiority. Instead of wasting valuable flight hours for very limited gains, the flight hours and bomb load could have been used far mor efficiently. CAS has always been very dumb use of flight hours. Thus only a very few dedicated CAS airframes have ever been built. They have been mostly failures, like Su-25 and A-10. In 21st Century any airframe is CAS airframe via use of GPS guided munitions, so CAS airframes are now a waste of money and effort as they were before.

you seem to an advocate of strategic air campaign. Which sometimes works, sometimes it doesn't. Effective against states where you can attack their centre of gravity, less effective when facing insurgency.

I'll take a case example of CAS fallacy. In Karelian Isthmus in 1944 when Soviet Union attacked against Finnish positions the initial defense position and the planned main defense position were crushed in succession with succesful artillery-tank co-operation. However, instead of acting like during the Winter War, the Soviet Air force dedicated themselves to close air support. As a result, enough Finnish reserve formations and artillery could be brought from between Lake Ladoga and Lake Ladoga to form an yet another front, which held. An another effect of concentrating on CAS was that Soviet Air Force could not prevent Finnish Air Force and Luftwaffe interdiction sorties, which had a deadly effect.

no weapon should operate in isolation.

Of course we have not even touched the attack helicopters yet, which were quite efficient in Algeria or early Afghanistan but not anywhere else.

Israelis might add some corrections there, as would Russians (and I don't mean that as quasi alternate term for Soviets). Then of course there would be Americans.
 
Yes, it's a solid airplane. The reason it may seem like plane from fifty years ago than today is that the specifications for A-X were written in 1967, 41 years ago. The solid structure of the airplane increases the chances of it's pilot getting out of the situation alive. However, when hit, A-10, like any aircraft, has to cancel it's mission and is subject to lengthy repairs.

As for your dials and gauges and no HUD, this is not true as you can see from any A-10 cockpit picture.

except that it takes a few hits to make it abort mission.
 
It was me who called the Marine AV8B a bomb truck, just my prejudices coming through.

Does the Italians dropping bombs in Libya in 1912 count as CAS? If not then trench strafing and bombing in WW1 certainly does, so the PoD would have to stretch back that far rather than post WW2.

Regular fighters make good enough CAS planes, most countries do just fine without dedicated CAS aircraft (A10, Harrier, Su25) or attack helicopters, or at least have done for decades during which both have been available.
 
Which brings us to important rule of CAS, it's useful when you have air superiority. Going against fully prepared enemy is troubles. Or when you can hide long enough to strike before enemy knows you are there.

Air superiority in general parlance means a situation in which enemy air power cannot harm your own operations. Generally enemy ground based air defenses are not included in the equation. A-10, like no other traditional CAS plane, can operate against forces shielded by competent air defenses. GPS guided munitions are changing the equation, but they don't require a highly specified CAS aircraft.

you seem to an advocate of strategic air campaign. Which sometimes works, sometimes it doesn't. Effective against states where you can attack their centre of gravity, less effective when facing insurgency.

Not at all. It's interdiction of enemy which has the most effect on enemy operations. A strategic air campaign may or may not have cost-effective effects upon an enemy. Remember, close air support is an air operation which

"(DOD, NATO) That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. See also direct support; general support; mutual support; support. "

In case of an insurgency a dedicated CAS air platforms are not needed, as normal fighters etc, or relatively low cost low-threat environment platforms (gunships, drones nowadays) can be used.

Now, I must say that in our century times are changing in favour of CAS, but it's not traditional CAS requiring low-flying sturdy mudmovers but rather an elaborate development of targeting for any platform.
 
Air superiority in general parlance means a situation in which enemy air power cannot harm your own operations. Generally enemy ground based air defenses are not included in the equation. A-10, like no other traditional CAS plane, can operate against forces shielded by competent air defenses. GPS guided munitions are changing the equation, but they don't require a highly specified CAS aircraft.

this is odd because in your previous post you claimed exact opposite

Is there an source for this? I really doubt this, as 1991 showed how vulnerable A-10 was against any competent air defense system. Even Iraqis could prevent A-10's from working when they had their TO&E strength air defense, in a terrain resembling a bowling alley, in almost perfect weather, so I doubt very much there was any fear from A-10's in any level of Soviet professional military staff. See Gulf War Air Power Survey available via USAF for references.

Not at all. It's interdiction of enemy which has the most effect on enemy operations. A strategic air campaign may or may not have cost-effective effects upon an enemy. Remember, close air support is an air operation which

"(DOD, NATO) That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. See also direct support; general support; mutual support; support. "

That could be problematic as past COIN proved (Vietnam, A'stan, Lebanon, Iraq....).

In case of an insurgency a dedicated CAS air platforms are not needed, as normal fighters etc, or relatively low cost low-threat environment platforms (gunships, drones nowadays) can be used.

Gunships are vulnerable (see Khafji) and drones don't carry that much ammo. Good for taking out specific targets though

Now, I must say that in our century times are changing in favour of CAS, but it's not traditional CAS requiring low-flying sturdy mudmovers but rather an elaborate development of targeting for any platform.

Sturdy mudmovers are less vulnerable
 
WI ground support aircraft (like the A-10 or the Hawker Typhoon) were not seen as being as necessary as they are IOTL, and thus aren't really built all that much?
You'd have to date your POD before 1916 or so, when the Germans introduced the first dedicated CAS birds. And you'd have to have air staff officers who are, IMO, remarkably stupid,:eek: unable to see aircraft might just be able to do more than survey trenches: if they could fight in the sky, surely they could fight troops on the ground...?
 
1. DON'T TAKE AWAY MY A-10 THUNDERBIRD II!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

2. Where have you heard these stories?

3. Well, if you want to go in an entirely different direction, away from Aircraft in particular I would see Mass-Cruise Missile Artillery Guns. Basicly a SAM for tanks.
 
"Is there an source for this? I really doubt this, as 1991 showed how vulnerable A-10 was against any competent air defense system. Even Iraqis could prevent A-10's from working when they had their TO&E strength air defense, in a terrain resembling a bowling alley, in almost perfect weather, so I doubt very much there was any fear from A-10's in any level of Soviet professional military staff. See Gulf War Air Power Survey available via USAF for references."

Actually, having been in an A-10 unit during the Gulf War, the biggest problem was that we were not operating the aircraft as they were designed to be used, as low level attack aircraft. We actually had a minimum altitude below which we were not allowed to go. We also did not operate with attack helicopters which were tasked to take out air defenses before the A-10s were to go in.

The Plane was designed to operate in the European theatre of operations. Kuwait was as different an environment from that as one could design. I've seen the A-10 operate as it was designed to, and it would have been effective. Problem is the Air Force never really liked the plane. Strange 18 years after this Gulf War survey, it is still flying.

We did have one of our aircraft come back with one engine out, a verticle stabilizer shot away, and part of one wing missing. Plane still got back.
 
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